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Journal
2010 | 20 | 3 | 210-214
Article title

A Defence of the Perceptual Account of Emotion Against the Alleged Problem of Ambivalent Emotion: Expanding on Tappolet

Authors
Title variants
Languages of publication
EN
Abstracts
EN
Tappolet (2005) has defended the perceptual account of emotion against a problem which some have raised against it, stemming from the phenomenon of ambivalent emotions. According to Tappolet, we can explain cases of ambivalent emotions unproblematically. To persuade us of this, she draws our attention to circumstances in which it seems entirely appropriate to have conflicting emotions with respect to the same situation. On her perceptual account of emotions, in such situations our emotions disclose two values, e.g., danger and attractiveness, at the same time. My aim here is to defend Tappolet by expanding on the considerations she adduces. In order to do this, I utilize Prinz's notion of "valence". Using this terminology, I shall show that the undeniable co-instantiation of emotions that are our intuitions classifies as "contrary", for example, fear and attraction does not actually constitute a contradiction.
Publisher
Journal
Year
Volume
20
Issue
3
Pages
210-214
Physical description
Dates
published
2010-09-01
online
2010-09-22
Contributors
author
  • Department of Philosophy, Seoul National University, 599 Gwanak-ro, Gwanak-gu Seoul 151-745, Korea (South)
References
  • De Sousa, R.The Rationality of Emotion. Cambridge: Cambridge, Mass., London: IT Press, 543-51, 1987.
  • De Sousa, R. Emotional Truth. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. Suppl. Vol. 76, 247-64, 2002.
  • De Sousa, R. Emotions: What I Know, What I'd Like to Think I Know, and What I'd Like to Think. In R. Solomon (Ed.). Thinking about Feeling. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 61-75, 2004.
  • Greenspan, P. A Case of Mixed Feelings. In A. Rorty (Ed.). Explaining Emotions, 139-161, 1980.
  • Morton, A. Emotional Accuracy. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. Suppl. Vol. 76, 265-75, 2002.
  • Nussbaum, M. C.Upheavals of Thought. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.
  • Prinz, J.Gut Reactions: A Perceptual Theory of Emotion. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004.
  • Prinz, J.The Emotional Construction of Morals. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.
  • Prinz, J. For Valence. Emotion Review 2, 5-13, 2010.[WoS]
  • Solomon, R. C.The Passions. New York: Doubleday, 1976.
  • Tappolet, C.Emotions et Valeurs. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2000.
  • Tappolet, C. Ambivalent Emotions and the Perceptual Account of Emotions. Analysis 65, 229-33, 2005.
Document Type
Publication order reference
Identifiers
YADDA identifier
bwmeta1.element.doi-10_2478_v10023-010-0021-0
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