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2011 | 49 | 1 | 49-60
Article title

What More is Folk Psychology?

Content
Title variants
Languages of publication
EN
Abstracts
EN
Oridinary describing and explaining of everyday behavior became an object of systematic psychological study in the late-40s. The results create a picture of folk psychology as a primitive version of scientific psychology, kind of "naive" theory which is rather false. The picture represents folk psychology only as a speculative artefact, but there is also another notion of folk psychology as a basic conceptual schema which organizes experience. The specific scientific approach to folk psychology is described, some arguments against the view of folk psychology as a theory are pointed and the alternative notion of folk psychology is demonstrated in this article.
Year
Volume
49
Issue
1
Pages
49-60
Physical description
Dates
published
2011-01-01
online
2011-09-22
Contributors
  • Instytut Psychologii, Uniwersytet Jagielloński Kraków
  • Instytut Psychologii, Uniwersytet Jagielloński Kraków
References
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Document Type
Publication order reference
Identifiers
YADDA identifier
bwmeta1.element.doi-10_2478_v10167-011-0004-9
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