Hybrid warfare challenges

• Authors: Josipa Vuković , Dario Matika , Slavko Barić
• Languages of publication: EN

Abstracts

EN

In this article, hybrid warfare challenges and their impact on the evolution of warfare in the new dynamic security environment are analysed. The aim of the research was to identify hybrid threats, explore the complexity of the hybrid conflict that involves professional Armed Forces and irregular (paramilitary) forces. The research has been conducted through two case studies of hybrid warfare: the Israeli - Lebanese conflict in 2006 and the Lebanese militia organisation Hezbollah as a prototype of hybrid opponents; and the contemporary hybrid conflict in Ukraine through the Russian paradigm of hybrid warfare. The conducted research showed that the decisive role that influenced the outcome of the conflict belonged either to rapidness or inertia in of the making of political decisions. The research results showed further that revision of the existing strategic and doctrinal documents are required, as well as reorganisation of the national security system (and the Armed Forces as part of it), without which they will not be able to deal successfully with the dynamic nature of future conflict and complexity of threats (“synergy of threats”). The political decision is the most essential parameter for sizing military organisation. The rapidity of response in the event of emergencies (especially outside the national territory) also depends on the promptness of political decisions in order to activate the Armed Forces.

Keywords

EN

hybrid threats; hybrid warfare; strategic documents; military doctrine; Armed; forces

• Publisher: Akademia Sztuki Wojennej
• Journal: Security and Defence Quarterly
• Year: 2016
• Volume: 12
• Issue: 3
• Pages: 118-138

Dates

published

2016-09-30

Contributors

author

Josipa Vuković

• Ministry of Defense, Croatia

author

Dario Matika

• Croatian Defense Army

author

Slavko Barić

• Croatian Defense Army

References

• Statements and opinions expressed in the article are exclusively authors’ and do not represent the views of the institutions where authors are employed.
• Ministry of Defense, Trg kralja Petra Krešimira IV br. 1, 10000 Zagreb (josipa.vukovic@ gmail.com).
• Croatian Defense Academy “Dr. Franjo Tuđman”, Ilica 256b, 10000 Zagreb (dario. [e-mail]).
• Croatian Defense Academy “Dr. Franjo Tuđman”, Ilica 256b, 10000 Zagreb (sbaric957@ gmail.com).
• Fontana (2010: according to Kalb, 2007) states that the most important Arab television channels Al-Arabya and Al Jazeera portrayed Israel as an attacker. The BBC showed both as aggressors, although blaming Israel more. US media were divided: Fox News was on the side of Israel, CNN was trying to be neutral, and ABC, CBS and NBC channels were more critical of Israel than of Hezbollah. The New York Times and Washington Post represented Israel as the attacker twice as often as Hezbollah on their front pages.
• Little green men (Rus. зелёные человечки, Ukr. зелені чоловічки) is a colloquialism in Ukraine for masked soldiers wearing green uniforms without any insignia or markings, but who are equipped with Russian weapons and military equipment.
• On February 27, 2014, in the Crimea, “little green men” first occupied the building of the Parliament to prevent the functioning of local authorities. The first building in Donetsk which was occupied in April 2014 was the building of regional state administration. The police and local security forces failed to defend the building, because they were not issued clear orders for its defence, because of their low morale, poor leadership and inadequate equipment.
• Meanwhile, the media, under the influence of the attacker, spread disinformation and discredited the attacked country trying to disorient international politics by the level of falsehood.
• An intensive media campaign successfully influenced the confusion of decision-makers, spreading fear and dissatisfaction with the central government and thereby weakening the potential and effective perception of the local Ukrainian army and police.
• In the referendum in the Crimea on March 16, 2014, 97% of the population of Crimea voted for annexation to Russia, and 3% for the autonomous status of Crimea as part of Ukraine. On Apr 4, 2014, the activists who occupied the regional administration building in Donetsk proclaimed the People’s Republic of Donetsk in the Donetsk area in Ukraine. On May 14, 2014, the People’s Republic of Lugano in the Lugano area in the east of Ukraine was self-proclaimed, too. Both self-proclaimed entities have no legal democratic legitimacy.
• Russian President Putin commanded the maintenance of emergency military exercises across western and central Russia in the period from February 26 to March 3, 2014. At the same time, the Russian defence minister, Sergei Shoigu, said: “These exercises are not in any way related to the events in Ukraine”. One part of the sudden military exercises, which was testing the readiness of the Russian military, took place on Russia’s borders, too, including the border with Ukraine. In these large military exercises, a total of 150,000 troops, 90 military aircraft, over 120 helicopters, 880 tanks and 1,200 pieces of military equipment were engaged. (Tensions on Crimea, Feb 26, 2014).

Identifiers

DOI

10.35467/sdq/103239