The Shia armed groups and the future of Iraq

• Authors: Kardo Karim Rached , Ahmed Omar Bali
• Languages of publication: EN

Abstracts

EN

In this article, we try to identify the impact of the Shia militias in Iraq on the future of this country. We maintain that these armed groups will be a destabilising factor for Iraq and its neighbours, and they will worsen and deepen the sectarian division in the Middle East. We assess these different groups from different perspectives, for example, using the Weberian theory that the state is the only entity that has a monopoly of violence, Ariel Ahram’s model of state-sponsored and government-sponsored militias, and finally the devolution of violence to these armed groups.

Keywords

EN

Iraq; Shia armed groups; Sectarian division; ISIS and New Middle East

• Publisher: Akademia Sztuki Wojennej
• Journal: Security and Defence Quarterly
• Year: 2018
• Volume: 19
• Issue: 2
• Pages: 39-53

Dates

published

2018-06-30

Contributors

author

Kardo Karim Rached

• University of Human Development, Iraq, Head of Diplomacy & Public Relations

author

Ahmed Omar Bali

• University of Human Development, Iraq, Head of Diplomacy & Public Relations

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Identifiers

DOI

10.5604/01.3001.0012.1471