POINTS OF VIEW FROM THE LOGICAL PERSPECTIVE (II)

• Authors: Duzi M. , Jespersen B. , Materna P.
• Languages of publication: EN

Abstracts

EN

In this abstract also the 1st part of the paper (publ. ibid. nr 3(2006) pp. 277-305) is covered. The authors offer a 'logical explication' of the frequently used, but rather vague, notion of 'point of view'. They show that the concept of point of view prevents certain paradoxes from arising. A point of view is a means of a 'partial' characterisation of something. Thus nothing is a 'P' and at the same time a non-'P (simpliciter)', because it is a 'P' only relative to some point of view and a non-'P' from another point of view. But there is a major, complicating factor involved in applying a logical method that is supposed to provide a formal and rigorous counterpart of the intuitively understood notion: 'point of view' is a homonymous expression, and so there is not just one meaning that would explain points of view. Yet the authors propose a common scheme of the logical type of the entities denoted by the term 'point of view'. It is an empirical 'function': when applied to the viewed object in question, it results in a (set of) evaluating 'proposition(s)' about the object. If there is an agent applying the criterion, the result is the agent's 'attitude' to the respective object. In Part I the authors first adduce and analyse various examples of typical cases of applying a point of view to prevent paradox. These cases are examined according to the type of the viewed object: a) the viewed object is an individual and b) the viewed object is a property or an office. In Part II they then show that the method described in Part I can be applied also to the analyses of the agents' attitudes. The authors explain how an agent can believe of something that it is a 'P' and at the same time a non-'P': the agent applies the different viewpoint criteria to the viewed object. The inversion of perspective consisting in the perspective shifting from the believer on to the reporter in the case of attitudes 'de re', and from the reporter to the believer in the case of attitudes 'de dicto', is also analyzed. The authors show that there is no smooth logical traffic back and forth between such attitudes unless some additional assumptions are added, and prove that they are not equivalent. By way of conclusion, the authors explicate the notion of 'conceptual' point of view and analyze the cases of viewpoints given by a conceptual distinction. Finally the authors show, that the proposed scheme of the type of point of view can be preserved, this time, however, in its extensional version.

Keywords

EN

ATTITUDES; CONCEPTUAL VIEWPOINT; INTENTION; POINT OF VIEW; TRANSPARENT INTENTIONAL LOGIC; VIEWED OBJECT

Discipline

• PHILOSOPHY: PHILOSOPHY

• Publisher: Institute of Philosophy of the Slovak Academy of Sciences and Institute of Philosophy of Academy of Sciences of Czech Republic
• Journal: Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
• Year: 2007
• Volume: 14
• Issue: 1
• Pages: 5-31
• Document type: ARTICLE

Contributors

author

Duzi M.

author

Jespersen B.

author

Materna P.

• M. Duzi, Katedra informatiky FEI, VSB-Technicka universita, 17. listopadu 15, 708 00 Ostrava-Poruba, Czech Republic

Identifiers

CEJSH db identifier

07SKAAAA02244701