REFORMULATING TICHY'S CONCEPTION OF BARE INDIVIDUALS

• Authors: Raclavsky J.
• Languages of publication: EN

Abstracts

EN

A bare individual was conceived by Tichy as an individual such as if the property the individual instantiates is non-trivial (contingent), it is possible for the individual to lack it (and still be the same individual); and for any trivial property (i.e. property with constant extension) that it cannot lack this kind of property. The exact readings of Tichy's original formulations of bare individuals are subjected to a detailed analysis to reveal that any of them is refutable by means of Cmorejian objection that there exist contingent properties which are partly essential (i.e. there exists an individual which cannot lack such property). To avoid such (valid) objection, the present paper attempts to rebuild Tichy's definitions into viable ones.

Keywords

EN

ANTIESSENTIALISM; BARE PARTICULARS; INDIVIDUALS; INTENSIONAL LOGIC; PROPERTIES

Discipline

• PHILOSOPHY: PHILOSOPHY

• Publisher: Institute of Philosophy of the Slovak Academy of Sciences and Institute of Philosophy of Academy of Sciences of Czech Republic
• Journal: Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
• Year: 2008
• Volume: 15
• Issue: 2
• Pages: 143-167
• Document type: ARTICLE

Contributors

author

Raclavsky J.

• J. Raclavsky, for postal address contact the journal editor

Identifiers

CEJSH db identifier

08SKAAAA04618869