PL EN


2008 | 17 | 4(68) | 233-247
Article title

W.V.O. Quine on Truth and Analyticity

Authors
Title variants
Languages of publication
PL
Abstracts
EN
The critique of the concept of analyticity undertaken by Quine in 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism' met with various objections. In particular, he was criticized for certain alleged inconsistency. He was ready to accept an intra-linguistic definition of truth as truth-in-L for any established language L, but at the same time he required that the general notion of analyticity were conceived inter-linguistically and unrelativized to any language in question. The author attempts to defend Quine against this attack. He assumes that definitions are instruments introduced with a view to a purpose they should serve. It is essential therefore to find out what purpose was to be served by the introduction of the concept of analyticity by those authors who used it. The author tries to answer this question and focuses on the problem whether an intra-linguistic definition of analyticity serves the required function. Then he goes on to inquire if the inter-linguistic definition of truth serves its function. He argues in the end that the negative answer to the former question and the positive answer the latter are right and save Quine from the objections.
Year
Volume
17
Issue
Pages
233-247
Physical description
Document type
ARTICLE
Contributors
author
  • C. Cieslinski, Uniwersytet Warszawski, Instytut Filozofii, ul. Krakowskie Przedmiescie 3, 00-047 Warszawa, Poland
References
Document Type
Publication order reference
Identifiers
CEJSH db identifier
09PLAAAA064112
YADDA identifier
bwmeta1.element.e5db0d6b-ff67-36b6-92a0-d50078ef321f
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