LOWE ON LOCKE'S AND FREGE'S CONCEPTION OF NUMBER

• Authors: Arrieta-Urtizberea Agustin
• Languages of publication: EN

Abstracts

EN

In his last book on Locke's philosophy, E. J. Lowe claims that Frege's arguments against the Lockean conception of number are not compelling, while at the same time he painstakingly defines the Lockean conception Lowe himself espouses. The aim of this paper is to show that the textual evidence considered by Lowe may be interpreted in another direction. This alternative 'reading' of Frege's arguments throws light on Frege's and Lowe's different 'agendas'. Moreover, in this paper, the problem of singular sentences of number is presented, and Frege's and Lowe's views are confronted with it.

Keywords

EN

CONCEPT OF NUMBER; EXISTENCE; FREGE GOTTLOB; LOCKE JOHN; LOWE JONATHAN; NUMBER ONE; NUMBER ZERO; SINGULAR SENTENCES

Discipline

• PHILOSOPHY: PHILOSOPHY

• Publisher: Institute of Philosophy of the Slovak Academy of Sciences and Institute of Philosophy of Academy of Sciences of Czech Republic
• Journal: Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
• Year: 2010
• Volume: 17
• Issue: 1
• Pages: 39-52
• Document type: ARTICLE

Contributors

author

Arrieta-Urtizberea Agustin

• Agustin Arrieta-Urtizberea, Department of Logic and Philosophy of Science, University of the Basque Country, Apartado 1249, 20080 San Sebastian, Spain

Identifiers

CEJSH db identifier

11SKAAAA090518