CONTROVERSY OVER THE EXISTENCE OF NON-CONCEPTUAL CONTENT ONTOLOGICAL AND SEMANTIC APPROACH (Onto-semantyczny wymiar sporu o istnienie tresci niepojeciowej)

• Authors: Kolodziejczyk Sebastian
• Languages of publication: PL

Abstracts

EN

In his seminal book (Mind and World) John McDowell argues against the widely spread claim of empiricists that content of experience might be non-conceptual. His argumentation refers to the Kantian idea of spontaneity and the conceptual and propositional activity of mind on the one hand, and to demonstrative concepts as a tool enabling full conceptualization of the entire content of any experience on the other. In this paper I am focusing on the second argument. It seems to be clear that if we assume that demonstratives indeed have this extraordinary function, we have to accept a much deeper stipulation that concerns both the work of concepts in general and ontological consequences. My claim here is that three main possible relations between concepts and the content of experience (these are constitutive, possessional and transformative relations) may lead us to three different ways of understanding content in terms of ontology. Different relations give us distinct pictures of experience and different pictures of non-conceptual content.

Keywords

EN

CONCEPTUALISM; MENTAL CONTENT; METAPHYSICS; NONCONCEPTUAL CONTENT; PHILOSOPHY OF MIND

Discipline

• PHILOSOPHY: PHILOSOPHY

• Publisher: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Uniwersytetu Szczecińskiego
• Journal: Analiza i Egzystencja. Czasopismo Filozoficzne
• Year: 2010
• Issue: 11
• Pages: 187-210
• Document type: ARTICLE

Contributors

author

Kolodziejczyk Sebastian

• Sebastian Kolodziejczyk, Instytut Filozofii Uniwersytetu Jagiellonskiego, ul. Grodzka 52, 31-044 Kraków, Poland

Identifiers

CEJSH db identifier

11PLAAAA100527