Čo iné je poznanie, ak nie zdôvodnené pravdivé presvedčenie?

• Authors: Miloš Taliga

Title variants

EN

What else is knowledge if not justified true belief?

• Languages of publication: SK

Abstracts

EN

If truth is an objective property of statements, then we are faced with the following dilemma: If the condition of truth is a necessary condition of knowledge, then knowledge can neither evolve nor disappear because true statements cannot become false, and at the same time, if the condition of truth is not a necessary condition of knowledge, then knowledge can also be something that is false. The condition of truth either is or is not a necessary condition of knowledge. Therefore: either knowledge cannot evolve or disappear, or knowledge can also be something that is false. The author of the article attempts to resolve the dilemma by a critical analysis of its conjunctive premise. He rejects the condition of truth as a necessary condition of knowledge in order to make room for the evolution and extinction of knowledge. He argues that the evolution and extinction of knowledge can be explained if we understand knowledge as unrefuted criticizable hypotheses. He provides his explanation within the framework of the philosophy of science of critical rationalism.

Keywords

EN

the dilemma of the condition of truth; evolution of knowledge; extinction of knowledge; critical rationalism

Discipline

• PHILOSOPHY: PHILOSOPHY

• Publisher: Institute of Philosophy, Czech Academy of Sciences
• Journal: Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)
• Year: 2023
• Volume: 71
• Issue: 3
• Pages: 475-488
• Document type: ARTICLE

Contributors

author

Miloš Taliga

• Filosofický časopis, redakce, Filosofický ústav AV ČR, v.v.i., Jilská 1, 110 00 Praha 1, Czech Republic