R. BUBNER'S AND I. KANT'S TRANSCENDENTAL ARGUMENT (R. Bubner i transtsendental'nyi argument I. Kanta)
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The article describes the qualifying features of the transcendental nature of L. Wittgenstein's formal logic and of the functional manifestation of transcendental level of languages functioning beyond their own sphere and meta-principles fixed by Quine. The notion of the self-referentiality used in order to explain the existence of transcendental dimensions of formal logic and the possibility of mutual understanding between the bearers of different languages beyond the meta-language principles is the most relevant to the question of the essence of the notion of transcendence. The article presents the main Bubner's conclusions about the functional values of the notion of transcendence. These are interrelated conclusions about the impossibility of transcendence deduction in the strict sense of the word, as well as about self-referential nature of the transcendental argument. They testify to a rather formal character of Kant's conception of synthetic character of empirical knowledge which treats the integrated structure of knowledge as a consistent and non-static representation of the unity of sensual experience object, the intuition unity within the judgment and the unity of concepts in judgments relations. Such a formal character of the discussed Kant's conception made difficulties for revealing the self-referential nature of transcendental argument and stimulated the attempts to find its deductive interpretation.
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