Mít tělo a být tělem : Analýza těla v Merleau-Pontyho „Fenomenologii vnímání“

• Authors: Jakub Čapek

Title variants

EN

To Have a Body and to Be a Body

• Languages of publication: CS

Abstracts

EN

The present paper analyses the conception of the body, presented by Merleau-Ponty in Phenomenology of Perception, from the perspective of the following question: does the analysis of the body as a body proper imply a certain form of dualism? Merleau-Ponty’s approach does not allow the formulation of the problem of dualism as a problem of relation between two substances (non-extensive one and extensive one). Experience of one’s own body, however, does imply a duality of pre-personal capabilities of the body and personal performances in which the individual in question uses “its own” body. The author proposes the distinction between the identifying and the possessive way of speaking about the body proper and attempts to apply this distinction on the duality in perceiving one’s body, as described by Merleau-Ponty. Therefore, the investigation of one’s own body does imply certain form of dualism.

Keywords

EN

Phenomenology of Perception; body; dualism; Merleau-Ponty

Discipline

• PHILOSOPHY: PHILOSOPHY

• Publisher: Institute of Philosophy, Czech Academy of Sciences
• Journal: Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)
• Year: 2011
• Volume: 59
• Issue: 7, Special No: Fenomenologie tělesnosti
• Pages: 99-114
• Document type: ARTICLE

Contributors

author

Jakub Čapek

• Filosofický časopis, redakce, Filosofický ústav AV ČR, v.v.i., Jilská 1, 110 00 Praha 1, Czech Republic