Podmínky racionality reflektované z pozice poznávajícího subjektu
The conditions of rationality as reflected from the standpoint of the knowing subject
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The author presents an interpretation of the position in which the knowing subject finds itself when performing the act of knowing, and she defines the concept of truth from the viewpoint of this position. Her starting point in these reflections is the subject’s conception of what its ideal position should be in performing the act of knowing. From this ideal position the knowing subject should be able to survey the real state of the noumenal world, fully in accord with Kant’s sense. By demonstrating the dependence of the truth of propositions on the meaning of the concepts contained in them, and then the dependence of that meaning on the relevant conceptual scheme, it is shown that the concept of the ideal position has internal contradictions. If such a presuppositionless position were to exist, then its viewpoint would necessarily that all reality would be deprived of its meaning. By introducing her own concept of basic ontology, and by describing its content, the author argues that there are limits to the potential refinement of the relevant conceptual scheme. Basic ontology is constituted by so called basic concepts and itself constitutes a kind of innate structure which acts as bearer of the sense of everything which we are able to perceive and about which we are able to talk. These concepts are for us simply ungraspable by linguistic means, and as such are independent of language. They might be called innate ideas, which are biologically founded in the subject and whose form arises from the subject‘s life needs. Every conceptual scheme is, then, always built upon the ground of some basic ontology. In this context the concept of truth is put into immediate connection with the concepts of the adequacy of basic ontology and the level of refinement of a conceptual scheme.
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