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**THE COMMUNICATIVE DIMENSION OF VIOLENCE:
POLISH LEGIONS IN ITALY AS AN INSTRUMENT OF APPEAL
TO “EUROPE” (1848–1849)**

In the late March 1848 Władysław Zamoyski stopped in Florence to visit the grave of his mother buried in the magnificent church of Santa Croce. Florence was on his half-way from Rome to Turin, two centers of the springing Risorgimento, where after long strivings the prince Czartoryski's right hand man managed to obtain agreements about the formation of Polish Legions. It must have been soon after when Zamoyski received a letter from the Prince dated 22nd of March with the words reacting to the outbreak of 1848 revolutions in Europe: “the scene, as you must know by now, has again changed completely. Berlin and Vienna – by far our enemies – suddenly transformed into our allies. Now the Italian Question becomes of secondary importance to us”¹. This article intends to interpret this unexpected turnabout and recalling of Zamoyski's Italian mission through the lens of the broader propaganda game Czartoryski conducted in Europe. By the same token, it will shed a new light on the function of Hôtel Lambert's legions.

Hôtel Lambert's legionary activities in Italy were conventionally analyzed through their diplomatic character and their military efficiency. However, as Jerzy Skowronek observed, Czartoryski acted “in accordance with his imperative to make use of every, even the smallest and indirect, action to evoke the Polish cause, to provoke another manifestation of sympathy with it, to condemn the partitioning powers”². Similarly, it is argued here that Hôtel Lambert used the idea of legions not to undertake a real struggle for Poland from afar, but to remind the European powers about the Polish case. Since the November uprising the Polish question had been gradually sinking into oblivion. The revival of the idea of Polish legions joining in European nations in their struggle against the *ancien regime* seemed a perfect opportunity to show again the persistence of the Polish cause. The moment was opportune – the Springtime of Nations rekindled the idea of fraternity of nations. The Poles could again link their right

¹ Adam Czartoryski do Władysława Zamoyskiego, Paris 22.03.1848, [in:] W. Zamoyski, *Jenerał Zamoyski, 1803–1868*, vol. 5, 1847–1852, Poznań 1918, p. 86.

² J. Skowronek, *Adam Jerzy Czartoryski 1770–1861*, Warszawa 1994, p. 379.

to liberty and independence to the general movement for political emancipation in Europe³.

Hôtel Lambert developed strategies of linking the Polish issue to various European movements; one of which was the Italian Risorgimento. This plan went beyond diplomacy and eliciting sympathy from the European rulers, which anyway seemed to bring little result, as Jerzy Zdrada wrote: all the more European courts ignored the Polish cause, all the more Czartoryski tried to win the favour of wide public opinion⁴. Moreover, in the midcentury diplomacy became one of the central targets of criticism directed specifically against negotiations behind closed doors. The newspapers, public rallies, and popular movements claimed their part in the policy making⁵. Mass media became increasingly important means of achieving political goals. For the first time the importance of public opinion came to light during the Greek fight for independence, and later, in 1848, this tool was also used by the Italians. Similarly Hôtel Lambert wished that Poland would achieve its goals following the Greek model, and Czartoryski promptly adjusted the activities of his political faction to the new revolutionary situation and in various manners strove to broaden the appeal of the Polish case to European public opinion, including publishing in the foreign press, organizing celebrations of Polish national anniversaries, holding charitable balls as well as having agents in European capitals who were responsible e.g. for spreading pro-Polish propaganda in literary salons. Everything that would promote the Polish cause in Europe was in demand. One of the especially interesting media strategies employed by Hôtel Lambert was presenting the policy of the partitioning powers towards the Poles as an international scandal. In particular, revealing or sometimes even constructing bogus affairs from the scratch was meant to strike Russia, which, additionally, was recurrently discredited and presented as barbarian. To this end, just before 1848, Hôtel Lambert brought to public light the so-called Makryna Mieczysławska case and supported the anti-Russian ethnographic theories of Franciszek Duchński.

The case of Makryna Mieczysławska was particularly interesting and peculiar. She was, reputedly, a Basilian nun who appeared at the Parisian residence of Czartoryski in 1845 with letters of recommendation from important Polish public figures (Jan Koźmian, gen. Dezydery Chłapowski, archbishop Leon Przyłuski) and claimed to be a victim of religious persecutions which were taking place in former Polish lands incorporated by Russia. The tsarist government carried out a policy of repressions towards the Uniates who refused to convert to Orthodoxy and which abolished the Basilians, the Uniates' monastic

³ S. Kieniewicz, H. Wereszycki, *Poland under foreign rule 1795–1918*, [in:] *History of Poland*, eds A. Gieysztor, S. Kieniewicz, E. Rostworowski (*et al.*), Warszawa 1968, p. 499.

⁴ J. Zdrada, *Historia Polski 1795–1914*, Warszawa 2005, p. 225.

⁵ *The Diplomats' World: The Cultural History of Diplomacy, 1815–1914*, eds M. Mosslang, T. Riotte, Oxford 2008, p. 14.

order. Mieczysławska herself suffered these persecutions. According to the letters of Władysław Zamoyski, one of many to write down her testimonies, Mieczysławska was mother superior of the convent in Mińsk that was subjected to elaborate harassment from a dissenter from the Uniate rite, an Orthodox bishop Józef Siemaszko.

W. Zamoyski described the ordeal and martyrdom of the Basilian nuns, depicting how they were forced to hard labour, regularly flagellated, tortured, fed with salty herrings for many days and not given water. The nuns were left at the mercy of lustful soldiers, harnessed to pull carts and boats. Most of them died or were killed during the several years of such treatment. Czartoryski did not inquire into the validity of the Basilian nun's account as her story presented the Russian anti-Catholic (and anti-Polish) policy in the worst possible light and illustrated it with very dramatic examples of barbarian tortures. He promptly sent Mother Makryna to Rome to testify to the Pope about her suffering. At the same time the whole anti-Russian campaign in the press was launched. The story of the martyr was hysterically presented in the pages of Polish journals in Paris: „Trzeci Maj”, „Dziennik Narodowy”, „Demokrata Polski”, but also in the French (e.g. „Journal des Debats”, „L'Univers”, „L'ami de la Religion”), Belgian („Journal de Bruxelles”), English („The Times”, „Daily News”) as well as the Italian press. Hôtel Lambert spared no effort to publish Makryna's account individually in different European languages⁶. Owing to Hôtel Lambert's intercession, Mother Makryna was received in Rome, first by cardinal Lambruschini and later by the Pope himself. The fact that she was granted a private audience with the Pope was undeniably a propagandist success of the Polish émigrés. The papal interest sanctioned Mieczysławska's martyrdom, publicized Russian barbarism and Polish hardships making the name of the alleged Polish martyr famous in Europe. Paradoxically, among many true stories of Russian repressions, however less spectacular or less attractive to the media, the one regarding Mother Makryna was in all probability false⁷.

⁶ The Polish version was printed in 1846 and had a truly baroque title: *M. Mieczysławska, Opowiadanie... księni Bazylianek Mińskich, o ich siedmioletnim prześladowaniu za wiarę, z woli Grzegorza XVI... przez X.M. Rytlę... X. M. Jełowickiego spisane w klasztorze Trojeckiej Góry w Rzymie*, Paris 1846. The account quickly appeared in French: *Récit de Makrena Mieczysławska... ou Histoire d'une persécution de sept ans soufferte pour la foi par elle et ses religieuses*, écrite sous sa dictée par le R. P. Maximilien Ryllo, l'abbé Alexandre Jełowicki, l'abbé Aloys Leitner, Paris 1846; in English: *The nuns of Minsk: Narrative of Makrena Mieczysławska, Abbess of the Basilian convent of Minsk; The history of a seven years' persecution suffered for the faith, by her and her nuns*, London 1846; W. O. Zienkiewicz, *Lord Aberdeen, the nuns of Minsk, Nicholas, and the Rossian [sic] state church*, London 1846; in Spanish: *M. Mieczisławska, Relacion del martirio que han padecido en Rusia de órden de su actual Emperador Nicolas algunas religiosas catolicas de la órden de San Basilio*, Quito 1847.

⁷ During the interwar period, the Jesuit and historian, J. Urban found out that Makryna Mieczysławska was a Russian soldier's widow by the name of Wińczowa. She was a lay cook in the

The above anti-Russian scandal was one of Hôtel Lambert's several attempts to draw European attention to the Polish suffering under partitions. Polish publicists appreciated the power of media and cultural networks, which was a wider practice of oppressed nations at the time. As Thomas Scheffler notices, through the same channels the Greeks or Bulgarians provided overblown accounts of Turkish tyranny, sometimes inventing atrocities to highlight their suffering under the Turks⁸. The purpose was to present Turkey as a barbarian state and to attract European sympathy for their national aspirations. Polish members of Hôtel Lambert constantly referred to the severe repressions Poles were subjected to and tried to refocus the attention of European public opinion on Polish national rights.

Besides publicizing scandalous deeds of the partitioners, the legionary initiative of Hôtel Lambert in Italy – whose goals, as is argued here, were not only military but also involved attracting publicity to the Polish cause in Europe – made reference to the threat of violence. In this context, rather than looking at their final military outcome, it seems more interesting to view Hôtel Lambert's legionary initiatives through their communicative function. As proposed in the volume by Jörg Requate and Martin Schulze Wessel (*Europäische Öffentlichkeit...*)⁹, we may interpret the very threat of violence in the 19th century, and more precisely, of insurgency, as means of appealing to the European public sphere¹⁰. Seeking the origins of a 'European public sphere' back in the 19th century, these authors claim that events like 1848–1849 upheavals, in which Europe spoke a common language to some extent, brought about the subsequent practice of appealing to the imaginary Europe from the side of 'peripheral' national groups which thereby wanted to advance their projects. This stemmed from the fact that all those groups were cut off from their regional or national public spheres. In this sense, in lieu of a national one, the European public sphere appeared as an institution of appeal, though arguably it might not have even existed¹¹. This sphere constituted a forum in the framework of which Polish, Czech, Serbian and Romanian intellectuals tried to draw attention to and provoke solidarity for their movements of national emancipation. After 1846, when the Risorgimento gained momentum, Italy was in the spotlight of Euro-

convent of Observants in Vilnius. She broke the law and was tried for fraud, she was also bitten by a military policeman, what could explain the evidence of injuries on her body. J. Urban, *Makryna Mieczysławska w świetle prawdy*, Kraków 1923.

⁸ T. Scheffler, 'Wenn hinten, weit, in der Türkei die Völker aufeinander schlagen...': Zum Funktionswandel 'orientalischer' Gewalt in europäischen Öffentlichkeiten des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts, [in:] *Europäische Öffentlichkeit: transnationale Kommunikation seit dem 18. Jahrhundert*, eds J. Requate, M. Schulze Wessel, Frankfurt am Main 2002, p. 225.

⁹ *Europäische Öffentlichkeit...*

¹⁰ T. Scheffler, 'Wenn hinten...' , p. 205–230.

¹¹ *Ibidem*, p. 13.

pean interest and was the best background against which to advertise national aspirations. Therefore, Hôtel Lambert, like many other national and social movements, tried to take advantage of the tense situation in the peninsula and introduce the Polish problem to the Italian context, which complied with the camp's golden rule of regaining the independence by 'pen and sword' and, necessarily, by taking advantage of international conflicts. To secure the sympathy of Western Europeans for Poland, the camp made relentless efforts to create a good climate for Polish political aspirations¹².

The wavering, non-formalized, and non-institutionalized European public sphere, as outlined above, would be most interested in and attracted by concrete events – revolutions, uprisings, annexations, congresses, *etc.* Naturally, the clearer the case could be depicted, the stronger reception it would gain. This is why drawing solid lines of divisions was useful to achieve recognition of national aspirations (as in the most successful story already mentioned, in which the Greeks spurred philhellenism, contrasting themselves with 'barbaric' Turks). Also the Poles, campaigning for the rights of nationalities, resorted to the threat of violence. Their idea of creating Polish legions in Italy was at the same time an element of a strategy to publicize the Polish cause and emphasize Polish credentials for struggling for their own patria. In consequence, most endeavours of Hôtel Lambert in Italy around 1848 revolved around the idea of creating a military formation that recruited Poles and would join the struggle of the Italians against their common oppressor – Austria.

Naturally, the plan alluded to the fifty-year-old and cherished reminiscence of the Polish Legions in Italy which served in the French army in the late 1790's to 1810's. After the final partition of Poland, many Polish soldiers and officers emigrated to France and Italy, as they believed that revolutionary France and its allies would come to the aid of Poland (France's enemies included the partitioners of Poland). With support from Napoleon, Polish military units were created and commanded by Jan Henryk Dąbrowski and had Polish military ranks. The so-called Polish Legions in Italy were considered to be a Polish army, but naturally served alongside the French during the Napoleonic Wars. Dąbrowski's Legions were at first used against the Austrians in Italy. In 1798 Poles helped the French capture Rome. At that time also the text of the future Polish national anthem – *Mazurek Dąbrowskiego* – was composed by Józef Wybicki, with words promising 'the return of Poles from Italy to join the Polish nation'. The very fact that the Polish national anthem was created in exile and on Italian land became symbolic.

More than fifty years later the idea and the legend of Polish legions in Italy continued to live on in the minds of the exiles (from radical Mickiewicz to

¹² K. Marchlewicz, *Continuities and Innovations: Polish Emigration after 1849*, [in:] *Exiles from European Revolutions*, ed. S. Freitag, Oxford–New York 2003, p. 113.

conservative Count Zamoyski), fellow emigrants and patriots in the country¹³. It was also evoked by the Italians, who like Mazzini mentioned it in their writing¹⁴. The Polish capacities of military mobilization outside Polish borders were also remembered by the partitioning powers, which naturally felt anxious whenever the Poles tried to evoke this idea.

PIEDMONT

Hôtel Lambert had conducted its pro-independence efforts on the Italian peninsula already before 1848, however, in spring 1848 it concentrated its endeavours there¹⁵. Władysław Zamoyski decided to personally carry out negotiations with Charles Albert about a Polish military formation in Piedmont. Moreover, realizing that the Piedmontese army was considerably weak, Czartoryski and Zamoyski offered the aid of a Polish military mission in the reorganization of the Italian troops before the intervention of Austria. Charles Albert was at first reluctant and more inclined to follow the slogan *Italia farà da sé* (Italy will do it on her own) and was careful enough not to provoke other Polish partitioners' intervention in Italy¹⁶. Additionally, France and England were sceptical about the idea of Italian-Polish alliance. Therefore, the ambitious plan was moderated to the formation of Polish legion in Piedmont.

“Polish cooperation and help must be beneficial for Italians. We only need to present it in a clear way [...] and gain their trust”¹⁷ – Polish agents in Italy constantly corresponded and met members of the Piedmontese government whereas Adam Czartoryski sent memorandums to the Piedmontese king and to the French government (enumerating the advantages they would gain by their

¹³ For Czartoryski, the legionnaire idea was especially dear. He regretted that at the time when Dąbrowski fought in Italy and Kościuszko was imprisoned in Russia, he spent time at the tsarist court in San Petersburg (as a hostage, but one enjoying all the pleasures of court). Mickiewicz also referred to the idea of Dąbrowski's legion: *A. Mickiewicz to the Contemporary Government of Lombardy, Milan 03.05.1848*, [in:] *Legion Mickiewicza. Wybór źródeł*, eds H. Batowski, A. Szklarska-Lohmannowa, Wrocław 1958, p. 118.

¹⁴ “Italy will remember the words: “All free Italians are our brothers” uttered by the commander of Polish Legions, general Dąbrowski”. G. Mazzini, *On the Slavonian National Movement, 1847*, quoted after *Legion Mickiewicza, Wybór źródeł...*, p. 33.

¹⁵ J. Wszolek, *Prawica Wielkiej Emigracji wobec narodowego ruchu włoskiego (przed rewolucją 1848 roku)*, Wrocław 1970.

¹⁶ “I saw today Ministers Balbo and Pereto. They have here a crowd of officers proposing their services. But they want to make a thing with their own forces” *W. Zamoyski to A. Czartoryski*, [in:] *W. Zamoyski, Jeneral...*, vol. 5, p. 96.

¹⁷ *Nota Hôtel Lambert 7.2.1848*, [in:] *Materiały dotyczące stosunków polsko-włoskich w latach 1848–1849 oraz 1860–63*, Biblioteka Czartoryskich Archive (BCZ) 6743 IV.

consent to this alliance)¹⁸. France could expand its European influence, confirm its ‘moral maturity’ and international position by acting ‘pour le triomphe des nationalités’. Charles Albert, on the other hand, apart from obvious military gains, could “increase his prestige in the eyes of his own subjects and of European public opinion”¹⁹.

Hôtel Lambert used all its contacts and invested great efforts to break down Charles Albert’s reservations regarding the Polish legion. After many long weeks, in March 1848, Zamoyski finally obtained the agreement to create two Polish legions in Piedmont, which would be sponsored mainly by the Polish aristocrat Ksawery Branicki²⁰. However, it was right at that moment, on March 22, that Adam Czartoryski re-called Zamoyski’s mission and summoned him to Berlin. Prussia was closer to Poland and the prince counted on more efficient cooperation between the Prussian and Polish movements. As the Polish-Prussian alliance soon appeared to be a chimera, in July Hôtel Lambert decided to resume the process of recruitment of Polish soldiers in Italy. Yet, with the time that passed the conditions changed – at this point the Piedmontese agreed only to enlist Polish soldiers to their own ranks without creating an individual Polish unit²¹.

In the course of time, while the Sardinian army was being defeated by Austrians, Czartoryski put forward another proposal to Charles Albert. Piedmont, counting on French aid, submitted a request for a staff officer. In the absence of a French response to this plea, Hôtel Lambert returned to its original plans and proposed Polish service and command²². A similar plan was suggested in Rome, where the army needed fundamental modernization. In both situations Hôtel Lambert’s idea was to fill key positions with Polish officers, which would not

¹⁸ *Korespondencja z Ministerstwem Wojny i Spraw Zagranicznych*, [in:] *Materiały dotyczące...*, BCZ 6743 IV.

¹⁹ A. Czartoryski, *Mémoire sur une Légion polonaise pour l’Italie a former les soins du Gouvernement français*, 28.05.1848, [in:] *Materiały dotyczące...*, BCZ 6742 IV.

²⁰ As for the French support, in an appeal to the Polish public, colonel Breański revealed that the French government for political reasons did not want to recognize Polish Legion in Italy, however driven by the sympathy to the Poles, it sponsored passports and transport of all volunteers. M. Sławianowski [F. Breański], *Treść Instrukcji ogólnej*, 20.01.1849 Turin, [in:] *Materiały...*, BCZ 6742 IV.

²¹ W. Zamoyski: “The king greeted me warmly after the victory of Goito and promised to greet every Pole in his army as well, but he did not want to listen about the recruitment of the foreign legion. *Italia fara da se* – he repeated”. W. Zamoyski, *Jenerał...*, vol. 5, p. 140.

²² W. Zamoyski made use of the rumors he heard in Turin that the Piedmontese army can be saved only by the foreign strategic thought. Some Turinians complained on *incapacita* of Italian generals and did not want to serve under commanders such as infamous General Girolamo Ramorino. Italians counted on the French generals and strategists. In the absence of a French help, Zamoyski began to prepare candidature of the Polish officer. M. Handelsman, *Rok 1848 we Włoszech i polityka ks. Adama Czartoryskiego*, Kraków 1936, p. 38.

only secure Polish-Italian cooperation, but also held considerable propagandist value.

The idea of Polish military engagement in Italy was progressing towards the climax of the Italian upheaval. This time, Władysław Zamoyski was warmly welcomed by the Piedmontese king, who was in need of foreign commandship²³. Zamoyski was so determined to place a Pole in the Italian army that he decided to go in person to Berlin and to bring back to Turin his candidate for the position of staff officer in the Piedmontese army, General Wojciech Chrzanowski. He strongly promoted Chrzanowski and even fabricated his resume to enhance chances for his appointment. The success of this plot was greater than expected: in February 1849, Chrzanowski was nominated not a staff officer, but a commander-in-chief of the whole Piedmontese army. The Polish presence and activity in Italy could not have been marked more strongly²⁴.

Nonetheless, things did not continue to run smoothly. As for the legion itself, after putting a Pole as the head of the Italian army, Czartoryski was less anxious about its creation. However, the legion remained an *idée fixe* of his nephew Zamoyski. Although the change of government in Piedmont in December 1848 (the so-called Turin's left with Vincenzo Gioberti in charge decided to conduct a war against Austria) favoured the idea of a Polish legion, the process of enrolling Polish soldiers was slow. Soon it was outstripped by the better-paced Russian and Prussian diplomacy, which strongly opposed the idea of Polish troops in Italy. Thus Piedmont once again suspended the recruitment on the pretext of its excessive costs²⁵. Eventually, the legion was not large and never participated in the main military operations. Neither had Chrzanowski brought luck to the Italian army²⁶. Appointed to his position in February, by March he had commanded the Sardinian army in the battle of Novara and was defeated by the Austrians under the command of Field Marshal Joseph Radetzky. This was one of the last acts of the Italian Springtime of Nations. The Polish legion had simply disintegrated.

²³ W. Zamoyski to Adam Czartoryski, 19.08.1848, *Alexandria*, [in:] W. Zamoyski, *Jenerał...*, vol. 5, p. 162.

²⁴ Apart from him, other well-known Polish officers joined the Sardinian army, such as majors Wróblewski, Przyłuski and generals Szemioth, Izbicki, Breański. The latter took command over a part of Adam Mickiewicz's legion in Italy, which Zamoyski managed to seize.

²⁵ In late January, W. Zamoyski reached the agreement with V. Gioberti about the legion and had soon left Turin. Meanwhile, as early as February, Gioberti called-off the recruitment. He was urged to do so by his ambassadors. The ambassador in Paris, Ruffini, encountered problems in France, which he commented to Gioberti: 'Questi benedetti Polacchi, caro Gioberti, sono per me una vera gonna di Dejanira'. M. Handelsman, *Rok 1848...*, p. 51.

²⁶ There is discussion between Polish historians of military science as to if W. Chrzanowski was the right candidate for the role.

ROME

Unfortunate as Hôtel Lambert's intervention in Piedmont was, it constituted only one part of Czartoryski's Italian programme during the Springtime of Nations. Another attractive spot in the peninsula, on which the eyes of Europe were concentrated, was Rome. Here too, through his agents, Adam Czartoryski appealed to Pope Pius IX to create a Polish legion to fight on Italy's side against the Austrians. The 'Roman' programme of Hôtel Lambert was not surprising given that almost the whole Italian national movement in 1847 focused its hopes on Pope Pius IX, seemingly liberal and interested in Italian unity. The Polish action in Rome had several purposes and the desire to create a strong Polish military formation in Rome, which could, prospectively, make its way to the Polish borders, was not necessarily of primary importance. Undoubtedly, the legionary initiative aimed at winning the Holy See's support for the Polish cause. Although relations were still strained by the encyclical *Cum Primum*, with the promising change to the papal throne the Polish-Roman compromise looked more feasible. Secondly, Hôtel Lambert wanted to incorporate Polish strivings to a matter of a pan-European interest, to which the policy of the head of the Catholic world undoubtedly belonged.

"Mister Zamoyski arrived in Rome in order to unearth from the Italian movement something suitable for improving the Polish cause"²⁷, Michał Budzyński reported in his memoirs. Already in the autumn of 1847 W. Zamoyski proposed to Pius IX the creation of a legion with Polish commander and officers. It was a timely proposal because the people of Rome seemed to favour the idea of war against Austria. Moreover, the papal advisory board, the so-called *Consulta*, submitted a request for foreign officers who could reorganize the obsolete papal army. Pius IX did not want to accept Polish candidatures though, as he believed and revealed in a conversation with Zamoyski: Poles would love to involve him in a revolution²⁸.

Not being allowed to help with the reorganization, the Poles thought they could at least work as instructors in the papal army. Hôtel Lambert's press organ „Trzeci Maj” wrote that Poles would serve the Roman army with double commitment: as sons of the Church and as the enemies of the Italian nation's oppressor – Austria. Despite intercessions for Poland by many respectable figures, only the outbreak of revolution in France changed the way the Pope

²⁷ M. Budzyński, *Wspomnienia z mojego życia (1860)*, Poznań 1880, p. 94.

²⁸ „Ci Polacy radzi by mnie w rewolucję wciągnąć”, [in:] W. Zamoyski, *Jenerał...*, vol. 5, p. 63. One year later the Pope still claimed that the Poles were disobedient. He repeated that they had the highest rate of divorces, they suppressed peasants and therefore, their present situation was just their atonement. M. Budzyński, *Wspomnienia...*, p. 173. “The pope neither needs nor wants Polish troops, but individual Poles may join his army” – reported W. Zamoyski to A. Czartoryski (September 1847), [in:] W. Zamoyski, *Jenerał...*, vol. 5, p. 28.

viewed the Polish proposal. Finally, in March 1848, Zamoyski's projects were given a favourable reception at the papal court. After obtaining an oral agreement to bringing Polish officers to Rome, Zamoyski left for Turin. Meanwhile, the talks with the Papal States' Minister of War, Aldobrandi continued and were successfully concluded on Czartoryski's behalf by the agent Ludwik Orpiszewski²⁹. Aldobrandi and Orpiszewski agreed on the compromise: the Polish legion would have an Italian commander (Giovanni Duraniolo) whereas Polish officers (W. Chrzanowski, J. Skrzynecki) would take command of the papal army. Satisfied, Zamoyski wrote to his British friend, Lord Stuart, that the opportunity of becoming *un soldat du Pape* far exceeded his fondest dreams³⁰.

Subsequent events mirrored the Piedmontese path: Czartoryski, having received news about the revolution in Berlin, revoked the Roman mission and asked his agent Orpiszewski to withdraw from the agreement with the Roman government and to solicit in Rome only a "blessing for a Polish campaign against the Russians". When Berlin's option failed, the Poles tried to reinstall the previous agreement, but the new papal government (with Terenzo Mamiani in charge) agreed only to enrol individual Polish soldiers to the papal army. This solution was far less satisfactory for the main organiser of Polish engagement in Italy, Zamoyski³¹. This time it became visible that the papal engagement in war against Austria was doubtful and that Piedmont remained the only possible nucleus of a free and united Italy.

Regardless of this fact, Zamoyski, who strongly supported the idea of Polish legions in Italy, reinitiated negotiations over the Roman legion as soon as Czartoryski gave him free rein once more. Similarly to the Piedmontese initiative, in Rome too the circumstances changed completely in the meantime as Pius IX had officially denounced the idea of war against Austria and he had ratified a concordat with Russia, which meant adopting a more cautious position. Consequently, calling Poles to arms in Rome was out of the question. The Roman part of the Italian project of Hôtel Lambert misfired. Interestingly enough, after the defeat of Piedmont, papal diplomacy renounced all contacts with the Poles³². Disappointed, agent Orpiszewski handed in his resignation as the Roman agent. Both legionary initiatives failed and Hôtel Lambert turned out to be no more efficient than an inexperienced poet, Adam Mickiewicz, who also created his legion in Italy at the time.

²⁹ *Historia dyplomacji polskiej*, vol. 3, 1795–1918, ed. L. Bazyłow, Warszawa 1982, p. 354.

³⁰ *W. Zamoyski to Lord D.C. Stuart, 13.04.1848*, Rome quoted after M. Kukiel, *Czartoryski and European Unity 1770–1861*, Princeton 1955, p. 260.

³¹ J. Nowak mentions that this solution was unsatisfactory for Zamoyski, due to its low political, military and propaganda outcome. J. Nowak, *Władysław Zamoyski. O sprawę polską w Europie (1848–1868)*, Poznań 2002, p. 65.

³² B. Cygler, *Wielka emigracja a kuria rzymska*, [in:] *Szkice z dziejów papieżstwa*, eds I. Koberdowa, J. Tazbir, Warszawa 1989, vol. 1, p. 170.

ALLIANCE

The third and final 1848 legionary idea of Hôtel Lambert connected with Italy included the aspirations of the Slavic peoples on the Balkans and was supposed to link them to the Italian movement. Czartoryski strongly insisted upon this conception because he actually believed that any Poland-driven legionary idea was feasible only if it could bring about a centrifugal effect upon the peoples living within the Habsburg Empire. The Italo-Slavic alliance presented the only possible scenario for the creation of a formation of real military power.

The project was aimed at the cooperation between the Italians, the Slavs and later also the Turks. It had been born already in the 1830–1840s and was based on two assumptions. The first was that a possible way to improve the situation of the Poles was to break Metternich's centralization system. For this purpose, they supported Italian, Hungarian and Slavic decentralizing and emancipative actions within the Habsburg monarchy. These actions, when coordinated, had better chances of success. Nevertheless, conflicts also existed between these aspiring nations, especially between the Hungarians and Italians on the one side, and the Southern Slavs on the other. Hôtel Lambert assumed that

the Italians could find their way to Slavs through the Poles. With the outbreak of a war against Austria, Poland could provide experienced officers and create Polish legions which would disorganize the enemy and provoke desertion from its ranks³³.

This strategy included sabotage and bribery carried out in the Slavic corps of Radetzky's army (e.g. the idea to bribe the pro-Austrian commander Josip Jelačić to take over Slavic and Hungarian deserters and prisoners of war). Moreover, in memoranda sent to Turin, Czartoryski suggested that the Italians (Piedmont) establish their consulate in Belgrade³⁴. The alliance would consist of Italians, Austrian Slavs, Hungarian revolutionaries, Vallachians, the Slavs in Turkey, and Turks themselves³⁵. Ideally Hôtel Lambert expected to win French support (and British neutrality) for the alliance and to be the vanguard of the whole operation³⁶.

The concept of Italo-Turkish-Slavic cooperation was innovative and did not harmonize with the ideas of the most prominent ideologists of the Italian

³³ [W. Zamoyski], *O Polakach we Włoszech 1848 i 1849 roku. List oficera polskiego w służbie sardyńskiej*, Turin 1849, p. 1, [in:] *Druki ulotne*, BCZ 91123 III a, b. This anonymously published text was probably written by Władysław Zamoyski.

³⁴ J. Skowronek, *Adam Jerzy...*, p. 461.

³⁵ L. Kuk, *Propaganda słowiańska obozu politycznego ks. Adama Jerzego Czartoryskiego we Włoszech w latach 1848–1849*, [in:] *Polonia, Italia e culture slave: Aspetti comparati tra Storia e Contemporaneità*, eds L. Marinelli, K. Zaboklicki, Warsaw–Rome 1997, p. 94.

³⁶ *Note au Ministre Aff. Etr. de la Sardaigne, 1848*, [in:] *Materiały...*, BCZ 6743 IV.

Risorgimento, who, like Cesare Balbo, favoured preservation of Habsburg's rule over the Southern Slavs as a barrier against what they considered the "increasing danger" of the Slavs³⁷. One should also bear in mind that Balbo's intention was to acquire Italian lands from Austria in exchange for some territories in the Balkans for the Habsburgs³⁸. These actions would adversely affect not only the Slavs, but also Turkey, which under Balbo's programme would have to be partitioned. Thus Hôtel Lambert, especially agents Michał Czajkowski and Franciszek Zach, who worked for rapprochement between the Slavs, Turks and Italians, strongly opposed Balbo's *Speranze*³⁹. For a long time these agents tried to block the extension of the Habsburgian and Russian influence on the area. They were working on awakening national movements in the Balkans and giving them a "western" face⁴⁰. The reflections of a Polish officer serving in the Sardinian army illustrate Hôtel Lambert's plan:

Whatever one may think, Poles, who tried to find their scope for activity in Italy last year, should know that with their doings they gained broad respect. If the Italian nation does not fall into an ultimate political nihilism, it will have to recognize the Polish role in showing it Slavs as friends of their cause and not its enemies⁴¹.

In order to change the reluctant attitude of the Italians towards the Southern Slavs, Hôtel Lambert regularly presented them as the allies the Italian struggle⁴².

³⁷ F. Chabod, *L'Italia contemporanea*, Turin 1961, p. 21.

³⁸ V. Mastny, *Italy and East Central Europe: The Legacy of History*, [in:] *Italy and East Central Europe. Dimensions of the regional relationship*, Oxford 1995, p. 9.

³⁹ J. Wszolek, *Prawica...*, p. 39.

⁴⁰ R. A. Berry, *Czartoryski's Hôtel Lambert and the Great Powers in the Balkans (1832–1848)*, "The International History Review" 1985, vol. 7, No 1, p. 66.

⁴¹ The author added: "Thanks to Polish cooperation with Gioberti, the Italians saw Southern Slavs through different lens. Until then they remained for the Italians Germanized barbarians", [W. Zamoyski], *O Polakach we Włoszech...*

⁴² Franciszek Duchiniński contrasted them with the Russians and Julian Klaczko remarked that their attitude often exceeded that of the Hungarians: "Let us have a good look at the Slavs' attitude towards the Italian cause, which is as holy and just as the Polish cause. Is it not Nugent who now fights against Hungarians and were there not Bandiera brothers who participated in the noble fight for liberation in Italy? Was it not the Slav, Tommaseo who with such an enthusiasm and sacrifice devoted himself to the Venetian cause? Who appeared to favour the Italian cause in April last year? Hungarians or Serbs?" Albert Nugent – count, Croatian intermediary for the province of Vojvodina. W. Felczak, *Węgierska polityka narodowościowa przed wybuchem powstania w 1848*, Wrocław 1964. Bandiera brothers – Attilio and Emilio served in the Austro-Hungarian Navy, the sons of Admiral Baron Francesco Bandiera. Devoted to the idea of Italian unification, they spread Italian propaganda among the Austrian officers. For their activities they were executed along with nine companions. J. Klaczko, *Socjalizm, polityka i narodowość*, „Gazeta Polska”, 16/17.03.1849, nr 61–62. Published also in: J. Klaczko, *Pisma z lat 1849–1851*, Poznań 1919, p. 8.

J. Klaczko wrote about Bandiera brothers coming from Venice, as Slavs. He applied the same category to Tommaseo, who was born in Dalmatia. Klaczko reinforced his point by mentioning that it was the parliament under Lajos Kossuth which decided to send Hungarian

Another means of breaking up the hostility between the Italian and Southern Slavs was through supporting the literary activities of mediators of reconciliation, such as Stefan Hrkalovic⁴³ on the Serbian side and Niccolo Tommaseo⁴⁴ on the Italian side. In the long campaign to forge the alliance, Hôtel Lambert addressed the Piedmontese authorities with numerous diplomatic notes and the Slavs with occasional press articles, fliers, and open letters⁴⁵. Finally, the idea found support of the prime minister of Piedmont at the time, Vincenzo Gioberti. He agreed to sponsor the recruitment of Slavic soldiers in Istanbul and Witold Czartoryski, the older son of the Polish Prince was entrusted with directing this action⁴⁶.

Another manner of building up the alliance was by establishing Slavo-Italian associations. The Poles cooperated with the democratic Italian activists Angelo Brofferio, Lorenzo Valerio and Niccolo Tommaseo, who were promoting the idea of Italo-Slavic alliance in the press, in parliament and through the establishment of the associations, such as *Societa per l'Alleanza Italo-Slava* in Turin⁴⁷. Tommaseo created a similar organization in the revolutionary Venice. Another one was established in Paris by Cyprien Robert. The societies had many well-known members and deputies to the Piedmontese parliament, such as Agostino Depretis and Massimo D'Azeglio (who even took patronage over the pro-Slavic option in Piedmont). Although many public figures offered their support to these Italo-Slavic societies, their activities were rather weak⁴⁸.

troops to Lombardy to support 'Austrian tyranny', whereas at the same time the patriarch Rajačić ordered a withdrawal all Slavic regiments serving in the Austrian army in Italy and entered into an alliance with Charles Albert. Josif Rajačić (1785–1861), the Serbian patriarch, administrator of Vojvodina and baron; the spiritual, political and military leader of the Serbs.

⁴³ S. Hrkalovic, *Zbliżenie włosko-słowiańskie* 1849, BCZ 6743 IV.

⁴⁴ Niccolo Tommaseo – He was interested in Polish cause already in the 1830s. He addressed the problem of Polish-papal conflict in his *Dell'Italia: libri cinque*, 1835, which was later reissued, separately as: N. Tommaseo, *Italia e Polonia: scritti di Nicolò Tommaseo*, Milan 1863. The note on the cover informed: "Mille copie a totale beneficio dei generosi figli della Polonia, depositate al Comitato Centrale Polacco in Torino". In the brochure from 1835, Tommaseo criticized the papal submissiveness towards the Russian Tsar.

⁴⁵ E.g. *Note au Ministre Aff. Etr. de la Sardaigne (1848)*, BCZ 6743 IV.

⁴⁶ K. Morawski, *Gioberti. Myśl i działania polityczne*, Warszawa 1936, p. 168–171.

⁴⁷ The programme envisaged "procurare l'amore fraterno fra gli Italiani e gli Slavi per l'indipendenza e la prosperita d'ambedue queste nazioni", E. di Nolfo, *Adam J. Czartoryski e il congresso di Parigi. Questione polacca e politica europea nel 1855–56*, Padova 1964, p. 23. M. Handelsman, *Rok 1848...*, p. 57. W. Mickiewicz, *Legion Mickiewicza: 1848*, Kraków 1921, p. 278.

⁴⁸ Leszek Kuk characterized the Slavic societies in Italy and France with these words: 'they were weak, did not have a social base. They depended upon the resourcefulness of a narrow group of activists. Nevertheless, they attempted to establish an institutional framework for the cooperation between different social circles'. L. Kuk, *Propaganda...*, p. 100–101.

If it was not for the press, the coming into being of Slavo-Italian associations and their mediocre activity would have passed almost unnoticed. It seems that from Hôtel Lambert's point of view, their very emergence and the support from important figures were already valuable. Despite the weakness of these organizations, the Slavic programme was well-developed theoretically especially in *La Pologne*, published in the years 1848–1851 by Cyprien Robert in Paris⁴⁹. The idea was also promoted in Valerio's leftist newspaper *Concordia*, which he soon left at the total disposal of the Società per l'Alleanza Italo-Slava in Turin. Niccolo Tomasseo devoted his periodical *La Fratellanza de' popoli* to the same association in Venice. In Genoa, Duchyński published his views in the daily *Corriere Mercantile*.

As these press titles indicate, the Italians deserved their national independence, but were not able to obtain it alone. Thus they should ally with the Slavs, who would also benefit from the future Italian victory as it would advance the 'principle of nationality' or at least ease their political suppression under Austrian empire (defeated Austria would be prone to make concessions). According to the plan, Poles were able to link Slavic interests with the Italian (European) ones. The next step was to involve Turkey in the coalition for further increase of the chances for success in defeating Austria. Czartoryski counted on a thorough transformation of the political order in eastern and central parts of Europe⁵⁰. Interestingly, the non-Europeanism of Turkey, which was a public concern at that time, was not a hindrance to this coalition. In its scandalizing campaigns, Hôtel Lambert tried to present the ("Asiatic") Russian and ("Teutonic") German nations as more distant in many ways from the European civilization than Turkey⁵¹. Since the 1830's European statesmen, such as Czartoryski, had already begun to shift their perceptions of the Ottoman Turk from the "barbarian other" with respect to the civilized Europe, towards an 'odd man out', different but necessary. Hôtel Lambert's visions were echoed in the Italian and French press⁵². Although, in the end, politically and militarily this programme yielded no result whatsoever, it contributed to the Italian and Western European understanding of the Balkan subject matter. Czartoryski's

⁴⁹ Idem, *Towarzystwo Słowiańskie w Paryżu w dobie Wiosny Ludów jako ośrodek propagowania spraw polskich i słowiańskich we Francji*, [in:] *Wielka Emigracja a sprawa polska...*, p. 173.

⁵⁰ L. Kuk, *Propaganda...*, p. 94.

⁵¹ *Duchyński do Pułkownika*, 5.03.1852; *Duchyński sześć rozpraw czternaście listów*, od maja 1849 do września 1853, [in:] X.A.C. *Correspondance 1834–1861*, BCZ 5653 IV. Czartoryski believed that German politics was the main obstacle on the general development of Europe. Germany did not acknowledge the idea of European unity and was strongly focused on its own particular needs. These arguments were regularly repeated in the prince's speeches, e.g.: A. Czartoryski, *Mowa X A. Czartoryskiego miana na posiedzeniu dorocznym Towarzystwa Literacko-Historycznego*, 29.11.1854, Paris; and idem, *Mowa księcia Czartoryskiego 1858*, [in:] *Mowy Xcia A. Czartoryskiego 1851–1860*, BCZ 6444 IV.

⁵² E.g. articles by Hipolit Desprez in "Revue des Deux Mondes" 1848. More about the French Slavophile journalism in the Balkan-Italian context: P. Żurek, *Hôtel Lambert i Chorwaci 1843–1850*, Warszawa 2005, p. 125, 176.

plans drew extensively on this changing perception of Turkey in the eyes of European public opinion. This change took place in the context of Russian rivalry with the Ottomans, which was considered a question of pivotal interest for the balance of power in Europe. Eventually, with the Treaty of Paris (1856), Turkey was officially recognized as a permanent part of the European balance of power (as the first non-European power to gain this status)⁵³.

CONCLUSIONS: THE THREAT OF VIOLENCE

Hôtel Lambert's legions in Italy were conventionally analyzed through their military efficiency. But scrutinizing their communicative purpose, one can see that the Poles referred first of all to positive connotations of violence. As T. Scheffler notices, violence was traditionally associated with the right of free people to self-defence. In the European tradition (theorized e.g. by French scholastics), free people had rights and were expected to fight against violators of their freedom. Jean Bodin wrote in his *Six books* about a war justly undertaken against despotism, by people who were raised in liberty and were not corrupted by submission. If they were brave they should oppose tyranny denying their liberty and free disposal of their own goods⁵⁴. The right to self-defence was also sanctioned by the Church, which agreed that those holding legitimate authority had the right to repel, by armed force, aggressors against the community entrusted to their charge (the *raison d'être* for the papal army). Max Weber described how in the 19th century this right was gradually overtaken by the state, which became an authority holding the monopoly of legitimate means of organized violence within defined territorial boundaries⁵⁵.

The Poles were deprived of the political structure of their own state and of their territorial boundaries. However, by the creation of organized military troops with Polish national emblems they could claim that they still represented the majesty of the state. Every attempt to establish legions abroad was for them an expression of a legitimate struggle in defence of the rights of the Polish nation. Hôtel Lambert wanted to impose this way of perceiving the Polish problem on European courts. Polish troops represented the free people of Poland, still willing to organize themselves even if abroad, vindicated and brave enough to conduct the fight against the oppressors of their state. Hôtel Lambert demonstrated these rights of the Poles by trying to adopt new means of winning general support in Western Europe – through journalism, official associations, and informal contacts in salons and different cultural circles. Czartoryski's camp

⁵³ I. B. Neumann, *Uses of the Other. 'The East' in European Identity Formation*, Minneapolis 1999, p. 40, 88.

⁵⁴ J. Bodin, *Six books of the Commonwealth (Book II, Chapter 2)*, Oxford 1967, p. 58–59.

⁵⁵ M. Weber, *Politik als Beruf*, Stuttgart 1992.

advocated the idea of Polish legions and the right of Poles to struggle for their homeland everywhere, just as they did very soon after the third partition (late 18th century), with Polish Legions in Italy accepted by Napoleonic France as a legal representation of the Polish state.

The promotion of the idea of Poland being still alive, with its former citizens ready to fight for her, was a more realistic goal of legions in Italy than their official military objectives. In the face of the camp's engagement in other theatres of conflict and their dependency upon Italian temporary diplomatic relations, the military idea lacked strong grounds. For Turin, the Polish legion was mainly an obstacle in peace negotiations with Vienna, a reason for Russian annoyance and an additional financial burden. Moreover, the monarchist Zamoyski's arduous efforts were directed only towards the governing political groups and these usually failed to see benefits of calling Poles to arms. The only true Italian supporters of the idea of Polish legions were republicans and they favoured the democrat Adam Mickiewicz's efforts in the peninsula⁵⁶. Even the Polish officers were reluctant towards this formation⁵⁷.

All above indicates that Czartoryski probably did not believe in the military effect of the Polish troops in Italy. One sign of his sceptical attitude to the idea of legions was the ease with which discussions about Polish military engagement in Italy shifted between the ideas of supporting Rome and Piedmont. The Poles could not really afford to build two formations. Given their long interest and activity in the peninsula, one expects that Czartoryski's well-informed agents could have achieved much more in Italy than the inexperienced Polish poet. In the end, they went through many rounds of negotiations over the creation of a Polish legion with both Pius IX and Charles Albert and being close to reaching their aims, they were recalled by Czartoryski.

This vacillating position of the prince is being explained by his indecisiveness and irresolute temperament. Some historians interpreted this wavering attitude as influenced by his preference to support domestic upheavals rather than Italian ones at the time. Meanwhile, the hypothesis that the prince lacked faith in the real military potential of the whole undertaking sheds a new light on Polish legions in Italy. In Czartoryski's conception, the legionary idea was to be revived to draw European attention to Polish activities and only in the second place it supposed to constitute a germ for the creation of a real Polish army. The grand plan assumed that the European situation would evolve favourably for the Poles, enough to allow them reinforce their formation and send the troops to join the struggle in Poland.

⁵⁶ J. Nowak, *Władysław Zamoyski...*, p. 101.

⁵⁷ *Spis Polaków, którzy wstąpili do armii sardyńskiej; Z Listu Pułkownika Kamińskiego z Brescia, 18.10.1848*: 'God punished us with this legion – people, with few exceptions, are weak. If it is approved by Sardinian government, it has to be organized differently. I do not have health, neither force, nor willingness to do it. On the other hand, other officers, like Mister Siodółkiewicz will be not listened to'. *Materiały...*, BCZ 6743 IV.

Nonetheless, before the situation matured, the Poles were supposed not to invest more than was requisite for attracting European attention. Czartoryski's caution undoubtedly resulted from the lesson taken from the fate of the previous Polish formation in Italy. Dąbrowski's Legions were used by Napoleon for the French purposes only and later were disposed of by being sent to fight the liberation movement in distant Haiti (1802). Moreover, Czartoryski's cautious attitude could partly result from his Polish adversaries' accusations that he was ready to sacrifice Polish soldiers anywhere in Europe and beyond (e.g. Algeria) for the sake of his controversial programmes and alliances with European rulers. Severely criticized by his fellow emigrants affiliated in the democratic camp, he felt concerned with their warning that: "Polish blood is necessary for Poland and should not be shed for the kings"⁵⁸.

Altogether, Czartoryski's decisions contributed to the final military weakness of the legions. The biggest success of Hôtel Lambert was to place a Pole at the head of the Italian army. Its profound importance was proven by Czartoryski's next step, when he followed up this propaganda success and decided that the most recognizable figures of the camp would personally engage in the Italian military campaign. The participation of several key figures of Hôtel Lambert could not notably change the outcome of the Italian war against Austria, but it was to enhance the propaganda value of the Polish efforts. Significantly, he chose his right hand man Zamoyski and the first-born son, Witold, to join the Piedmontese ranks. During heavy campaigning, Witold Czartoryski became a company commander, whereas Zamoyski managed to avoid more serious battles and he later commented: "I, as always, was lucky enough to keep away from the bullets; it appears that my blood waits for the Polish ground".

Not only the formal external obstacles and Czartoryski's wavering tactic, but also the way in which the leader of Hôtel Lambert conceived it in the first place, decided the fate of the Polish legionary idea in Italy⁵⁹. Czartoryski tried to avoid unnecessary bloodshed as long as the plan of the creation of a real military power (e.g. Italo-Slavo-Turkish to fight Austria) was unfeasible. Therefore, he hesitated, recalled Zamoyski from Rome and Piedmont at decisive moments, after both centres had already agreed on the creation of Polish troops. He seemed to be content with the propaganda value of Polish actions in Italy – without spilling blood for foreign cause the Poles won European attention by placing Polish officers in command of the whole Piedmontese army and by getting similar order from the papal side, with which they teased the partitioning powers. The Poles (if they wanted) could again struggle in Italy and gain foreign

⁵⁸ W. Zamoyski, *Jeneral...*, p. 181.

⁵⁹ Most of the works on that subject agree that Hôtel Lambert's policy in Italy was fully dependent upon these two factors. Cf. especially: M. Handelsman's, *Rok 1848...*, issued also, slightly changed, in Italian: *Roma. Gli antecedenti del quarantotto e la politica polacca*, [in:] *Le relazioni fra l'Italia e la Polonia. Dall'eta romana ai tempi nostri*, Rome 1936.

appreciation for their cause. Czartoryski was proud of the fact that the names of Polish fighters surfaced again during the Springtime of Nations, as he believed: "Poland derives its life and hope from the names of its sons that are being pronounced in Europe"⁶⁰.

Evoking the threat of violence at an important moment of European commotion was not only to remind 'Europe' about the Polish national rights. This message was also addressed to the partitioning powers to show them that even if oppressed on Polish lands, the Poles will always undertake new initiatives abroad. Hôtel Lambert tried to prove that exiled Poles could be still dangerous, unpredictable, flexible with their alliances, and aimed at destabilizing the existing regional powers in Central-East Europe. Hôtel Lambert's capabilities were limited, but the idea of legions inscribed in the broader insurgent movement had an unnerving effect on the partitioning powers. In this light, we may analyze the Polish insurgent threat and legionary activity in Italy as the means, alongside diplomacy and other propaganda measures, of communicating with partitioners and of attracting European attention.

Lidia Jurek

KOMUNIKACJA PRZEZ UŻYCIĘ SIŁY: LEGIONY POLSKIE WE WŁOSZACH JAKO INSTRUMENT APELU DO „EUROPY” (1848–1849)

Plan powołania do życia legionów polskich we Włoszech (1848) był najczęściej analizowany przez pryzmat działań dyplomatycznych Hôtelu Lambert oraz ich słabej wojskowej efektywności. Artykuł ten – na podstawie materiałów archiwalnych – interpretuje inicjatywę legionową Czartoryskiego z punktu widzenia szerszej gry propagandowej prowadzonej przez księcia w Europie. Legiony miały za zadanie zjednanie sprawie polskiej europejskiej opinii publicznej. Odwoływały się do pozytywnych konotacji idei przemocy jako uświęconego europejską tradycją prawa wolnych ludzi do stawiania zorganizowanego oporu uzurpatorom oraz do hołubionej tradycji włoskich legionów Dąbrowskiego.

Dlatego właśnie Czartoryski wydawał się zadowolony z wartości propagandowej działań swoich agentów we Włoszech, którym udał się nie lada wyczyn – umieszczenia Polaka na czele całej armii włoskiej (piemonckiej). Wizja legionów jako załączka armii polskiej wydawała się tutaj grać rolę drugorzędną.

⁶⁰ A. J. Czartoryski, *Mowa powiedziana na obiedzie danym dla JW Generała Dembińskiego w Paryżu 13.04.1854*, [in:] *Mowy Xcia Wojew. A. Czartoryskiego przygotowane do druku, vol. II Zawierający mowy emigracyjne od r. 1834–1861*, BCZ 6449 IV. *Czartoryski already said similar words on the same occasion 3 years earlier*: 'Spreading the fame of their sons is one of the most efficient ways by which Poland may multiply attention which it is given in Europe. This fame keeps Poland alive when both its final victory and defeat are not close', A. Czartoryski, *Mowa Księcia na Obiad dany w Paryżu dla Generała Dembińskiego na dniu 13 kwietnia 1851*, [in:] *Mowy Xcia A. Czartoryskiego 1851–1860*, BCZ 6444 IV.