Theoretical Aspects of Collective Decision Making - Survey of the Economic Literature

• Authors: Piotr Stanek
• Languages of publication: EN

Abstracts

EN

The article aims at surveying the economic literature related to collective decision making. In order to do so it proposes a coherent framework allowing for a structured analysis of the factors influencing the works of a committee. These factors are divided into external ( shaped outside of the committee e.g. by law) and internal ones (related to the composition of the committee and interactions between its members). The survey of the general economic literature related to collective decision making presented within the proposed framework yields interesting suggestions for further research, including the consequences for the shape of monetary policy committees

• Publisher: Uniwersytet Łódzki. Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego
• Journal: Comparative Economic Research. Central and Eastern Europe
• Year: 2013
• Volume: 16
• Issue: 1
• Pages: 103-121

Dates

published

2013-03-01

online

2013-04-30

Contributors

author

Piotr Stanek

• Cracow University of Economics, Department of International Economics

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Identifiers

DOI

10.2478/cer-2013-0007