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“AN ISOLATED CASE”*: THE SLOVENE CARINTHIANS AND THE 1920 PLEBISCITE

ABSTRACT

The end of WWI saw the dissolution of the multiethnic Central European Empires and the formation of new states based on Woodrow Wilson’s concept of national self-determination. This article underlines the limitations of Wilsonian national self-determination, focusing on the Slovene Carinthians and the pro-Austrian result of the 1920 plebiscite. The outcome of the plebiscite exemplifies that minorities are motivated by more than solely ethno-linguistic reasons when deciding what state to belong to. Even though other factors existed, the key motivations for Slovene Carinthians to remain with Austria were of economic and political nature. It will be contended that the importance of the centuries long acculturation of Slovene Carinthians to Austria brought them closer to Austria than to the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. Additionally the phrasing of the plebiscite made Slovene Carinthians’ decision a question of state preference rather than ethno-linguistic identity. Moreover, the unpleasant occupation of parts of Carinthia by the troops of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes and the higher effectiveness of Austrian propaganda played a key role in the vote of many Slovene Carinthians. Lastly, the majority of Slovene Carinthians being farmers, reliant on Austrian trade opportunities, swayed them toward a pro-Austrian vote. Thus, the Carinthian plebiscite of 1920 builds a strong case against the assumption that ethno-linguistic ties alone should be the foundation for state formation arguing that other factors are equally or more important.

Key words: 1920 Carinthian Plebiscite; Slovenia; Austria; Wilsonian national self-determination

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* Lord Arthur Balfour (1848-1930), English Foreign Secretary in Paris. (Fräss-Ehrfeld, 2000)

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This work was supported
by the author’s own resources.
No competing interests
have been declared.

Streszczenie

Zakończenie I wojny światowej przyniosło rozpad wieloetnicznych imperiów w Europie Środkowej i powstanie nowych państw w oparciu o doktrynę samostanowienia sformułowaną przez Woodrowa Wilsona. Niniejszy artykuł uwypukla ograniczenia Wilsonowskiego samostanowienia, skupiając uwagę na przypadku Słoweńców karyńckich i korzystnym dla Austrii rezultacie plebiscytu z 1920 roku. Wyniki plebiscytu pokazują, że podejmując decyzję o swej przynależności państwowej, mniejszości kierują się nie tylko względami etniczno-językowymi. Dla Słoweńców karyńckich, którzy zdecydowali się na pozostanie z Austrią, oprócz innych czynników kluczowe znaczenie miały motywy o charakterze ekonomicznym i politycznym. Autorka dowodzi, że wielowiekowa akulturacja Słoweńców karyńckich w monarchii austro-węgierskiej spowodowała, iż bliższa była im Austria niż Królestwo Serbów, Chorwatów i Słoweńców. Taki wynik plebiscytu spowodowany był także sformulowaniem pytań: pytano o preferowaną państwowość, a nie o tożsamość etniczno-językową. Ponadto, kluczową rolę dla wyniku głosowania odegrał przykry przebieg okupacji części Karyntii przez wojska Królestwa SHS oraz większa skuteczność propagandy austriackiej. Wreszcie, fakt, że większość Słoweńców karyńckich stanowili rolnicy, którzy chcieli nadal korzystać z dawnych możliwości, jakie dla tego zawodu stwarzała Austria, wpłynął na to, że głosowali oni za pozostaniem w tym kraju. Plebiscyt karyński 1920 roku stanowi zatem przekonywujące świadectwo niecelności założenia, że same tylko więzi etniczno-językowe mogą stanowić fundament kształtowania państwa, a ponadto dowodzi, że równie ważną rolę odgrywają w tym także inne czynniki.

S ł o w a k l u c z o w e: plebiscyt 1920 roku w Karyntii; Słowenia; Austria; Wilsonowska zasada samostanowienia

All translations from German to English are found in the Appendix. German and English place names have been used in the text but Slovene names have been attached in the Appendix since they are equally applicable.

INTRODUCTION

At the end of the Great War, United States President Woodrow Wilson effectuated the right of national self-determination for the ethnically diverse peoples of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. This notion of statehood and nationality allowed for the various peoples confined in the Habsburg *Vielvölkerstaat* to create independent, democratic states or to confederate with ethno-linguistic kin-states. The effectiveness of national self-determination as a peacemaking and nation-building tool on dealing with the defeated Central Powers has been greatly contested.

Following the Habsburg Empire's dissolution, the Carinthian Plebiscite of 1920 not only put Wilson's notion to the test, but also shows, in historic hindsight though, that this notion caused problems in the future. Contrary to what was expected, the Slovene Carinthians¹ (SC) opted for staying part of Austria and recognizantly refused to join the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes (KSCS)², who insisted that Carinthian districts

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¹ Carinthians held to be ethno-linguistically Slovene.

² Created on December 1st 1918 by joining the Monarchy of Southern Slavs and the Kingdom of Serbia and Montenegro. (Fräss-Ehrfeld, 2000, p. 49)

inhabited by SC be joined together to the Southern Slavs' territories instead of remaining part of the former 'oppressor' state, Austria.

The historiographical debate amidst Austrian and Slovene historians questioning why SC voted in favor of Austria and not the KSCS accentuates flaws in Wilson's notion concerning influencing factors in decision making processes of minorities when exercising their right of national self-determination. In the case of the SC' decision, these factors clearly reveal that they were not motivated by a desire to join a conceptually related ethno-linguistic kin-state. In fact, the contrary is true; a historical consensus agrees that most SC were not persuaded by ethno-linguistic ties in deciding their national fate.

The plebiscite of October 10th, 1920, resulted distinctly in favor of Austria. This outcome has divided historians across the lines in assessing the key factors governing the Slovene Carinthian voters' choice. While Slovene historians like Peter Vodopivec (1986) and Augustin Malle (2000) argue that SC formed a decision based on state preference and not identity, Austrian historians like Heinz Dieter Pohl (2002) suggest that the SC' deeply set Austro-Hungarian acculturation prevented them from joining the KSCS. Hellwig Valentin (2009), Thomas Barker (1984), and Andreas Moritsch (1981), however, bring forward pragmatic factors, maintaining that socio-economic benefits induced SC to opt for Austria. Claudia Fräss-Ehrfeld emphasizes the international powers' influence on the plebiscite toward a, for them more favorable, pro-Austrian result. (Fräss-Ehrfeld, 1986)

So far, historians have provided ample research on the factors influencing the SC' choice, but they hardly discussed why the Carinthian vote runs counter to Wilson's theory on ethno-linguistic factors serving as basic constituents of statehood. This paper will demonstrate that the Wilsonian notion's geopolitical and geo-cultural blindness in favor of ethno-linguistic ties when applied to the defeated powers of WWI, illustrated in the case of Carinthia, failed to fully recognize the political and economic reality of the peoples concerned.

Supporting this argument, four major factors impelling SC will be examined. Firstly, impacts of acculturation over six hundred years meant that SC were not single-mindedly motivated by linguistic ties. They shared land, religious customs and values, and historic traditions bonding them to the Empire and, consecutively, to Austria. Secondly, use of the 'Miles Mission's'³ findings in Carinthia will show that some Slovenes based their decision on state preference, not ethno-linguistic links. They identified more advantages in joining the Austrian democratic republic than joining the military monarchy of the KSCS. Thirdly, SC participation in combating KSCS troops and the Austrian propaganda's effectiveness will show that, instead of welcoming the KSCS as ethno-linguistic kin, the SC perceived them as an enemy force. The SC' reaction to KSCS occupation will underline that Wilson had not realized that a disruption of day-to-day life by foreign forces would undermine the value of ethnic bonds. Fourthly, it will be argued that the economic benefits provided by the Austrian state, which would be lost upon separation, played a pivotal role in the voting decision of a predominantly agricultural Slovene population. Thus demonstrating, once more, that ethnic ties were overruled by other factors. This will be accomplished with the use of both primary and secondary sources. Most of the texts and sources will be in English and German; and Slovene sources have been incorporated, were translations were to be found.

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³ Composed of two professors and two US army members, one Austrian, one Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes representative as part of the US mission to Negotiate Peace conducting research to define the Austro-Slovene border. (Fräss-Ehrfeld, 1986, p. 10)

WILSON'S NATIONAL SELF-DETERMINATION

*"The phrase is simply loaded with dynamite. It will raise hopes which can never be realized."*⁴

The Allied Powers' limited understanding of the multi-ethnic fabric of Austro-Hungarian society resulted in internal troubles for the newly created states, lasting partly to this day. This can largely be traced back to the limitations of Wilson's notion of national self-determination in its application to reorganize the boundaries of the Habsburg Empire.

National self-determination embodied the essence of Wilson's political thought molded by "a cluster of ideas embracing Christianity, self-government, democracy, nationality, and the organic state" (Lynch, 2002, p. 423). It provided a basis for "the freest opportunity to autonomous development"⁵ of nations that belonged to defeated empires. It is generally believed that, as Alfred Cobban has argued, national self-determination refers to, "the right of a nation to constitute an independent state and determine its own government for itself"⁶. The confusion regarding the definition of national self-determination that still persists today, stems from the contrasting perception of its meaning at the time. While Wilson considered it to represent the right of "government with consent of the governed" (Fräss-Ehrfeld, 2002, p. 306), it was understood, in its application to Central Europe, as providing the basis for the creation of nation states built on ethnic ties. (Lynch, 2002, p. 224)

This paper will argue that Wilson greatly overestimated the sway of ethno-nationalism in relation to national self-determination. "[W]hat [did] 'self-determination' mean", Fräss-Ehrfeld asks, "when applied to a people who did not want to join the nation of their blood-brothers, or else were absolutely indifferent to all national questions?" (Fräss-Ehrfeld, 1986, p. 8) In that case, ethnic and linguistic ties do not necessarily translate to national ones. (Pohl, 2002, p. 185) Hence, SC were compelled by other factors.

THE CARINTHIAN PLEBISCITE

*"The Slovene who does not want to be a Yugo-Slav is a curiosity we should not have believed if we had not seen him, and in large numbers"*⁷

Wilson's Fourteen-Points and his notion of national self-determination rearranged the borders and political fate of Europe. At St Germain, the Allies decided to re-establish the borders of the Central Powers by means of plebiscites. (Kapitan, 2006, p. 1) Generally, Allied Powers saw plebiscites as the last resort to accomplish this. Yet Carinthia's economy was highly dependent on the north of Austria, and had an important train transit route connecting northern and southern Europe. (Fräss-Ehrfeld, 2000, p. 58) This prompted holding a plebiscite, despite the KSCS' territorial claims founded on ethno-linguistic links.

This plebiscite was to decide the national fate of the larger part of the *Klagenfurt* Basin consisting of approximately 755 square miles with a population of 125,900 north of the *Karawanken* Mountains. (Fräss-Ehrfeld, 2000, p. 163) Also, the economically and

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⁴ Robert Lansing in Pomerance (1976, p. 10).

⁵ Point X Woodrow Wilson's 14 Points, (1918) ('President Woodrow Wilson's 14 Points (1918)', n.d.)

⁶ Alfred Cobban in Ambrosius (2002, p. 125).

⁷ 'Bericht von Miles an Coolidge, Report No.9, Wien, Februar 1919', in Burz (2002, p. 135).

administratively important cities such as *Völkermarkt*, *Klagenfurt*, *Bleiburg*, *Ferlach*, and *Eisenkappel* were located within the Basin, as were two vital bodies of water, the *Wörthersee* Lake and *Drau* River, making it of key interest to both Austria and the KSCS. (Fräss-Ehrfeld, 2000, p. 166) The Basin's cities generally displayed a higher German speaking population while the countryside carried a predominantly Slovene population of 95 percent or more. (Fräss-Ehrfeld, 2000, p. 166)

For the purpose of the plebiscite, an "ethnic line" (Fräss-Ehrfeld, 1986, p. 9; see map) divided the Basin into two zones. Zone A, the larger zone, was in the southern part of the Basin, covered 662 square miles and had 73,000 inhabitants, most being Slovene Carinthian. Zone B ranged over a territory of 133 square miles and had a population of 54,000, with a majority of German Carinthians⁸ (GC). (Fräss-Ehrfeld, 1986, p. 9) To have a fair and democratic plebiscite, the Allies decided that, at first, the predominantly Slovene-speaking Zone A should vote, and should this bring a pro-KSCS majority, then the predominantly German-speaking Zone B should be allowed to vote. However, a vote in Zone B never occurred because 59.04 percent of votes in Zone A went to remaining with Austria. (Fräss-Ehrfeld, 1986, p. 7)

The plebiscite's result contradicted many expectations, and especially those of the KSCS. The 1910 consensus had shown that in the area composing Zone A, 70 percent of the inhabitants considered the Slovene idiom to be their *Umgangssprache* and thus it was assumed to also be a reliable determinant for nationality and national leaning. (Fräss-Ehrfeld, 1986, p. 12)

SLOVENE ACCULTURATION TO AUSTRIA: DOES LANGUAGE AUTOMATICALLY EQUAL NATIONALITY?

"If he feels himself a German, though it is not his mother tongue, is he to be counted as such?" (Barker, 1984, p. 86)

Historians, so far, have not placed enough emphasis on the circumstance of SC and GC having lived side by side for centuries, which effected the SC' acculturation to the Habsburg Empire and, consequently, to Austria. Acculturation has been defined as "the dual process of cultural and psychological change that takes place as a result of contact between two or more cultural groups and their individual members" (Berry, 2005, p. 698). This ongoing process generated, by degrees, basic communal relationships between Austrians and Slovenes. Sharing common customs and traditions, in part also commonly molded by Roman Catholicism's prevalence, further reinforced these ties. Thus they "learn[ed] each other's languages, shar[ed] each other's food preferences, and adopt[ed] forms of dress and social interactions that are characteristic of each group" (Berry, 2005, p. 700). Martin Wutte in *Deutsch – Windisch – Slowenisch*, (Klagenfurt, 1927) (Morrissey, 2012, p. 33) introduced the contested idea of the *Windische*⁹ as a group representing SC who unvaryingly preferred Austria to Slovenia or the KSCS. (Akturk, 2007, p. 28)

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⁸ Carinthians held to be ethno-linguistically German.

⁹ Before the 19th century *Windische* related to Slavs in general living amongst German speakers. It was used to differentiate Slovenes living in Carinthia and Styria from those living southward of the Karavank. With the rise of ethnic nationalism Austro-Germans started describing Slovenes who had assimilated to German culture and so spoke a Slovenian dialect blended slightly with German, as *Windische*. This *Win-*

The acculturation of SC to Austria going back hundreds of years became more prominent between the Austrian Revolution of 1848 and the beginning of the Great War. While the highly popular concept of ethnic nationalism swept across Europe only few SC pursued the idea of an independent Slovenia. Since German gradually became the Empire's official language, fluency in German was essential to rise socially in rank and to attain higher positions in both the economic and political spheres. Additionally, economic success being related to collaborations with German speakers gave rise to successful SC considering themselves more Austrian than Slovene. Moreover, the lack of popularity for the Slovene national movement in Carinthia shows that SC did not fully embrace, joining the pan-Slavist movement or radically national ideas. Nor did they, for the most part and also due to constraining geographic obstacles, associate themselves with the rest of the Southern-Slavs. Lastly, failure to establish Slovene as a language taught on par with German allowed a German-focused educational system to reduce the use of Slovene to a language mainly used at home. All these factors combined inhibited growth of strong solidary or pan-Slavist nationalist feelings, and induced SC in their decision favoring Austria in the 1920 Plebiscite. These Slovenes, contrary to Wilson's expectations, did not want to reunite with Southern Slavs, preferring the life they had created over centuries amidst GC.

This dates back to when the Habsburgs acquired Carinthia in the 14th century. Under the Habsburgs, German established itself more and more as the official and dominant language. (Hunter, 2000, p. 7) This resulted in GC occupying higher social positions when compared to those held by SC. Of course there were also some wealthier land-owning SC, yet, they were mainly in agriculture and associated with forestry and cattle breeding. (Moritsch, 1981, p. 223) These wealthier SC occupied more influential positions within villages like, doctors, and teachers, and thus forged stronger socio-economic bonds between GC and SC. Depending on GC in the cities for trade, SC gradually identified themselves as Austrian rather than as Slovene. (Barker, 1984, p. 75) Accordingly, most of them stated that they had stopped considering themselves in the censuses conducted by the authorities before WWI as 'Slovene Thinking'. (Moritsch, 1981, p. 225)

Speaking German as an essential skill for SC was not only reflected in the economic sphere but also in the success of the 19th century German nationalist¹⁰ movement versus the faintness of the Slovene counterpart. After the 1848 Revolution and during the remainder of the century, both German and Slovene ideas of nationalism eventually grew stronger, prompting deputy Joseph Mayer to remark in 1863 that „Vor dem Jahre 1848, lebten die Deutschen und Slowenen in großer Harmonie, man wußte nichts von zwei Nationalitäten [...] das Jahr 1848 kam und mit dem Jahr 1848 die Slowenische Agitation“ (Fräss-Ehrfeld, 2000, pp. 29–30). Slovene nationalists tried to promote the uniting of SC via organizations like the *Tabor Movement*, established 1868 in *Krain*, which encouraged the idea of a united Slovenia. (Pleterski, 1981, p. 51) Yet they never received enough support, lacking a common bond amongst all Slovenes in Austria. (Novak, 1954, p. 10) At a meeting in Vienna on deciding upon the new structure of Austria after the revolu-

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dischtheorie impeded Slovene nationalism from flourishing in Carinthia. Wutte, after the Plebiscite, defined the *Windische* as those Slovenes who voted pro-Austrian. Later on, *Windische* was used by Austrian nationalists as an insult and was used to create a divide amongst the Slovene Carinthians. (Hunter, 2000, pp. 51–64)

¹⁰ During the early 19th century, German nationalism in the Austro-Hungarian Empire related to cultural and linguistic ties. In the later 19th century nationalism started tying in more closely with regional links. After the German Unification in 1871, the idea of a distinct 'Austrian' nationalism became stronger. (Vink, 2013, pp. 12–13)

tion, for instance, it was suggested to separate Austria according to *Kreise* determined on "a national basis" (Barker, 1984, p. 63). The attempt for division based on ethnic ties was strongly resisted by both GC and SC. Instead of separating into two different nationalities, GC championed the idea of Slovene integration and assimilation to Austria. Hence, stronger German nationalism imminently heightened the pressure on Slovenes to assimilate. That GC filled greater positions of power meant they could easily thwart any attempt by Slovene nationalists in consolidating the Slovenian standing in Carinthia. (Barker, 1984, p. 74) The GC further isolated SC from the Slovene national movement by threatening them that any non-German speaking children would never attain prosperity and rank. (Barker, 1984, p. 74)

In the education system, particularly, the German nationalists successfully marginalized Slovene Carinthian nationalists. Under the reign of Maria Theresia and Joseph II many reforms improving the school system and the situation of minorities had been initiated. (Hunter, 2000, p. 31) Following the liberal *Märzverfassung* of 1848, each minority had the right to be taught in their respective mother tongue. Yet in Carinthia this met pronounced opposition, since it was viewed as Slovene emancipation sneaking in through the backdoor. (Malle & Entner, 2003, p. 4) Nevertheless, "[s]eventy-three Slovene schools were established in southern Carinthia, as well as five utraquistic schools and nine purely German ones" (Hunter, 2000, p. 32). The *Reichsschulgesetz* of 1869 also empowered regional diversification of what language schools should teach in. (Hunter, 2000, p. 33) Despite these advances, Slovene was only taught up to the second or third grade and then replaced with German. It seems Slovene school instruction was mainly used as a stepping-stone toward teaching German. (Hunter, 2000, p. 33) Even though in 1880 and 1891 orders from Vienna were delegated to Carinthia to ensure that Slovene be taught in schools, provincial Carinthian authorities remained hesitant in giving Slovenes opportunities to learn their language in a formal school setting. (Hunter, 2000, p. 34) More progressive teachers also encouraged instruction solely in German, after 1869, since they believed it would benefit their students' career prospects in the future more than Slovene ever could. (Hunter, 2000, p. 44)

Hence, the prominence of German instruction in schools further reduced a stronger budding of Slovene nationalist feelings. Andrej Einspieler expressed the sentiment of most Slovene nationalists at the time saying; "if one takes a language from a people, one has cut off a pulsating vein, has pierced its heart" (Hunter, 2000, p. 68). The failure to establish Slovene as a language taught in schools was a great setback for the Slovene national cause. The prevalence of German in schools as well as its importance in most spheres of life, except for the home, resulted in Slovene culture gradually receding and assimilation pressure to Austria rising further. Indeed, people declaring themselves as Slovenians in Carinthia decreased from 30% in 1890 to 9% in 1951 (Although emigration, as well as Germanization during the Nazi occupation (Kirk, 1991, p. 651) needs to be accounted for, assimilation also played a vital role). (Hunter, 2000, p. 29) This coincided with a decrease in those who considered themselves Slovene speakers. While in 1848 there were 114,000 declared Slovene speakers, in 1919 their number sank to 66,436. (Valentin, 2009, p. 21) It is important to note that the numbers garnered from these surveys questioned what the person's *Umgangssprache* was not one's mother tongue. German being used on a daily basis did not mean Slovenian was no longer spoken; it was just the result of German hegemonizing political and economic spheres. (Pohl, 2002, p. 183)

NATIONAL SELF-DETERMINATION: A QUESTION OF STATE PREFERENCE?

"I should have given all of Carinthia to Austria without further ado" (Martin, 1929, p. 23)

While some Slovenes in Carinthia voted for the Basin to remain part of Austria because they had acculturated to Austria and had not formed a strong Slovene national identity, a number of identity-confident SC based their vote on the question of state preference rather than ethnic ties.

Even though the goal at Saint Germain was to find a way to divide Carinthia based on ethnic bonds, the research, conducted to achieve clarity regarding new state boundaries, shed more light on SC' preferences of state than on ethno-linguistic links. The 'Miles Mission' was sent to Carinthia in 1919 to gather objective data and construct a recommendation concerning the viability of the Basin's separation. Slovene historians have argued¹¹, that the 'Miles Mission's' conclusions transformed the plebiscite into a question of state rather than ethnic preference. Thus, some Slovenes in Carinthia based their decision on the preference of living in the more progressive, democratic, Austrian Republic rather than the structurally rigid military monarchy of the KSCS. (Fräss-Ehrfeld, 2000, p. 102)

Due to bloodshed caused by increasing tensions between the KSCS and Austrian troops in 1919, the 'Miles Mission' went to Carinthia to prevent further escalation of hostilities. The Mission's research tour of the country lasted from the 28th of January to the 6th of February. (Fräss-Ehrfeld, 2000, p. 96) The Mission, as Sherman Miles¹² wrote to Archibald Coolidge¹³, was supposed to collect information on, "(1) a clear and unmistakable geographical line of demarcation, (2) national desires of the people, and (3) how [their] decision would affect the chances of a peaceful administration of the country"¹⁴. To accomplish this, the Mission tried questioning people from the most diverse socio-economic backgrounds, "peasants on farms and along the roads, merchants in villages, priests in churches, teachers in schoolhouses, lawyers, officials of all sorts, about everything under the sun" (Martin, 1929, p. 16). They even examined cemeteries to see if tombstone names pointed more to the Slovene or German origins of the deceased. (Martin, 1929, p. 18)

Despite trying to find the core leanings of SC regarding their relation to Austria and the KSCS, the questions asked by the Mission did not discover nationalist ties but uncovered politico-economic preferences. Lawrence Martin¹⁵, in the "Perfect Day of an Itinerant Peace Maker", written in 1929, provided some of the questions asked in his recollections:

"Would you prefer to be ruled by Austria or by Yugoslavia?"

"Were your markets before the war northward toward Vienna, eastward toward Marburg, or southward toward Trieste across the rugged Karawanken?"

"Is the majority of people in this village Austrian or Slovene?"

"Of course, we know that they are Carinthian; but where did your grandfathers come from? And what language did they speak?" (Fräss-Ehrfeld, 1986, p. 16)

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¹¹ Vodopivec, Pleterski, Moritsch.

¹² Head of 'Miles Mission' and US army member. (Fräss-Ehrfeld, 1986, p. 10)

¹³ Head of the commission to observe the political situation in former Austria-Hungary. (Fräss-Ehrfeld, 1986, p. 9)

¹⁴ 'Bericht von Miles an Coolidge, Report No.9, Wien, Februar 1919', in Burz (2002, p. 135).

¹⁵ Major in the US army, specialist for the Division of Territorial, Economic and Political Intelligence, professor of geography, and Mission Member. (Fräss-Ehrfeld, 1986, p. 10).

Examining the wording of these questions, the slight impression arises that they are phrased suggestively in favor of Austria. Especially the second question displays a slant using suggestive imagery via the adjective 'rugged'. The questions failed to obtain insights as to what ethnic group Slovenes felt closer to but gained insights of what state they preferred to be part of. Thus, the 'Miles Mission' changed their initial view of separating the Basin along an ethnic divide. (Vodopivec, 1986, p. 22) They saw that the "majority of Slovenes thought it wiser that they should continue to be subjects of Austria" (Martin, 1929, p. 23) and "from the point of view of national desires, [their] investigation convinced [them] that the majority of the people between the Drau and the Karawanken [...] preferred Austrian rule"¹⁶. This shows that in Carinthia national self-determination related not to ethno-linguistic ties but to the dominance of economic and political preferences.

Therefore, the KSCS regarded the 'Miles Mission's' conclusion as biased and unfair. They considered the Mission to have had preconceived pro-Austrian views, and accused them of not properly researching less prominent parts of the Basin. (Barker, 1984, p. 105) In addition, the KSCS felt that the 'Miles Mission', consisting largely of foreigners, would not induce Slovene inhabitants to express their true feelings, but would entice them to answer questions in German due to the official character of the interviews. (Barker, 1984, p. 105) Recollections of the 'Miles Mission's' work by Martin offer historical insight to the limitations of the Mission's work. His essay was published long after the Mission left Carinthia. Therefore one must bear in mind the possible skews of memory provoked by the passage of time. Although he presents the facts objectively and accurately, his pro-Austrian bias does shimmer through. One must consider that Martin, geographer that he was, might have recommended for the Basin not to be divided because he strongly appreciated a geographically organic unity. Also, Martin was limited in his research because he spoke no Slovene, thus he may not have been able to fathom completely the opinions expressed by Slovenes questioned. Particularly since Robert Kerner,¹⁷ proficient in Slovene, strongly recommended the division of the Basin. It is also important to point out that the KSCS troops' aggressive conduct may have swayed Martin against the KSCS, and may therefore have influenced his recommendations opposing a separation.

Despite complaints of partisanship on the KSCS side, it is fair to say that the Mission's conclusions reflected the sentiments of the majority of the Basin's Slovenes. The newly created, "decentralized parliamentary monarchy" (Dinko, 1940, p. 582) of the KSCS did not appeal to the Basin's Slovenes. The KSCS, under Serbian stronghold, was founded on the "autocratic rule of the monarch, by frequent uprisings of a military character, by wars and territorial expansion, and by chronic constitutional crisis" (Dinko, 1940, p. 584). Although a "parliamentary monarchy", in reality the King had complete control of the government, and parliament only exercised a very limited influence. (Dinko, 1940, p. 586) In comparison, the First Austrian Republic offered more. The new republic's military being constricted by the Treaty of St Germain and, like the country itself, in poor economic repair meant that male citizens were not threatened by imminent conscription. (Wambaugh, 1993, p. 204) Additionally, even though in transition, after the monarchy's demise, Austria still possessed a relatively stable government. It boasted a strong Social

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¹⁶ 'Bericht von Miles an Coolidge, Report No.9, Wien, Februar 1919', in Burz (2002, p.135).

¹⁷ Member of 'Miles Mission' and professor of Slavic studies at University of Missouri. (Fräss-Ehrfeld, 1986, p. 10).

Democratic party and a working parliamentary system in place. (Hanisch, 1994, p. 274) Janko Pleterski cogently observes that the social-democratically ruled republic drew in social-democratically inclined SC, thus prompting politically ideologically motivated loyalty to select for aspects of state over aspects of ethno-linguistic coherence. He substantiates this indicating that the number of pro-Austrian Slovene voters and Slovene social democrats compared with the parliamentary elections of June 19th 1921. This suggests that Slovene social democrats may have turned the plebiscite into an Austrian victory. (Moritsch, 1981, p. 227)

Furthermore, the Slovenes voting for Austria consonant with their state preference did not necessarily consider themselves assimilated to Austria. For them, remaining with Austria did not render them any less Slovene. (Vodopivec, 1986, p. 23) A pro-Austrian propaganda poster reads,

SLOVENES! LET US STAY IN CARINTHIA! YOU WILL SEE THAT WE SHALL OUTLIVE EVEN THE SLOVENES IN SLOVENIA! [...] WE SHALL SPEAK OUR DEAR MOTHER-TONGUE UNDER AUSTRIA IN AN UNDIVIDED CARINTHIA WE SLOVENES SHALL STAY (Vodopivec, 1986, p. 23).

It must be noted that many SC, like many other peoples in the Habsburg Empire, lacking a national identity may have transferred the loyalty they bestowed on the ruling Habsburg dynasty as source of authority and power onto that of the republican state. (Rathkolb, 2013) This Slovene population segment saw their autonomy or way of life not endangered in Austria, and for that reason alone did not want to become part of a dictatorial and military oriented KSCS.

THE KSCS OCCUPATION: THE ETHNIC BROTHER, AN INVADER RATHER THAN A LIBERATOR?

"Kärnten frei und ungeteilt"

The KSCS believed that the Austrians had been suppressing the Slovenes in Carinthia and brainwashed them into being pro-Austrian. They "[...] undoubtedly claim[ed] that the Austrian leanings of their brethren in Carinthia [were] due to [...] Germanization, and that in a few years under the rule of their own people the Carinthian Slovenes would become as loyal to their nationality, as the rest of their brethren"¹⁸. Therefore, the KSCS wanted every part of Carinthia, where Slovene inhabitants could be traced back 50 years, to become part of their kingdom. (Fräss-Ehrfeld, 2000, p. 151) For them, the ideal situation was to receive the whole of the Basin, including both major cities *Villach* and *Klagenfurt*. (Fräss-Ehrfeld, 1986, p. 9)

SC did not agree with this plan; their committed participation in the *Abwehrkampf*, underlines the discontent of SC with the presence of, what they considered, enemy troops. SC living in Zone A during that time, experienced traumatic incidents inflicted by KSCS army and administration representatives, which dissuaded them from voting pro-KSCS. The effectiveness of pro-Austrian propaganda in promoting a unified Carinthia appealed much more to the SC population than KSCS' propaganda that imposed their 'ethnic brothers' on them. Hence it seems that the KSCS, who according to Wilson's concept

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¹⁸ Archibald Coolidge at American Commission to Negotiate the Peace of February 12, in Fräss-Ehrfeld (1986, pp. 9–10).

would be more immediate to SC than Austria, was actually perceived more as an invader than a liberator.

The KSCS troops' presence from the middle of December 1918 to June 1919 resulted in effectively organized guerilla opposition from both GC and SC. (Fräss-Ehrfeld, 2000, p. 156) Although the Carinthian government called for all eligible men to join the fight against the occupier, the number of those actually conscripted was only 3 percent. (Fräss-Ehrfeld, 2000, p. 120) This indicates that the Austrian military greatly relied on cooperation with civilian volunteer corps. That the better equipped and prepared KSCS army was driven out suggests that Carinthians as a whole did not want them on their lands.¹⁹

This is exemplified by an incident during the occupation of the *Rosental Valley*, located between *Villach* and *Klagenfurt*, during January 6th and 7th 1919.²⁰ There, civilian GC and SC joined forces and managed, with only minor casualties, to expel the KSCS occupiers within 36 hours.²¹ The KSCS had already been in this area for two months, and technically could have won the support of the predominantly Slovene population. (Fräss-Ehrfeld, 2000, p. 106) Quite the opposite happened, fighting started in the town of *Arnoldstein*, and several sources confirmed that a number of men from the pre-dominantly Slovene *Gail Valley* were responsible for the attack.²² Miles states that "[...] the fight was started by Slovenes who were not from the Rosenthal but who fought to free the Rosenthal from Jugo-Slav occupation in order to clear their communication with their markets at Villach"²³. This military commitment suggests that for SC, the KSCS' troops constituted an aggressive enemy just as much as for the GC. The KSCS' military presence threatened the livelihood of SC and thus set them in opposition to their ethno-linguistic kin.

Adversity toward the KSCS is further supported by the reaction of Slovenes living in the separated areas outlined by the 'ethnic' demarcation line of June 1919. While life in Zone B remained relatively unchanged with low military presence²⁴, Zone A experienced the enforcement of drastic changes. The soldiers present created a hostile atmosphere conducting house searches, enforcing internments, and imprisoning anyone who caused trouble or appeared pro-Austrian. (Fräss-Ehrfeld, 2000, p. 172) As Miles reported the "Jugo-Slavs based their administration on military forces, but they also use[d] that force as a constant threat against the people" (Fräss-Ehrfeld, 2000, p. 136). This situation provoked not only discontent, it also fueled armed opposition against the KSCS, even amongst committed KSCS supporters like the Slovene clergy. (Fräss-Ehrfeld, 2000, p. 172)

In addition to military presence, the administration's language and local signposts changed into Slovene. (Barker, 1984, p. 147) Slovene teachers were imported (Barker, 1984, p. 147), and, in the 34 of the total of 51 municipalities in Zone A, KSCS mayors arbitrarily replaced Austrian ones. (Fräss-Ehrfeld, 2000, p. 171) Austrian aristocrats' landed property was confiscated, and "German organizations and societies – economic, cultural, and social – were placed under army control and had to cease operations" (Barker, 1984, p. 147). Around 5,000 GC were driven from their homes, and those remaining suffered cruel discrimination. (Barker, 1984, p. 147) To counter-act these changes and to create

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¹⁹ 'Bericht von Miles an Coolidge, Report No.9, Wien, Februar 1919', in Burz (2002, p. 135).

²⁰ 'Bericht von Miles an Coolidge, Report No.9, Wien, Februar 1919', in Burz (2002, p. 135).

²¹ 'Bericht von Miles an Coolidge, Report No.9, Wien, Februar 1919', in Burz (2002, pp. 135–136).

²² 'Bericht von Miles an Coolidge, Report No.9, Wien, Februar 1919', in Burz (2002, pp. 135–136)

²³ 'Bericht von Miles an Coolidge, Report No.9, Wien, Februar 1919', in Burz (2002, p. 137).

²⁴ 'Bericht von Miles an Coolidge, Report No.9, Wien, Februar 1919', in Burz (2002, p. 135).

the impression of improved conditions under the KSCS' authority, food from the KSCS was sent to Zone A, and schools and roads were built. (Barker, 1984, p. 147) Nevertheless, as was seen by the result of the plebiscite the modifications made by the KSCS were not welcomed by the Slovenes but regarded more as a hostile takeover.

The strong opposition of SC to the KSCS was further shaped by the effective use of propaganda by Austrians from summer 1919 to October 1920. (Valentin, 2009, p. 17) During this time, pro-Austrian propaganda surfaced everywhere. The Austrian propaganda system under the *Landesagitationsleitung* disseminated propaganda to the separated Zone A through a *Vertrauensmann*. (Barker, 1984, p. 148) He would smuggle propagandistic flyers, stickers and posters into the occupied zone. (Barker, 1984, p. 148)

Thus SC were constantly bombarded with the importance of Carinthia's unity, and "*Kärnten frei und ungeteilt*" became a key slogan of Austrian propaganda. Pro-Austrians argued for Carinthia's unity referring to common customs, history, and age-long co-existence, but also underlining economic reasons. (Hörzer, 2008, p. 5) Slogans like,

SEVERANCE FROM KLAGENFURT AND VILLACH MEANS OUR ECONOMIC DEATH. WE DO NOT WANT TO WITHER IN THIS FASHION. WE WANT TO LIVE AS FREE SLOVENE CARINTHIANS IN A UNITED AND PEACEFUL CARINTHIA (Vodopivec, 1986, p. 24)

resonated with many Slovene farmers. Printing posters in German, Slovene, and in local dialects, the Austrian propaganda effectively captured the diversity of the Basin. Austrian propaganda also exploited the SC' fear of the KSCS' militarism. (Fräss-Ehrfeld, 2000, p. 182) As can be seen in *Posters 1* and *2* (See Appendix), Austrian propaganda successfully alienated Slovenes from the KSCS by highlighting the importance of the fruitful economic and social opportunities present in Austria, in comparison to the lack of economic development and political stability in the KSCS. (Hörzer, 2008, p. 10)

KSCS propaganda, on the contrary, failed to recognize that not all Slovenes in Carinthia were alike. So it did not appeal to Slovenes acculturated to Austria or those yet undecided as what to vote in the plebiscite. (Valentin, 2009, p. 17) KSCS propaganda related only to Slovenes' language and ethnic links to the KSCS. It instrumented slogans like „*Die zehn Abstimmungsgebote für Slowenen*“, "4. Ehre Deine Muttersprache, auf daß Du auf eigener Scholle Dein eigener Herr werdest und nicht ein deutscher Knecht" (Fräss-Ehrfeld, 2000, p. 182 (See Appendix: *Poster 3*). The KSCS seriously believed that such slogans would convince the Slovene population to join them. In September 1920, Jovan Cviji stated in the KSCS' *Nova Europa*; "The only thing that is sure is that the number of nationally conscious Slovenes has increased since our administration and troops have been in Zone A"²⁵. In reality this was not the case; similarly to Wilson's national self-determination, KSCS propaganda focused too strongly on ethnic ties. It failed to appreciate that many SC had a good life in Austria and were not waiting to be freed by strangers claiming to be their kin.

Thus, Slovene Carinthian reaction to the KSCS' occupation shows that the Wilsonian notion did not adequately consider the effects of the division of a territory based on ethnic reasons, nor did it foresee that hostile disruption of daily life for those involved would engender opposition.

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²⁵ Jovan Cviji, *Nova Europa*, September 16, 1920, in Wambaugh (1993, p. 203).

THE SLOVENE FARMERS: ECONOMIC BENEFITS OUTWEIGH ETHNO-LINGUISTIC TIES?

“Wes Brot ich esse, des Lied ich singe” (Fräss-Ehrfeld, 2000, p. 193)

A key aspect the Wilson’s national self-determination discounted was the importance of economic ties for people deciding what state they wanted to belong to. The ‘Miles Mission’ concluded that “from the point of view of economics, it is highly undesirable that the province of Carinthia be divided by a political frontier”²⁶, and so no longer supported a division based on language.

A reason leading to the Mission’s conclusion lay in the predominantly agricultural structure of Carinthia. Although it had some industry, it lagged far behind the rest of Austria. (Barker, 1984, p. 23) According to data collected in 1910, a significant number of Slovenes, 70.6%, were employed in the agricultural sector. (Malle, 2000, p. 175) While a number of Slovene peasants were subsistence farmers, a significant number sold their goods in larger cities. The largest, market-oriented Slovene agricultural properties were located north of the *Drau* between *Klagenfurt* and the town of *Griffen*. Cattle and agricultural products cultivated there were mainly sold to markets in *Klagenfurt* and *Völkermarkt*. (Moritsch, 1981, p. 222)

KSCS administration falsely believed to be able to break this bond with Austria during the 12-month separation. Slovene farmers, having greatly relied on trading with the major cities in Carinthia, now had to accommodate the division of the Basin, meaning they had to take “a long journey over the Loibl pass or [pay] a costly railroad fare through the Rosenbach tunnel” (Wambaugh, 1993, pp. 203–204) to KSCS territory, instead of having direct access to their usual trading places. Therefore, the division of Carinthia prevented farmers from selling their goods in Austria and forced them to compete with low prices offered by Croat and Serb farmers in the KSCS. This caused a stark decrease in income for Slovene farmers. (Hörzer, 2008, p. 18) The return to normalcy after the removal of the demarcation line proved to farmers how much easier life in Austria was. (Fräss-Ehrfeld, 2000, p. 193) They could now access all their usual markets, in addition to receiving more attractive Austrian food prices, which were higher due to the general shortages experienced in Austria at the time. (Moritsch, 1981, p. 230) Moritsch points out that since 60 percent of votes were pro-Austrian, and most of the Slovene population consisted of farmers they leveraged a pro-Austrian outcome of the plebiscite. (Moritsch, 1981, p. 228) This is further supported by the fact that the communities closest to *Klagenfurt* voted pro-Austria. In the predominantly Slovene municipalities of *Tainach* and *Grafenstein*, close to *Klagenfurt*, the votes resulted in 85.9 and 88.1 percent pro-Austrian votes respectively. (Moritsch, 1981, p. 228) These results were even higher than the 83.4 percent achieved in the predominantly pro-Austrian municipality of *Völkermarkt*. (Moritsch, 1981, p. 228)

The argument gains momentum because urban votes mainly went to the KSCS. For city dwellers, it provided greater benefits. More food at lower prices was available, and more job as well as entrepreneurial opportunities were on offer. (Moritsch, 1981, p. 230) Yet, urbanites making up only a minority of the Slovene population, meant most of their votes going to the KSCS were insignificant to determining the result of the plebiscite. That Slovene farmers voted out of economic self-interest contradicted what Wilson and the ‘Miles Mission’ expected before going to Carinthia. The Allies failed to acknowledge that

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²⁶ ‘Bericht von Miles an Coolidge, Report No.9, Wien, Februar 1919’, in Burz (2002, p. 135).

the Karawank Mountains, separating Carinthia from Slovenia, had created closer trade relations between Slovenes and Austrians. Before the Empire's dissolution, there were "no barriers to trade and human movement" (Kladivo, Ptacek, Roubinek, & Ziener, 2012, p. 49) between the predominantly Austrian and Slovene populated parts of Carinthia. The two had "merge[d] economically, with capital, product, and labor flowing" (Kladivo et al., 2012, p. 49). The line's implementation severely disrupted vital relations forged in centuries and they could not be dissolved based solely on ethno-linguistic similarities.

However popular it is for historians to stress economic factors concerning the Slovenes' decision-making process is, it may be conceived of as biased in historical hindsight. Politico-economic circumstances in, both, Austria and the KSCS after WWI were highly instable and volatile. Back then no one anticipated which state would really enable a better life. Nevertheless, the importance of Austrian economic benefits were outlined by National Councilor Florian Gröger²⁷ at the time when he explained that „*Ich glaube schon, daß es weniger die nationalen als die rein wirtschaftlichen Gründe sind, weil die Leute wissen, daß sie nicht leben können, wenn sie an Jugoslawien fallen*“²⁸.

CONCLUSION

Wilson's Fourteen-Points and his concept of national self-determination based on ethno-linguistic ties were the main criteria according to which the former empires were re-defined and new states created in 1919. The impact this theory had on Europe can still be seen today. Wilson's limited appreciation of Central European geography and of the former empires' construct, as well as the victors' unequal treatment of the defeated powers as prohibiting Austria to join Germany, caused far-reaching difficulties.

Even Hitler instrumented national self-determination based on ethno-linguistic links to justify the conquest of *Lebensraum* to safeguard the "purity of the Aryan race." This resulted in the discrimination, persecution and expulsion of many Austrian Slovenes after the *Anschluss* to National-Socialist Germany in 1938. Still today a minority of politically rightwing Carinthians consider Slovenes as foreign elements.

Therefore, the case of Carinthia provides an example of how Wilson's idealistic concept for people of similar ethnicity to confederate did not integrate the reality of political and economic contexts enough. As has been argued, Wilson had disregarded that living alongside for centuries resulted in the reciprocal acculturation of peoples forming the Austro-Hungarian Empire. In Carinthia, a large number of SC had acculturated to Austria and so felt no affiliation to the KSCS. Furthermore, even though Wilson wanted peoples to join with their ethnic kin, the phrasing of research and questionnaires placed greater emphasis on issues of preferred statehood rather than on national identity. In Carinthia this is exemplified through the results of the fieldwork conducted by the 'Miles Mission'. In addition, the creation of a demarcation line based on ethnic ties often resulted in unwanted significant disruptions of life. As was seen in Carinthia, the KSCS troops and the changes they implemented were perceived as an imposition. This is supported by the active role SC played in the *Abwehrkampf*. Rejection of the KSCS is further corroborated

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²⁷ Journalist and politician of the Social Democrat Party, later governor of Carinthia. ('Florian Gröger', 1990)

²⁸ National Councilor, Florian Gröger in the minutes regarding the Plebiscite in Juli 28th 1920 in Hörzer (2008, p. 18).

by the success Austrian propaganda achieved compared to KSCS propaganda's failure. This focused too much on ethnic coherence, ignored the importance of the economic and cultural unity of the Basin and failed to embrace the diversity of Carinthia. Moreover, the Allied Powers did not recognize the importance of economic relations sustaining whole regions when carving up empires. As was seen, Carinthian farmers greatly relied on trade with Austria and a disruption of this endangered their livelihood.

While political and economic factors were of grave importance in determining SC' decision, it would be worthy to examine other areas such as religion, for example. SC being predominantly Roman Catholic could relate more to Roman Catholic Austria than, the religiously diverse (Roman Catholic, Orthodox, Muslim) KSCS. Furthermore, greater insight to what determined SC' decision could be given, in this essay, if access to interviews, and a greater range of primary documents, including Slovene and Serbo-Croatian sources would have been available.

Lastly, while this essay portrayed one case in which Wilson's theory did not apply, it is important for historians to further examine the topic. To this day, the disputed implementation of national self-determination following the dissolving of the Central Powers' multi-ethnic empires generates continued conflicts. Therefore it is important to shed greater light on the topic in order to better understand what factors determine peoples' considerations for the basis of the creation of states.

APPENDIX

Translations

Place names in English and Slovene in order of appearance in text

- *Königreich der Serben, Kroaten Und Slovenen*: Kingdom of the Slovenes Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes Kraljevstvo Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca (SHS), Yugoslavia
- *Kärnten*: Carinthia, Koroški
- *Karawanken*: Karavanks, Karavanke
- *Völkermarkt*: Velikovec
- *Klagenfurt*: Celovec
- *Bleiburg*: Pliberk
- *Ferlach*: Borovlje
- *Eisenkappel*: Železna Kapla
- *Wörthersee*: Lake Wörth, Vrbsko jezero
- *Drau*: Drava
- *Krain*: Kranjska, present day Slovenia
- *Villach*: Beljak
- *Rosental*: Rosenthal, Rožu
- *Griffen*: Grebinj
- *Loibl*: Ljubelj
- *Rosenbach*: Področca
- *Tainach*: Tinje
- *Grafenstein*: Grabštanj


Translations in order of appearance in text:

(All translations rendered by the author)

- 1) *Vielvölkerstaat*: Multi-ethnic Empire
- 2) *Umgangssprache*: Day-to-day Language
- 3) *Deutsch-Windisch-Slowenisch*: German-Windic-Slovene
- 4) *Windische*: Windic
- 5) *“Vor dem Jahre 1848, lebten die Deutschen und Slowenen in großer Harmonie, man wußte nichts von zwei Nationalitäten...das Jahr 1848 kam und mit dem Jahr 1848 die Slowenische Agitation”*: Before the year 1848, Germans and Slovenes lived in harmony, and no one conceived of two nationalities [...] the year 1848 arrived and with it did the Slovene agitation.
- 6) *Kreise*: Political Districts
- 7) *Märzverfassung*: March constitution
- 8) *Reichsschulgesetz*: Imperial School Law
- 9) *Abwehrkampf*: 'the self-defense struggle'
- 10) *“Die zehn Abstimmungsgebote für Slowenen”, “4. Ehre Deine Muttersprache, auf daß Du auf eigener Scholle Dein eigener Herr werdest und nicht ein deutscher Knecht”*: The ten Voting Commansments for Slovenes. 4. Honor your mother tongue so that you may be master of your own land and not a German serf.
- 11) *“Kärnten frei und ungeteilt”*: Carinthia free and undivided
- 12) *Landesagiationsleitung*: Provincial Propaganda Directory
- 13) *Vertrauensmann*: Secret Austrian supporter
- 14) *“Wes Brot ich esse, des Lied ich singe”*: “Whose bread I eat, whose tune I play”
- 15) *“Ich glaube schon, daß es weniger die nationalen als die rein wirtschaftlichen Gründe sind, weil die Leute wissen, daß sie nicht leben können, wenn sie an Jugoslawien fallen”*: I do believe that nationalist causes played less of a factor than the purely economic ones, since I know people will not be able to make a living once they belong to the KSCS.

Maps:

Paris, 4th June 1919 Map



(Fräss-Ehrfeld, 2000, p. 147)

Pro-Austrian Propaganda Posters:

Poster 1



“What we reap in Carinthia we want to sow! We will remain loyal to Carinthia”
(Fräss-Ehrfeld, 2000, p. 179)

Poster 2



“The SHS-State does not have any labor welfare!”
(Fräss-Ehrfeld, 2000, p. 177)



(Hörzer, 2008, p. 20, translated from German by author)

1. Believe in our victory!
2. You shouldn't mock Yugoslavia, it liberated you!
3. Put all your work energy into the plebiscite!
4. Honor your mother tongue that you will be your own master on your own ground rather than a German vassal.
5. Do not kill yourself and your offspring by voting for the Germans!
6. You shall not be unchaste with the Austrian strumpet!
7. Do not let your Slovene-Carinthian land be stolen!
8. Do not concern yourself with the untruthful promises and empty threats of the Germans!
9. Do not covet Klagenfurt, because it will come to us on its own!
10. Do not covet German wealth, for there is none!

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