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Kostiantyn Raikhert
Department of Philosophy
Odesa I. I. Mechnikov National University, Ukraine
<https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2929-9128>
k.rayhert@onu.edu.ua

The Logics of Sense and the Russian-Ukrainian War

Abstract:

The study examines Russian philosopher Andrei Smirnov's conception of the logic of sense as a way of providing exposition of the reasons for the Russian-Ukrainian war. The logic of sense is simultaneously a theory of rules of sense-setting and the very rules of sense-setting created by a culture and the ruling culture. Smirnov thinks that the reasons lie in the clash between common-human European culture and its logic of sense and all-human Russian culture and its logic of sense. Smirnov sees no difference between Russians and Ukrainians and considers the Ukrainian culture an essential and indispensable part of Russian culture. Therefore, the expansion of the common-human European culture to Ukraine challenges the all-human Russian culture.

Keywords:

civilization, culture, logic of sense, Russian-Ukrainian war

In March 2022, the Russian Ibn Sina Foundation released a video interview with Russian philosopher and specialist in Arabic studies Andrei Smirnov. The video interview was entitled "Islam in the Mirror of Science. Europe vs. East. How Does One Not Become Ethnic Supplies?" Contrary to what is stated in the title, the interviewer Andrei Lukashev, a Russian philosopher and specialist in Arabic studies, declares at the very beginning that the interview will focus on the causes of the Russian-Ukrainian war. It is noteworthy to emphasize that Andrei Smirnov is a significant person in Russian philosophy: Smirnov is the head of the Institute of Philosophy of the Russian Academy of Sciences, president of the Russian Philosophical Society, and editor-in-chief of the

“Philosophical Journal,” one of the leading philosophy journals in Russia. Hence, the appearance of this interview with Andrei Smirnov under such a misleading title during the Russian-Ukrainian war might not seem coincidental. The interview is also interesting as it shows the way leading and respected Russian philosophers think about the war.

At the outset, two remarks should be made. First, Smirnov does not use the word “war” to refer to the Russian-Ukrainian war. He uses the phrase “events in Ukraine.” Second, by and large, the explanation of the reasons for the “events in Ukraine” for Smirnov is an application of his conception, which was introduced in Andrei Smirnov’s several works *The Logic of Sense. The Theory and Its Application to the Analysis of Classic Arabian Philosophy and Culture* (2001),¹ *The All-Human One vs The Common-Human One* (2019),² “The All-Human One vs The Common-Human One: Europe, Arabian World, Russia” (2019),³ and *The Logic of Sense as a Philosophy of Mind: The Invitation to Meditation* (2021).⁴ Further in the text, I will refer to some above-mentioned works to clarify some of the assertions made in the video interview.

Smirnov distinguishes four levels of reasons for the Russian-Ukrainian war. The highest level, the one that is the most obvious, is force (military) with elements of diplomacy. Below that is the political level. Even lower is the socio-economic level. The lowest, the most basic, is the cultural and civilizational level. Smirnov is interested in the last level because this is the level of mentality, worldview, way of thinking, and the so-called “logic of sense.”⁵

Smirnov’s “logic of sense” is not like Giles Deleuze’s “logic of sense.” In *Logique du sens (Logic of Sense)*⁶ Deleuze investigates the structure and genesis of sense. Deleuze thinks that sense is a pure ideational event, which is not reducible to propositions and their three dimensions (states of affairs denoted by propositions; experience and mental activities like beliefs, desires, images, and representations expressed through propositions; general notions). Besides, according to Deleuze, the sense is not a principle or an origin but an effect produced from elements that do not have a sense. Deleuze’s logic of sense is, primarily, concerned with the issues of philosophy of language and logic, although it is not narrowed down to them only; Smirnov’s logic of sense is mainly concerned with the issues of philosophy of culture.⁷

In the video interview, Smirnov does not clarify what the logic of sense is. However, this term is substantially explained in the book *The Logic of Sense* (2001). According to Smirnov, the process by which a sense is created is called “sense-setting.” This sense-setting follows certain strict rules which determine the semantic content. The existence of certain strict rules of sense-setting allows us to speak of the logic of sense. The term “logic of sense” has two meanings: 1) logic of sense is a theory as a conceptual reflection of sense-setting laws in our consciousness; 2) logic of sense is the laws of sense-setting themselves, which exist objectively and independently of whether consciousness grasps or ignores them. In the latter meaning, the logic of sense is what drives culture. Different Cultures Produce Different Logics of Sense.⁸

In another book, *The All-Human One vs The Common-Human One*, the laws of sense-setting are considered as the collective cognitive unconscious, as Smirnov writes: “culture as a way of sense-setting manifests

1) Smirnov, *Teoriya i yeyo prilozhenie*.

2) Smirnov, *Vsechelovecheskoe vs. Obshchechelovecheskoe*.

3) Smirnov, “Yevropa, Arabskiy mir, Rossiya.”

4) Smirnov, *Logika smysla kak filozofiya soznaniya*.

5) Ibn Sina Foundation, “Islam v zerkale nauki.” Hereafter this will be cited parenthetically in text as IZN.

6) Deleuze, *Logique du sens*.

7) See Konev, “Zhil Delyoz i Andrey Smirnov,” chast 1 and 2.

8) Smirnov. *Teoriya i yeyo prilozhenie*, 498.

itself in the activity of each consciousness, which builds its world of meaningfulness along those fundamental lines, which are set by the collective cognitive unconscious.”⁹ While the laws of sense-setting in the ordinary life are not cognized, that is they are unconscious, the laws of sense-setting themselves can be detected and isolated; otherwise, it would be impossible to speak of the logic of sense.

It would seem, then, that Smirnov should have tried to compare the logic of the sense of Russian culture and the logic of the sense of Ukrainian culture in an effort to expose the root causes of the war between Russia and Ukraine. But no, Smirnov believes that the “events in Ukraine” are not a Russian-Ukrainian war, but a clash of the cultural and civilizational plates of Europe and Russia. Moreover, this clash is the result of a project that Europe has been implementing since the Renaissance and the fault of this very project (IZN). In other words: Smirnov, without saying this directly, claims that the responsible party for the “events in Ukraine” is Europe, and not Russia, which caused the war with Ukraine in 2014.

Here it is self-evident that Andrei Smirnov’s position is similar to the Clash of Civilizations thesis introduced by Samuel P. Huntington. According to Huntington’s thesis, the Western belief in the universality of Western values and political systems is naïve; this belief drives the West’s attempts to widespread such “universal” values and political systems among other civilizations (this is the core meaning of globalization) and causes antagonization between Western civilization and other civilizations. The clash of civilizations is a struggle between different cultures.¹⁰

However, Smirnov does not limit himself to pointing out the clash of civilizations; he says that the cause of the clash between European (in other words Western) civilization and Russian civilization is the “fault” in European civilization. This “fault” is a crisis. Not a simple crisis, but a decline. It is no coincidence that when Smirnov speaks of the “fault” of European civilization, he mentions Oswald Spengler, author of *Der Untergang des Abendlandes (The Decline of the West)*. Smirnov moves within the “logic” of the conceptions of the dynamics and decline of cultures or civilizations, which include not only Oswald Spengler’s morphology of cultures,¹¹ but also Arnold Toynbee’s theory of local civilizations,¹² Nikolai Danilevsky’s political theory of cultural-historical types,¹³ Pitirim Sorokin’s typology of cultures,¹⁴ and Konstantin Leontiev’s conception of Byzantinism and Slavism.¹⁵ In these conceptions, any culture or civilization eventually perishes. Some scholars (Konstantin Leontiev, Oswald Spengler) believed that European culture was in a state of dying.

According to Smirnov, the project that Europe has been building since the Renaissance is the project of universal common-human reason. This project is a belief in reason, the belief that consciousness is fully available to a human being. This places at its center an autonomous subject who is competent to make rational choices, who holds irrevocable rights and freedoms, and who ensures the effective implementation of democracy. European philosophy played no small part in making this happen because European philosophy, from the Ancient Greeks onward, has been constituting the project’s universality and rationality (IZN).

Smirnov thinks that the European project has a “fault,” and the cause of the “fault” is that the belief in the clarity of consciousness, was challenged by different conceptions like Marxism and Freudianism. Marxism points out that human consciousness is determined by social relations, and Freudianism points out that human

9) Smirnov, *Vsechelovecheskoe vs. Obshchechelovecheskoe*, 208.

10) Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?”

11) See Spengler, *Der Untergang des Abendlandes*.

12) Toynbee, *A Study of History*.

13) Danilevsky, *Rossiia i Yeuropa*.

14) Sorokin, *Social and Cultural Dynamics*.

15) Leontiev, *Vizantinizm i slavyanstvo*.

consciousness is determined by drives and the unconscious. Erosion of the European project is an erosion of the autonomy of the subject, her/his/their rational procedures, choice and rights, and freedom. It implies the erosion of democracy because democracy is given consideration as a rational choice (IZN).

Yet, Smirnov sees two perils of the European project for other cultures, for example, Russian. The first peril is the globalizing character of the European project. Globalization is the expansion of the European project across the globe. This means the dissemination of rational procedures and European values. The second peril is that everything that does not fall under the expansion of the European project is in effect recognized as being uncivilized, barbarous, and non-human. If a person is un-Europeanized, s/he/they are considered subhuman. That is why Smirnov questions, “how is the universality and non-alternative nature of the European view justified?” (IZN). Smirnov does not answer directly this question. Considering the above, though, the answer is evident: European culture gave rise to a logic of sense that led to the birth of the European project. Had there been a different culture, there would have been a different logic of sense, and there would have been a different project.

Smirnov reproaches European philosophy, which is responsible for the birth of the European project, for not being able to recognize these two threats and dismantle itself and the project. He is asking: “why can’t European philosophy dismantle itself?” But I think that Smirnov contradicts himself. If European philosophy is not able to dismantle itself, then what are the above-mentioned Marxism and Freudianism doing? In addition, there are many instances of challenging the European project and European philosophy: critical theory, deconstruction, postcolonial studies, and so forth.

A more radical approach could be suggested. Smirnov uses such words as “logic,” “philosophy,” “culture,” “civilization,” and so forth. In different words: Smirnov uses the terminological apparatus of the Europeans (representatives of Western culture) in general, and European philosophers in particular. In this case, Smirnov himself and his philosophical approach have fallen under the influence of the European project; one way or another Smirnov himself thinks as a European philosopher, that is, he is part of the European project. Then, his criticism is of the failure of European philosophy to “dismantle” itself, and that European culture is “dismantling” of European philosophy and culture through European philosophy. It appears that Smirnov himself is an example of how to “dismantle” European philosophy and European culture using European philosophy. In doing so Smirnov speaks about the logics of sense as theories/conceptual reflections of sense-setting laws in our consciousness or as sense-setting laws which exist objectively and independently of whether consciousness grasps or ignores them. It means that the logic of sense is impossible without consciousness and reason. By using the word “logic,” even in conjunction with “sense,” Smirnov consciously or unconsciously shows his belief in reason; the logic of sense is a belief in the reasonableness of culture.

Smirnov could try to get out of the situation by saying that “logic,” “philosophy,” “culture,” “civilization” and so on are words to express conventionally speaking: “cultural universals”: different cultures are congenial in that within the process of their development such cultural phenomena as logic and philosophy appear, and they reflex themselves through concepts denoted as “culture” and “civilization” in the European culture. However, because of historical and geographical conditions, different cultures can produce and be guided by their logics of sense but, this does not cancel the implicit belief in the reasonableness of culture. If any culture that produces the logic of sense proceeds from a belief in reason, then what is the difference between the European project and other cultural projects? Moreover, we can add that any logic of sense will strive to make its laws of sense-setting available to the consciousness of the carrier of this logic of sense: this carrier should in principle (potentially) have access to the laws of this logic of sense and understand their content, but s/he/they do not have to be an expert on these laws (philosophers, specially trained people, can act as experts in such cases). It is comparable with the laws of the state: any citizen can in principle know the laws of the state and understand their content; however, s/he/they do not have to be a legislator or a lawyer (an expert on the laws).

Either way, the inability of European philosophy, according to Smirnov, to take a critical look at the foundations of the globalizing-universal-rational project of European culture prevents this philosophy from admitting alternative projects, projects of other cultures. For European culture, other cultures are ethnic supplies (IZN). The only way to combat this is for other cultures to elaborate their logic of sense: their laws of sense-setting. For this reason, Smirnov suggests an alternative project for Russian culture.

Smirnov's project draws on the work of Russian thinkers, representatives of Pochvennichestvo, Slavophilia, Eurasianism, and Russian religious philosophy. All of them were held together by a factual belief in the unique path of Russia, whatever it may be called.

The key author for Smirnov is Nikolai Danilevsky. Smirnov is especially interested in Danilevsky's theory of cultural-historical types and the idea of the All-human outlined in Danilevsky's work *Russia and Europe* (1869). According to that theory, cultural-historical types (Egyptian; Chinese; Assyria-Babylonian-Phoenician, or Old Semitic; Indian; Iranian; Jewish; Greek; Roman; New Semitic, or Arabian; German-Romanic, or European; evolving Slavic) develop as living organisms and are in constant competition with each other and with the external environment.¹⁶

Danilevsky contrasts the common-human with the all-human. His opposition is based on a different understanding of the genus relation. The genus relation can be understood in two ways: 1) genus as generic: an abstract common (common characteristics), for example, the common between all representatives of the cat family; 2) genus as all-species: the totality of all representatives of a species, for example, the real totality of all representatives of the cat family. The common-human here is an abstract notion of human beings, whereas the all-human is the totality of all human beings. The latter is "higher than any individual-human, or popular; but it also consists only of the totality of all the nations, in all places and times existing and having to exist; it is incompatible and unfeasible in any one nation; its reality can only be different-placed and different-temporal."¹⁷ It is significant that for Danilevsky, a common-human civilization is impossible because it is not clear how to realize the abstract "human" in reality, and an all-human civilization because it is an unattainable ideal because for an all-human civilization to occur, all the cultural-historical types must develop consistently and together.¹⁸

Smirnov rethinks Danilevsky's conception. To him, the logic of identity of European culture is the embodiment of the common-human. He gives the following example: being European is a generic concept for German, French, English, and so forth; it is an abstract concept that captures certain attributes that unite Germans, Frenchmen, Englishmen, and so forth into Europeans ("The German is the German" and "The German is the European"). The all-human is what Russian culture presents with its logic of Sobornost. And here Smirnov finds it very difficult to explain what this is: being Russian is "the ability to accept someone else's subjectivity" (IZN); "To assert your Russianness means to assert that a Daghestani is a Daghestani, that a Jew is a Jew, and so forth. To assert the subjectivity of all others" (IZN); "To accept another subjectivity in oneself and to assert another subjectivity" (IZN). To clarify Smirnov's thought, the video interview even quotes a fragment of some of Putin's speeches:

I am a Russian man. As the saying goes, I'm all Ivan and Mary in my family. But when I see examples of such heroism as young Muslim Gadzhimagomedov, a native of Dagestan, a Lak ethnicity, and other soldiers of ours, I want to say: "I am a Lak! I am a Daghestani! I am a Chechen! I am an

16) See Danilevsky, *Rossiia i Yeuroopa*, 115–41.

17) *Ibid.*, 153.

18) See *Ibid.*, 154.

Ingush! A Russian! A Tatar! A Jew! A Mordvinian! An Ossetian!” It is simply impossible to list all of the more than 300 nationalities and ethnic groups. I think you know what I mean. But I am proud that I am part of this world, part of the mighty, strong, multinational people of Russia. (IZN)

Putin here is using the rhetorical device of identifying himself with the audience, to create a kind of feeling of unity with the audience. Smirnov, on the other hand, uses Putin’s words to support his conception, which can be seen as an argumentum ad verecundiam. (Is it even possible to use what someone says rhetorically as some kind of justification for one’s conception?) But even if Putin’s words act as support for the notion of the “all-human,” it can in no way indicate support for the uniqueness of Smirnov’s Russian project. There are other states with many nationalities and ethnicities, such as the United States of America. And in these states, the head of state may say something similar to what Putin said. How is Americanness then different from Russianness?

It would have been simpler if Smirnov had explained himself in Danilevsky’s terms, something like Russianness is all-human, that is, it is the totality of all nationalities and ethnicities living in the Russian Federation, but Russianness is not compatible and nor realizable in any of these nationalities and any of these ethnicities. Smirnov, however, does not put it this way. Moreover, Smirnov actually does not follow Danilevsky, because first, Danilevsky speaks of the Slavic cultural-historical type and not of the Russian type; second, Danilevsky considers only the Slavic peoples, not all the peoples who live in Russia, as part of the Slavic cultural-historical type; and third, according to Danilevsky, the all-human like the common-human, is not a quality of any one cultural-historical type.

One could try to grasp the concept of Sobornost. Yet this notion itself is difficult to understand. The *New Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, for example, describes Sobornost as “a concept of Russian philosophy, meaning the free spiritual unity of people both in church life and in secular communion, communion in brotherhood and love.”¹⁹ As applied to Russianness, it can be presented as follows: Russianness has to be the free spiritual unity of people living on the territory of the Russian Federation, the communion of these people in brotherhood and love. Whether Smirnov means this kind of unity is not clear.

Smirnov’s interviewer, Lukashev, tried to understand what Smirnov means when he talks about Russianness but, according to Smirnov, Lukashev failed to understand the logic of the sense of the Russian project, probably because Lukashev cannot overcome European logic and think within a different logic (IZN).

It should be understood that Andrei Smirnov does not unfold his conception in the video interview; he limits himself to an outline of his conception. In order to understand his conception, one should refer to Smirnov’s texts, primarily *The All-Human One vs. the Common-Human One*. This text says that contemporary globalism is trying to implant into the consciousness the idea of the common significance of European culture and, thus, to destroy the diversity of other cultures. Smirnov contrasts globalism with the all-human project of world order, “the project of preserving all the diversity, all the richness of manifestations of the human spirit, which revealed itself in a variety of logics deployed as a diversity of cultures. This project should make the multipolar world multi-civilizational.”²⁰

According to Smirnov, large communities of people called nations, which are organized into states, and which are carriers of a particular culture, and creators of a particular civilization, have three levels of collective identity: 1) the lowest level of collective identity is the national identity; 2) the middle level of collective identity is the “regional” level of collective cognitive unconscious, common to several nations and states and

19) Lazarev, “Sobornost,” 581.

20) Smirnov, *Vsechelovecheskoe vs. Obshchechelovecheskoe*, 205.

setting the general contours of their culture and civilization²¹; 3) the highest level of collective identity is the global level. Smirnov points out that the lower level of collective identity detaches itself from the middle level of collective identity, acquiring a unique characteristic only of a given people.²² Here we can hypothesize and imagine that at each of the three levels of collective identity there is a logic of sense of a certain order: bottom-up, first, second, and third.

Smirnov believes that European culture is a regional level of collective identity, which most likely unconsciously claims the status of a global collective identity. Here one could draw a certain, not strict, analogy with formal logic, in which almost every formal system or formal language claims universality. But if we accept this analogy, then we can come to the generalization that every logic of sense aspires to universality. In this case, European culture's claim to a common-human status is a normal phenomenon.

Smirnov also believes that Russian culture is built on the logic of the all-human, which is what he writes:

In the history of Russia, the logic of the all-human declares itself. Only this logic can be the logic of a truly human world order, which does not suppress any culture but, on the contrary, preserves it as a precious asset of all. The logic of the all-human is its own, "native" and organic to Russia's culture. Not to try to sneak to fit into someone else's civilization pie - it is unlikely that even crumbs will go to them, but to build their own. Only this can be a project of truly and genuinely successful, albeit not hasty, civilizational development for Russia.²³

Here I would prefer if Smirnov provided a concrete example. He does not do this, leaving the reader to guess for himself how it might be. I, for example, see it this way: there is a Lak – this is the lower level, there is a Daghestani – this is the middle level (Lak is a nationality in Dagestan), there is a Russian – this is the highest level (Dagestan is an autonomous republic in the Russian Federation). If my example is a correct understanding of Smirnov's conception, then some problems arise. I can give another example: there is the Flemish – this is the lower level, there is the Belgian – this is the middle level (the Flemish live in Flanders, the land of Belgium), there is the European – this is the highest level (Belgium is in Europe). Here European culture is also presented as a global culture. Perhaps, the European project is not only common-human but also all-human, and the Russian project is not only all-human but also common-human. The fact that Smirnov did not make clear the concepts he uses (for example, "Sobornost"), and the basis on which he singles out the common-human and the all-human makes my interpretation possible.

On this basis, according to Smirnov, the clash of European culture and Russian culture is a clash of one regional collective identity with one global collective identity, but in my interpretation of what Smirnov said, the clash of European culture and Russian culture is a clash of two global collective identities, both of which may well be common-human identities and all-human identities.

Concerning Ukrainians, one would think that Ukrainian collective identity in the all-human collective identity of Russia occupies either a lower or a middle level. However, according to Smirnov, this is not the case. Here is what Smirnov says about it in the video interview: Ukraine is "arranged like Russia." "How do you separate Russians and Ukrainians? If you take at least the European part of Russia, there almost every family or every second family has relatives who are Ukrainians," and in the current territory of Ukraine, there are people who have relatives in Russia. Some people came from the territory of Ukraine and permanently

21) Ibid., 205.

22) Ibid., 205.

23) Ibid., 208.

reside in Russia. “The main thing is that the relationship of Russians and Ukrainians is not a relationship of two different identities. If they are two different identities, they are bound to clash.” “The Ukrainian crisis is an artificial clash of identities.” So, what does Smirnov say? He says that there is no separate Ukrainian identity; it is still the same Russian identity. This is justified by the existence of kinship between Russians and Ukrainians and the residence of Ukrainians in Russia and Russians in Ukraine. Smirnov’s argument seems very unconvincing. Let us take a hypothetical example: let us say that Serbs and Croats are connected by kinship ties. Also, Serbs live in Croatia and Croats live in Serbia. Does this mean that there is no Croatian identity, that all Croats are actually Serbs? I think Croats do not agree that they are Serbs and Serbs do not think that Croats are Serbs.

In fact, Smirnov refuses Ukrainians’ identity, refusing to acknowledge that one of the causes of the Russian-Ukrainian war is a conflict of identities. It may follow from Smirnov’s words that the Ukrainian identity as something different from the Russian identity, is imposed by the European project which in this way tries to undermine the all-human logic of Russian culture. In this case, for Smirnov, the “events in Ukraine” are indeed an existential challenge (IZN), because the Russian-Ukrainian war is an attempt by the European project to destroy the logic of sense of the Russian project.

Here I would like to draw attention to Smirnov’s words: “Culture as a way of sense-setting manifests itself in the activity of each consciousness, which builds its world of meaningfulness along those fundamental lines, which are set by the collective cognitive unconscious. This is the subjective aspect of culture, but it already reveals an inevitable transcendence of the individual.”²⁴ And here I have a question: “Has Smirnov researched whether Russian culture as a way of sense-setting, that is, the Russian logic of sense or the Russian collective identity, manifests itself in the activities of the individual consciousness of each Ukrainian?” Probably not, because he does not deliver any evidence of that. But this does not matter to Smirnov, because he can always refer to the expansion of the European project.

Conclusion

Andrei Smirnov has created an ill-defined conception that is poorly reasoned. In general lines, the conception is one of dynamics and decline of cultures or civilizations, according to which cultures are governed by certain logics of sense, or laws of sense-setting. Large communities of people, which are called nations, which are organized into states, and which are carriers of this or that culture or creators of this or that civilization, have three levels of collective identity: 1) the lowest level of collective identity is the national identity; 2) the middle level of collective identity is the “regional” level of collective cognitive unconscious; 3) the highest level of collective identity is the world level. Smirnov believes, but has failed to justify, that European collective identity is the middle level of collective identity in contrast to Russian collective identity, which is the highest, all-human, level of collective identity.

Smirnov believes that there is no Ukrainian identity: when it comes to Ukrainianness, we are really talking about Russianness. Ukrainianness is a part of the all-human level of Russian collective identity. European culture tries to impose an artificially created Ukrainian identity on some Russians (who in fact are Ukrainians). This has already led to an existential challenge for Russian culture and as a consequence to the “events in Ukraine” (or the “Ukrainian crisis”). It turns out that the Russian-Ukrainian war is an attempt to save the all-human Russian project from the encroachments of the common-human European project.

24) Smirnov, *Vsechelovecheskoe vs. Obshchechelovecheskoe*, 210.

From the outside, Andrei Smirnov's conception looks like a philosophical conception that is built on poorly defined or clarified concepts and several assumptions that must be taken on faith, which makes this conception seem unconvincing and inconsistent. However, since the beginning of the Russian-Ukrainian war, Andrei Smirnov has been actively promoting his conception.²⁵ So, it has a chance to become recognized by Russian Academia as an explanation and justification of Russian aggression against Ukraine; especially for those Russian intellectuals who do not accept the philosophies of radical and fringe intellectuals like Aleksandr Dugin, Zakhar Prilepin, Aleksandr Prokhanov, Vladislav Surkov.

25) See Pruzhinin et. al. "Round Table Proceedings"; The Institute of Philosophy of the Russian Academy of Sciences. "Kruglyy stol."

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