Semantic Externalism and Its Answer to the Problem of Skepticism

• Authors: Maria Ebner

Title variants

PL

Strategia antysceptycka eksternalizmu semantycznego

EN

Semantic Externalism and Its Answer to the Problem of Skepticism

• Languages of publication: PL

Abstracts

PL

This paper discusses various answers to the problem of skepticism offered by some advocates of semantic externalism: Putnam’s argument against the brain-in-a-vat hypothesis and its reconstructions presented by Brueckner and Warfield. I argue that all these responses fall short of being successful. Brueckner’s disjunctive argument needs to be supplemented by a disquotational principle that assumes a specific interpretation of the other premises (the vat-English interpretation is excluded). Warfield’s argument rests on the principle of privileged access to the content of one’s own mental states. This additional premise is highly controversial given the externalist theory of meaning. I discuss two kinds of argument against combining semantic externalism with privileged self-knowledge: the reductio argument and the “slow-switching” arguments. The last part of the paper critically examines McKinsey’s attempt to construct a successful anti-skeptical argument.

• Publisher: University of Warsaw, Institute of Philosophy
• Journal: Filozofia Nauki
• Year: 2020
• Volume: 28
• Issue: 2
• Pages: 75-98

Dates

published

2020-06-26

Contributors

author

Maria Ebner

Identifiers

DOI

10.14394/filnau.2020.0010