The Fregean Axiom

• Authors: Mieczysław Omyła

Title variants

PL

Aksjomat Fregego

EN

The Fregean Axiom

• Languages of publication: PL

Abstracts

PL

This paper discusses the semantic assumption that Roman Suszko called “the Fregean Axiom.” According to the Fregean Axiom, a logical sentence is a name of its logical value, which means that all true sentences are names of one and the same object called “Truth,” and - by analogy - all false sentences are names of one and the same object called “False.” The Fregean Axiom is at odds with the common-sense intuition. Usually, we think that a sentence is not a name but anexpression that states that a certain state of affairs occurs. The article analyzes the presuppositions underlying the axiom. The second part of the text discusses the consequences of either adoption or rejection of the axiom.

• Publisher: University of Warsaw, Institute of Philosophy
• Journal: Filozofia Nauki
• Year: 2020
• Volume: 28
• Issue: 3
• Pages: 99-109

Dates

published

2020-10-31

Contributors

author

Mieczysław Omyła

Identifiers

DOI

10.14394/filnau.2020.0017