Bycie – nie bycie, prawda – fałsz w koncepcji Arystotelesa

• Authors: Marian Andrzej Wesoły

Abstracts

EN

The basis of Aristotle’s arguments about truth and falsity is formulated syntactically according to the distinctions of ‘to be’ as the predicative affirmation - composition and, correspondingly, ‘not to be’ as negation – separation. As the nominal defining characteristic of falsity is contradiction, so of truth is non-contradiction. The expression of truth or falsity in the declarative sentence of affirmation or negation is a function of thinking as a human cognitive disposition under the semantic figures of categorical predication. In addition, we cite Aristotle’s more important texts on the true intellection of non-composites (indivisibles), the investigation of truth and probability, the diagnosis of falsehood, the truthfulness and lying. Finally, a mention of modern adaptations of Aristotle’s concept of truth.

Keywords

EN

Aristotle; Being – Not-Being; Categorical predication; Falsity as Contradiction; Truth as non-contradiction; Philosophy as investigation of truth; Truthfulness and Lying

• Publisher: Uniwersytet im. Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu
• Journal: Peitho. Examina Antiqua
• Year: 2021
• Volume: 12
• Issue: 1
• Pages: 171-196

Dates

published

2021

Contributors

author

Marian Andrzej Wesoły

• The Jacob of Paradies Academy

Identifiers

DOI

10.14746/10.14746/pea.2021.1.9

Biblioteka Nauki

2016357