Of Luck Both Epistemic and Moral in Questions of Doping and Non-Doping

• Authors: Kenneth William Kirkwood

Title variants

PL

Of Luck Both Epistemic and Moral in Questions of Doping and Non-Doping

• Languages of publication: EN

Abstracts

PL

This article is a case study of a question of possible doping and how our insights into our moral judgements about doping are subject to considerations of both moral, but more presciently, epistemic luck. The eternal ambiguity surrounding the prevalence of doping, and its impact on high-level sport make this question entirely relevant for our discussions about the ethics of performanceenhancement in sport.

Keywords

EN

doping; ethics; sport; moral luck; epistemic luck; case study

• Publisher: Uniwersytet im. Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu
• Journal: Ethics in Progress
• Year: 2020
• Volume: 11
• Issue: 1
• Pages: 77-84

Dates

published

2020-06-09

Contributors

author

Kenneth William Kirkwood

• Western University

• https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9615-4650

References

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Identifiers

DOI

10.14746/eip.2020.1.4