Czy po Heideggerze i Levinasie możliwa jest etyka w tradycyjnym tego słowa znaczeniu?

• Authors: Ryszard Moń

Title variants

EN

Is ethics in the traditional meaning of the word possible after Heidegger and Levinas?

• Languages of publication: PL

Abstracts

PL

The author tries to answer the question whether thinking is possible as a type of knowledge about human behaviour. To this end, he compares two thinkers, who, while differing considerably from one another, are similar in that they reject the traditional philosophy of existence, and use language with multiple meanings. Heidegger considered ethics as something of fundamental importance, but differing from ethics as knowledge, or as normative science. Levinas, on the other hand, believed ethics was the first philosophy, but did not treat it as normative. He argued that ethics was not cultivation of good, nor even a system of values, but a relationship with others. Heidegger criticized traditional ethics and morality, treating them as immature, juvenile even. Nevertheless, there is something in his writings that suggests what he had in mind was the necessity of existence. The ethics criticized by Heidegger or by modern French anti-humanists as well as Levinas reemerges in the form of humanities, as a discipline which puts man in the centre of the universe and defines actions that are appropriate for him. Shouldn’t we, however, following the train of Kant’s thought on the role of judgment, affirm the ontological difference Heidegger talked about? Since Kant accepted valuation of beauty, one can hazard a guess there exists a certain minimum of substantiation; if not of moral truth, then at least of substantiation at the level of meaning. Subjectivity must be shown as the power to create meaning, and thus to take moral action. Ethics after Heidegger still seems to be possible.  

EN

The author tries to answer the question whether thinking is possible as a type of knowledge about human behaviour. To this end, he compares two thinkers, who, while differing considerably from one another, are similar in that they reject the traditional philosophy of existence, and use language with multiple meanings. Heidegger considered ethics as something of fundamental importance, but differing from ethics as knowledge, or as normative science. Levinas, on the other hand, believed ethics was the first philosophy, but did not treat it as normative. He argued that ethics was not cultivation of good, nor even a system of values, but a relationship with others. Heidegger criticized traditional ethics and morality, treating them as immature, juvenile even. Nevertheless, there is something in his writings that suggests what he had in mind was the necessity of existence. The ethics criticized by Heidegger or by modern French anti-humanists as well as Levinas reemerges in the form of humanities, as a discipline which puts man in the centre of the universe and defines actions that are appropriate for him. Shouldn’t we, however, following the train of Kant’s thought on the role of judgment, affirm the ontological difference Heidegger talked about? Since Kant accepted valuation of beauty, one can hazard a guess there exists a certain minimum of substantiation; if not of moral truth, then at least of substantiation at the level of meaning. Subjectivity must be shown as the power to create meaning, and thus to take moral action. Ethics after Heidegger still seems to be possible.

Keywords

PL

etyka; prawda bycia; relacja z innymi; myślenie refleksyjne

• Publisher: Uniwersytet im. Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu
• Journal: Filozofia Chrześcijańska
• Year: 2009
• Volume: 6
• Pages: 117-126

Dates

published

2009-01-01

Contributors

author

Ryszard Moń

• Uniwersytet Kardynała Stefana Wyszyńskiego Wydział Filozofii Chrześcijańskiej Katedra Etyki Współczesnej

References

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• Ferry L., Renaut A., La question de l’éthique apres Heidegger, w: tenże, Systeme et critique de la raison dans la philosophie contemporaine, Bruxelles 1992.
• Ferry L., Renaut A., Systeme et critique de la raison dans la philosophie contemporaine, Bruxelles 1992.
• Forthomme B., Structure de la metaphisique levinasienne, ,,Rev. Phil. Louvain" 78(1980).
• De Greef J., Le concept de pouvoir éthique chez Lévinas, „Rev. Phil. Louvain” 68(1970).
• Hegel G.W.F., Fenomenologia ducha, tłum. A. Landman, t. 2, Warszawa 1965.
• Heidegger M., List o humanizmie, tłum. J. Tischner, w: tenże, Budować, mieszkać, myśleć. Eseje wybrane, Warszawa 1977.
• Heidegger M., Wprowadzenie do metafizyki, tłum. R. Marszałek, Warszawa 2000.
• Heidegger M., Czym jest metafizyka?, w: tenże, Znaki drogi, tłum. K. Pomian Warszawa 1995, s. 9-24.
• Kant I., Krytyka czystego rozumu, tłum. R. Ingarden, t. 2, Warszawa 1986.

Identifiers

DOI

10.14746/fc.2009.06.09