Spór o naturę świadomości

• Authors: Karol Polcyn

Title variants

EN

The problem of consciousness

• Languages of publication: PL

Abstracts

PL

Although phenomenal consciousness resists explanation in physical terms, it remains an open question whether or not consciousness is an intrinsically physical phenomenon since it remains an open question whether or not conscious states are identical with physical states. This question is one of the key issues of debate in contemporary philosophy of mind. Here I survey some of the key arguments designed to show that conscious states are not physical states. I argue that materialists have no satisfactory response to those arguments.

EN

Although phenomenal consciousness resists explanation in physical terms, it remains an open question whether or not consciousness is an intrinsically physical phenomenon since it remains an open question whether or not conscious states are identical with physical states. This question is one of the key issues of debate in contemporary philosophy of mind. Here I survey some of the key arguments designed to show that conscious states are not physical states. I argue that materialists have no satisfactory response to those arguments.

• Publisher: Uniwersytet im. Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu
• Journal: Filozofia Publiczna i Edukacja Demokratyczna
• Year: 2013
• Volume: 2
• Issue: 1
• Pages: 200-212

Dates

published

2013-06-16

Contributors

author

Karol Polcyn

• Uniwersytet Szczeciński

Identifiers

DOI

10.14746/fped.2013.2.1.10