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2015 | 4 | 2 | 77-90

Article title

Dualizm bytu i powinności w czystej teorii prawa Hansa Kelsena

Authors

Content

Title variants

EN
The problem of is/ought dichotomy in Hans Kelsen’s pure theory of law

Languages of publication

PL

Abstracts

PL
Following paper is concerned with the problem of Is/Ought dichotomy in Hans Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law. This is one of the most important problems which needs to be addressed in order to provide autonomous legitimacy of law in terms of normativism. The claim that those two spheres ought to be separated, is analysed from three different philosophical perspectives: ontological, epistemological and normative. Each of them posits Kelsen’s dichotomy as essential to a development of his concepts. The paper is an attempt to answer the question why this distinction is necessary in the context of legal validity and effectiveness.
EN
Following paper is concerned with the problem of Is/Ought dichotomy in Hans Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law. This is one of the most important problems which needs to be addressed in order to provide autonomous legitimacy of law in terms of normativism. The claim that those two spheres ought to be separated, is analysed from three different philosophical perspectives: ontological, epistemological and normative. Each of them posits Kelsen’s dichotomy as essential to a development of his concepts. The paper is an attempt to answer the question why this distinction is necessary in the context of legal validity and effectiveness.

Keywords

Year

Volume

4

Issue

2

Pages

77-90

Physical description

Dates

published
2015-12-15

Contributors

author
  • Uniwersytet im. Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu

References

Document Type

Publication order reference

Identifiers

YADDA identifier

bwmeta1.element.ojs-doi-10_14746_fped_2015_4_2_16
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