DOI : 10.14746/pp.2017.22.4.1

Zbigniew CZACHÓR
Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań

The enlargement of the European Union – Poland's example. Between unity and diversity

Abstract: The history of Poland's integration activities, undertaken both before and after joining the EU, has featured several attempts to demonstrate its desire to become an independent entity in the internal EU game of the interests of other EU countries and institutions. This has been the case, since Poland's interests have not always been compatible with the interests of the other actors of integration. For instance, Poland has opposed the scenario of the faster development of countries forming the 'hard core' of the EU. On the other hand, Poland still supports the universal postulate of making Europe a continent of democracy, freedom, peace and progress. The European Union has remained the guarantee that the lines that divide Europe will be erased and stable and consistent development ensured. Therefore, the author believes that Europe (the European Union) has no alternative, and will have to opt for a universalist-and-particular synthesis of unity in multiplicity, and unity in diversity, which enriches and develops but does not divide countries. First and foremost, this synthesis emphasizes the common good while not losing sight of (abandoning) the individual good.

Key words: integration activity, enlargement, interests, common good, accession

Theoretical introduction

The period between 2015 and the present day can clearly be named the "decisive moment" (French: *l'instant decisive*) when the outcomes of Poland's accession to the European Union can be reviewed. There are three clashing perspectives here. One concerns the timeframe and the thirteenth anniversary of Poland's accession (May 1, 2017). Another concerns the most profound crisis of integration ever, encompassing the economic and financial crunch (the threat of the collapse of the Economic and Monetary Union with its common currency, the euro), Brexit, the collapse of the European Neighbourhood Policy and the refugee crisis. Finally, there is the electoral victory of the Law and Justice (PiS) party in the fall of 2015 in Poland.

The theoretical approach taken in this paper – the concept of the decisive moment – has been borrowed from Henri Cartier-Bresson, and it boils down to conducting a simultaneous analysis of numerous factors allowing Poland's membership of the EU to be assessed. This approach is the outcome of the clash of idealistic and pluralistic paradigms (neofunctionalism, first and foremost) with that of realism (neorealism) and realistic constructivism.

This approach may also be referred to as the theory of the decisive moment. Taking this point of view, it is worth considering whether the hitherto mainstream perception of the position of Poland in the European Union is likely to be undermined and replaced by a Eurorealistic or even Euroskeptical approach.

What is also significant here is the theory of context, which refers to the requirement of taking into a critical account a set of coexisting current factors and points of refer-

ence rooted in the political, ideological and socio-economic environment associated with a radically altered approach to the role of Poland in the EU.

The context makes it possible to precisely understand the determinants of Poland-EU integration before and after 2015. The context (political, ideological and socio-economic) is decisive for the present European policy in Poland. The context is also an element of narration and deliberation, as presenting a positive or negative image of the European Union influences the degree to which either the united or different strategic and tactical goals (interests) of Poland and the EU are emphasized.

The context also makes it possible to explain the change that has occurred in European policy in Poland after 2015, whose authors (primarily J. Kaczyński[1]) have decided that it should focus on reinforcing the independence of Poland in the European Union by emphasizing sovereignty and the concept of a Europe of Fatherlands (“Europe of equal and solidary states”).

Non-confrontational (idealistic) determinants of the Polish accession doctrine

1. Twenty years after the adoption of the National Integration Strategy, Poland’s EU membership continues to be a strategic development goal. The debate on the integration of Poland with the European Union has gone through several crucial stages over this period. Stage one was about the identification of integration objectives and intentions; it was concluded in Luxembourg when the European Council resolved to commence accession negotiations with Poland in 1997. Stage two spanned the period between March 1998 and the end of the negotiations in December 2002, and marked the time when Poland’s integration plans were confronted with the reality of European policies, in particular that of intergovernmental relations. Period three lasted from 2003 to the accession on May 1, 2004, and may be referred to as the period of celebration, since it witnessed the accession treaty being signed, ratified and coming into effect. The last, current, post-accession stage is the time when the formal provisions associated with membership are confronted with the extent to which they can be absorbed into the Polish legislation, economy and politics (*Narodowa*, p. 4).

This post-accession period can also be divided into the times of the governments of Law and Justice (PiS) and Civic Platform (PO) respectively. The political consensus on the position of Poland in the EU has clearly been destroyed over this period. The first reason for this was the dispute over the content and ratification of the Lisbon Treaty. The second reason, which we are facing today, is related to the infringement procedure launched by the European Commission against Poland, and the serious disputes between Poland and the EU on the issue of immigrant relocation, as well as energy and climate policies, not to mention the election of the President of the European Council.

2. Talking about the recent years of Poland’s membership, both in 2004 and at present, the integration with the European Union has facilitated accelerated internal development, modernization of the economy and legislative system as well as bridging the developmental (civilizational) gap between Poland and many other European states. The

[1] Jarosław Kaczyński is the leader of the ruling party in Poland – PiS (translator’s note).

accession treaty entered into force on May 1, 2004, initiating a new, advanced stage of political and regulatory transformation processes. The present Poland’s legislative, political and economic systems are intrinsically coupled with those of the European Union.

3. Poland’s ambitions to become a full and serious member of the European Union have long been accompanied by thorough considerations of the benefits and consequences of abandoning efforts in this regard. The assumption is that Poland’s integration with the EU is associated with opportunities, increased potential and, therefore, with the spontaneously generated ‘added value’ of accession. The analysis must not ignore the alternative of ‘failed integration,’ however, which means consciously or unconsciously staying outside European integration or on the outskirts of the European Union. This has to be taken into consideration, because Poland’s membership of the European Union has required and continues to call for enhanced unification and harmonization in politics, economy and legislation. Had Poland failed to release its energy and kick start the accession potential, its participation in the EU might have been faulty and the benefits decidedly smaller. It remains an open question, however, whether or not the current government in Poland intends to continue these efforts. The answer appears to be affirmative.

4. Poland’s integration with the EU has been based on the conviction that this process is beneficial for both parties. Poland is trying to prevent any potential threats, continuously verifying, monitoring and assessing integration and applying mechanisms and instruments intended to prevent the adverse consequences of accession. This task is far from easy, though. Fortunately, Poland is not on its own in the EU system. It is accompanied by twenty-seven solidary states and the whole EU institutional system that supports it (Kubin, 2016, pp. 70–75).

EU membership generates political, economic and social benefits for Poland. The political gains primarily concern involvement in the project of building an integrated Europe by means of active participation in the European governance system and the operations of EU institutions and entities in broadly understood legislative terms. So far, it has been assumed that such an involvement makes it possible to increase the stability of the democratic system in Poland and promulgate standards and values rooted in the European public realm. Another political benefit concerns the tighter relations emerging between Poland and Europe (including also non-EU members) at the individual, local and regional levels. Following Poland’s accession to the European Union, regions have been reinforced and empowered, in particular as concerns the management of structural funds. In individual terms, Poland’s accession to the EU has enabled Poles (Polish citizens as on May 1, 2004) to partake in eliminating obstacles to free movement, settlement and employment in the EU (*Raport*, pp. 2–5).

The economic benefits encompass being part of the common single market with its advancing free flow of goods, services and capital, as well full access to EU financial transfers, communication exchange and inflow of investment and new technologies.

The social benefits include the implementation of European standards in Poland, especially as concerns internal security, labor conditions, health, education, information and quality of life. It is also about the benefits generated by the implementation of European environmental standards which pertain to rising living conditions, the implementation of modern and environmentally friendly technologies based on the rational consumption of raw materials and energy, as well as simultaneously improving the ef-

ficiency of operations and avoiding the scenario of continuously damaging the biological and environmental balance.

The integration of Poland and the EU is also associated with costs of both budgetary and socio-economic nature. The former are related to the member ‘contributions’ (payments to EU budget, co-financing of structural investments and the Common Agricultural Policy) and the costs borne to ensure the operation of the central structure of coordination and administration, alignment of legislation, personnel training and information activities. The socio-economic costs may, and actually do take the form of difficult challenges faced by some sectors of economies, regions or business entities.

It should be borne in mind that considerations on the topic of benefits and costs are typically relative in nature. What is a political cost for some, for instance transferring a portion of power exercised by certain state authorities to EU institutions, is a benefit for others who see it as participation in EU decision-making processes. The economic costs related to the implementation of EU legislation (*acquis communautaire*) and the overwhelming unification and harmonization bring modernization, increased competitiveness and enforce learning and self-improvement. Similarly, what one group sees as a possible increase of labor costs may mean growing remuneration and improved living conditions for another group (*Narodowa*, pp. 6–10).

It should not be forgotten that the costs generated by the unprecedented dynamics of transformations following the accession have not been the price Poland has paid for joining the EU, but the price for long-lasting economic backwardness and civilizational stagnation. These costs would most likely have had to be borne had Poland joined the EU or not. The experience of other states that have joined the Communities and EU shows that, in the long run, the economic benefits generated by integration are significantly greater than the costs of adaptation required by the specific operations of the EU.

The determinants of Poland’s membership of the European Union. Between unity and diversity

1. The transformations of the political system and economy which initiated the process of Poland’s integration with the European Union resulted from numerous domestic and external factors. The most significant external determinants included the following (Najder, pp. 1–3; Berend, 2012, pp. 5–15):

– the political and economic confrontation between the East and the West came to an end, resulting in the hegemonic role of the Soviet Union being undermined, and then in the collapse of the USSR, the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance;
– the opposition and, later, the then new government in Poland (rooted in the Solidarity movement) enjoyed the support of the USA and countries and organizations in Western Europe (first and foremost, the European Communities, European Union and the Council of Europe);
– Poland’s seeking to take the North-Atlantic path was associated with Western Germany’s pursuit to reunite the FRG and GDR;

– the neighborhood of Poland changed thoroughly (in the aftermath of the reunification of Germany and the collapse of the USSR and Czechoslovakia).

The following crucial domestic factors have been identified:

– the collapse of real socialism (its rejection by Polish society in the June 4, 1989 election);
– transformation of the system from socialism to capitalism (free-market economy) and a parliamentary democracy;
– the agreement of different political forces as to Poland’s foreign policy and, in particular, Poland’s preparation for joining the EU; this agreement was broken after some time by the PiS party, first and foremost, which has always pursued a Euro-realistic attitude and the sovereign position of Poland in Europe.

2. Talking about the more than a dozen years of Poland’s membership, both in 2004 and at present, the integration with the European Union was aimed to facilitate internal development, cohesion and modernization as well as bridging the developmental (civilizational) gap between Poland and its surroundings. Poland’s EU membership has been a strategic goal and apparently continues to be one. This goal was consistently implemented by successive governments in Poland from 1989 to 2004 as the expression of the majority of Polish society’s desire for Poland to be a member and active agent in European structures.

3. Membership of the European Union has given Poland a multitude of new political, economic and socio-cultural opportunities which have served the purpose of catching up with the most developed countries in the EU and globally. The system of agreements and connections between the European Union and the states and institutions/organizations across the globe has enabled Poland to employ them for the purposes of its own promotion and development (*Raport*, pp. 9–12).

Determinants against Poland’s accession to and membership of the European Union

1. Poland’s expectations to join the European Union were rooted in the national interest. From the very beginning, however, the accession was far from easy and called for a number of contradictory and mutually exclusive approaches and interests to be overcome (*Narodowa*, pp. 8–10).

2. Being an EU member, Poland has had the right and obligation to present and defend its own interests. Yet the extent and intensity of positive or negative interactions between Warsaw and Brussels remains an open question.

3. The greatest (and most profound) crisis of integration and the European Union, which started as early as in 2005 (and has not ended despite what the ‘official optimists’ claim), evidences that the status of Poland in the European Union has to be founded on Poland’s national interests being taken into account, and included in the interests of the integrating community of the 28 member states (or 27 after Brexit) and the extensive EU institutional system.

4. After over a dozen years of integration Poland has failed to acquire a strong political position and the reputation of a predictable and responsible country. This has been the case

despite the good economic situation, political stability in the difficult period of the economic crunch and the high support of Poles for integration, which has always distinguished Polish society from many other European societies (*10 PL-UE*, pp. 1–6). Political parties in Poland and successive governments from 2008 to 2015 committed countless mistakes and frequently abandoned the efforts to strengthen the position of Poland in the EU, not to mention the lack of European education in Polish schools and universities. The same can be said about the NGOs, whose activities aimed at the propagation of European ideas have not been supported, and even if they have, the financing has been provided by the EU, Norwegian funds and the resources of German political foundations.

5. Poland has negotiated billions of euros to be allocated under the Multiannual Financial Framework 2014–2020 and has been assured of its strategic partnership by Germany and France. All that did not help the PO to win the 2015 parliamentary and presidential elections.

6. At present (2017), the Polish government stresses that what continues to count in the process of European integration is the sovereignty of Poland and its independence from, and equality with other states and EU institutions. In this way, the Polish government is abandoning the mainstream approach to integration and the EU, and seeks such allies as Hungary and other Central European Countries, rather than Germany.

7. The European Union has been weakened by crises and is completely unable to deal with some EU countries, including Poland, infringing EU legislation and the Copenhagen criteria. This reinforces the political elite’s conviction that ‘you can do whatever you want’ in the EU without any repercussions.

Change of the context, narration, discourse and deliberation concerning the paradigm of how to approach European Union membership in 2005–2007 and after 2015

1. The issue of Poland’s objectives (interests) becoming incompatible with the expectations of the European Union is related to the different outlooks Warsaw and Brussels have in the following areas:

– how Poland’s integration with the EU is defined as the conscious positioning (‘becoming engrafted’) in the system of Western Europe;
– how the process of economic, legislative and political transformations is understood;
– how Poland’s full participation in the Single Market is perceived, including the advancement of the free flow of goods, services and capital as well as the access to EU financial transfers and permanent, institutionalized communication;
– Poland’s economy and legislation have had to be significantly aligned with those of the EU, which has been expected to mean that European standards would be imposed, in particular in the fields of the economy, internal security, labor conditions, health, education, quality of life and environment;
– the energy and capacity released after the accession ensure that Poland’s development potential is not curbed by the outcomes of integration (Mucha-Leszko, 2014, pp. 40–41);

– the extent (level) of participation in the European governance system, in the full scope of operations of EU institutions and entities;
– the intensity with which Poland builds its relations with the rest of Europe at the individual, local and regional levels;
– the coordination of political, administrative and diplomatic activities by means of intensive domestic Europeanization.

2. The results of Poland’s EU membership evidence that Poland has taken better advantage of the EU than other countries in the same region which joined the EU in 2004 and 2007, respectively. Poland has become a leader in economic growth. Poland’s GDP has increased by half (48.7%) since joining the EU. EU funds in 2004–2013 have facilitated the implementation of over 160,000 projects at a cost of over EUR 120 bn (*10 PL-UE*, pp. 7–10).

On the other hand, having been an EU member for over a decade, Poland has stumbled over the serious problem of the medium level development trap. Despite being in the EU, Poland has been stuck, finding it difficult to move from the stage of rapid development based on quantitative factors (such as inexpensive labor, EU funds streaming in and foreign investment) to the intensification stage based on modern technology, high industrialization, export competitiveness (the requirement to strengthen its competitive position) and, thereby, higher labor efficiency, improved quality of products and services, and generating its own capital resources (Lissowska, 2014, pp. 1–4).

3. Poland has to become more independent in how it is positioned inside the EU and become a real EU power broker. This is of particular importance in the face of the growing rivalry, contradictions and conflicts in the integration system of the following triad:
– between EU member states;
– between EU institutions;
– between the former two.

This may be achieved within the framework of EU instruments (policies) (Czachór, 2009, pp. 1–5).

4. The integration crisis is not making it easier for Poland to maintain the unity of its interests with the EU. The EU does not give Poland much leeway in the implementation of its European policy. Poland cannot afford to find itself in the European peripheries or to fall into the medium development trap, by becoming dependent on external agents (the European Commission first and foremost), foreign investment and the economic situation of the largest partners (Germany). Therefore, it is necessary to complete the following tasks:
– intensively expand abilities, capacities, resources and reserves, man-made processes and manpower collected in order to be used in a strategic and reactive way. These resources primarily include: financing, raw materials, energy, human capital as well as experience, knowledge and competences/skills;
– seek authorization from the EU and its agents for Poland’s activities and acquire the skills to employ EU potential for the implementation of Poland’s objectives and plans which do not go against the *acquis communautaire* and *acquis politique*;
– run an ongoing dialogue/debate without avoiding difficult topics, and thereby display assertiveness in terms of implementation and harmonization, while opposing those political and legislative solutions which defy the interests of Poland;

– firmly reject the assumption that EU decisions are/will be made only by selected members (a handful of the strongest EU members);
– permanently participate and unceasingly (stubbornly) voice the opinions of Poland’s representatives (the government, president, national parliament, local governments and NGOs, representative structures of Poland’s business, academia and culture) on every matter of the integration process. Poland must not merely be a passive observer and commentator;
– flexibly establish partnership agreements with other EU states (strategic or not) and links (bilateral and multilateral) resulting from shared interests and values. This will allow Poland to state its position on a particular topic and seek allies with a similar attitude. This policy will make it possible to undermine or eliminate such concepts as the ‘European directorate,’ ‘the core’ of Europe, or ‘different speeds,’ all of which are intended to reinforce the division of the EU into a center and peripheries;
– develop a network, or institutional and non-institutional links (including informal personal contacts and friendships);
– take advantage of emerging opportunities, yet avoid benefitting from others’ weaknesses;
– employ forward thinking to eliminate threats which may undermine Poland’s position in the EU. Potential issues need to be resolved through the ongoing review, monitoring and assessment of membership based on the mechanisms and instruments applied to prevent the adverse impact of potential risks and dysfunctions.

The outcome of Poland’s over a decade-long membership of the EU must be a question of Polish opinion on the future of the EU and eurozone

1. Poland is in the political elite of EU members, having both the moral right and the right following from its treaties to participate in shaping the future of Europe. After all, Poland has demonstrated (with the pace and depth of its economic and political transformations) it is a reliable partner in shaping the new European reality.

2. In this context, it should be Poland’s primary task to develop an efficient model for the coexistence of different, opposing entities, human experiences and opinions employing the *modus vivendi* principle.

3. The awareness that Poland is co-responsible for the future of Europe must not be a taboo in Poland. It is our task to define how Poland envisages the future of an integrated Europe and subject it to public debate, for the sake of Polish society, too, which has to realize what may happen once the flow of EU financial resources stops.

4. Poland’s membership of the Economic and Monetary Union (eurozone) is a crucial challenge for the future of Poland in 2017–2020. In conformity with the accession treaty which entered into force on May 1, 2004, Poland is obliged to adopt the common currency. Therefore, repeating “never” or “firmly negative” is of no formal significance.

Given the above, it may be assumed that the following will be required of Poland to join the eurozone:
– the conviction that gaining access to cheaper capital as a result of adopting a single currency is a positive development needs to be changed. Unfortunately, this is a trap.

When interest rates are too low, a speculation bubble might emerge which then bursts, triggering a crisis;
– competitiveness in terms of price and quality has to be achieved to facilitate exports, alongside high professional activity, low structural unemployment, people investing in themselves and high mobility;
– a flexible attitude to Poland’s participation in the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) II, which has been an official requirement so far. Participation in the ERM II may lead to Poland’s losing its competitiveness in terms of costs;
– Poland’s being invited to the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) extended primarily by the Euro Group (primarily Germany), the European Commission and European Central Bank. All arguments ‘for’ and ‘against’ need to be considered after such an invitation.

The European Union’s enlargement to include Poland and the opinion of Polish society

1. The high level of social support for European integration continues to be a highly important determinant of Poland’s position in the EU. It cannot be founded exclusively on Poland succeeding in acquiring further billions of euros from the EU, the lack of border controls due to the *Schengen acquis* and the access of the unemployed in Poland to the EU labor market. Therefore, a European education must not be neglected at both national and local levels, and with the participation of both public institutions and NGOs. The goals of this education (“learn Europe, learn through Europe, learn about Europe”) have to continue to encompass the following:
– the promulgation and implementation of European integration within the framework of “Europe’s go-to people” formula;
– research, education and cultural activities related to European topics in order to support the endeavors to strengthen the position of Poland in the EU;
– full implementation of membership results in the domestic system of integration by means of designing and preparing the appropriate background (triad I): institutions (structures) – procedures – people (triad II: politicians – officials – experts);
– participation in the development of European civil society and commitment to the revival of the European project;
– a debate on the European future of Poland after 2020.

2. The current and future condition of public discourse on Poland’s membership of the EU is influenced by the following factors (Czachór, 2010, pp. 14–15):
– the financial and economic situation in Poland, in particular in the times of a European and global crisis;
– the level/scale of absorption of EU financial resources;
– the attitude of political parties and their leaders to European integration;
– the political agreement/agreement between political parties (or its lack) on Poland’s integration with the EU;
– the negotiating skills of Poland/the Polish government, and the ability to reach the necessary compromise;

– the ability to express Polish interests at the European level;
– Poland’s position in the EU (both imagined and actual);
– Poland’s representation in the European Union’s institutions;
– the conformity of Polish legislation to European/EU legislation;
– preparedness to adopt a single currency – the euro;
– the extent and quality of information spread by the mass media about the EU and European integration;
– public polls which evidence the extent to which Polish society supports the EU, given the continued low level of knowledge about European integration and the EU in Poland.

3. EU membership of Poland continues to enjoy high support among Polish society. On the other hand, the attitudes of Poles to the issue of Poland’s membership of the EU are far from unanimous. 37% of Poles believe that their country would handle future challenges better if it were outside the EU. It can therefore be understood that nearly 40% of Poles do not perceive the EU as the only alternative for the future development of Poland and that, under specific circumstances, this group could envisage being outside the EU framework. In a survey carried out in February 2016, over one third of Poles (35%) said that EU membership excessively curbs the sovereignty and independence of Poland. Another interesting feature is that, compared to other countries, Poles seem to be against the idea of enhanced integration (Balcer, Buras, Gromadzki, Smolar, 2016, pp. 5–6).

Due to the above-mentioned factors, the outlook presented in the following quotation does not resonate well among Poles: “We are killed by nations. It’s a poison running in our veins. It doesn’t allow us to unite on supranational problems. Democracy is unable to keep up with the economy and control it because nations do not allow democracy to go beyond state borders. If we allowed that, a supranational democracy would be empowered and people would get the sense of having an influence. They would not have to vent their frustration by voting for populists. When we don’t allow the EU to seriously integrate we surrender to the power of the global economy, or nationalist populists” (Sierakowski, 2016, p. 12). The more so, as practically nothing has been done since accession to help Poles become more familiar with and better understand the transformations occurring in Europe and the European Union.

Conclusion

1. Despite the multitude of problems related to Poland’s EU membership, our joining was based on respect for the values referred to in Article 2 of the Treaty of European Union, which reads as follows: “The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail.”

2. Having been an EU member for over a dozen years marks the right time for Poland to consider the coordination of European policy in Poland. European policy is not a de-

pendent element of foreign policy. Since the Office of the Government Plenipotentiary for European Integration and Foreign Aid was established in the early 1990s, European policy has been considered to be independent, or at least autonomous, from state foreign policy. The situation changed when the Office of the Committee for European Integration was included in the system of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It was justifiable to combine the departments dealing with foreign affairs and European policy, as was evidenced in the course of the Polish presidency of the EU council.

3. After the period of over a dozen years since joining the EU, Poland should be guided by the following principles (Jaskulski, 2013, p. 23):

– further integration of Poland with the EU makes sense only provided that it is mutually beneficial;
– EU member states, in particular the countries of the ‘Old EU,’ have to be continuously persuaded that Poland has a unique position in Central and Eastern Europe;
– Poland’s European policy has to seek to achieve (maintain) the balance between the European and the Atlantic;
– the principle of the mutuality of asymmetric adjustments jointly negotiated (before and after accession), whether in or outside treaties, needs to be maintained;
– the conduct of EU institutions and any member state must not breach the principle of non-discrimination, solidarity and European cohesion. All the proponents of the implementation of the EU’s hard core (kernel – a union within the Union) should hear a firm ‘no’ from Poland;
– Poland is obliged to continuously evidence (confirm) its ability to fulfill the obligations related to integration that it has accepted;
– Polish borders must not become the lines of any new divisions and must not close and isolate;
– succeeding in the EU depends on national specializations (including Poland’s specialization) in specific topics – different EU policies and fields of activity (for instance, the European Neighbourhood Policy, strong and efficient agriculture and energy policy);
– Poland is becoming a partner of actors who are bigger and stronger. Poland wants to be distinguished by its firmness and consistency on the one hand, and by innovation and resourcefulness on the other. This is particularly noticeable in the activities of Polish MEPs;
– it continues to be necessary to present a precise definition of Poland’s vision of an integrated Union (Europe), also in the context of the future of integration (Bachmann, 1999, pp. 144–145);
– the only limitation on Poland’s independent position in the European Union will be imposed by the respect for the *acquis communautaire*. Yet whenever EU legislation is not in line with Poland’s national interest it should be opposed by all available (lawful) legislative and political measures. Failing to meet the obligations towards the EU which are stipulated in the treaties may be a path to nowhere;
– Poland must not give the impression of feeling like a guest, rather than a member of the EU. It cannot only dig into EU financial resources, while forgetting the legislative, economic and financial achievements of the EU (Kosikowski, 2016, p. D6).

Bibliography

Bachmann K. (1999), *Polska kaczka – europejski staw. Szanse i pułapki polskiej polityki europejskiej*, Warszawa.

Balcer A., Buras P., Gromadzki G., Smolar E. (2016), *Polacy wobec UE: koniec konsensusu*, Warszawa.

Berend I. T. (2012), *Od bloku sowieckiego do Unii Europejskiej. Transformacja ekonomiczna i społeczna Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej od 1973 roku*, transl. J. Gilewicz, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego, Kraków.

Czachór Z. (2013), *Kryzys i zaburzona dynamika Unii Europejskiej*, Dom Wydawniczy Elipsa, Warszawa 2013.

Czachór Z. (2010), *Pozycja międzynarodowa Polski Anno Domini 2010. Analiza politologiczna czynników wpływu*, in: *Dwa dwudziestolecia. Geopolityka. Państwo. Społeczeństwo*, eds. P. Hauser, W. Mazurczak, Wydawnictwo Poznańskie, Poznań.

Czachór Z. (2009), *Proces dochodzenia Polski do członkostwa w Unii Europejskiej*, in: *Negocjowanie granic: od UE 15 do UE27. Rozszerzenie wschodnie Unii Europejskiej. Część pierwsza – Grupa Luksemburska (2004): Estonia, Polska, Republika Czeska, Słowenia, Węgry, Cypr w UE*, ed. T. R. Szymczyński, Wydawnictwo Naukowe WNPiD UAM, Poznań.

10 PL-UE. 10 lat w Unii Europejskiej (2014), Ministerstwo Spraw Zagranicznych, Warszawa, http://www.msz.gov.pl.

Jaskulski A. (2013), *Analiza polskiej polityki europejskiej w latach 2004–2014. Założenia, wyzwania, aktorzy, oceny*, Author’s material, Poznań.

Kosikowski C. (2016), *Korzystajmy z dobrych wzorców unijnych*, “Dziennik Gazeta Prawna”, 1 marca.

Kubin T. (2016), *Kontynuacja procesu rozszerzania jako wyzwanie dla Unii Europejskiej*, “Teka Komisji Politologii i Stosunków Międzynarodowych”, nr 11/2.

Lissowska M. (2014), *Instytucje rynku pracy – czy Polska popada w pułapkę średniego poziomu wzrostu?*, http://www.pte.pl/kongres/referaty, 25.02.

Mucha-Leszko B. (2014), *Wzrost gospodarczy i proces konwergencji oraz średnio- i długoterminowe perspektywy zmniejszania luki rozwojowej*, in: *Pozycja gospodarcza Polski w Unii Europejskiej*, ed. B. Mucha-Leszko, Wydawnictwo UMCS, Lublin.

Najder Z. (2008), *Polska w Europie*, “Dziennik”, 12 kwietnia.

Narodowa Strategia Integracji (1997), Urząd Komitetu Integracji Europejskiej, Warszawa.

Raport w sprawie korzyści i kosztów integracji Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej z Unią Europejską (2000), Raport stanowi realizację uchwały Sejmu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej z dnia 18 lutego 2000 r. w sprawie przygotowań do członkostwa Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej w Unii Europejskiej, Rada Ministrów, Warszawa, 26 lipca.

Sierakowski S. (2016), *Wieje piaskiem od strony wody*, “Gazeta Wyborcza” 2–3 lipca.

Rozszerzenie Unii Europejskiej – przykład Polski. Między jednością a różnorodnością

Streszczenie

Polska kilka razy w swej historii aktywności integracyjnej przed i po przystąpieniu do UE podjęła próbę zademonstrowania pozostałym krajom UE i unijnym instytucjom, że chce być samodzielnym podmiotem wewnątrz-unijnej gry interesów. Tym bardziej, że nie zawsze interesy Polski są zgodne z interesami pozostałych aktorów integracji. Na przykład sprzeciwiamy się postulatowi szybszego rozwoju krajów należących do „twardego jądra” UE. Z drugiej strony Polsce nadal bliskie jest uniwersa-

listyczne przesłanie, które brzmi: naszym wspólnym życzeniem jest uczynienie Europy kontynentem demokracji, wolności, pokoju i postępu. Unia pozostaje dla Polski nadal gwarantem redukowania linii podziału w Europie i popierania stabilności i pomyślnego rozwoju. Z uwagi na powyższe, zdaniem autora nie ma innego wyjścia, Europa (UE) musi postawić na uniwersalistyczno-partykularną syntezę jedności w wielości oraz jedności w różnorodności, która wzbogaca i rozwija, ale nie rozbija. A przede wszystkim eksponuje dobro wspólne bez zaniku (zatracania) dobra indywidualnego.

Słowa kluczowe: działania integracyjne, rozszerzenie, interesy, dobro wspólne, przystąpienie

Article submitted: 18.09.2017; article accepted: 20.11.2017