Russian smart power in Georgia

• Authors: Lasha Markozashvili , Tinatini Dvalishvili

Title variants

PL

Rosyjska smart power w Gruzji

• Languages of publication: EN

Abstracts

EN

Russia has always been active militarily; however, the current regime attempts to combine hard power with soft power tools. Russian-Georgian relations are wrought with tensions and clashes. The Western-oriented foreign policy of the latter causes worries in the Kremlin. Although the Russian federation has a strong standing in the Caucasus region, prominently due to its military presence there, the smart power policy is enacted to gain long lasting legitimacy. The mediums, such as pro-Russian non-governmental organizations, cultural intelligentsia and the Church clergy, promote the notion of a common culture and shared values. This promotion is usually accompanied by negative narratives directed towards the liberal West.

PL

Rosja zawsze była aktywna militarnie; jednak obecny reżim próbuje połączyć instrumenty siły twardej i miękkiej. Stosunki rosyjsko-gruzińskie charakteryzują napięcia i starcia. Prozachodnia polityka zagraniczna Gruzji powoduje zaniepokojenie Kremla. Pomimo że Federacja Rosyjska ma silną pozycję na Kaukazie, z uwagi na jej obecność wojskową w regionie, polityka stosowania siły inteligentnej uzyskała długotrwałą legitymizację. Takie środowiska jak pro-rosyjskie organizacje pozarządowe, inteligencja kulturowa i duchowieństwo promują pojęcia wspólnej kultury i wspólnych wartości. Podobne promowanie zazwyczaj towarzyszy negatywnej narracji skierowanej ku liberalnemu Zachodowi.

Keywords

EN

Russia; Georgia; Smart Power; Soft Power; Orthodox Church; Neo-Eurasianism; Russia; Georgia; Smart Power; Soft Power; Orthodox Church; Neo-Eurasianism

PL

Rosja; Gruzja; smart power; siła miękka; Cerkiew prawosławna; neo-eurazjatyzm

• Publisher: Uniwersytet im. Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu
• Journal: Przegląd Politologiczny
• Year: 2017
• Issue: 4
• Pages: 173-188

Dates

published

2017-12-15

Contributors

author

Lasha Markozashvili

• National Defence Academy of Georgia

author

Tinatini Dvalishvili

• Ilia State University of Georgia

References

• Armitage R. L., Nye J. S. (2007), How America Can Become a Smarter Power, in: CSIS Commission on Smart Power; A Smart, More Secure America, eds. R. L. Armitage, J. Joseph S. Nye, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C.
• BBC (2013), Thousands protest in Georgia over gay rights rally – BBC News, retrieved September 1, 2017, from http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-22571216.
• BECA (1997), Minimum Requirements for NATO Membership, retrieved September 1, 2017, from https://1997-2001.state.gov/www/regions/eur/fs_members.html.
• Bennetts M. (2012), In Putin’s Russia, little separation between church and state, “Washington Times”, retrieved September 2, 2017, from http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/aug/13/putinrussia-little-separation-church-state/.
• Civil. (2013), Civil.Ge | Georgia and Shah Deniz II Gas Project, Retrieved August 24, 2017, from http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=26793,
• CRRC (2017a), Do you agree or disagree that there is a Russian propaganda in Georgia?, NDI: Public attitudes in Georgia, April 2017, Caucasusbarometer.org, Online Data Analysis, retrieved August 30, 2017, from http://caucasusbarometer.org/en/na2017ge/RUPROPAG/.
• CRRC (2017b), How much influence does Russia have in determining Georgia’s future?, NDI: Public attitudes in Georgia, April 2017, Caucasusbarometer.org, Online Data Analysis, retrieved August 30, 2017, from http://caucasusbarometer.org/en/na2017ge/INFRUSGEF/.
• CRRC (2017c), What kind of impact did relations with Russia since 2012 have on nat. security, NDI: Public attitudes in Georgia, April 2017, Caucasusbarometer.org, Online Data Analysis, retrieved August 30, 2017, from http://caucasusbarometer.org/en/na2017ge/RUIMPSEC/.
• Dahl R. A. (1957), The Concept of Power, “Behavioral Science”, 2(3), 201–215.
• DFWatch (2013), Georgian Patriarch met Putin, http://dfwatch.net/georgian-patriarch-met-putin-29796-16983.
• DFWatch (2014), Supporters and opponents of NATO clash in Tbilisi, Democracy & Freedom Watch | News | Democracy & Freedom Watch, retrieved September 3, 2017, from http://dfwatch.net/supporters-and-opponents-of-nato-clash-in-tbilisi-42442-27449.
• Dugin A. (2004), Evraziiskaya Ideia v kachstvennom prostranstve, “International Eurasian Movement”.
• Dzvelishvili N., Kupreishvili T. (2015), Russian Influence on Georgian NGOs and Media, https://idfi.ge/public/upload/russanimpactongeorgianmediadaNGO.pdf.
• Eka Janashia (2014), Moscow Distributes Passports in Georgia. Field Report.
• EPRC (2013), Remittance for Family and State, retrieved August 18, 2017, from http://www.eprc.ge/index.php?a=main&pid=219&lang=geo&stext=%E1%83%9B%E1%83%98%E1%83%92%E1%83%A0%E1%83%90%E1%83%9C%E1%83%A2%E1%83%94%E1%83%91%E1%83%98.
• Georus (2013), About Project-Our Goals; Movement for the Russian & Georgian Dialogue and Cooperation, retrieved September 4, 2017, from http://www.georus.org/?do=static&page=geo-projeqt.
• GeoStat (2013), Georgia’s Export by Countries, retrieved August 21, 2017, from http://www.geostat.ge/?action=page&p_id=133&lang=geo.
• GeoStat (2017), Foreign Direct Investments, retrieved August 16, 2017, from http://www.geostat.ge/?action=page&p_id=2230&lang=geo.
• GeWorld (2014), Resolution of the Scientific-Practical Conference “Maidan: Lessons for the South Caucasus Countries”, retrieved September 4, 2017, from http://geworld.ge/ge/6199/.
• Giorgi Menabde (2014), Kremlin’s Followers in Georgia Become Active, “Jamestown. Eurasia Daily Monitor”, vol. 11, issue 62, retrieved from https://jamestown.org/program/kremlins-followersin-georgia-become-active/#.VkZYhHarTIU.
• Hermant N. (2015), Inside Russia’s Troll Factory: Controlling debate and stifling dissent in internet forums and social media, retrieved August 10, 2017, from http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-08-12/inside-russias-troll-factory-internet-forums-social-media/6692318.
• IDFI (2015a), Russian Capital in Georgian Business, retrieved August 21, 2017, from https://idfi.ge/en/russian-capital-in-georgian-business-full-report.
• IDFI (2015b), The Impact of Russian Money Transfers on Stability of Georgian Economy, retrieved August 16, 2017, from https://idfi.ge/en/the-impact-of-russian-money-transfers-on-stability-ofgeorgian-economy.
• IRI (2011), Georgian National Study 2011.
• Iverioni (2015) " Why is May 9 a day of victory for Georgia? ", retrieved September 3, 2017, from http://iverioni.com.ge/13062-ratom-aris-9-maisi-gamarjvebis-dghe-saqarthvelosthvis.html.
• Kapanadze S. (2014), Georgia’s Vulnerability to Russian Pressure Points, retrieved from http://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/ECFR106_GEORGIA_MEMO_AW.pdf.
• Karaganov S. (2009), Russia in Euro-Atlantic Region, “Rossiyskaya Gazeta”, November 24.
• Kevorkova N. (2013), Patriarch of Georgia: Our church and people never cut ties with Russia, RT
• Op-Edge, retrieved September 2, 2017, from https://www.rt.com/op-edge/patriarch-georgiarussia-ties-438/.
• Kommersant (2014), Грузины подрались из-за Крыма – Мир – Коммерсантъ, retrieved September 6, 2017, from https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2431652.
• Kroenig M., McAdam M., Weber S. (2010), Taking Soft Power Seriously, “Comparative Strategy”, 29(5), 412–431, http://doi.org/10.1080/01495933.2010.520986.
• Lomtadze G. (2015), , damoukidebloba, retrieved September 5, 2017, from http://damoukidebloba.com/c/news/neitralitetis_iluzia.
• Markozashvili L. (2014), Transition toward Democracy – Georgian problems, “Political Science Review”, 3, 185–203.
• Markozashvili L., Al-Weshah A. (2014), Student Attitudes Survey, Erasmus Mundus, Sumi, Ukraine.
• McClory J. (2010), The New Persuaders: An International Ranking of Soft Power, The Institute for Government, London.
• NationalBank (2017), Remittance by Countries, retrieved August 19, 2017, from https://www.nbg.gov.ge/index.php?m=304.
• Nye J. S. (1990), Soft Power, “Foreign Policy”, (80), 153–171, http://doi.org/10.2307/1148580.
• Nye J. S. (2004), Soft Power: the Means to Success in World Politics (1st editio), Public Affairs, New York.
• Nye J. S. (2006), Think Again: Soft Power, “Foreign Affairs”.
• Nye J. S. (2009), Get Smart Combining Hard and Soft Power, “Foreign Affairs”.
• Nye J. S. (2010), Can Russia Be Great?, “Project Syndicate”.
• Nye J. S. (2014), Putin’s Rules of Attraction, “Project Syndicate”.
• PirveliRadio (2014), Putin’s Awards to Alexander Chachia, retrieved September 6, 2017, from http://pirveliradio.ge/?newsid=20257.
• Portland (2017), Soft Power 30, retrieved September 2, 2017, from https://softpower30.com/.
• Reginfo (2014), Georgian Journalists to Introduce to Media Literacy in Moscow, retrieved September 6, 2017, from http://ick.ge/rubrics/politics/19456-i.html.
• Russell B. (2004), Power: A New Social Analysis, Routledge, London–New York.
• Saqinform. (2013), Unknown Putin – Book Presentation in Tbilisi, retrieved September 4, 2017, from http://saqinform.ge/news/16233/%E2%80%9Eucnobi+putini%E2%80%9C+-+Tbilisshi+axali+wignis+prezentacia+gaimarTa.html.
• Shekhovtsov A. (2009), Aleksandr Dugin’s Neo-Eurasianism: The New Right à la Russe, “Religion Compass”, 3(4), 697–716.
• Socor V. (2006), Russia Bans Georgian, Moldovan Wines and Other Products, “Eurasia Daily Monitory”, vol. 3, retrieved from https://jamestown.org/program/russia-bans-georgian-moldovanwines-and-other-products/.
• SputnikGeorgia (2015), Rally in front of President’s Palace, with Demand of Military Neutrality, retrieved September 4, 2017, from https://sputnik-georgia.com/society/20150924/228603088.html.
• Tsurkov M. (2015), Georgia not to replace Azerbaijani gas by Russian gas, retrieved August 23, 2017, from https://en.trend.az/azerbaijan/business/2447847.html.
• WorldBank (2013), World Bank Launches Initiative on Migration, Releases New Projections on Remittance Flows, retrieved August 18, 2017, from http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/pressrelease/2013/04/19/world-bank-launches-initiative-on-migrationreleases-new-projections-onremittance-flows.

Identifiers

DOI

10.14746/pp.2017.22.4.14