PL EN


2017 | 7 | 325-342
Article title

Why Legal Reasoning has to be Unique

Content
Title variants
Languages of publication
EN
Abstracts
EN
This article addresses the issue of the uniqueness of legal reasoning and, specifically, the author advances the thesis that what makes legal reasoning different from the reasoning  employed in demonstrative and empirical sciences and matters of everyday life is not the actual form (scheme) of this reasoning but the legal milieu. Thus, he tries to demonstrate that some features of law – such as its normative and prescriptive nature, difficulties with the verification of its content on empirical grounds, its limitations stemming from the physical world and dependence on humans and their minds, as well as the ‘unspecialized’ character of law agents and the extraordinary role of authority – influence legal reasoning as well. At the same time these features also allow this reasoning to be unique, despite its adoption of forms of inference that are present elsewhere.
Keywords
Year
Volume
7
Pages
325-342
Physical description
Dates
published
2017-09-15
Contributors
References
Document Type
Publication order reference
Identifiers
YADDA identifier
bwmeta1.element.ojs-doi-10_14746_ppuam_2017_7_20
JavaScript is turned off in your web browser. Turn it on to take full advantage of this site, then refresh the page.