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NEOAUTHORITARIANISM AS A CHALLENGE TO GLOBAL SECURITY

INTRODUCTION

In the political discourse of recent years, the term “New Authoritarianism” (“Neo-authoritarianism”) is used more and more frequently as opposed to “Old Authoritarianism.” Its appearance is a reflection of the renovation processes of the classic authoritarian regime. The characteristics of modern political regimes are changing very rapidly, which requires an analysis of these processes, an assessment of the possible consequences of functioning of non-democratic regimes for the security of the global and other levels. Currently, there is no coherent concept of neoauthoritarianism that would allow us to characterize this regime through the determination of its features, tools, consequences and risks for global security.

Despite the emergence of scientific studies of neoauthoritarianism in recent years, they most often relate to case studies of individual states, the political course of individual neoauthoritarian leaders. To a lesser extent, this political regime is conceptualized by political science taking into account the regime transformations of both recent decades (that is, within the third wave of autocratization), and recent years (against the background of the coronavirus pandemic, the Russian-Ukrainian war, the escalation of tensions in the Indo-Pacific region, etc.). New security challenges, the global decline in the quality of democracy, the activation of radical and populist political actors, etc. (Adler et al., 2023) actualise and activate the scientific understanding of the nature of neoauthoritarianism, the determination of the system of its characteristics and possible consequences.

The purpose of the study is to determine the features of neoauthoritarianism as a political regime, its tools and consequences of functioning for global security. The results of the study will contribute to the conceptualization of neoauthoritarianism by political science, the identification of its threats to global, regional, and national security.

THE THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL FUNDAMENTALS OF RESEARCH

The concept of “neoauthoritarianism” was first used to refer to the Chinese political regime from the late 1980s (Li, 2015), which combined Marxism with market reforms.

During the years of the third wave of autocratization, this concept began to be used in political discourse to denote an increasingly extensive list of states. Simultaneously, there is currently no scientific consensus in the research environment regarding which states can justifiably be positioned as neoauthoritarian. The reason for this is the numerous hybrid regimes, and defective democracies, the characteristics of which may be similar to those of neoauthoritarian regimes.

New authoritarian regimes in various modifications have been actively evolving over the past decades. R. Dahrendorf was among the first to draw attention to the signs of a new authoritarian trend and warned against underestimation of the “creeping authoritarianism” (2006). Researchers point to the turn to authoritarian forms of government in the search for a way out of the many crises facing humanity. L. Cooper called it “authoritarian contagion” (2021).

The spread of neoauthoritarianism is seen as a challenge to democracy (Wiatr, 2019), as there has been a global expansion of authoritarian rule. There is a global expansion of neoauthoritarianism that opposes liberal democracy (Repucci, Slipowitz, 2022). Researchers (Awad, 2022; Babones, 2018; Glukhova, 2019; Jordan, 2020; Krastev, 2011; Lendvai-Bainton, Szelewa, 2021; Lewis, 2020; Müller, 2022; Treisman, Guriev, 2015; Wiatr, 2019; Waring, 2018, 2019, 2021) use the examples of individual states to study the features of modern authoritarian regimes, compare the models of “new” and “old” authoritarianism. Neoauthoritarianism is seen as a digitized old model of an authoritarian regime that was based on fear (Guriev, Treisman, 2022).

However, the conceptualization of neoauthoritarianism, the identification of its potential threats is not complete due to the political dynamics that affect the configuration of all modern political regimes. This refers to the rising geopolitical competition, new security challenges, and the disorderly multipolarity of the modern world. Therefore, the scientific understanding of neoauthoritarianism, the clarification of its threats, potential consequences, etc. are conditioned by the dynamics of socio-political processes on a global scale. It is important to understand the security threats caused by the global wave of autocratization.

A broad range of states can serve as cases for the conceptualization of neoauthoritarianism: 1) states that are not only neoauthoritarian themselves, but also export neoauthoritarianism to other states; 2) states that successfully carried out democratic reforms, but subsequently deteriorated the quality of democracy to such an extent that they were rated as autocracies; 3) states that started liberal-democratic transformations, but they were not consistent and were quickly changed by the process of de-democratization; 4) states in which democratic reforms were not carried out or were minimal, declarative.

In our view, neoauthoritarianism should be defined as an undemocratic system of methods and means of exercising centralized state power, which is characterized by the formalisation of democratic principles, institutions and procedures, and the widespread use of digitalization to realize the goals of the regime. Since the category “political regime” is directly related to state institutions (authorities), the study of their positions and decisions makes it possible to characterize the current regime. Considering the fact that the list of states, on examples of which modern authoritarianism can be studied, is constantly expanding, primarily those neoauthoritarian states that are the

largest exporters of neoauthoritarianism were examined. We collected and processed data on the characteristics of political processes, foreign policy initiatives, export of neoauthoritarianism, etc., which were demonstrated in the largest authoritarian states during the third wave of autocratization. Hence, the features and main tools of neoauthoritarianism are systematized, the possible consequences of rising neoauthoritarianism on a global scale and its threats to global security are identified.

FEATURES OF NEOAUTHORITARIANISM

The operating conditions of neoauthoritarian regimes are very different from those in which authoritarian regimes functioned in the 20th century. Currently, most neoauthoritarian regimes are integrated into the global capitalist economy, and consequently dependent on international trade, labour resources, investment flows, etc. They have to adapt to the world of open borders, global media and economies based on knowledge, technology, information and communication progress. In the absolute majority of modern authoritarian regimes, the role of ideology has significantly decreased. The ideological component of neoauthoritarian regimes has lost its former integrity due to the need to adjust to many challenges and global innovations.

Neoauthoritarian regimes actively use the achievements of democracy for anti-democratic purposes (Ginsburg, 2020: 222). They tend to imitate certain procedures, tools, and mechanisms of democracy. That is, neoauthoritarian regimes partially preserve a democratic facade (Schedler, 2013; Levitsky, Way, 2010). They turn less to mass repressions, but instead manipulate information, resort to propaganda, use the most hidden forms of pressure and control, which they try to provide a legal justification for.

Modern authoritarianism differs from “old” authoritarianism in that it tries to hide its undemocratic nature. For this, democratic legal norms are adopted, international legal acts are ratified, etc. This is done to minimize external criticism of the regime, prevent sanctions, and preserve opportunities to receive international aid, loans, etc.

Neoauthoritarianism is considered as the latest form of authoritarian regime, which is grounded on the characteristics of authoritarianism of the 20th century, but has changed the tools of exercising power, the attitude to ideology, has become flexible and adapted to the current historical moment. Neoauthoritarian regimes quickly adapt to information and communication progress, digitalization of public administration, emergence of new challenges in the international arena, etc.

Actually, the external dimension of neoauthoritarianism is of interest, that is, how this political regime influences international politics, provokes new security challenges, and creates new problems. Therefore, the main characteristics of neoauthoritarianism as a global phenomenon that has upward destructive dynamics should be identified.

According to our estimates, neoauthoritarianism:

- is aimed not so much at promoting authoritarian values, but rather at devaluing liberal-democratic institutions and undermining citizens’ trust in them, deepening the lines of social division that exist in the communities of liberal-democratic

states. Therefore, neoauthoritarianism is a policy of global containment of democracy (Walker, 2014), formation of its image as an incompetent regime in the face of current global challenges;

- is capable of rapid modifications, responsive to changes in the political landscape. Neoauthoritarianism is flexible on ideological issues. In most states, it has abandoned its previous integrity, immutability, and combines those characteristics that seemed incompatible before. That is, neoauthoritarianism is eclectic;
- uses the achievements of democratization, globalization, digitalization to strengthen its sustainability. Of particular interest are technologies for monitoring and control, disinformation, propaganda, information censorship, content manipulation, as well as hacker attacks, interference in the electoral process of other states, dissemination of hate speech, incitement to social tension, etc.;
- has a rising interest in foreign policy, geopolitics; neoauthoritarian regimes try to influence the international environment more and more decisively. For example, China actively demonstrates such interest in the South China Sea, Russia – in Ukraine and Syria (Allison, 2017), Saudi Arabia – in Yemen, Iran – in Iraq, Syria and Lebanon, etc. Neoauthoritarian regimes try to change the international order based on international law, universal rights and values. They go beyond their borders by exporting authoritarian standards and principles. It primarily refers to the sale of technologies for tracking, surveillance, control of information flows, etc. For example, Russia supplies Iran with software and devices to monitor citizens; China exports surveillance technologies on a global scale, mainly to African countries (Bader, 2015);
- synthesizes all types of power that is present in international politics today – “soft,” “hard,” “smart,” “sharp” power. Despite the readiness to use military force in the international arena, “soft power” is used first of all.¹ Authoritarian regimes invest in their own instruments of “soft power” to compete with democracy in the sphere of ideas (Walker, 2016: 57–58), and resort to non-transparent lending to other states. An example is China, which, within the framework of the One Belt, One Road Initiative, lends to infrastructure projects in developing countries (Ghana, Egypt, Suriname, Sri Lanka, etc.). However, such states cannot repay their debts in a timely manner, which leads to the deepening of various forms of dependence on China;
- expands the spectrum of what can be used as a weapon: data, information, people (migrants, refugees, etc.), food (grains, oil crops, etc.), energy, oil and gas resources, investments, etc. Various forms of latent and (less often) open aggression are demonstrated. An example is the migration crisis on the border between Belarus and the EU states (since 2021), in which migrants from the Middle East have been involved. A clear example is Russia’s blocking of the “grain corridor,” through which Ukraine provides the food needs of those countries that are at risk of starvation;
- uses the tool of blackmail in international politics (energy, nuclear, etc.) (LaBelle, 2023; Szulecki, Overland, 2023). Vivid examples of 2022–2023 are the weaponization of energy by Russia: gas blackmail against the EU, use of control over Ukrain-

¹ Investments are directed to educational and cultural projects to cover up espionage. Economic and business connections are used to export corrupt practices and interfere in politics. Pseudo-social organizations, radical and populist non-governmental organizations, etc. are financially supported.

ian nuclear power plants (Chornobyl and Zaporizhzhia) for nuclear blackmail, targeted destruction of the energy infrastructure of other states and sabotage of such facilities. Another form of blackmail is the blocking (imposing a veto, delaying ratification or other legal procedures) of certain decisions of democratic institutions, which include one or another neoauthoritarian state. As an example, let us cite Turkey's long delay in ratifying the NATO membership of Finland and Sweden, masking its democracy behind a democratic facade;

- spreads fakes, conspiracy theories, unsubstantiated accusations, manipulatively influences international public opinion and moods of citizens of various states, conducts informational and psychological operations. For this purpose, pro-government media, international multilingual TV channels, “Internet troll factories,” official websites of state institutions, profiles of heads of state in social networks, etc. are used. An example is the activity of the Russian “troll factory” “Internet Research Agency” from Olginio (St. Petersburg);
- chooses the tactics of immediate mirror measures in response to criticism of democratic states, for example, personal and sectoral sanctions, expulsion of diplomats, accusations of espionage, etc.

Obviously, this list does not include all the characteristics of neoauthoritarianism, but it determines the configuration of this newest regime.

MAIN TOOLS OF NEOAUTHORITARIANISM AT THE INTERNATIONAL LEVEL

New authoritarian states are a strong challenge to the liberal-democratic international order, peace and stability. These states undermine the standards of democracy and international law, which were achieved by collective efforts in the second half of the 20th century. This is done by virtue of a wide range of tools. Let us dwell on the main tools that neoauthoritarian regimes apply when engaging in international interactions.

Power tools include, first of all, the annexation of the territory of sovereign states, various ways of violating sovereignty and territorial integrity or threatening to do so, testing new types of weapons as a form of demonstration of power, etc. For example, Russia in 2014 carried out the first annexation in Europe of the territory of the sovereign state of Ukraine. China shows activity in the South China Sea, including the militarization of reclaimed islands; rejects arbitration efforts and causes the escalation of conflict with India over disputed territories; the issue of Taiwan became particularly acute.

Tools of coercion to action (political, economic, law-making, etc.), *inducement to make the necessary decisions* (bribery, blackmail, threats, etc.). For instance, China uses sanctions in response to the anti-Chinese policy of Western countries; since 2021, the law on sanctions policy against the states that cause harm to China has been in effect; restrictions on trade and investment are introduced, etc. Russia resorts to “mirror” sanctions against “unfriendly states” that imposed sanctions on it. Hungary² opposes

² The issue of classifying Hungary as a neoauthoritarian state is not clear-cut. The European Parliament positioned the political regime of Hungary as a “hybrid regime of electoral autocracy,”

anti-Russian sanctions that are implemented within the EU and intensifies cooperation with Russia, especially in the energy sector, which is contrary to the EU security strategy. T. Wright (2017: 18) notes that autocrats use a wide range of forms of coercion to counter threats to their rule or to maintain certain spheres of influence abroad.

Tools of influence on other states within the scope of “soft power”. First of all, it is about investing in infrastructure projects, new jobs, etc. Intellectual and political networks committed to neoauthoritarian regimes are cultivated by funding educational, research institutes, analytical centres, and think tanks. The influence of neoauthoritarian states is also carried out through investment projects, which leads to individual states falling into debt dependence on authoritarian creditors, and therefore in the future they are forced to agree to unfavourable conditions for further cooperation.³

Tools of subversion include propaganda, cyber attacks, political sabotage, disinformation campaigns, providing covert financial support to certain political forces, etc. Neoauthoritarian states aim to discredit, weaken, undermine the ideological appeal of open societies and destroy liberal democracy. Their pressure on other states is now more and more covert. Currently, such pressure is carried out through cyber attacks, through the involvement of artificial intelligence, “Big Data,” etc. Support is provided to radical, populist, nationalist parties operating in democratic states. Subversive activities also occur through the media of authoritarian states that have networks of foreign branches (Russian RT, Chinese CGTN, etc.).

Tools for the formation of values, “correct” perception of socio-political issues. An illustration is the spread of narratives about the failure of the liberal-democratic political model. Autocrats associate liberal democracy with stagnation, unpredictability, security challenges, and even chaos. Neoauthoritarian actors disseminate such ideas not only independently through modern media channels, but also by virtue of the organizations they join. An example is the international non-governmental organization CIS-EMO (Commonwealth of Independent States – Election Monitoring Organization), which is an election observer. This organization “does not notice” falsifications of the election results, spreads information about the transparent democratic nature of certain electoral processes. Such actions undermine the critical evaluation of the elections made by unbiased democratic monitoring organizations.

Electoral tools that involve interference in the electoral process of other states. Elections are the most vulnerable democratic institution to external influence. Russia, China, and Iran most actively influence the results of electoral processes in other countries (O’Connor et al., 2020) in order to undermine citizens’ trust in the electoral process, reduce the chances of certain candidates, and increase the probability of elect-

“electoral autocracy” (European Parliament, 2022). It is obvious that the political regime of this country no longer meets the characteristics of democracy. Although the basic democratic processes are preserved in this type of hybrid regimes, the quality of democracy is constantly deteriorating and the gap with the values of democratic regimes is growing. We see this as Hungary’s evolution towards neoauthoritarianism.

³ The Chinese initiative One Belt One Road burdened individual states with overwhelming debt, favours Chinese firms over local business or transparent international tenders, and paved the way for the expansion of China’s military expansion into new territories. For example, Sri Lanka took a loan of 8 billion dollars from China for the construction of the deep water port of Hambantota. Since the loan was not repaid on time, the port was leased to China for 99 years at the end of 2017.

ing the “necessary” political parties and candidates. Let us provide examples. During the 2017 presidential elections in France, Russia took the side of far-right candidate M. Le Pen (Jurczyszyn, 2018). During the 2017 German parliamentary elections, Russia supported the Eurosceptic “Alternative for Germany” (Applebaum et al., 2017). Russian influence is evident in the results of the 2023 parliamentary elections in Slovakia, where the populist SMER-SD party led by pro-Russian politician R. Fico won. China repeatedly interfered in the election process of Canada, the USA, and the countries of the Indo-Pacific region. In addition to illegal contributions to election campaigns, numerous tools of influencing the public through social networks, etc. were used.

Tools of pressure on international organizations. Most often, neoauthoritarian states exert such pressure in order to narrow human rights, limit their protection mechanisms, and prevent international organizations from making decisions that undermine the stability of neoauthoritarian regimes. Such pressure, first of all, is carried out within the UN. For instance, China and Russia actively use their status as permanent members of the UN Security Council to veto decisions that do not meet their goals in the international arena. In 2018, Russia and China initiated a reduction in the number of UN human rights peacekeepers. China tries to neutralize the UN’s control over human rights and also seeks to limit the UN’s ability to hold any government accountable for serious human rights abuses. The Chinese regime increasingly attempts to use the openness of institutions in democracies to impose its worldview and limit critics (Richardson, 2022).

The specified list of tools that are currently in the arsenal of neoauthoritarian regimes for international interactions is not exhaustive and includes only the most obvious ones, in our opinion.

GLOBAL CONSEQUENCES OF ASCENDING NEOAUTHORITARIANISM

Let us analyse the consequences of rising neoauthoritarianism on a global scale. The most obvious consequence is the fact that neoauthoritarian regimes have endangered democracy as the dominant global model. In recent decades, authoritarian leaders have cooperated, pooling resources to strengthen their power and accelerate their assault on democracy, human rights, and liberal values. For that reason, the probability that autocracy will overtake democracy as a global model of governance is increasing.

Even in the states with a seemingly stable tradition of democracy, internal anti-democratic forces (populists, ultra-radicals, etc.) are becoming active. They contribute to the rise of illiberal discourse; incite hate speech; demonstrate anti-Western rhetoric; discriminate against migrants, national, sexual and other minorities; show racism and xenophobia, etc. All this destroys democracy and opens wider opportunities in the international arena for neoauthoritarian regimes. This undermines the international order, which after the Second World War was formed by the collective efforts of democratic actors of international politics.

Those neoauthoritarian states with significant resources undermine the established international consensus that democracy is the only viable way to prosperity and secu-

ity. At the same time, they promote authoritarian approaches to governance. It is obvious that neoauthoritarian political regimes are increasing their destructive influence on the international system and global security. The events of 2022–2023 clearly showed the reality of new power scenarios, nuclear blackmail, revealed various cooperation schemes of neoauthoritarian states in order to circumvent Western sanctions or prevent them. The consequences of rising neoauthoritarianism in the global dimension will be a change in the world agenda, a restructuring of the global security architecture, unless democratic states manage to prevent such a scenario.

For a long time, the democratic community to a certain extent tolerated the newest authoritarian regimes, gave them credit, cooperated in the economic sphere, enabled access to technological developments, etc. Trade agreements were often prioritized over values. Condemnation of undemocratic regimes often ended with the voicing of “concern,” the adoption of certain statements, resolutions, and sometimes sanctions. It is now evident that such a reaction was not enough.

Let us point out several emerging consequences of ascending neoauthoritarianism on a global scale:

1. *Growth in the use of force scenarios for conflict resolution.* Autocratization contributes to new large-scale conflicts, a new arms race, and a rapid increase in defence spending by modern states. The third global wave of autocratization led to new wars, as evidenced, first of all, by the Russian-Ukrainian war and rising tensions around Taiwan.
2. *Growth of various types of crises* (food, energy, etc.). Concurrently, the cooperation of states to get out of these crises is complicated due to the different vision of states with democratic and non-democratic regimes for solving problems.
3. *Growth of political corruption.* Political corruption takes root in democratic international institutions. Officials from democratic states are used as lobbyists for the interests of neoauthoritarian states and institutions. At the same time, the pressure on investigative journalists, corruption whistleblowers, and public activists is increasing.
4. *Active dissemination of conspiracy theories.* These theories are popularized by representatives of the government, pro-government propagandists, influencers through popular social networks, etc. The goal is the formation of the “correct” attitudes needed by a particular neoauthoritarian regime, the destabilisation of public attitudes.
5. *Weakening of international mechanisms and tools for the protection of human rights.* It has become much more difficult for human rights defenders to perform tasks in neoauthoritarian states. Some of these states are closed for monitoring the state of human rights compliance. Neoauthoritarian regimes ignore or implement limited recommendations of international institutions regarding human rights. There are latent or open campaigns of persecution against human rights defenders.
6. *Growth of economic and social problems* (poverty, social stratification, shrinking middle class, population migration, etc.). This is a consequence of the weakening of democratic political institutions, which functioned as a kind of economic safety net and protected against financial and other crises.
7. *Increasing volumes of data manipulation, disinformation.* Last but not least, this is due to digital technologies (Anthony et al., 2019; Dragu, Lupu, 2021; Jones, 2022). Various restrictions on the work of the media, control over information flows will

be strengthened (Kendall-Taylor et al., 2020). In addition to the obvious misleading of the population, this also represents a huge challenge for liberal democracies trying to conduct policy based on facts.⁴

8. *Deterioration of the effectiveness of the global civil society functioning.* This will happen because at the national level in neoauthoritarian states there will be all kinds of mechanisms to suppress independent voices, for example, the adoption of laws on foreign agents, state support for pro-government non-governmental organizations, etc.
9. *Withdrawal of states from international agreements, conventions, institutions, non-recognition of the jurisdiction of international courts,* etc. For example, in 2019, Russia withdrew from the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, and in 2022 – from the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (The European Convention on Human Rights); in 2019, Iran abandoned the international nuclear deal it signed in 2015; Turkey withdrew from the Istanbul Convention in 2021.

These are just a few of the global consequences of ascending neoauthoritarianism, which are already evident in the course of the third wave of autocratization.

CONCLUSIONS

As a result of the rise of neoauthoritarianism, international relations are becoming increasingly unpredictable. The speed and scope of changes in the international arena are exceptionally rapid. With the strengthening of authoritarian tendencies in the world, events that had a low probability are taking place. Unforeseen events occur, for which the subjects of international relations are unprepared. The growth of neoauthoritarianism can lead to a situation where democratic states and institutions will not have sufficient resources to respond to new challenges.

Leading neoauthoritarian states implement a number of strategies that involve less influential non-democratic states. This is a violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of other states; attempts to “absorb” (take under complete control) the other states; weaponization of energy resources, food, social media, as well as strategic objects (nuclear power plants, reservoirs, etc.); nuclear blackmail; “shattering” of the situation in other states; organization of sabotage, etc.

Features of neoauthoritarian regimes that distinguish them from “old” authoritarianism are: reduction of the role of ideology; integration into the global capitalist economy; attempts to hide their undemocratic nature, to imitate a democratic facade; replacing mass repressions with the most hidden forms of pressure and control, manipulation and propaganda; providing a legal basis for any undemocratic initiatives; using the benefits of democratization, globalization, digitalization to achieve the regime’s goals, etc.

⁴ The example of mortality from coronavirus infection shows that scientific evaluation and international comparison of the effectiveness of measures against the coronavirus are impossible if the statistics of authoritarian states contain false data. As a result, joint international efforts to overcome crises are less effective and problematic to implement.

The main tools of neoauthoritarian influence on other states are: power tools (annexation, various ways of violating sovereignty, etc.); tools of coercion (corruption, blackmail, etc.); 2) tools of influence within the framework of “soft power” (financing of educational and research institutes, analytical centres, infrastructure projects, etc.); 3) tools of subversion (propaganda and disinformation campaigns, cyber attacks, covert support for radical, populist, nationalist parties, etc.); 4) tools for the formation of values, “correct” perception of socio-political issues; 5) electoral tools (financing of parties, candidates in other states, influence on voters of other states through social networks and other communication channels); 6) tools of pressure on international organizations (initiating or blocking the adoption of certain decisions).

A major consequence of the ascending neoauthoritarianism on a global scale is the fact that neoauthoritarian regimes have endangered democracy as the dominant global model. Their efforts have already disrupted the world order that was formed after the Second World War by the collective efforts of democratic subjects of international politics. The consequences of rising neoauthoritarianism in the global dimension will be a significant change in the world agenda, a restructuring of the global security architecture, unless democratic states manage to show political will and prevent such a scenario with collective efforts. Currently, we see a number of consequences of rising neoauthoritarianism, which manifests itself in various spheres of life, for example: withdrawal of states from international treaties and institutions, non-recognition of the jurisdiction of international courts; growth of data manipulation, disinformation; deepening of socio-economic problems and increasing frequency of various types of crises; weakening of international human rights protection mechanisms; active dissemination of conspiracy theories; more frequent force scenarios for conflict resolution, etc.

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ABSTRACT

The purpose of the study is to determine the features of neoauthoritarianism as a political regime, its tools, and consequences for global security. It is reasoned that neoauthoritarianism is an undemocratic system of methods and means of exercising centralized state power, which is characterized by the formalisation of democratic principles, institutions and procedures, and the use of digitalization to realize the goals of the regime. The features and tools of neoauthoritarianism are systematized, and the probable consequences of neoauthoritarianism on a global scale are assessed. The following features of neoauthoritarian regimes are determined: reduction of the role of ideology; integration into the global capitalist economy; imitation of a democratic facade; covert forms of pressure and control, manipulation, propaganda; providing a legal basis for any undemocratic initiatives; using the advantages of democratization, globalization, digitalization to achieve the regime's destructive goals, etc. The following tools of neoauthoritarian influence are determined: power tools, tools of influence within the scope of "soft power," tools of subversion, tools for changing values, electoral tools, tools of pressure on international organizations, etc. It is proven that due to neoauthoritarian intervention, the risks to global security are increased. The main consequence of ascending neoauthoritarianism on a global scale is the fact that neoauthoritarian regimes have endangered democracy as the dominant global model, reshaping the global security architecture.

Keywords: new authoritarianism (neauthoritarianism), global security, security challenges, export of neauthoritarianism, neauthoritarian intervention, tools of neauthoritarian influence

NEOAUTORYTARYZM JAKO WYZWANIE DLA GLOBALNEGO BEZPIECZEŃSTWA

STRESZCZENIE

Celem badania jest określenie cech neoautorytaryzmu jako reżimu politycznego, jego narzędzi oraz konsekwencji dla bezpieczeństwa globalnego. Twierdzi się, że neoautorytaryzm jest niedemokratycznym systemem metod i środków sprawowania scentralizowanej władzy państwowej, który charakteryzuje się formalną konsolidacją zasad, instytucji i procedur demokratycznych, wykorzystaniem cyfryzacji do realizacji celów reżimu. Usystematyzowano cechy i narzędzia neoautorytaryzmu oraz oceniono prawdopodobne konsekwencje neoautorytaryzmu w skali globalnej. Cechami reżimów neoautorytarnych są: redukcja roli ideologii; integracja z globalną gospodarką kapitalistyczną; imitacja demokratycznej fasady; ukryte formy nacisku i kontroli, manipulacje, propaganda; zapewnienie podstawy prawnej dla wszelkich niedemokratycznych inicjatyw; wykorzystywanie zalet demokratyzacji, globalizacji, cyfryzacji do realizacji destrukcyjnych celów reżimu itp. Narzędzia wpływu neoautorytarnego definiuje się jako: narzędzia siłowe, narzędzia wpływu w zakresie „soft power”, narzędzia wywrotowe, narzędzia zmiany wartości, narzędzia wyborcze, narzędzia nacisku na organizacje międzynarodowe itp. Udowodniono, że w wyniku interwencji neoautorytarnych wzrastają zagrożenia dla bezpieczeństwa globalnego. Główną konsekwencją wzrostu neoautorytaryzmu w skali globalnej jest to, że reżimy neoautorytarne zagraziły demokracji jako dominującemu modelowi globalnemu, przekształcając globalną architekturę bezpieczeństwa.

Słowa kluczowe: nowy autorytaryzm (neoautorytaryzm), bezpieczeństwo globalne, wyzwania bezpieczeństwa, eksport neoautorytaryzmu, interwencja neoautorytarne, narzędzia wpływu neoautorytarnego

