Durkheimowska interpretacja moralizmu prawa według Jonathana Haidta

• Authors: Maciej Juzaszek

Title variants

EN

A Durkheimian interpretation of legal moralism according to Jonathan Haidt

Abstracts

EN

In the article, I try to answer the question of whether Durkheimian utilitarianism, reconstructed on the basis of Jonathan Haidt’s idea, can justify the enforcement of morality by criminal law (i.e. whether it is an adequate theory of legal moralism). In the first part, I present what Durkheimian utilitarianism is and what its theses are, and in the second, using the interpretative key that Herbert Hart used in the debate with Patrick Devlin, I explain what moralistic position it is actually defending. Ultimately, I come to the conclusion that the main thesis of  Durkheimian utilitarianism is the Hartian thesis on disintegration. However, the lack of an adequate empirical justification raises doubts as to whether it can constitute a satisfactory theory of the moral justification of criminalization.

PL

W artykule poszukuję odpowiedzi na pytanie, czy Durkheimowski utylitaryzm, zrekonstruowany na bazie koncepcji Jonathana Haidta, może stanowić uzasadnienie egzekwowania moralności za pomocą prawa karnego (tzn. czy jest adekwatną teorią moralizmu prawa). W pierwszej części przedstawiam, czym Durkheimowski utylitaryzm jest i jakie głosi tezy, w drugiej zaś, korzystając z klucza interpretacyjnego Herberta Harta wykorzystanego w polemice z Patrickiem Devlinem, wyjaśniam, jakiego stanowiska moralistycznego teoria ta rzeczywiście broni. Ostatecznie dochodzę do wniosku, że główną tezą Durkheimowskiego utylitaryzmu jest Hartowska teza o dezintegracji. Brak odpowiedniego uzasadnienia empirycznego rodzi jednak wątpliwość, czy może on stanowić satysfakcjonującą teorię moralnego uzasadnienia kryminalizacji.

Keywords

EN

Jonathan Haidt; Patrick Devlin; legal moralism; Émile Durkheim; Herbert Hart; Durkheimian utilitarianism

PL

Jonathan Haidt; Patrick Devlin; moralizm prawa; Émile Durkheim; Herbert Hart; Durkheimowski utylitaryzm

• Publisher: Uniwersytet im. Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu
• Journal: Ruch Prawniczy, Ekonomiczny i Socjologiczny
• Year: 2022
• Volume: 84
• Issue: 4
• Pages: 5-19

Dates

published

2022

Contributors

author

Maciej Juzaszek

• Uniwersytet Wrocławski, Polska

• https://orcid.org/0000000281871945

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Identifiers

DOI

10.14746/rpeis.2022.84.4.01

Biblioteka Nauki

28785989