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Trumpism as an Alternative Look at the Great America

Abstract: The article analyzes the phenomenon of “Trumpism,” which brought hopes for its renewal and expectation of changes into traditional American politics. “Trumpism” swung at the power of the Deep State and showed America that it is historically, mentally, culturally, and economically fragmented. The paternalism of American democrats toward a certain part of the country’s population, which Trump positions as “communism,” opposes the true America, which is personified by the states of the “rusty belt” and its working class. “Trumpism” sees the true rebirth of America in a policy of sound national egoism and in America’s focus on itself. For opponents of President Donald Trump, his return to power means another immersion of the ruling elite in the fight against many unknown things, when the political “behind the scenes” has already come out of the shadows and has shown its actual goals.

Key words: “Trumpism”, republicans, democrats, Deep State, global leadership, pragmatic isolationism

The absence of Donald Trump at the inauguration of the 46th President of the United States, Joe Biden, and the public promise to return eloquently testify that he is not broken as a politician and has accepted the challenge thrown to him by the deep state. Trump and his team learned from their first experience in big politics. The main of this is that democratic America and the freedoms proclaimed by it are under the close attention of the financial oligarchy and monopolists of global IT corporations. And if earlier many states of the world knew

the strength of their interests, then in 2017–2020, America felt this influence in full. The results of the scandalous election campaign of the US president in 2020 showed that the “Washington swamp,” the fight against which was proclaimed as the main goal of President Trump, turned out to be more skillful in the informational stories of personified hostility to the current president, methods and means of political struggle. The union of big money and the absolute power of media corporations over the mind of a philistine (Gore, 2008) with the tactics of social and ethnic-group populism of the democrats neutralized Trump’s “new nationalism,” which was aimed at the revitalization of the America’s “rusty belt” and the return of its artisan class to the era of the former heyday of the 60s and 70s of the last century.

The desire of the democrats to impeach Trump by all means, even after he left the presidency, testifies not so much to settle scores with him as a political opponent and that part of the Republicans who support him, but rather on demonizing the ideas of “Trumpism” that he and his team have proposed to the American society in the country’s domestic and foreign policy. According to the democrats, in the conditions of the appearance of new centers of power in the world that challenge America’s leadership, “Trumpism” has opened a second (internal) front in the fight against the US globalist course as America’s highest destiny. For them, agreeing with Trump’s policies meant recognizing the “end of history” of the great mission of American liberalism and the end of the domination of the financial oligarchy.

An alternative manifestation of will, freedom, and self-awareness in “Trumpism” revealed a disease of the spirit of American democracy, which can be correlated with the ontological situation of *choretia* (uncertainty) as one of the states of the “sick Logos,” which Romanian philosopher K. Noika thought about. It was a situation when things took place in principle, but in this state, they did not exist in reality. It is the “process of blurring the certainties that things and people ask themselves. This is the destruction of certainties, which can intensify and also slow down their natural movement to the point of complete exhaustion” (Shkepy, 2005, p. 117). In this position, the American society found itself confessing the morality of the absolute individualism of the economic person as the highest distinctness of market democracy. “Trumpism,” on the other hand, suggested that American socio-economic, cultural-racial and financial-oligarchic certainties, which circulated in the influential media in the form of vague concepts of freedom and prosperity, were tied to the real

situation in the country, according to Trump, and began to rapidly lose your greatness for the last 50 years.

The picture of political confrontation between democrats and republicans makes the term “Trumpism” attractive for research and the search for blurred truth from different points of view. Today the political science and historical context of the “Trumpism” phenomenon can be traced in the works of many authors. In the substantive side of the “Trumpism” discourse, it should be noted such authors as Thierry Montbrial, R. Berdan, D. Seldin, Alan Cafruni, Kevin Ryan, S. Ivannikov, L. Sokolschik, and others. Paying tribute to the author’s positions, we note the insufficient coverage of the ontological aspect of the ideas of “Trumpism,” which has far-reaching consequences for the Republican Party and American democracy as a whole.

Based on this formulation of the question, the purpose of this article is to clarify the ontology of the flow of “Trumpism” within the framework of the US Republican Party. That ideological baggage is based on the conservative paradigm of understanding the socio-political processes in the country and the world. The erosion of party ideologemes, as a set of tactical and strategic tasks, and the basis of unity, which happened in the ranks of the republican elite, prompted us to hypothesize about the strengthening of trumpocentrism in the republican party as a condition for maintaining the positions of this force in the struggle for the White House. The central thesis of a possible renewal was practically set by Trump and sounds like this: “Where does America’s greatness begin and on what is built?” To substantiate the hypothesis, we will be helped by addressing the issues of American history, the problem of interpreting American identity, the economic well-being of deep America, the consequences of the rhetoric of the political struggle between democrats and republicans during the 2020 presidential race, and the battles in the two Capitol chambers over the political fate of the 45 US President.

During the preparation of the article, the following **scientific methods** were used: historical – to reveal internal factors that had a significant impact on the formation of the trend of “Trumpism” within the Republican Party; comparative – to clarify the intentions of political discourse between the administration of President Trump, democrats and the top of the Republican Party; dialectical – to identify political contradictions between republicans and democrats in sensitive questions of domestic and foreign policy.

Trump stepped into the forefront of big American politics as Mr. Incognito. Politics for President Trump was supposed to become a new sphere of manifestation of his charismatic qualities with the prospect of maintaining his reputation and continuing the successes that he has already achieved in the big construction business. He was not a democrat and not entirely republican. He was the antithesis of the global militant liberalism of the democrats and the conciliation of part of the top of the republicans in exchange for the opportunity to live at the expense of America and the Americans. And if the motto of President Trump, “Make America Great Again,” became a threat to the vital interests of the “deep state,” then the representatives of the class of working and white America, those over 45–50 years old, he instilled hope for a better life. Trump will rightfully enter the political history of the United States as Weber’s phenomenon of a “politician by vocation,” who challenged “politicians by profession” (Weber, 1994). According to Trump, this political class of the American establishment, as an integral part of the “deep state,” has long lived in a world of certain standards of political ideologemes and represents the interests of inclusive capitalism, devoid of any obligations to society and the state.

Donald Trump’s dream “Make America Great Again” has deep roots in the party and political history of the United States. It is due to President Theodore Roosevelt (a distant relative of F. D. Roosevelt) and the new political force he created – the progressive party of the United States (1912–1916). The new political force, which emerged from a split within the Republican Party during the presidential campaign in 1912, was nicknamed the “Bull Moose Party.” Although in the end, T. Roosevelt lost the election to W. Wilson, for the first time in the history of an American two-system party organization, he took second place in terms of the number of votes collected.

The success of T. Roosevelt was primarily associated with the left deviation of the “progressives” and, in modern terminology, the focus on improving the quality of life of working America. T. Roosevelt envisioned solving social justice problems through mechanisms of business regulation, which should be created by special government agencies. It was a key thesis of the Progressives’ economic platform. In practice, this meant a decrease in the omnipotence of monopolies, partial control of financial and economic activities by the state, and forcing capital to social responsibility for the benefit of the progressive development of the entire society. T. Roosevelt deliberately supported the scale of his political “pro-

gressive” romanticism with the maxim he had gained through suffering: “Speak softly, but hold a big baton in your hands, and you will go far.”

The repeated reading of the pages of the party-political history of the United States as a form of spirit [Hegel], but to a different degree of maturity of the political mind of the conservative part of the country’s ruling class, American society is doomed in the format of “Trumpism.” Trump’s new conservatism is in no way matched with the views of the progressionists who have left the political arena. Rather, it manifested itself as a “farce of history,” which was embodied in the personality of the 45th President of the United States and reflected the interests of the real creators of America’s greatness. For this category of the establishment, individualism, career, personal success, and financial stability are valuable, not the “communism” of democrats toward a part of American society, which Trump himself opposes. The combination of this political plot with a new interpretation of the historical guilt of white America towards black America as the phantom pain of the period of slavery with the problems of latent segregation revealed all the “understatement” of ideals, values, and narratives that the United States was so proud of.

The split of the country into two camps and the final defeat of the democrats in February 2021 following the results of the Senate vote on the lifelong removal of Donald Trump from possible government posts in big politics convincingly show that the phenomenon of “Trumpism” is not accidental in American political life. The roots of his ideas are deep, and he, as an extraordinary person, is in demand by broad sections of American society. The top of the Republican Party cannot ignore this, if only because, on the one hand, they do not have the best candidate for the presidency of the country in the elections in 2024, and on the other hand, the dismissal of Trump threatens the republicans with final discrediting in the eyes of voters and leaving from all branches of government into the shadow of the democrats. The realities of the political struggle are such that this means long oblivion and an outsider’s status on all domestic and foreign policy issues. “Trumpism,” on the other hand, is strong in its ontology and resolute willingness to reflect the historical essence of deep America, which was lost in the big game called “globalization.” Realizing all the risks of this game, a significant part of American society demands its share of happiness here and now and not the promised bright prospects. As a consequence, the ontology of “Trumpism” is made up of economic nationalism, as the basis of America’s prosperity, a special American identity, as a symbol of the hard work and determination of

a free personality, which created the United States project, and pragmatic isolationism in international politics, as a principle of promoting America's interests.

To one degree or another in the public space, these ideas were expressed long before President Trump by American analysts J. Fulbright (1967), T. Veblen (1984), M. Novak (1997), and others. The leitmotif of these authors' reflections may be J. Fulbright's statement that "the causes of national egoism, belligerence and internal problems in the United States are associated with the constant struggle of the two Americas: the first is generous and humane, the other is narrow and selfish; the first is self-critical, the other is self-confident, the first has a sound mind, the second is filled with fantastic ideas, the first is reasonable, the second is careless in the use of force ... In the struggle between the Americas, the first task of the United States was to change vocabulary and values, ... reconciliation of America with itself for her own good" (Fulbright, 1967, pp. 240–246).

Trump began the Great Reset (reboot) by bringing big business to a common moral code. For the Trump politician, the slogan "You are America" was a reflection of the aspirations of deep America and a sign of a split in American society that must be overcome in the name of "Great America." The recognition by the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago that for decades the United States has experienced growing inequality in income and wealth between socio-economic groups (Kluwer, 2019) was nothing new for Trump. The dimensions of this inequality before his eyes were created by the capitalist system itself, the main actors of which (TNCs) have always strived and are striving for super-profits.

The specifics of the American model of capitalism are reflected in two characteristic phenomena. The first is reflected in the American economy. There are two contrasting areas that never intersect. It is the world of big money, the life of which is reflected in financial exchanges, and the world of the real economy, where real goods and services are produced. The monetary policy determines the dynamics of the first sphere. It is what the Federal Reserve System (FRS) and the US Treasury do. The rise and fall of markets are directly related to how much money printed by the Federal Reserve goes into the economy.

While the FRS is throwing money away, stock indices are growing. If the FRS stops doing this or raises rates, money becomes more expensive, growth stops. This mechanism has been working for decades. Therefore, according to authoritative analysts, no matter what happens, the quotes of

the main exchange players remain stable, and the financial markets have long been torn away from the real economy (*There are massive protests*, 2020). Once again convincing of this, for example, the calmness of the stock exchanges during the riots (May–June 2020) in more than 40 US cities, which were associated with the death of J. Floyd. It turns out that the financial oligarchy did not take everything that was happening seriously. For a long time, social phenomena no longer belonged to negative catalysts influencing the future income of large corporations, which cannot be said about the specifics of the functioning of the second sphere – the sphere of the real economy, which also requires “cheap” money for its development.

Internal instability, extraordinary events (catastrophes, epidemics), and purely economic indicators, such as profit norms and innovative characteristics (to be fast, to be light, to be dynamic, which is associated with information technology) (Friedman, 2002), force American companies look for sites for the production of goods in other countries, where you can use cheap skilled labor, cheap raw materials, and developed infrastructure.

For America in 2019–2020, this reality, but in a more negative light, was demonstrated by the COVID-19 pandemic. It exacerbated this long-standing inequality: the economy decreased by 2%, and the unemployment rate approached 20% (Kluwer, 2019). But even more alarming, the burden of the pandemic has disproportionately fallen on wealthy citizens and socially unprotected – minorities, women, low-paid workers.

And if, for objective reasons, Trump could not do anything with the first component of the American economic model, then he tried to influence the second with financial and legislative levers. Trump’s economic idea is based on the postulates of the era of classical liberalism with its characteristic real production, market, and production relations between the main classes. Financial capital in such an economy was part of this system and served all its elements (Ivannikov, 2020). This formulation of the question about finance capital suggests that “Trumpism” does not accept rather not so much the results of the evolution of the capitalist system, as a result of which finance capital received enormous power (something is beyond its power to change), but rather the fact that the financial oligarchy has become tangibly influence the institutions of the state in decision-making. Trump is not against its role “outside” when it is necessary to weaken competitors and enemies of America, as well as to prevent the implementation of projects that are dangerous for the US leadership.

For example, as in the case of Nord Stream 2, the political, economic, and financial interests of all the players in big American politics have coincided. Or, for example, how Trump supported big American business in the trade war with China. An eloquent confirmation of this was the conclusion in November 2017 of an agreement between the largest Chinese sovereign wealth fund CIC, and Goldman Sachs, which made it possible for American companies to see a complete picture of the true size of the financial accounts of China's GDP and its trade balance (Kafruni, 2017).

Trump is for business, and for the greatness of America, he will always support business. Trump is against the merging of the interests of the financial, economic, and IT oligarchy into the club of the “national-global government,” which, on the one hand, sees America as a global economic hub, which lives under the principles not of ownership and production, but of import and consumption, which is killing the “working” America, and on the other hand, by positioning itself as a state within a state, uses its resources in its own interests. According to Trump, such a policy of institutional substitution is being pursued by the “Washington swamp,” which has begun to confidently take over power and influence over the past fifty years.

With the increased role of finance capital, as well as the consequences of the deindustrialization of America, “Trumpism” is perceived as a “historical accident” (Ivannikov, 2020) that needs to be corrected. By solving this problem, the return of national producers to the United States was proclaimed, and the way was to provide business with certain benefits and reduce taxes on the rich. Trump promised to include a mechanism for importing duties and additional taxation for opponents of such a course. His decisive position was evidenced by campaign statements in 2016 in Michigan regarding the auto giant Ford, which began to move production to Mexico to gain additional profits. During the primaries, Trump promised to introduce a 35 percent duty on all cars made by American firms abroad and imported into the United States.

It is clear that in the race against time, trying to change the established principle of obtaining excess profits by monopoly companies, President Trump was doomed. But in terms of improving the lives of ordinary Americans, his economic policies still did something. For the period from 2017–2019 (before the start of the COVID-19 pandemic), the unemployment rate in the United States was 3.5%, and the number of jobs increased by 10 million, which is much better than the results of Democratic President Barack Obama. Trump also stabilized the economic situ-

ation in the country in the conditions of unprecedented pressure from the consequences of COVID-19. In this regard, economist Klover Wolters stated: “In 2021, the US economy must increase in the range of 5–6%. Considering this growth path, labor markets will continue to improve, and by the end of 2023, the unemployment rate will return to its pre-pandemic level of 3.5%” (Kluwer, 2019). Time will show how President Biden’s economic successes will look against the background of these expectations, but one thing is clear – these figures should not go below.

The second challenge to which President Trump proposed his answer was no less sensitive to the American society than the first. It is a question of American identity. Before Trump, he was within the framework of a restrained ethnocultural discourse, the essence of which was reflected in the concept of political correctness, which replaced the policy of the famous American “melting pot.” In both the first and second cases, the acute topics of domestic racism and segregation, which are present in American society, were within the framework of multiculturalism and tolerance. These concepts became a part of educational, emigration, and social policies that, on the one hand, restrained the growth of social tension in society, and on the other – contributed to the formation of public consciousness for unity around the patriotic slogan “we are Americans.”

The apparent amorphousness of this construction appeared when Trump suggested looking at the issue of American identity in the context of economic realities and social expectations. He correlated the resource of opportunities and the expanding boundaries of state paternalism with the growing social problems within the country, the results of the “open doors” policy for those who are wishing to emigrate to the United States, and the state’s expenditures on supporting low-income citizens, among whom the vast majority were African Americans and emigrants. Ultimately, the question boiled down to the well-known problems of any state: an unbearable social burden on the budget; the dependence of a certain part of society, which is not inclined to work; unpreparedness and, to put it mildly, the cool attitude of some African Americans and emigrants to work in the real sector of the economy, where a certain industrial culture, qualifications, and skills are needed.

According to his position, Trump destroyed the artificially supported strategy of the democrats of “social communism,” which had been saving society from acute conflicts for a long time. It was formulated by President L. Johnson: “... we need to do something about this, and we

have to give them something. A little, but enough to calm them down, but not to change anything.” In practice, this meant that the “Do-It-Yourself” slogan of Protestant America was sacrificed for various social benefits of an economic, educational, financial, and career nature that has become an integral part of American life since the 1960s. It became especially typical for the African American part of the country (Berdan, 2020).

The unsightly picture of growing social tension was reinforced by alarming facts from the life of working America, which became in the public domain. For example, according to VOX and CBSN, in 2020, in the United States, 12 million children and 24 million people in older age groups who live on small pensions are malnourished, have health problems. From 30 to 40 million people are under constant threat of eviction from the occupied housing due to the inability to pay for it. In certain circumstances, for an outpost of democracy, which the United States considers itself, such data could well be attributed to enemy propaganda, but, alas, these are the fruits of democratic rule, as Trump has repeatedly pointed out.

In this part of society, the government’s long-term policy to support emigrants is causing increasing misunderstanding and irritation. According to the most conservative data, the number of emigrants awaiting US citizenship in 2020 was about 20 million. Every year, social support and the integration procedure for this group of people cost America 16% of GDP, significantly higher than in the EU. In this regard, American economists J. Grayson and C. O’Dell write that as the government and politicians have less and less resources for distribution, and the desire to be elected to power remains high, the “consumer approach” always wins (Grayson, O’Dell, 1991, p. 94). But unlike H. Clinton, who in her campaign speeches “saw a divided country much deeper than it is, and in the duty of everyone to build a fair America” (Fortune, 2016), Trump offered Americans “not handouts in the form of free medicine and higher education, but creating opportunities to earn so much that everyone can pay for everything they need to live” (Forbes, 2016). Trump linked the solution to this problem with creating new jobs and limiting the number of emigrants who take these jobs from Native Americans. For democrats, tight control over emigration policy meant shifting their political ambitions into a turbulent electoral race and losing the keys to winning the political struggle against republicans. In electoral statistics, this would sound like a direct loss of potential supporters who have received a chance for a better life from their hands.

For more information about this original text, enter the original text. Send the comment. Side panels in the dualism of the modalities of the speeches of the two politicians “build”/“don’t give handouts” showed not so much the rhetoric of competitors in the presidential race, as Trump’s art and courage in intending to connect questions of economic well-being with issues of the cultural identity of deep America, whose vision of the country’s prospects is associated with patriarchal conservative society of the late XIX – first half of the XX century. As a result, American identity became the unforeseen map of the political game for the democrats. Its spiritual basis was quite clearly described by M. Weber in Protestant ethics (Weber, 1994), which was brought to American society by immigrants from the Old World.

The individualistic joy of life, supported by freedom, rights, and law, determined the essence of the American way of life, and the principle of equality (moral) formed in the New World a universal commandment for all migrant citizens – “takes care of individual growth and prosperity” (Seltznik, 2002, p. 41). Hence, in the understanding of “moral equality,” a purely American approach prevailed: the principle of equality implied treating people as equals. Each person was endowed with responsibility and the right to determine what good is and how to achieve it through his own efforts (Seltznik, 2002, p. 42). In this formulation, freedom acquired a material character (private property), became a powerful engine of socio-economic transformations, and remained sacred and untouchable as the highest value. The combination of a new ethic with the risks of many-sided free competition resulted in American identity. It was reflected like big business in the ethics of working America and had a strong influence on the industrial culture of many generations. For many years, the life goals of this part of society were determined by the maxim – to achieve more through self-improvement. White, Protestant, English-speaking America became the bearers of this identity (Ivannikov, 2020).

Thus, in Trumpism, American identity manifested itself as a phenomenon with its own specific ethnic-national affiliation with unique cultural and historical characteristics (Sokolshchik, 2019). On the one hand, it is a recognized fact that they (characteristics) reflect the unity of the spirit of economic freedom and religious emancipation, which is associated with the Protestant community, and on the other, that in this sound they do not allow anyone to become one hundred percent American assimilation of the dominant system of values. This American reality phenomenon is demonstrated by the integration of large ethnic-national groups from

Mexico, Central America, and Southeast Asia, which retain their resilience to the conditions of mass culture and the specifics of ethnic-psychological reactions to technocratic values. The degree of concern on the part of American society for such a polarization of the country's cultural and value background is reflected in research and surveys by such authoritative centers as Pew and PRRI. In a 2011 Pew Research Center poll, more than half of baby boomers and older Americans saw an increase in the number of immigrants as a threat to American values and customs, and according to a 2015 PRRI survey, older white Americans are more likely than younger that the culture and values of American society are now worse than they were in the 1950s (Frey, 2017). Such sociology captures the contradictions of material and ideal forms of culture of technological and non-technological civilization. In the words of G. Lebon, "products of the racial soul" cannot simultaneously and equally use the representatives of different cultures (Lebon, 2011, p. 296).

Trump has given a special role to American identity. On the one hand, it should act as a guardian of the spirit of the creators of America's greatness. It is assigned the role of a bond between generations and the same value of Americans as freedom. On the other hand, it should become an instrument for reformatting the consciousness of the migrant environment, which operates with purely mercantile interests. In Trump's concept of economic nationalism, historical identity should act as a locomotive for revitalizing the "rust belt" – the region of the Midwest near the Great Lakes, where the bulk of the heavy industry is concentrated. According to Trump's 2020 campaign support map, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Wisconsin, Michigan, and Iowa have become centers of renewed self-confidence. It is where Trump's voters (and republicans) are concentrated, and the pulse of America's sentiment resides here. It is true patriarchal conservative America. Family values, traditions, and patriotism are important here. For this part of America, Trump is the personification of these values. He is the father of five children and the family business owner (Lanetsky, 2017). He is not connected with the oligarchy, annoying to everyone, and eternal promises to make life better. The scale of the perception of these thoughts is evidenced by the fact that a traditional American voted for Trump – this is a resident of a one-story America, the middle class, workers, medium and small businesses, evangelicals, and those republican supporters who have ceased to believe the party elite. Trump was also supported by a significant number of voters who were classified as rich and poor. All this says that in the minds of Americans,

politician Trump at a certain stage in the historical development of the United States, has become a sought-after personality, and “Trumpism” itself is not at all an accidental phenomenon.

The head of the French Institute of International Relations, Thierry de Montbrial, referring to Trump’s legacy, expressed the idea that in the system of international relations, “Trumpism” should be viewed as a tendency to limit the concept of “national interests” to a narrower understanding (Montbrial, 2019). In our opinion, this can be presented as pragmatic isolationism in the international arena, based on two interrelated strategies. The first strategy seeks to make America’s partners and allies who live in Europe and Asia pay for their security, not in words, but deeds. It was reflected by the slogan: “Stop living at America’s expense.” The second is to build America’s greatness on the advancement of real, not imaginary, national interests. In materializing the proclaimed strategies, Trump rejected globalism, like everything associated with it in the past 50 years: the policy of upholding human rights, the export of democratic values, the involvement of the United States in all world conflict situations. According to Trump, this brought only economic losses to the United States and new threats to its national security at home. The slogan “good deal” has become the hallmark of Trumpism in foreign policy. In practice, this meant transferring the materialization of the domestic political agenda to the foreign policy contour and shifting the center of gravity of public sentiment towards a more selfish and mercantilist foreign policy. Refusal from external obligations, which do not imply immediate and tangible benefits for the United States, presupposed a concentration on internal affairs, which did not look so brilliant in the United States (Suslov, 2017). The combination of the internal political agenda with the external reminds us of the intentions of G. Morgenthau’s concept of “realism,” where the policy of struggle for “power” has a perspective if it has strong internal roots.

Trump’s second logical step in foreign policy isolationism was the separation of concepts traditional for the US foreign policy course, such as global leadership (involvement) and the greatness of America associated with economic well-being, political respect, and military primacy. For the first time since 1945, Trump openly stated that the international obligations of the United States and their national interests do not always coincide. That priority should be given to the latter – even if this is done to the detriment of the production of so-called global goods associated with supporting young democracies (Suslov, 2017).

The new guidelines for US foreign policy reflected two US national security strategies of 2017 and 2018. The 2017 Strategy focuses the Trump administration's attention on protecting the country, promoting American prosperity, maintaining peace with power, and increasing US influence. These are the country's vital interests, which is consonant with the administrations of Barack Obama and George W. Bush. The main message for America's partners in the 2017 strategy sounded as the absence in the foreign policy of plans to impose a way of life and democracy, while simultaneously expressing concern about the strengthening of new centers of power – Russia and China, and already traditional threats from rogue regimes like North Korea and Iran, and international terrorism (Seldin, 2017) Strategy 2018 for the first time voiced the Trump administration's emphasis on the country's real, not perceived national interests. The spirit of the document reflected Trump's "America First" campaign slogan. The strategy includes four strategic objectives: strengthening the influence of the United States; transformation of influence into a positive force in the interests of achieving peace, prosperity, and development of society; creating partnerships with those who share the United States' desire for freedom and prosperity and establishing allies with those who, according to the United States' opinion, can contribute to the implementation of American policies around the world (Al-Makaleh, 2018).

The isolationist sound of the US foreign policy was reflected in the withdrawal from UNESCO and WHO, the Trans-Pacific Partnership, the Paris Climate Agreement, the Open Skies Treaty, and the INF Treaty. Against the background of a decrease in economic and military aid to democracies in Eastern Europe, the component of the US world leadership in the military component of American military power (an annual increase in the country's military budget) has increased, and NATO's budgetary solidarity under US pressure was first materialized in an increase in the military spending of the participating countries.

Conclusions

The analysis of the phenomenon of "Trumpism" gives us grounds to draw the following conclusions.

First. D. Trump, as a non-democrat and a failed republican, burst into American politics like "The Petrel" from the famous work of M. Gorky.

It brought hope to the inhabitants of historical and deep America for a renewal of their living conditions and the representatives of the deep state – political uncertainty and economic risks.

Second. In the isolationism/globalism dualism, “Trumpism” viewed its second position as a threat to America’s greatness, which is posed by the “Washington swamp,” the omnipotence of the media and IT corporations seeking to replace the interests of the state with the interests of their own enrichment and rise. For this highly influential segment of American society, President Trump’s domestic policies did not bode well, making him an enemy of the America they represented.

Third. President Trump has revised America’s foreign policy strategy and forced its allies and friends to pay the “bills” rather than live at the expense of America and the Americans. In Trump’s America, the country’s national interests have become more pragmatic, economically oriented, and less ideologically supported. The withdrawal of the United States from many international treaties and organizations meant that from now on, the United States would pursue a balanced national strategy, which organically combines interests both on the internal and external contours of the policy of national interests.

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Trumpizm jako alternatywna perspektywa Wielkiej Ameryki

Streszczenie

Artykuł przedstawia analizę fenomenu „Trumpizmu”, który przyniósł nadzieję na odnowienie Ameryki oraz oczekiwania zmian w tradycyjnej amerykańskiej polityce. „Trumpizm” rzucił wyzwanie amerykańskiemu Deep State i pokazał, że Ameryka jest historycznie, mentalnie, kulturowo i ekonomicznie podzielona. Paternalizm amerykańskich demokratów wobec pewnej części amerykańskiej populacji, co Trump określił mianem „komunizmu”, stoi w sprzeczności wobec prawdziwej Ameryki, spersonifikowanej przez stany należące do „pasa rdzy” i ich klasy robotniczej. „Trumpizm” dostrzega szansę prawdziwego odrodzenia Ameryki w polityce niezachwianego narodowego egoizmu i skupieniu Ameryki na sobie samej. Dla przeciwników politycznych Donalda Trumpa jego powrót do władzy oznaczałby ponowne pograżenie elity rządzącej w walce przeciwko nieznanemu, podczas gdy to, co działo się za politycznymi kulisami już wyszło na światło dzienne i odkryło swoje prawdziwe cele.

Słowa kluczowe: „Trumpizm”, republikanie, demokraci, Deep State, światowe przywództwo, pragmatyczny izolacjonizm

