The Risk of Russia Using Nuclear Weapons Due to the War in Ukraine from the American Perspective

• Authors: Łukasz Jureńczyk

Title variants

PL

Ryzyko użycia broni jądrowej przez Rosję w związku z wojną na Ukrainie z perspektywy amerykańskiej

Abstracts

PL

Przedmiotem artykułu jest ryzyko użycia broni jądrowej przez Rosję w kontekście wojny na Ukrainie. Celem artykułu jest analiza i ocena takiej możliwości z perspektywy amerykańskiej. Głównym problemem badawczym jest, czy według amerykańskich naukowców i ekspertów realne jest użycie przez Rosję broni jądrowej przeciwko Ukrainie lub państwom NATO? Z perspektywy Zachodu nie można wykluczyć takiej możliwości, jednak znakomita większość badaczy i analityków uważa, że ryzyko takie jest bardzo niewielkie. Jeśli do tego dojdzie, to prawdopo dobnie będzie to wykorzystanie taktycznej broni jądrowej przeciwko celom wojskowym w Ukrainie. Mniej prawdopodobne jest wystrzelenie taktycznej broni jądrowej przeciwko elementom infrastruktury wykorzystywanej do przesyłu z Zachodu broni dla Ukrainy, zlokalizowanej w państwach wschodniej flanki NATO. W ramach badań wykorzystano wywiady przeprowadzone przez autora w Waszyngtonie i Nowym Jorku oraz ekspertyzy amerykańskich think-tanków. Analiza przeprowadzona została w perspektywie paradygmatu neorealizmu ofensywnego.

EN

The paper’s subject is the risk of using nuclear weapons by Russia in the context of the war in Ukraine. The aim is to analyze and evaluate such a possibility from the American perspective. The main research problem is whether, according to American scholars and experts, is it realistic for Russia to use nuclear weapons against Ukraine or NATO countries? From the perspective of the West, such a possibility cannot be ruled out, but the great majority of researchers and analysts believe that the risk is very small. If this happens, it will likely be the use of tactical nuclear weapons against military targets in Ukraine. It is less likely that tactical nuclear weapons will be launched against elements of the infrastructure used to transport weapons from the West to Ukraine, located in the countries of NATO’s eastern flank. The research used interviews conducted by the author in Washington and New York and the expertise of American think tanks. The analysis was carried out from the perspective of the paradigm of offensive neorealism.

Keywords

EN

nuclear weapons; war in Ukraine; the United States; nuclear blackmail; Russian military aggression

PL

broń jądrowa; wojna w Ukrainie; Stany Zjednoczone; szantaż jądrowy; rosyjska agresja zbrojna

• Publisher: Uniwersytet im. Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu
• Journal: Środkowoeuropejskie Studia Polityczne
• Year: 2022
• Issue: 4
• Pages: 49-64

Dates

published

2022

Contributors

author

Łukasz Jureńczyk

• Uniwersytet Kazimierza Wielkiego w Bydgoszczy

• https://orcid.org/000000031149925X

References

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Identifiers

DOI

10.14746/ssp.2022.4.3

Biblioteka Nauki

31339478