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2021 | 48 | 2 | 131-141

Article title

¿Es el artículo una unidad pragmática? Acerca de la teoría de la definitud y la referencia

Authors

Content

Title variants

EN
Is the article a pragmatic unit? On the theory of definiteness and reference

Languages of publication

Abstracts

EN
In this paper I intend to review some theories of the article, paying attention to the relations they establish between reference and +/–definiteness of a noun phrase (NP). The prototypes of +/–definiteness in Spanish are the definite and indefinite articles and NPs determined by them. Nevertheless, the actual reference of a NP depends mostly on its use (a speech act) and varies according to its pragmatic context. Reference and definiteness are mutually related concepts accompanied by pragmatic and semantic implications. I wish to make a critical overview of some proposals in this field of research.

Keywords

Year

Volume

48

Issue

2

Pages

131-141

Physical description

Dates

published
2021

Contributors

author
  • Uniwersytet im. Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu (Polonia)

References

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  • ASALE (2009). Nueva Gramática de la lengua española. Madrid: Espasa.
  • Bertolet, R. (1984). Reference, fiction and fictions. Synthèse, 60, 413-37.
  • Carlson, G. (2006). Reference. In L. Horn, & G. Ward (Eds.), The Handbook of Pragmatics (pp. 74-96). Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing.
  • Christopherson, P. (1939). The Articles: a Study of their Theory and Use in English. Copenhagen: Munksgaard.
  • Donnelan, K. (1966). Reference and definite descriptions. Philosophical Review, 77, 281-304.
  • Geach, P.T. (1962). Reference and Generality. New York: Cornell University Press.
  • Heim, I. (1982). The Semantics of Definite and Indefinite NP’s. Amherst: University of Massachussetts.
  • Karolak, S. (1989). L’article et la valeur du syntagme nominal. Paris: PUF.
  • Karolak, S. (1990). Kwantyfikacja a determinacja w językach naturalnych. Warszawa: PWN.
  • Kleiber, G. (1981). Problèmes de référence: descriptions définies et noms propres. Paris: Klincksieck.
  • Kripke, S. (1977): Speaker’s reference and semantic reference. In P.A. French, T.E. Uehling, Jr. & H.
  • Wettstein (Eds.), Midwest Studies in Philosophy, vol. II: Studies in the philosophy of language (pp. 255-276). Morris, MN: University of Minnesota.
  • Laca, B. (1999). Presencia y ausencia de determinante. In I. Bosque, & V. Demonte (Eds.), GDLE (pp. 891-928). Madrid: Espasa-Calpe.
  • Leonetti Jungl, M. (1990). El artículo y la referencia. Madrid: Taurus.
  • Leonetti Jungl, M. (1996). El artículo definido y la construcción del contexto. Signo & Seña, 5, 102-136.
  • Lewis, D. (1979). Scorkeeping in a language game. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 8, 339-359.
  • Löbner, S. (1985). Definites. Journal of Semantics, 4, 279-326.
  • Lyons, C. (1999). Definiteness. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  • Neale, S. (1990). Descriptions. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
  • Polański, K. (Ed.) (1993). Encyklopedia językoznawstwa ogólnego. Wrocław: Ossolineum.
  • Quine, W.V. (1972). Méthode de logique. Paris: Armand Colin.
  • Rothschild, D. (2007). Presuppositions and scope. Journal of Philosophy, 104, 71-106.
  • Russell, B. (1905). On denoting. Mind, 14, 479-493.
  • Searle, J. (1969). Speech Acts. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  • Strawson, P.F. (1950). On referring. Mind, 59, 320-344.

Document Type

Publication order reference

Identifiers

Biblioteka Nauki
1395890

YADDA identifier

bwmeta1.element.ojs-doi-10_14746_strop_2021_482_012
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