Kyrylo Mieliekiestsev

Candidate of Historical Sciences,
Senior Lecturer at the Department of History of Ukraine and Auxiliary
Sciences of History, Vasyl' Stus Donetsk National University
https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4931-9576
k.melekestsev@donnu.edu.ua; kmelekescev@gmail.com

BETWEEN MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON: INFORMATION INFLUENCES ON EARLY DIALOGUE WITH NATO IN POLAND AND UKRAINE (1991–1994)

Summary: The research covers the early years of Ukraine's and Poland's cooperation in their bilateral relations in the context of building up security policies between the NATO and the CSTO in 1991–1994. Various information influences from state and non-state actors, internal and external, made it so the processes of the search for security guarantees ended up quite different between the two neighboring countries. Covering sources and literature that provide evidence for influences from sources such as the Kremlin, the non-lustrated "old guard" former Communist party functionaries in Ukraine, and the former opposition in Poland, the research shows how the two countries' relations with the NATO differed, and why, though both countries joined the Partnership for Peace program at roughly the same time, Poland managed to start active Euro-Atlantic integration much earlier than Ukraine did. Using sources such as the text of the treaties, the establishing documents and legislature guidebooks of organization, public writings of diplomats and former policy makers, the research shows what exactly were the risks that the NATO assessed in the joining of former Eastern Bloc countries (with the unstated reasons for the small number of contacts of those countries with NATO in the 1991–1994 relevant to the West's suspicion of post-Soviet intelligence and military), and which points of the first Ukraine-NATO proved "too much" for the former. Furthermore, Ukraine's early success with the number of NATO exercises it partook in during the first years of the Partnership for Peace became an example to other Eastern Europe countries seeking better relations with NATO and defense sector reforms, including the Republic of Poland. The paper also highlights the tendencies of cooperation between Ukraine and the Republic of Poland in the context of NATO enlargement and the various aspects of Atlantic integration. The most important among them was cooperation in security and defense, both bilateral and within the framework of the NATO Partnership for Peace Program.

Keywords: Foreign influence, information influences, information policy, information warfare, NATO, Republic of Poland, Ukraine

1. Introduction

The history of Ukraine-NATO relations is known for the high politicization of the issue of possible membership in Ukrainian societal discourse. Meanwhile, for the neighboring countries, former members of the "Eastern Bloc", in particular in the Republic of Poland, integration into the Atlantic Alliance was considered an integral part of the national security system. The path of Ukrainians to such an assessment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was a much more tenuous one. Both the "neutral" and the openly pro-Moscow parties, such as the Communist Party of Ukraine, incited a sense of fear towards NATO in Ukrainian society, portrayed it as an aggressive force in the new world, threatened that joining the alliance would inevitably become a real betrayal, a "knife in the back" for the "Russian brothers." Only the open aggression on the part of the Russian Federation forced the leading parties to reconsider their attitude to Atlantic integration and work to normalize the corresponding attitude in society. As it were, according to the results of surveys by the Razumkov Center in 2016, 72% of Ukrainians declared that they would vote in favour Ukraine joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organization if such a referendum was to take place (Naboka & Zhavornkov, 2018). With the growth of public support for Ukraine's NATO ascension a new question arose: how did some of Ukraine's neighbors joined NATO earlier? A common answer was that they started building up relations with the organization much earlier, while Ukraine focused too much on adhering to the principles of neutrality. In this paper, we look into Poland and Ukraine's relations with NATO in 1991–1994 to compare these early days of re-gained independence and see if there were indeed major differences in the approaches of the countries' leadership. And if so, what were the information pushes that influenced said decision-makers, and how?

2. Literature review

Ukrainian historiography on relations with NATO is represented a plethora of works, both decades-old and printed in the last few years. A significant place in the historiographic review is occupied by developments

in cooperation with the EU and NATO to deepen integration and guarantee security. H. Perepelitsa was one of the first to develop this topic, considering the future accession to NATO as a result of Ukraine's Euro-Atlantic choice, its significance for the reform of the country's armed forces (Perepelytsia, 2001). The principles of Euro-Atlantic integration processes are meticulously described in the work titled "The North Atlantic Alliance: History, Functions, Structure, Relations with Ukraine", edited by Professor D. Dzvinchuk (Dzvinchuk, 2012). Among the latter works, the collective monograph "Together or Separate? 20 years of Polish-Ukrainian relations" edited by O. Boryniak, M. Valiak and I. Hurak (Boryniak et al., 2013). Separately, we will highlight dissertation studies on the topic of relations between modern Ukraine and the Republic of Poland. They made up an important part of Ukrainian historiography of the second stage. Due to this, the preparation of the monograph was facilitated by familiarization with the developments of predecessors. The Polish experience for Ukraine and the prospects of Polish support for the Ukrainian course towards the EU and NATO are analyzed in I. Todorov's monograph "Ukraine on the way to the European and Euro-Atlantic community" (Todorov, 2006). I. Todorov's works cover aspects of the implementation of the EU's Eastern Neighborhood policy in the regions of Ukraine, in particular using the examples of Donetsk region, Kherson region, Crimea, etc. The state and public levels of policy implementation are considered, the EU's support for Ukraine on the path of reforms and democratic changes is proven (Todorov, 2013). The fundamental events in the development of relations between Ukraine and NATO are indicated, namely the Charter on a special partnership (July 1997) with the member states of the Alliance (Todorov, 2014). A broad review of sources and scientific literature is presented in the study by N. Chorna (Chorna, 2007). Multiple PhD theses of Ukrainian political scientists turned toward the peculiarities of the European and Euro-Atlantic integration dimension in the politics of Poland and Ukraine.

Polish researchers have been considering the peculiarities of Ukraine's bilateral relations with Poland since the beginning of the 1990s. Considering the analyzed literature of the period, we believe that the work of Polish scientists is distinguished by a much higher level of validity of the conceptual foundations

of Eastern foreign policy. Therefore, we suggest starting the review of the first stage of historiography on the topic with the works of Polish scientists. The studies of B. Wizimirska (Wizimirska, 1991), J. Nowakowski (Nowakowski, 1991) and others have gained significance. J. Onyszkiewicz, in considering the new geopolitical and security strategy of Poland, highlighted the need for the activity of the Polish authorities in the Ukrainian direction, considering it a matter of exceptional importance (Onyszkiewicz, 1992). As noted by the Polish researcher J. Draus, at the turn of 1993–1994 there was a cooling of Ukrainian-Polish relations caused by the espionage scandal surrounding A. Lysenko and the signing by Poland of a controversial agreement with Russia regarding the construction of a gas pipeline that would bypass the territory of Ukraine. Draus outlines Moscow's influence on the Ukrainian-Polish discourse regarding NATO, for example, when the Kremlin "officially informed" the Ukrainian side that Poland allegedly offered Moscow to abandon support for Ukraine`s independence in exchange for support for the Russian Federation's entry into NATO (Draus, 2010, p. 32–33). According to the Polish researcher K. Fedorowicz, the "cooling phase" of the Ukrainian-Polish cooperation on that matter was also connected with the discourse regarding mid-20th century events (Fedorowicz, 2011, p. 164).

3. Materials and methods

The processed source base is classified according to the following groups: legislative acts of higher state authorities, presidents, parliaments, governments; international acts: official documents of bilateral Ukrainian-Polish relations and cooperation in international organizations; journalism and official speeches, interviews, analysis of state and public figures; materials of Ukrainian and foreign periodicals.

An important theoretical basis of the research is the transformation of Ukrainian-Polish relations from bilateral to those that have signs of part of multilateral relations within the framework of Euro-Atlantic integration processes. The researched period covers the early 1990s, and so Ukraine's relations with foreign structures are defined by bilateralism, and thus Ukraine-NATO relations in this period contend to

differing trends from the 21st century ones. Since the first years of Ukraine's independence, Z. Brzeziński proposed a theoretical concept for the development of Ukrainian-Polish relations from bilateral to multilateral: "Poland can be considered a magnet that will attract other countries to the processes of European integration, as well as to the Euro-Atlantic Union" (Bzhezinskyi, 1998). On a related note, today we can talk about the partial implementation of such a concept on the examples of Ukrainian-Polish cooperation in European integration processes. With the strengthening of the role of Poland in Europe, the Ukrainian-Polish bilateral partnership formed in the 1990s became an integral part of the European and Atlantic integration processes.

In order to comply with the principle of historicism, special methods of historical research were used during the writing of the work. The comparative-historical method contributed to the awareness of the integrity, interdependence, as well as the problematic coexistence of Ukraine and Poland. Using the method, the role of the countries of Eastern Europe in the international arena in 1991–1994 was clarified, primarily in relation to the processes of NATO expansion to the east. It was also established common and different informational influences regarding the attitude of Ukraine and Poland to NATO, as well as various state and non-state actors' attitudes towards Ukraine's Euro-Atlantic aspirations.

4. Results of the research

The first milestones of Ukrainian-Polish cooperation in the context of Atlantic integration date back almost to the time of Ukraine's declaration of independence. The Advisory Committee of the Presidents of Ukraine and the Republic of Poland actively considered the issue of collective security, but the proposals of the President of Ukraine, Leonid Kravchuk, to create an independent Ukrainian-Polish military block protected by nuclear weapons, met with the disapproval of the Polish side, interested in Euro-Atlantic integration (Trofymovych. 2010, p. 124). The activity of the Republic of Poland in matters of Euro-Atlantic integration had already made the Ukrainian initiatives to create a joint security strategy in Eastern Europe irrelevant by early 1990s (Dzvinchuk. 2012,

p. 295). In 1989, diplomatic relations between Poland and NATO began, two years before the collapse of the USSR (Skubiszewski, 1991).

During 1989–1991, Warsaw conducted secret negotiations with NATO (Chorna, 2007, p. 309). The purpose of the negotiations was to coordinate the process of liquidation of the "descendants of the KGB" – the expulsion of the former Soviet agents from the defense sector (Buch, 1991, p. 17–18). The last units of the Soviet troops left the territory of Poland only on September 17, 1993 (Dylonhova, 2007, p. 191). For several years, on July 5, 1994, Poland signed the project on the Individual Partnership Program with the North Atlantic Alliance (Drozd, 1994, p. 110). In the same month, American President B. Clinton made an important statement that the USA supports the expansion of NATO to the east (Kozakevych. 1999, p. 87). Because of this, the period 1994–1997 marked the beginning of Atlantic integration for the Republic of Poland. This direction also interested Poland's bilateral partners: Lithuania, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Ukraine (Mieliekiestsev, 2018, The allies…). Accordingly, the countries created opportunities for the exchange of information in the field of defense and security in their contractual framework of 1991–1994 (Mieliekiestsev, 2018, Tendentsii spivrobitnytstva).

Prior to 1994, Ukraine did not have any official agreements directly with NATO (NATO: dovidnyk, 2001). NATO, however, started "building bridges" since 1991, when the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (the predecessor of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council) was founded in response to the fall of the Soviet "Eastern Bloc." NATO member states and nine countries of Central and Eastern Europe, which once belonged to the Warsaw Pact, became members of this organization from the first days of its existence. This organization constituted a de facto forum on security issues that would give NATO countries new mechanisms of communication with the countries of the former rival bloc. Among Ukraine's contacts with NATO before 1994, we can mention cooperation with the North Atlantic Cooperation Council. Namely, the official visit of NATO Secretary General M. Wörner to Kyiv on February 22-23, 1992, when he officially invited Ukraine to participate in the RPAS. Ukraine became an official member of this organization on March 10, 1992, the same year the President

of Ukraine L. Kravchuk visited Brussels with a visit to the NATO headquarters (Mieliekiestsev, 2018, Tendentsii spivrobitnytstva).

Among the forum initiatives of the RPAS supported by Ukraine at the time, we can single out the seminar of the North Atlantic Assembly "Ukraine and European Security," which took place on June 20-23, 1993 in Kyiv. During this Ukraine-NATO dialogue, the problems of Ukraine`s domestic and foreign policy were discussed, especially the issue of Ukraine`s support for the proposal to eliminate the nuclear weapons of the former USSR located on its territory, as well as the implementation of economic and conversion programs in the future (Lipkevych, 2008, p. 165).

Such a neutral non-aligned paradigm, supported by the then head of the Ukrainian MFA, A. Zlenko, was dominant in the Ukrainian political community in 1991–1995, and extended to the principles of foreign policy (Zlenko, 2009). Similar to the foreign policy of Yugoslavia during the Cold War, Ukraine offered a neutral, isolated status to other countries "between Moscow and Washington" (Todorov, 2014). Ukraine, unlike other former Soviet republics such as Belarus and Kazakhstan, refused to sign the CIS statute and join the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), created on May 15, 1992 around Moscow. However, as noted above, Ukraine's proposals to maintain neutrality or even to form a bloc separate from NATO and the CSTO in Central Europe did not receive support in Poland.

The neutral, non-aligned paradigm of Ukrainian politics, supported by the then-head of the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry, A. Zlenko, was dominant in the Ukrainian political community in 1991–1995, and extended to the principles of foreign policy (Zlenko, 2009). Similar to the foreign policy of Yugoslavia during the Cold War, Ukraine offered this paradigm of a neutral, isolated status to other countries "between Moscow and Washington" (Todorov, 2014). Ukraine, unlike other former Soviet republics such as Belarus and Kazakhstan, refused to sign the CIS statute and join the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), created on May 15, 1992 around Moscow. However, as noted above, Ukraine's proposals to maintain neutrality or even to form a bloc separate from NATO and the CSTO in Central Europe did not receive support in Poland.

Unlike Ukraine, the Polish authorities unequivocally considered the "Soviet heritage" as the consequences of foreign control, de facto occupation, which is why they were preparing for Atlantic integration in opposition to former Soviet agents on their territories. At the same time, Ukraine preferred integration rather than lustration of old Soviet bureaucracy, due to which the governmental levels of trust in the Ukrainian state on the part of NATO was much lower than in the case of Poland (Zlenko, 2010). "Non-alignment" was not a panacea for Central Europe: Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic were looking for ways to prevent the possibility of the restoration of Moscow's influence. Because of this, the choice in favor of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was vital for the leaders of these countries.

On the other hand, the "Main directions of Ukraine's foreign policy" approved by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine on July 2, 1993 determined the need to implement "the establishment of military-political cooperation with other, primarily neighboring states and international organizations, in particular NATO and the EU." The document emphasized the importance of creating a pan-European security structure based on existing international institutions, namely NATO. Given the changes in the geopolitical situation in Europe after the collapse of the USSR, the declared intention of non-alignment was recognized as having to be adapted to new conditions. Non-alignment must not have become an obstacle to full-scale participation in the pan-European security structure (Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (n.d.), Pro Osnovni…).

A contradiction in the law was thus created: on the one hand, the previously-stated "observance of the non-bloc status" was established, and on the other hand, orientation towards the created pan-European security systems in order to ensure the national security of Ukraine. In 2005, the Verkhovna Rada got rid of references to Ukraine's non-aligned status in legislation, and in 2014, Ukraine was able to officially renounce its non-aligned status. However, in 1993, despite the contradictions in legislation, these documents had the status of law, which explains the absence of direct agreements with NATO. Instead, security issues were resolved through bilateral agreements, in particular with Poland. The founding "Treaty on good neighborliness between Ukraine and the Republic of Poland" of 1992 established cooperation in the field of security and defense. On February 3, 1993, it was extended by the "Agreement between the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine and the Ministry of National Defense of the Republic of Poland on military cooperation" (Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (n.d.) Uhoda mizh…).

The clauses of this agreement regarding the exchange of information on the organizational structures of the ministries of defense, cooperation in the rear and technical support of the troops, joint training of headquarters and troops, legal and scientific research activities in the armed forces were important for Ukraine's first contacts with NATO. Thanks to the agreement, it became possible to involve Polish teachers in the training courses for officers of the multinational headquarters of the National Defense Academy of Ukraine. This allowed the Ukrainians to gain important experience from the Polish side regarding cooperation with NATO in various fields, in particular in the certification and production of weapons in accordance with NATO standards. This was an important experience for the military and defense industry of Ukraine, the export of which made up a significant part of the country's income. However, the de facto implementation of the agreement became possible only in 1994 after Ukraine and Poland codified the regime of mutual air traffic in the controlled and operational space.

A major change came with the framework of NATO's document of the "Partnership for Peace," which was signed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, A. Zlenko, on February 9, 1994. On May 25, 1994, he sent a presentation document on Ukraine's participation in the program to NATO. "Partnership for Peace" offered such areas of activity as the expansion and activation of diplomatic and military cooperation in Europe, increasing the stability of the region, building stronger relations based on the principles of economic cooperation and democratic principles. In this way, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe were encouraged to further reforms. The implementation of the principles of the organization, the budget, the pace and scale of operations were made dependent on the personal position and capabilities of each of the participating states of the "Partnership for Peace" (Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (n.d.) Partnerstvo zarady…).

During 1994–1995, Ukraine and the Republic of Poland cooperated with NATO to develop their first individual partnership programs. Both countries became a participant in the mechanism for exchanging information on issues of defense and budget planning in the direction of cooperation with the Alliance. The goal was to create a mechanism for NATO countries to assess their own forces for participation in combined operations. Thanks to the complex of measures, Ukraine and Poland received new opportunities to train their armed forces to participate in joint actions (such as peacekeeping operations, training, logistics) with NATO member states. In this way, the principle of "Partnership for Peace" on the openness of the military budgets of the states and the planning of collective security in Europe was embodied. Evidently, such NATO programs had a positive effect on the state of the Ukrainian defense sector: in the same 1994, the Armed Forces of Ukraine were already training in joint military exercises on the territory of Poland. The following year, units of the AFU also took part in 98 NATO events, including 13 military exercises. Accordingly, Ukrainian liaison officers were assigned to NATO headquarters and the Partnership Coordination Center. The following year, the results of the first Individual Ukraine-NATO partnership program were summarized, according to the results of which Ukraine fulfilled the program by 38%, participating in 113 NATO events out of 268 (Lipkevych, 2008, p. 165). Such results even exceeded the number of Poland–NATO events of 1995, which prompted the Polish side to further expand its participation in the Alliance in the following years. As a result, during 1998 (a year before Poland's official accession to NATO), the number of events in which Poland took part reached almost 450, which was more than eleven times higher than in 1995 (Buhlai, 2016, p. 162).

However, these first initiatives met with opposition in the Ukrainian political community, the Ukraine–NATO partnership was under attack for "violation of the principles of non-alignment." The fact that only on September 12, 2002, seven years after its signing, the "Security Agreement between the Government of Ukraine and NATO" was ratified. This important document regulated the issue of storage and mutual protection of information of limited use. The agreement was signed on March 13, 1995 by NATO Secretary General W. Claes together with V. Vasylenko, the representative of Ukraine to the EU and NATO. The discussion was sparked by Ukraine's obligation to grant access to security documents to all its citizens who need it while performing official duties (Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (n.d.) Uhoda pro…). For post-Soviet Ukraine, accustomed to the secrecy of documents related to defense and security issues, such conditions were nonsense bordering on interference in internal affairs (even though NATO programs also covered non-military issues).

5. Conclusions

The research allowed to see that the differences in Poland's and Ukraine's relations with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 1991–1994 were, relatively, small. Both countries lacked any official treaty with the NATO until 1994, both went through neighbourly partnership, before even being allowed to approach the topic of integration into the alliance. However, Poland did get an early start for its talks with NATO in 1989, before even the breakup of the Soviet Union, and has proved itself more agreeable in its talks with the organization, compared to Ukraine's concerns over certain parts of the dialogue that concerned sharing classified information with the alliance.

The results of Ukraine's cooperation in the field of security for the 1991–1993 period, both with the Republic of Poland and with the North Atlantic Alliance, left much to be desired. Basic defense agreements were signed with Poland, the actual implementation of which took place during 1994–1999, and relations with NATO developed mostly at the initiative of the Alliance countries. The goal of the organization's policy regarding Ukraine during this period was primarily to ensure peace in Europe and eliminate the nuclear potential of the post-Soviet countries. Before 1994, Ukraine could not expect real cooperation, and the position of Ukrainian politicians was mostly in favor of "neutrality" and "non-alignment."

It is important to note why any movement towards Ukrainian partnership with NATO were characterized by such slowness during 1991–1994. Ukrainian foreign policy in the 1990s was characterized by the dominance of the search for the establishment of bilateral relations, particularly with the post-Soviet and neighboring countries. Exceptions to this rule were

participation in UN structures, cooperation with the European Commission, and the status of a founding country (but not an official member) of the post-Soviet Commonwealth of Independent States. However, for the most part, Ukraine acted by signing bilateral agreements with neighboring states, particularly in security matters.

The situation changed in 1994, when Ukraine became the first country from the Commonwealth of Independent States to join the NATO program "Partnership for Peace." This new scheme of practical partnership ensured that NATO had a significant influence on the former "Eastern Bloc" countries even before they officially joined the Alliance. However, while Ukraine's participation in the program could be considered, in a way, exemplary, the slow pace of progress in the previous years, and the mutual distrust between ex-Soviet bureaucracy and NATO, did not allow it to transform its PfP successes into quick Euro-Atlantic ascension results. On the other hand, Ukraine's active participation in the PfP "energized" other countries that considered cooperation or integration with NATO, Poland among them.

References:

1. Boryniak O., Valiak M., Hurak I. (eds.) (2013). *Razom chy okremo? 20 rokiv polsko-ukrainskykh vidnosyn: monohrafiia* [Together or separately? 20 years of Polish-Ukrainian relations: a monograph]. Publishing house of Vasyl Stefanyk Prykarpattia National University [in Ukrainian].

2. Buch G. (1991). Kto jest wrogiem?: pośpiech Polski w drodze do NATO jest calkowicie zrozumialy [Who is the enemy?: Poland's haste on the way to NATO is completely understandable]. *Polityka* [Politics], 43, p. 1–18 [in Polish].

3. Buhlai N. (2016). Vstup Polshchi do NATO: realizatsiia yevroatlantychnoho vyboru [Poland's entry into NATO: implementation of the Euro-Atlantic choice]. *Ukraina-Ievropa-Svit. Mizhnarodnyi zbirnyk naukovykh prats. Seriia: Istoriia, mizhnarodni vidnosyny* [Ukraine-Europe-World. International collection of scientific works. Series:: History, international relations], 17, p. 157–165 [in Ukrainian].

4. Bzhezinskyi Z. (1998). Ukraina – Polshcha: rol ta mistse v yevropeiskii intehratsii [Ukraine – Poland: role and place in European integration]. *Nezalezhnyi kulturolohichnyi chasopys "Ï"* [Independent culturological journal "Ï"], 14. http://www.ji.lviv.ua/n14texts/brzez-st.htm [in Ukrainian].

5. Chorna N.M. (2007). Normatyvno-pravove zabezpechennia intehratsii Polshchi u yevropeiski ta yevroatlantychni struktury [Normative and legal support of Poland's integration into European and Euro-Atlantic structures]. *Naukovi zapysky Vinnytskoho derzhavnoho pedahohichnoho universytetu imeni Mykhaila Kotsiubynskoho. Seriia: Istoriia* [Mykhailo Kotsyubynskyi Vinnytsia State Pedagogical University research notes. Series: History]. VDPU im. M. Kotsiubynskoho, 12, p. 306–314 [in Ukrainian].

6. Draus J. (2010). *Doslidzhennia polsko-ukrainskykh stosunkiv u 1991–2008 rokakh: narys problematyky* [Research of Polish-Ukrainian relations in 1991-2008: essay on the issue]. Chornomorskyi litopys. Naukovyi zhurnal [Black Sea Chronicle. Scientific journal]. Issue 1. p. 32–41 [in Ukrainian].

7. Drozd J. (1994). Status militarny obszaru byłej NRD a polska polityka zbliżenia z NATO [The military status of the former GDR area and the Polish policy of rapprochement with NATO]. *Sprawy Międzynarodowe* [International relations], 2, p. 109–116 [in Polish].

8. Dylonhova H. (2007). *Istoriia Polshchi 1795–1990* [History of Poland 1795–1990] Ed. house «Kyievo-Mohylianska akademiia».

9. Dzvinchuk D.I. (ed.). (2012). Pivnichnoatlantychnyi alians: istoriia, funktsii, struktura, vidnosyny z Ukrainoiu [The North Atlantic Alliance: history, functions, structure, relations with Ukraine]. Misto NV [in Ukrainian].

10. Fedorowicz K. (2011). *Polityka Polski wobec Rosji, Ukrainy i Bialorusi w latach 1989-2010* [Poland's policy towards Russia, Ukraine and Belarus in 1989-2010]. Wydawnictwo Naukowe Uniwersytetu im Adama Mickiewicza [in Polish].

11. Kozakevych Ye. (1999). Rozshyrennia NATO ta yevropeiska polityka Ukrainy [NATO expansion and Ukraine's European policy]. *Politychna dumka* [Political thought], 1–2, p. 86–100 [in Ukrainian].

12. Lipkevych S.Ya. (2008). Pravovi aspekty spivrobitnytstva Ukrainy z NATO [Legal pecularities of Ukraine-NATO cooperation]. *Visnyk Natsionalnoho universytetu «Lvivska politekhnika»* [Bulletin of the Lviv Polytechnic National University], 634: Derzhava ta armiia [State and army], p. 163–172 [in Ukrainian].

13. Mieliekiestsev K. (2018). Tendentsii spivrobitnytstva Ukrainy ta Respubliky Polshcha v konteksti atlantychnoi intehratsii [The tendencies of cooperation between Ukraine and the Republic of Poland in the context of Atlantic integration]. *Economic and law paradigm of modern society*, 2, p. 117–121 [in Ukrainian].

14. Mieliekiestsev K. (2018). The allies and foes of Ukraine on the path to Atlantic integration. *Topical Issues of Humanities, Technical and Natural Sciences*, 3, p. 92–96 [in English].

15. Naboka M., Zhavornkov H. (2018). Mify pro NATO, yaki poshyriuie rosiiska propahanda [Myths about NATO, which are spread by Russian propaganda]. Radio Svoboda. https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/29128460.html [in Ukrainian].

16. NATO: dovidnyk [NATO Handbook] (2001). NATO. Office of Information and Press. https://www.nato.int/docu/other/ukr/handbook/2001/pdf/handbook.pdf [in Ukrainian].

17. Nowakowski J. (1991). Polska polityka wschodnia w 1991 roku [Polish eastern policy in 1991]. *Rocznik Polskiej Polityki Zagranicznej* [Yearbook of Polish Foreign Policy], p. 77–87 [in Polish].

18. Onyszkiewicz J. (1992). Kilka uwag o probleme bezpieczenstwa Polski [A few comments on Poland's security problems]. *Polska w Europie* [Poland in Europe], p. 27–36 [in Polish].

19. Perepelytsia G.M. (2001). Vstup do NATO yak rezultat yevroatlantychnoho vyboru Ukrainy [Joining NATO as a result of Ukraine's Euro-Atlantic choice]. Ekonomichnyi chasopys-XXI [Economic journal-XXI], 6, p. 19–22 [in Ukrainian].

20. Skubiszewski K. (1991). Polska i Sojusz Północnoatlantycki w latach 1989–1991 [Polan and the North Atlantic Alliance in 1989–1991]. *Sprawy Miedzynarodowe* [International relations], 1, p. 9–50 [in Polish].

21. Todorov I. (2014). Istorychni, heopolitychni ta polityko-pravovi zasady spivrobitnytstva Ukrainy ta NATO [Historical, geopolitical and political and legal foundations of cooperation between Ukraine and NATO]. *Nezalezhnyi kulturolohichnyi chasopys "Ï"* [Independent culturological journal "Ï"], 77. http://www.ji.lviv.ua/n77texts/Zasady_spivrobitnyctva.htm [in Ukrainian].

22. Todorov I. Ya. (2006). *Ukraina na shliakhu do yevropeiskoi ta yevroatlantychnoi spilnoty: monohrafiia* [Ukraine on the way to the European and Euro-Atlantic community: monograph]. DonNU.

23. Todorov I. Ya. (2013). Rehionalnyi vymir initsiatyvy YeS «Skhidne partnerstvo» v Ukraini [The regional dimension of the EU initiative "Eastern Partnership" in Ukraine]. *Chornomorskyi litopys* [Black Sea Chronicle], 8, p. 38–42 [in Ukrainian].

24. Trofymovych V. (2010). Politychni vidnosyny Ukrainy ta Respubliky Polshcha [Political relations of Ukraine and the Republic of Poland]. *Naukovi zapysky "Transkordonne spivrobitnytstvo u konteksti perspektyv yevropeiskoi intehratsii Ukrainy". Seriia "Politychni nauky"* [Scientific notes "Cross-border cooperation in the context of prospects for the European integration of Ukraine". "Political Sciences" series.], 4, p. 121–133 [in Ukrainian].

25. Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (n.d.) *Partnerstvo zarady myru (Zaproshennia)* [Partnership for Peace (Invitation)]. Retrieved October 29, 2023 from http://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/950_015/conv [in Ukrainian].

26. Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (n.d.) *Pro Osnovni napriamy zovnishnoi polityky Ukrainy* [About the Main Directions of Ukraine's Foreign Policy]. Retrieved October 29, 2023 from http://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/3360-12 [in Ukrainian].

27. Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (n.d.) *Uhoda mizh Ministerstvom oborony Ukrainy ta Ministerstvom natsionalnoi oborony Respubliky Polshcha pro viiskove spivrobitnytstvo* [Agreement between the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine and the Ministry of National Defense of the Republic of Poland on military cooperation]. Retrieved October 29, 2023 from http://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/616_191/conv [in Ukrainian].

28. Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (n.d.) *Uhoda pro bezpeku mizh Uriadom Ukrainy i Orhanizatsiieiu Pivnichnoatlantychnoho Dohovoru* [Security Agreement between the Government of Ukraine and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization]. Retrieved October 29, 2023 from http://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/950_002/conv [in Ukrainian].

29. Wizimirska B. (1991). Polska polityka zagraniczna [Polish foreign policy]. *Rocznik Polskiej Polityki Zagranicznej* [Yearbook of Polish Foreign Policy], p. 8–12 [in Polish].

30. Zlenko A. (2009). Neitralitet chy pozablokovist: chy tse v interesakh Ukrainy? [Neutrality or non-alignment: is it in the interests of Ukraine?] *Viche*, 8, p. 12–13 [in Ukrainian].

31. Zlenko A. (2010). *Pereosmysliuiuchy zovnishniu polityku Ukrainy: vazhkyi shliakh dlia dosiahnennia konsensusu* [Rethinking the foreign policy of Ukraine: a difficult path to achieve consensus]. Den [Day], 6 [in Ukrainian].