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Regional Market Integration in the SADC region: a Comparative Case Study of Botswana and Zambia

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ABSTRACT: Regional market integration is crucial in increasing development for emerging economies. However, research has shown that, in the case of developing countries, the process of market integration faces various obstacles. This study aims to analyse the key determinants of successful market integration for developing countries, as well as to investigate under what conditions some countries may benefit more (or less) than others from market integration, particularly in the SADC region. Based on the existing literature on the main debates and theories on regional market integration of developing countries, this study has used the method of process-tracing to investigate the causal relationship between governance and institutions, market integration and development. The analysis based on this study has found that good and sound policies aimed at increasing domestic capabilities deriving from both public and private governance and institutions is vital in determining relative market integration success. The results indicate that the discrepancies found among SADC Member States hinder the process of regional market integration. On this basis, it is recommended that the linkages between the SADC Member States be strengthened through increased levels of coordination and integration.

KEYWORDS: Regional integration, SADC, development, trade liberalisation

Introduction

The regional market integration of countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) is fundamental for the economic development of these countries. South Africa excepted; the Southern African region has experienced exceptionally rapid economic growth rates over the past two decades (Arndt & Roberts, 2018). Generally, the high economic growth rates recorded within this region have been supplemented by the increased growth in trade, mainly from South Africa to the rest of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) (ibid.). Despite these prospects, economic integration is difficult, especially among economies that are less developed. However, slow implementation of policies designed for integration have been noted globally and not just in Southern Africa (Brenton & Hoffman, 2016). Furthermore, higher regional market integration efforts have higher chances of succeeding when there is strong internal support from Member State governments and the private sector (ibid.).

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Recently, a variety of scholars have argued that in developing countries, trade policy should be implemented in a manner that favours the expansion of trade among southern countries. This type of South-South trade strategy is considered central in the framing of a new economic order (Greenaway & Milner, 1990). Therefore, trade liberalisation and integration at the global level needs to be carefully managed and phased. The impact of trade on growth is generally viewed as having a positive effect on the growth of an economy (Cline, 2004). The mechanism behind this effect is that trade allows for increased specialisation of production. In turn, specialisation permits higher attainments of economies of scale, particularly for countries that have comparatively small domestic markets and economies. Consequently, this allows countries to put to use their country-specific abundant factors of production (ibid.). However, to fully benefit from the gains of trade and integration, the internal market of a country must be sufficiently developed (Brenton & Hoffman, 2016). Prior to most recent decades, many Southern African countries often did not have developed enough internal markets to benefit from market integration, but as economic growth increased in the SADC region, prospects for positive results from integration may become more apparent.

Trade Liberalisation: a powerful tool for development

The literature available on trade liberalisation in developing countries emphasises the support for South-South trade, highlights the obstacles faced by Southern African developing countries in reaching market integration goals and explains the complex causality between the determinant of deep integration. The implementation of trade liberalisation and regional trade agreements have proven to be a powerful tool for stimulating economic growth, poverty reduction and promoting development (Dornbusch, 1992). Foroutan (1992, p. 2) defines and characterises these types of integration by stating that this is where "barriers to the free movement of goods, services, and factors of production (labour and capital) are removed vis-à-vis partners so that the regional market is effectively unified". South-South cooperation, defined by Fraeters and Maruri (2010, p. 5) as the "exchange of resources, technology and knowledge between developing countries" is established on the premise that this type of cooperation and trade will result in a more mutually dependent, equal relationship between economies which are at similar stages of development and integration (Horner, 2015).

A regime is more "outward-oriented" and liberal when general levels of state intervention are reduced and where reforms in trade favour a move towards openness, liberality, and neutrality (Santos-Paulini, 2005, p. 785). Further research on the relationship between trade liberalisation and poverty reduction provides evidence that trade liberalisation can be an important component of developmental strategies in developing countries (Winterset al., 2004). Trade liberalisation is also tied with increases in productivity generally experienced at a sectoral level as opposed to at a firm level; however, it is important to note that openness in trade and exports allows for improvements and growth of efficient firms due to increased import competition (ibid.).

Nonetheless, the evidence on South-South trade benefits is mixed. Asymmetries among southern countries may arise even within South-South trade regions (Krapohl, 2010; Venables, 2003). In practice, there has been a slow adoption and response to regional initiatives as developing countries are cautious about implementing liberalisation (Behar & Edwards, 2011). Moreover, there is a strong argument that trade as such may not be the most important policy domain but rather those policies that increase human capital, education and health of labour which increase the capacity of the state (Winters et al., 2004). In turn, increasing provision for these "capacity elements" is contingent on the quality of governance and institutions of a country (ibid.). Similarly, Foroutan (1992, p. 13) argues that the simple removal of trade barriers does not influence intra-group trade if the participating partners do not have a demand for each other's exports.

In sum, the underlying arguments in favour of the theoretical gains of integration are contingent on the degree to which participating countries have similar levels of development, the degree to which these gains are redistributed among winners and losers and how efficient the partners are in participating in integration – conditions which are hardly satisfied in the SSA region (Foroutan, 1992). Gains of regional integration are conditional on the developmental policies of local governments, for example, with respect to access to education, informational support, and training on opportunities in neighbouring economies. Despite the sometimes-pessimistic view on South-South trade, trade among SSA countries is still valuable to study, because, under the conditions that countries are on the same level of development and willing to participate, as evidenced by other successful regions in the global South, market integration can be beneficial.

Evidently, there is a complex relation between the various political, economic, and social aspects of regional market integration. The increasing trends in democratisation of SSA countries have provided a possibility in which these aspects of market integration can be related in a manner that creates benefits from market integration that are redistributive and fair, particularly in South-South trade agreements. The extent to which a country may enjoy gains from trade is reliant on the internal domestic market and the extent to which a country has adequate and developed capabilities to do so. The government and institutions in place are the main decision-makers of policies which are devised to increase trade liberalisation as well as invest in social capabilities of the population. Therefore, it is important to analyse the relation that both public and private governance and institutions have in determining policy domains which affect the capabilities of the population in a manner that contributes to market integration.

This article aims to challenge the conventional wisdom of deeper regional integration in the SADC region by providing insights on the key determinants of successful market integration. Analysing the SADC member states of Botswana and Zambia as cases for this analysis will provide an understanding of the various paths of integration employed by these two case studies, which may prove beneficial in contributing to studies in this field.

To explore this debate in the literature and the evidence, this article will focus on the following main research question: What are the key determinants of successful market integration in the SADC region, and under what conditions might some members benefit more (or less) than others?

Furthermore, the conceptual debates based on the literature available discussing this topic allude to the importance of both public and private governance as key drivers of successful market integration, and therefore, the sub-questions of this article are:

- How does the quality of *public* governance and institutions affect the success of market integration? Likewise,
- How does the quality of *private* governance and institutions affect the success of market integration?

By the success of market integration, it is meant the extent to which countries are able to integrate into a region by way of trade liberalisation in a manner that produces gains for the economy and social development.

Methodology

The research questions aim to analyse the ways in which successful market integration is dependent on the type and quality of institutions governing SADC Member States. This is done by the method of process-tracing, which is particularly relevant when the objective of the research is to empirically establish a causal chain relationship of causes, effects, and posited intervening variables (George & Bennett, 2005, p. 147). Moreover, process-tracing involves the analysis of the intermediate variables in a process to make inferences about the mechanism that took place and how it resulted in certain outcomes (Bennett & Checkel, 2015, p. 6). Deriving from the literature presented, it is apparent that the causal conditions set in place as the initial main driver of development is the state of institutions and the quality of governance of a country. Additionally, the "capture causal mechanisms" set in place as an intermediate step can be identified as the range of policy domains implemented by the states and the market integration relative success or failure.

By studying the sequence of events (placed in motion before and after the signing of the SADC Treaty in 1992) and factors that lead to market integration, starting with institutions and quality of governance, it is possible to directly answer the research questions.

Table 1. The Capture Causal Mechanism

Causal condition (X)	Capture causal mechanism (M)		Outcome (Y)
Institutions and quality of governance (private and public)	Part 1	Part 2	Development results
	Range of other policy domains such as education/ human capital, health etc.	Integration/trade liberalisation: relative success or failure	

Own elaboration/Source: Beach (2016).

Case Study Selection

Both Botswana and Zambia obtained independence during the same timeframe (in 1966 and 1964 respectively), and both have made efforts to implement trade liberalisation reforms to participate in market integration. Botswana's relatively long-standing sound economic policies and good management have allowed it to experience continued economic growth by escaping the resource curse and participating in trade within the region (Sarraf & Jiwanji, 2001). Moreover, the enduring stability of governance and sound policies and incorporation of the private sector in policy decision-making in Botswana extends to the country's ability to successfully integrate into the SADC region and enjoy gains from trade and contribute to social development.

On the other hand, the case of Zambia depicts a more challenging example than Botswana as it shows how the volatile democratic stance of the country and inadequate fugal policies have made the process of regional market integration more challenging. Nevertheless, given the relative stability and high degrees of democracy experienced in Zambia in most recent decades, the country has been able to shift its policies and grow its domestic market. Moreover, Zambia has more recently particularly advanced in terms of private governance and competition in its value chains (Arndt & Roberts, 2018). Regarding growth rates, Zambia's output growth (measured as the growth of Gross Domestic Product (GDP)) was persistently declining from the 1980s but experienced a recovery in the mid-1990s during the time of the establishment of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) and SADC free trade agreements (FTAs), where it increased on average 7 per cent (World Bank, 2021a).

SADC's linkage to Domestic Institutions and Governance

The SADC was established in 1992 as a successor of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) that was established in 1980 (SADC, 2020). This organisation is a state-driven and highly intergovernmental organisation, albeit with a comparatively weak institutional framework. However, the outcomes of these goals depend on how Member States organise domestic policies to adhere to SADC policies. The link between domestic institutions and governance with the SADC organisation is of importance because those countries which adhere to the policies implemented by the SADC, are expected to experience gains from deeper regional integration. One of the main goals of the SADC includes the implementation of a SADC-FTA and customs union. Intra-regional trade has seen a significant rise since the implementation of the SADC Protocol on Trade in 1996 which shows the commitment of the SADC organisations and its Member States to furthering regional development.

Nonetheless, not all Member States strictly obey these policies, which may undermine the positive effects of market integration success. The Secretariat, being the policy implementing branch of the SADC, does not have supra-national power and thus lacks the authority and capacity to enforce policy decisions on Member States (Tantanyiwa & Hakuna, 2014, p. 113). Additionally, any conflict resolution processes depend on the SADC Summit, comprised of the Heads of State and Governments, as well as the Committee of Ministers – both of which may be obligated to keep their own political and domestic interests as a priority. As the supreme policy-making institution of the SADC, the Summit may provide too much power to the individual Heads of State or Governments. Moreover, Member States are often faced with conflicting obligations due to their membership obligation to other organisations and agreements such as the SACU or other preferential trade agreements.

As seen in Figure 1, intra-regional trade in SADC presents a case that shows a variety of incomes and volatility of integration over time, but also a steady upward trend. Dependence of some SADC member states on South Africa means that they do not trade with other Member States which in turn produces low growth in trade between the rest of the Member States and may subsequently lead to large external debt (Tantanyiwa & Hakuna, 2014, p. 113). Furthermore, some market integration policies may disregard or neglect some rural Southern African populations which leads to low levels of income and exacerbates poverty levels (ibid.). This suggests, *inter alia*, that the national structures which make up the SADC need to become more interactive with the organisation (Tjønneland, 2005, p. 182). Therefore, to understand which determinants are key for successful market integration, and under what conditions might some members benefit more (or less) than others, it is of use to analyse the case studies of Botswana and Zambia as two SADC Member States which have, to a certain extent, been able to

Figure 1. Intra-Regional Trade in SADC (as % of total trade)



Source: RIKS (2021).

achieve positive outcomes from their membership to the SADC organisation.

The Case of Botswana

Botswana is an example of a SADC Member State that has been able to derive policies that have produced successful outcomes in terms of market integration and development. Botswana's political stability and rapid growth rates are mainly attributed to the interrelationship between a structure of elite democracy and an open market economy, which blends both modern and "traditional" elements (Good, 1992). Moreover, Botswana's exemplary performance of its policies to incorporate the private sector into trade reform decision-making can be extended to its success in market integration and trade liberalisation and steady success rates over time, particularly in the SADC region.

Historic and present role of public and private institutions and governance

Since its independence in 1966, Botswana has been able to hold free and fair democratic elections, although these elections have since always been won by the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP). Moreover, Botswana has since not experienced political instability, civil wars, or coup d'états and has had dedicated, incorrupt leadership. Beyond the systemic institutional and structural factors that underpinned the autonomy that aided in Botswana's economy's development and growth, Botswana's reliance on diamonds allowed the country to integrate better and further its development (Good & Taylor, 2008, p. 760). Since the country's independence, diamonds, economic growth, the government, and the De Beers Corporation (a Southern African mining company that held control of the world's diamond market) have been tightly interlinked (ibid.). The agreement that Botswana made with the De Beers Mining Company and the early resistance to the incursion by De Beers allowed the Botswanan government to control the terms of diamond exploitation and decide on who receives the benefits in the mining sector and protect local mining institutions. The revenues obtained from capital-intensive diamond production were utilised to invest in physical and human infrastructural development (ibid.).

Since then, Botswana has achieved and preserved the necessary administrative capacity to maintain its progress and economic development (Hope, 1995). This, in combination with its prudent macroeconomic and fiscal policies, as well as its deliberate policies towards the development of human resources, has significantly contributed to the country's high human development and aided in the avoidance of the resource curse so commonly experienced by many natural resource-abundant countries (Iimi, 2006; Rodrik, 1998). Moreover, Botswana did not participate in excessive government spending, which in many cases may have led to an appreciation of the real exchange rate, that ultimately would have affected both the growth of the non-mining and agriculture industries negatively (Siphambe, 2004, p. 355).

Democratisation has been linked to increased trade liberalisation and Botswana is a case which demonstrates this positive correlation as historical accounts have long determined Botswana's high degree of democratisation as a key determinant of its trade liberalisation policies. High levels of government credibility are corroborated by the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI)[1]. Botswana's CPI in 2020 stood at 60 – which is almost 20 points higher than the SADC average of 40, showing it to be a relatively "clean" nation. This implies that it is not perceived as a corrupt country. These low levels of corruption perception are in line with various sources which claim that there are low levels of rent-seeking in Botswana, hence low to no expropriation. The linkages between the high degree of democratisation, government credibility and low rent-seeking levels by politicians create an environment that fosters trade liberalisation because it allows for transparent trade reforms to occur.

The environment created by high levels of democracy and transparency foster an adequate environment for the coordination and inclusion of the private sector. The capacity of the private sector in policy construction and application is paramount. Some strategies to increase this capacity include the Private Sector Development Strategy and Programme, which was created to generate a significant initiative toward increasing exports, generating employment, and diversifying economic activities, particularly within the private sector (UNCTAD, 2016a: pp. 34–35). Botswana shows a relatively high level of Ease of Doing Business, although this ranking has decreased in the last decade. Despite the decrease in Botswana's position between 2010–2018, Botswana remains among the highest three Southern African countries in this ranking, placing 87, closely behind Zambia, which ranks 85th and South Africa, which ranks 84th in 2018 (World Bank, 2020).

Furthermore, the private sector also plays a crucial role in the decision-making process of trade policies, as seen by the successful participation of the 2015 (private and public) multi-stakeholder consultation with the Reference Group in Botswana, which aimed to represent private sector stakeholders by obtaining information and understanding the needs of the private sector as well as deliberating on various suggestions on addressing said needs and concerns (UNCTAD, 2016a; p. 6).

The Botswanan government's emphasis on incorporating and building on relations between civil society by redistributing gains from trade into capacity formation becomes evident given the figures on investment in social infrastructure, education, and health. Initially, Botswana utilised the gains from diamond exports to create a 'big push' in the investment of human capital and social development (Good & Taylor, 2008). This is seen as a good example of redistributive policies to benefit the rural population as an interest group. This facilitated a successful response and the use of integration as a policy.

Building the Domestic Market of Botswana

The composition of Botswana's GPD illustrates how government expenditure on education as a percentage of the GDP remained at relatively low levels between 14–16% from the early 1980s until 1992 but increased dramatically to 26.5% in 2007, where it has since remained (World Bank, 2020). Similarly, government expenditure on health has fluctuated between 4 and 6% between the years 1993 to 2013; nonetheless, it has shown a slight absolute increase (ibid.).

Botswana's efforts to increase the quality of health and education in the country are done with the aim of eradicating poverty. Botswana currently has approximately one-fifth of its population living in poverty (USAID, 2019, p. 4). Moreover, Botswana has also reaffirmed its commitment to ending the HIV/AIDS pandemic by creating and implementing the National Strategic Framework for HIV/AIDS and Multi-sectoral Strategy for the Prevention of Non-communicable Diseases to eradicate AIDS as a health threat by the year 2030 which has seen significant progress (USAIDS, 2019).

[1] The Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) is a measure of the perceived degree of corruption. This measure is taken by surveying various businesspeople, risk analysts, investors, and the general public. This score ranges from 0 to 100, where 0 implies a "clean" nation and 100 implies a very corrupt nation. (Transparency International, 2020).

Trade policies and trade agreement memberships

Market integration and trade liberalising policies have been beneficial to Botswana in fostering economic growth. However, trade liberalisation is still difficult and presents some obstacles. One of Botswana's most significant limitations for experiencing economies of scale in manufacturing and trade comes from its small population size (2.3 million). Therefore, by joining the SADC, Botswana has expanded this market size and increased its trade relationship with other Southern African countries. Additionally, Botswana belongs to the SACU, a customs union composed of a few countries that also form part of the SADC region. Botswana's membership plays a vital role in its trade policies because its trade policies are defined at the SACU level rather than at an independent country level (Zizhou, 2009, p. 13).

Trade Performance and Market Integration

For most of the past 60 years, Botswana has had a stable economy, which is reflected in its increasing GDP per capita, stable inflation rates, increasing investment, and steady balance of payments. Botswana's trade patterns closely reflect its proximity with the SADC Member States, particularly Namibia and South Africa. The GDP per capita of Botswana began to increase in the 1970s and 1980s; however, this growth remained stagnant in the 1990s. Nonetheless, according to the World Bank (2021), the GDP per capita increased dramatically in the early 2000s during the period when the SADC Protocol on Trade was implemented.

Development Results

Given the figures and historical accounts, it can be concluded that Botswana has experienced increasing government revenues, no unstable deficits, and no expropriations; hence, Botswana's growth can be accounted for in a very conventional manner. Nevertheless, analysing stylised facts of economic indicators is insufficient in determining the state of human development in Botswana. Poverty alleviation and eradication are valid indicators of development, especially in the Southern African region. Income distribution and inequality have progressively, yet slowly, decreased since the early 1990s. The World Bank (2021c) Gini Coefficient estimate stood at 60.8 in 1993 and decreased to 53.3 in 2015. Although inequality has been decreasing, this figure is not negligible and remains a large social problem.

Nevertheless, the trend of decreasing poverty is supported by the data and figures seen in table 2 of some of the social HDI indicators of Botswana. The enrolment rate in primary and secondary schooling has increased, especially that of secondary school enrolment, which increased from 7.6% in 1970 to 83.6% in 2015. Moreover, although the World Bank Human Development indicator dataset has no available data for the adult literacy rate for 1997, this figure has increased by 20 per cent from 1991 to 2013. These figures serve as a valid indicator of Botswana's investment into primary

Table 2. Social HDI indicators of Botswana, 1970–2015

Indicator/Year	1970	1995	2005	2015
Secondary school enrolment rate (% gross)	7.6	60.7	83.6	–
Primary school enrolment rate (% gross)	67.2	110.4	111.1	103.2
Infant mortality rare per 1000	87.1	39.1	21.0	32.1
Life expectancy at birth (years)	53.8	54.4	52.1	67.3
Adult literacy rate (% of people above 15 years of age)	–	68.6[a]	81.2[b]	86.8[c]

Own elaboration/Source: World Bank (2021)

[a] Data for the year 1991
[b] Data for the year 2003
[c] Data for the year 2013

education for the population. The infant mortality rate has also been diminishing since 1970 where the figure stood at 87.1 to 32.1 infant deaths per 1000 in 2015. This is a decline of more than double and, along with the life expectancy, which has increased by a little less than 20 years of life, serves as an indicator of Botswana's investment in health care. Nonetheless, some of these gains in investment in health care have been diminished due to high rates of HIV/AIDs in the country (Robinson, 2013, p. 188).

In sum, Botswana's long-standing autonomy and elite legitimacy anchored in traditional ways of choosing rulers and accepting more inclusive authority have allowed it to experience greater ease in integrating into the regional market, as evidenced by the present data on increasing intra-regional trade. This, in turn, produced better development results over time which shows that SADC integration was helpful. However, this was not due to trade liberalisation alone. The increasing levels of human development further foster an environment for Botswana to become self-reinforcing; hence, in this case, the strong role of public governance was key in determining Botswana's success in the aspects of relative market integration success and development. This, accompanied by the enforcement of strict laws on property rights and no expropriation (Acemoglu et al., 2002), contribute to the reduction of poverty in a manner that allows its population to have freedoms to innovate and further develop the internal market and create an ideal situation to maximise gains from trade within the SADC. In essence, Botswana's success is linked to its economic relationship with its neighbouring countries.

The Case of Zambia

The case of Zambia illustrates a more problematic case than Botswana and provides evidence to show how less successful governance and institutions, and inadequate policies create a situation which may be detrimental for experiencing gains from trade liberalisation. However, given the relative stability of the political framework since the early 2000s, Zambia has made attempts to reintroduce open economic policies and cooperate with the rest of the SADC Member States. This further shows that a country like Zambia can sustain good policies in relation to trade integration, which then begins to produce benefits rather than distortions.

History and present role of the public and private institutions and governance

Zambia gained its independence from the British Administration in 1964. Zambia was governed by its founding president, Kenneth Kaunda for the United National Independence Party (UNIP) under a semi socialist single party system from 1964 to 1991 (Bratton, 1992, p. 81). In the 1970s, Zambia accumulated credit to an extent that the IMF and World Bank intervened by implementing SAPs. This created further political tension throughout the next two decades due to the failure of these adjustment programs (Fraser & Larmer, 2010, pp. 62–63). Consequently, these adjustments did not lead to gains from trade as maximum gains from liberalising policies are beneficial based on neoclassical conditions such as perfect information, no risk, small firms function in competitive markets. These conditions are not always satisfied in Zambia.

Soon after, Zambia was greatly impacted negatively by the 1980s debt crisis of developing countries. Various studies on the development of the economy during Kaunda's rule clearly determine that Zambia's dependence on copper became a main source of the country's economic inflexibility and vulnerability towards external shocks as well as its absence of a coherent scheme geared towards economic growth (Rakner et al., 1999; Bigsten & Kayizzi-Mugerwa, 2007, p. 5). During this period, copper prices were volatile, and Zambia did not have the same control and autonomy over this commodity as Botswana did with diamonds. Additionally, the nationalisation of the copper industry was poorly implemented, and the policies implemented were ruinous to the Zambian population.

Nonetheless, a later shift in regime due to pressures from the population ushered a change in the perception of the role of the state in managing natural and economic resources from a state-driven model, which heavily mismanaged the mining sector, to a possible exchange of ownership of copper mines to private foreign investors (Fraser & Larmer, 2010, pp. 62–63). Throughout the 24-year period of the nationalisation of the copper mines starting in 1973, the industry experienced a grave decline in levels of productivity (Sikamo et al., 2016). Eventually, after the privatisation of the Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines (ZCCM) in 1996, the whole mining industry began to take effect and by the year 2000, all mining assets were officially privatised (ibid.).

Eventually, authority trends tended to be more democratic. Since, higher levels of democracy prove to be beneficial for gains in regional integration and development, Zambia is in a good position to attract investment and gain support from civil society on increasing overall social welfare by means of trade liberalisation. Despite the increased and relatively stable level of democracy, Zambia has a level of perceived corruption which is higher than the average SADC country (Transparency International Reports, 2020). Moreover, as a consequence of high levels of perceived corruption, Zambia's business environment and competition levels have also stagnated. Hence, Zambia's low levels of competitiveness have been a major obstacle in attracting private sector interest (UNCTAD, 2016b). Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) are crucial as a major source of job creation and productivity and represent around 99 percent of total number of firms operating in Zambia (Mphuka et al., 2014, p. 4). For SMEs, it is imperative that the business environment is efficient to act as a potential force in diversifying the Zambian economy. Therefore, it is crucial to for the government to further develop the business environments (UNCTAD, 2016b).

Zambia's ranking in the World Bank (2020) "Ease of Doing Business" indicator shows Zambia ranking in the mid-range of the 190 countries included in this ranking. However, over the span of 8 years from 2010 to 2018, Zambia's ranking decreased from 80th to 85th.

Building the Domestic Market of Zambia

During the mid-1990s, Zambia concentrated its efforts in increasing its infrastructure capacity with the revenues received from the copper mining industry by building roads and enhancing its mining (UNCTAD, 2016b). However, in recent decades, less emphasis has been placed on developing non-material productive qualities (ibid.). Some examples of non-material productive capabilities include education and health of the Zambian population. Between 1995 and 2005, Zambia's expenditure on education and health as a percentage of GDP increased gradually (African Development Bank, 2021), signalling to a rising attention on the need to increase non-material capabilities of the population. However, both these indicators decreased after the year 2005 which show a decreasing in capacity building as a priority for the government (ibid.).

Additionally, the Zambian government has pledged to various commitments to reduce rural poverty, enhance the availability and quality of sanitation, and increase social protection (USAID, 2019, p. 8). Agreements of this nature show Zambia's willingness to increase the living standard of the population and further enhance the capability of the nation.

Market Integration

Zambia has experienced increased levels of market integration, and the government has implemented liberal trade policies to deepen regional integration by signing multiple common markets and development community agreements in Africa. Despite heavy disruptions and shifts in the copper mining sector, Zambia has still managed to liberalise trade to a certain extent and has experienced benefits and has particularly advanced in private governance and competition in its value chains (Arndt & Roberts, 2018).

Zambia's economy performed underwhelmingly since its independence in 1964. The global debt crisis of the 1980s affected Zambia and resulted in a persistently low annual GDP growth rate (African Development Bank, 2021). This has changed since 1999 where it began to perform particularly well. Revenues from copper produced robust growth during the period of 1964 to 1969, where the real GDP growth rate was 10.9 percent per year at and revenues from copper as a share of total revenues averaged at approximately 40 percent (UNCTAD, 2016b). During this period, the government tried to disperse these benefits by investing in the construction of infrastructure such as roads and buildings for hospitals and schools (UNCTAD, 2016b, p. 2). Conversely, the period of the 1980s showed signs of unsustainable growth and the GDP per capita and real GDP annual growth rate declined and remained at low levels until the turn of the millennium (African Development Bank, 2021). Zambia has since shown increased levels of annual growth rates since the early 2000s, however, this recent rise in growth has not necessarily been accompanied by a reduction in poverty levels in the country (Bwalya et al., 2011).

Data shows increase in trade particularly from the start of 2001, during the same period as the implementation of the SADC Protocol on Trade from 1996 (International Trade Centre, 2020). Moreover, South Africa has maintained its position as being Zambia's largest source of imports, though this the share in percentage has decreased from

55.9 percent in 2001 to 33.2 percent in 2019 (ibid.). This represents success of in the aim of SADC to decrease dependency of South Africa for trade. Namibia is Zambia's second largest importer from the SADC region; however, it holds a very small share at 1.6 percent in 2019. On the other hand, Zambia's largest global exports destination is Switzerland with 44.3 percent of the share in 2019. South Africa is Zambia's largest export destination within the SADC region and but only holds 2.6 percent of the share, which is a sharp decrease form South Africa's 7.9 percent share in 2009 and its 22.2 percent share in 2001. Namibia, which is Zambia's second largest export destination within the SADC, increased its share from 0.1 percent in 2001 to 0.8 percent in 2019. These trade patters depict the weak relation between Zambia with other SADC Member States, particularly regarding export destinations.

Development Results

Zambia holds potential to increase trade competitiveness as well as accelerating development in for the country. As shown in Table 3, various social indicators such as primary school enrolment increased from 85.6 percent in 1970 to 101.46 percent in 2015. Adult literacy rates have also increased in the past three decades from 64.99 percent in 1990, to 86.74 percent in 2018. Infant mortality rate has experienced positive outcomes as seen with the decrease of 108.2 percent infant mortality rate in 1970, to 46.7 percent in 2015. These variables serve as indicators of Zambia's development progress and provide evidence that certain outcomes are being reached, albeit as relatively lower levels and rates as other more advanced SADC Member States.

To summarise, after independence, founding President Kaunda's weak redistributive and macroeconomic policies and negligence of socio-economic factors hindered the potential for Zambia to positively exploit its exports of copper. This stands in strong contrast to Botswana's long-standing stable institutions and autonomy. The high levels of perceived corruption in Zambia contribute to a lack of credibility and legitimacy in the government which in turn adversely affects the business environment and enhances conflicts of interest groups in the trade industry. Nevertheless, like Botswana, Zambia has experienced increasing intra-regional trade in the SADC. However, in most recent years, intra-regional trade has decreased as sources of imports to China have increased. The asymmetries presented between the case of Zambia and the case of Botswana reflect, in the relative extent, which one of these countries have better managed to integrate into the SADC framework. Where Botswana has achieved relative success of market integration and enjoyed greater gains in development results, Zambia has achieved less success and has experienced slower growth rates and development results.

Discussion

The analysis on Botswana presents an exemplary case of successful market integration in which

Table 3. Social HDI indicators of Zambia

Indicator/Year	1970	1995	2005	2015
Secondary school enrolment rate (% gross)	12.65	19.93[b]	n/a	n/a
Primary school enrolment rate (% gross)	85.60	84.04	112.09	101.46
Infant mortality rate per 1000 live births	108.20	101.40	63.80	46.70
Life expectancy at birth (years)	50.11	44.24	48.50	61.74
Adult literacy rate (% pf people above 15 years of age)	n/a	64.99[a]	61.13[c]	86.74[d]

Own elaboration/Source: World Bank Development Indicators (2021)

[a] Data from the year 1990
[b] Data from the year 1994
[c] Data from the year 2007
[d] Data from the year 2018

public governance creates an environment that allows private institutions and governance to participate and, in that way, cooperate to increase the capacity of the domestic market. This has been key for the implementation of trade liberalisation as a policy to increase development. The analysis on Zambia, on the other hand, shows a case which has been less successful than Botswana. This has allowed for contrasting the different policy agendas implemented by the two countries. Zambia has achieved a multi-party democracy and government stability much later than Botswana, and these effects show in terms of how Zambia's main export commodity was not used in a manner in which gains were redistributed fairly. This delayed democracy has had various implications on the credibility and legitimacy of both public and private institutions which has had implications that transcend its course to market integration and achieving development results. The main findings of this paper have clarified and emphasised the discrepancies experienced between countries such as Botswana which has had sound policies as opposed to Zambia which has had a volatile and more corrupt government has affected the outcome.

The role of public governance and institutions

The quality of public governance and institutions have played a fundamental role in affecting the degree of market integration experienced by Botswana and Zambia. Botswana's National Trade Policy incorporates elements of policies on increasing the capacity of the population; redistributing gains from trade to various interest groups is also made a priority. Moreover, the Botswanan government has included the private sector in its trade policy decision-making process in a manner which enhances cooperation within the country's borders to ultimately increase its weight and importance in regional integration decision-making.

As observed, the public governance of a country determines the rules and regulations in which various stakeholders in the trade industry operate. In the case of Botswana, the state has a long-standing history of legitimate public governance, which has created an environment in which the rule of law, transparency, accountability, and property rights are of utmost importance, given the knowledge that a sound government produces positive developmental outcomes. Furthermore, its history of redistributing gains from trade has allowed Botswana to become self-reinforcing in terms of institutions, policies, market integration and development. These institutions have allowed Botswana to undertake the various obstacles of trade liberalisation and integration. This has been done by creating multiple public institutions which assemble delegates from the various stakeholders of the trade industry, such as local producers and private sector representatives. By implementing redistributive policies to protect local producers and by investing in increasing infrastructure for trade, as well as by increasing education and health, an ideal situation is created to maximise gains from trade. Furthermore, these policies have allowed Botswana to diversify its economy by decreasing slightly its reliance on diamonds exports. This has increased Botswana's position in terms of quantity exported and is reflected throughout the past decades in its increased levels of trade within the SADC region. Moreover, Botswana has steadily increased its position in the SADC region by importing and exporting more intra-regionally and reducing its dependence on South Africa. This, in turn, has allowed the Botswanan government to increase its weight in negotiations within the SADC framework.

Ultimately, good public governance and sound policies have enabled Botswana to achieve positive developmental results as seen from the increase in HDI and other social development indicators. Therefore, the role of public governance was key in determining successful market integration.

Zambia, on the other hand, has not shared similar historical characteristics to Botswana in terms of stable governance, legitimacy, and state capacity building. Where Botswana managed to hold control of gains from diamonds, Zambia was unable to do the same for copper because of poorly implemented nationalisation efforts by single-party ruler Kaunda. This left certain local interest groups in the copper mining industry at a disadvantage. Although having high ambitions for creating and facilitating sustainable development through trade policy, the overall functionality of the government is still undermined by the obstacles of trade which the country has yet to fully address. The main goals that the Zambian government had set in place included diversifying its economy in a manner that efficiently facilitates sustainable development and promotes the competitiveness of the private sector.

Nonetheless, these ambitions have been out of reach given that the Zambian government continues to have high levels of perceived corruption, which has decreased the legitimacy and trust of the state to redistribute gains from trade to avoid losers of market integration.

Yet, shares of intra-regional trade have increased since 2001, especially by importing more from SADC Member States such as Mauritius, Namibia, and Tanzania. Shares of exports, on the other hand, have not shown a significant change in the share of SADC Member State participation. Nevertheless, overall trade patterns in Zambia have increased since the implementation of the SADC Protocol on Trade. Additionally, Zambia has managed to achieve one of its principal goals set by the SADC, which was to decrease dependence on South Africa. Although these results show positive outcomes of relative market integration success, in comparison to Botswana, it is evident that this industry is not operating as efficiently as the potential it holds.

Although having created some policies in the regional scope, Zambia has not been sufficient in cultivating a competitive economy and competitors often still resort to unfair trade practices. Moreover, in terms of the increasing capability of the population, since 1995, the Zambian government has increased its health and education expenditure as a percentage of GDP. This percentage has decreased dramatically in more recent years which shows a reduction in importance of capability building, given that GDP has risen over the past decades, poverty is still a prevalent issue in Zambia, which further hinders the process of self-reinforcing mechanisms.

The role of private governance and quality of institutions

The two case studies have provided evidence that the public and private governance act simultaneously to provide the pathways through market integration and, ultimately, developmental outcomes. As the private sector works within the "rules of the game" established by the public governance and institutions, these two sectors are highly interlinked and are mutually dependent.

Private governments and institutions have played a significant role in market integration in Botswana. The development of the private sector in Botswana has allowed for emerging opportunities in exports. Botswana's ranking in the "ease of doing business" indicator reflects the country's business environment and indicates that private sector firms can have opportunities to perform with relative ease, in comparison to other Southern African countries, such as Zambia. This has allowed Botswana to incorporate higher diversification of its economy by increasing the attractiveness of firms, which increases productivity levels. The main obstacles identified in Botswana's economy had been the conflict of interest between the private sector and public sector; however, the government of Botswana has created a multi-stakeholder consulting group which provides representation of the interest groups and resolves conflict. Moreover, with the support from the national government, foreign private sector firms use local producers and workers in their industrial projects, which further contributes to the employment and knowledge transfer in the country. This has contributed to the increased capacity of education and knowledge of the Botswanan population.

In the case of Zambia, historically, the role of private institutions and governance has laid the foundation of parts of Zambia's trade industry, particularly seen with the changing ownership between privatisation and nationalisation of copper mines during President Kaunda's rule. The effects of the privatisation of the ZCCM, which started in 1996, began to show effects in the early 2000s, in which the new private investors began to upgrade existing assets. The privatisation of the ZCCM created social backlash due to the negative effects that it had on government spending in terms of human capital development. However, in other sectors, such as the supermarket industry, large private companies have made attempts to take advantage of the increased urbanisation of the Zambian population. However, this created problems for local producers who were pushed out of the market. Nevertheless, the involvement of the private sector is crucial for increasing innovation and competitiveness of a country to diversify its economy. However, Zambia's low levels of a competitive environment has resulted in the disinterest of the private sector to invest in local Zambian producers.

The implications of this on regional integration is that the full potential of the private sector to contribute to trade and exports is not being fully realised and, hence, success of market integration has been lower in Zambia than in Botswana, with the latter being able to create a strong system in which the private and public sectors are coordinate to increase gains for both. Despite this, Zambia has also experienced increased levels in capabilities of the domestic market, which combined with regional integration, has resulted in an increase in development for the country.

Winners and losers of SADC regional market integration

Overall, the decisions made by my domestic institutions are closely interlinked with the SADC organisation framework. The SADC organisation has placed various ambitious goals toward increasing regional integration, some of which have been addressed better than others. However, the analysis on the SADC framework has presented some constraints which have been identified. These include weak, and sometimes unorganised, institutions that have hampered the implantation of the protocols in place to increase trade among Member States; the SADC Secretariat is one of them as it does not have the ability to exercise great power in enforcing regional policies and their implementation on domestic markets. Moreover, SADC policy progress has been limited. Although an FTA has been reached, other goals, such as the common currency, are still far from being achieved. There still exist various economic disparities among Member States. South Africa, for example, has seen a lot of gains and experiences the highest share of SADC trade relations, but these gains are not necessarily distributed among the rest of the region. This may lead to conflict among Member States, which do not experience similar gains.

This has created winners and losers of regional market integration where countries that have a stronger economy and are more developed, such as South Africa and Botswana, receive higher gains from integration. On the other hand, those countries which have not achieved the same developmental results, have a lower negotiation power and are often overlooked in determining regional policies and, hence, can be considered the losers of regional market integration, such as Zambia. The results presented show that market integration has been overall successful in achieving certain goals such as the SADC-FTA. However, the asymmetries and discrepancies between Member States create identifiable gaps in the SADC framework.

Conclusion

This study aimed to challenge the conventional wisdom and the sometimes-pessimistic view of deeper market integration in the SADC region. The analysis on the SADC organisation has provided insight on the functioning of the institution and has shown that although some market integration goals have not yet been achieved, the organisation has accomplished its central goal of increasing intra-regional trade. As developing countries become increasingly more structurally harmonised in terms of fiscal and macroeconomic policies and development, the asymmetries between Member States become less obstructing. Additionally, it can be concluded that regional market integration, although a powerful tool for development, cannot alone be implemented in substitution of good domestic policies. The roles of public and private institutions are fundamental in fostering a good environment and implementing policies which reinforce human capabilities and achieve development results. Nonetheless, some limitations to this study exist, including lack of availability of data on market integration, capacity building and development outcomes. In this sense, higher degrees of research need to be conducted in and in-depth manner to ensure updated and coherent information. Although this study has focused on the case of the SADC region, the results obtained have wider applications for other Southern regional development blocs which are found in a similar position.

To further achieve the objectives of the SADC and its Member States, many policies must be implemented and adopted, both by the SADC organisation and the Member States. The following policy recommendations are based on the case of Botswana. However, these recommendations may prove beneficial to other SADC Member States that have similar levels of income status, HDI levels, and polity IV scores, such as Namibia, South Africa, Mauritius, and Seychelles. These recommendations are the following:

- Though Botswana has established various committees to enhance cooperation and communication among various stakeholders, it is apparent that the large web of institutions may create some overlapping and double efforts. Therefore, Botswana should decrease the number of committees and institutions to create better regulations that apply to all interest groups.
- Similarly, these countries must ensure that overlapping membership in various regional economic agreements become more harmonised and clarified to avoid additional costs or double efforts in implementing intra-regional trade. In this manner, the private sector is also able to participate and adhere to these policies.
- The government should facilitate the access of local producers to regional markets by lowering barriers of trade such as tariffs on certain imports needed by local producers for manufacturing.

- As seen in the case of Zambia, supply chains are beneficial to development and increasing market integration; therefore, Botswana and similar countries should implement a strategy that aims to increase the participation of the private sector even further.

The following policy recommendations are directed toward Zambia which could also apply to other Member States with similar income status, HDI levels and polity IV scores, such as Mozambique, Malawi, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe. These recommendations are:

- To aim to improve the degree of democracy of the state to reduce levels of perceived corruption and gain trust from civil society and the private sector. This will increase the participation of the private sector and reduce delays in trade reform.
- Increase the support for the growth process by increasing capacity of domestic markets. This includes dedicating a larger portion of government expenditure to the education and health sector. As well as increase non-material productive capabilities.
- Reduce inefficiencies at the border such as bribery and corruption which, in addition to making trade more difficult, also result in trade delays.
- Increase the competitiveness of the economy by reducing costs and increasing the productivity of the economy. This can be done by developing a framework that incorporates both the private and the public sector to increase coordination.

The above policy recommendations and implications provide grounds for increased global integration, convergence, and development.

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