GLOBAL GOVERNANCE –
A PERSPECTIVE ON WORLD POLITICS.
FOUR THEORETICAL APPROACHES

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ABSTRACT: The objective of this article is to demonstrate the place of the global governance concept in four international relations theories: realism, liberalism, neoliberal institutionalism and social constructivism. Global governance is defined as the sum of ways that institutions and international organizations, both public and private, use to try to cooperate at the global level in order to manage their common affairs. In addition, the paper defines global governance as being a specific perspective on world politics that offers a tool for understanding global change in an era of shifting boundaries and relocated authorities. The main research questions of the article are: how the most influential IR theories have reacted to the global governance concept and why the term 'global governance', so popularly and so frequently used in the 1990's, has not resulted in a stable concept. Conclusions and suggestions presented in the summary point out that global governance held the promise of a radical transformation (predicted by almost every IR theory) of world order at the end of the Cold War. However, this great institutional transformation has never taken place. Therefore, current global politics still remain resistant to any form of world (or global) governance.

KEYWORDS: global governance, realism, liberalism, neoliberal institutionalism, social constructivism

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INTRODUCTION

Over the last two decades, the global governance concept has become extremely popular and fashionable among social science scholars. In addition, confusion in regard to its authentic meaning has greatly increased during this time. Since the publication by James Rosenau and Ernst-Otto Czempiel's work entitled *Governance Without Government*, the term 'global governance' has been used by students of world politics to describe global change as well as its outcomes and implications for international relations. 'Global governance', as previously was the case with 'globalization', has become a buzzword used in a myriad number of IR articles and books in different meanings and contexts.

A great number of scholars are of the opinion that the date of publication of *Governance Without Government* in 1992 brought the term 'global governance' onto the scholarly stage. And, in fact, since that time the global governance concept has been widely used. However, some scholars (Hewson, Sinclair 1999: 6) have noticed that the term is quite difficult to find in the above-mentioned book. Instead, the authors (Rosenau, Czempiel 1992) use the following terms: 'international governance', 'systems of governance' and 'governance on world politics'. Despite these inaccuracies, there is no doubt that since 1992 the term 'global governance' – understood as being different forms of managing global processes and affairs that result in transnational repercussions – has been introduced to the academic (as well as political) debate. These attempts to 'govern globalization' may be divided into three forms of governance: the official (within interstate forums that are subject to the rules of public international law), the unofficial (within the private and civil sector domain) and hybrid governance trends (Gupta 2002: 361–388).

Together with James Rosenau, whose reflections on global governance were the most influential during the 1990s, Rod Rhodes (1991), Lawrence S. Finkelstein (1995), Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye Jr. (2002) have been trying to define the concept and have focused their research on global change. In this way, global governance concept was created, as well as the debate about alternatives to the state-centric theorizing came about. The discourse has also been intensively developed since 1995, when the first issue of the 'Global Governance Journal' appeared. Moreover, in 1995 the UN Commission on Global Governance published the report *Our Global Neighborhood* (1995: 27) that also defines 'global governance' as 'the sum of the many ways individuals and institutions, public and private, manage their common affairs'. In addition, the report suggests that

"at the global level, governance has been viewed primarily as intergovernmental relationships, but it must now be understood as also involving nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), citizens' movements, multinational corporations, and the global capital market" (1995: XIV).

The idea of global governance has been developed as an answer to the changing nature of world politics. During the 1980ˢ and 1990s, theorists recognized a deeper change within world politics. This change, spurred by technological revolution and the globalization of economic life, has caused scholars to perceive our world as no longer being organized in a set of discrete (separate) sovereign states. The international system is no longer constructed of Westphalian polities but has become a system of multiple actors concerned with multiple issues (Mingst 1999). According to the opinion of David Held and Anthony McGrew (2002: 9), "as an analytical approach, global governance rejects the conventional state-centric conception of world politics and world order. The principal unit of analysis is taken to be the global, regional, transnational system of authoritative, rule-making and implementation".

Being aware of the fact that new phenomena within the social world need new categories of description as well as new conceptual tools which should be appropriate to the change, some scholars have started to accept this challenge. As a consequence, the concept of global governance has been developed as a tool to assist in this endeavor while understanding "the era marked by shifting boundaries, relocated authorities, weakened states and proliferating of nongovernmental organizations" (Rosenau 1999: 287).

According to J. Rosenau (1995: 363), our conceptual scope must be broadened if we want to understand international relations – or, as L.S. Finkelstein (1995: 368) has pointed out, what we until recently have called 'international relations' – in the changed circumstances in the twenty-first century. The concept of interdependence has been appropriate while describing world politics since 1970s, but since the end of the Cold War the dynamics of interdependence have tended to have global consequences. Therefore, analysts as well as scholars quite naturally have begun to use the term 'global governance'.

The development of the global governance concept was also the answer to the main IR theories: realism and neoliberal institutionalism, which had dominated the debate during the 1970ˢ and 1980ˢ and which, after the end of the Cold War, started to lose their importance. According to Ronnie Lipschutz (1997: 82–102), the global governance concept has become also a great challenge for all scholars trying to answer the question of who makes the most influential

decisions related to world politics and what kind of decisions are they, and how are they negotiated.

The central research questions of this paper are as follows: 1) how the most influential IR theories have reacted to the global governance concept, and 2) why the term 'global governance', so frequently used in the 1990s, has not resulted in a stable concept. In order to accomplish the first goal, the paper will analyze the global governance concept from four different approaches: realism, liberalism, neoliberal institutionalism and social constructivism. Of course, it is impossible to analyze the publications of all authors associated with these theories. Therefore, this paper focuses only on those which have been published after 1992 and which are related to the problem of the changing nature of international affairs after the Cold War. In addition, only those publications have been taken into consideration whose authors use the term 'global governance' according to the changing nature of international system. In addressing the second question, the academic popularity of the global governance concept as well as the transformation that it has undergone since 1990ˢ will be presented.

ONE GLOBAL GOVERNANCE'S VIEW OR MANY?

In order to present the meaning of 'global governance' in the clearest way possible, I will use two very popular definitions. The first one was developed by J. Rosenau and the second one by L.S. Finkelstein. According to J. Rosenau (1995: 13–43), global governance refers to more than the formal institutions and organizations through which the management of international affairs is or is not sustained. "[…] global governance is conceived to include systems of rule at all levels of human activity – from the family to the international organizations – in which the pursuit of goals through the exercise of control has transnational repercussions". Lawrence S. Finkelstein (1995: 367–372), in the first issue of the "Global Governance Journal", suggested that global governance could be defined as "governing, without sovereign authority, relationships that transcend national frontiers. Global governance is doing internationally what governments do at home". Combining these two definitions into one, global governance can be described as a global system of norms that influence the behavior of international actors. In addition to that, Eric K. Leonard (2002: 168) stresses that the norms should be intersubjectively accepted.

The representatives of almost each IR theory have presented their own assumptions related to the global governance concept as well as to its explaining capacity. The theorists who actually believe that the state is going to wither away stress the role of the global governance concept or even the global governance theory. Some of the scholars who are more skeptical while analyzing the changing nature of the current international system underline the fact that global governance, as a theory, overstates the challenges to the state as well as the alternatives to it. The analysis of the term 'global governance' used by the representatives of four IR theoretical perspectives made it possible to create four global governance understandings associated with the four appropriate theories.

The first analytical perspective is realism, which is perceived as being a product of a long philosophical and political tradition. It has to be also noted that realism is not (and never has been) a single theory[1], but it is often compared to 'a big tent' with room for a number of different theories[2]. Among the variants of realism, the most popular is the realism of K. Waltz that is described as structural realism or neorealism. The great difference between the structural and traditional realism is the emphasis placed by the representatives of the former on the structure of the international system[3]. According to K. Waltz (1990: 21–37), "neorealism develops the concept of a system's structure which at once bounds the domain that students of international politics deal with and enables them to see how the structure of the system, and variations in it, affect the interacting units and the outcomes they produce. International structure emerges from the interaction of states and then constrains them from taking certain actions while propelling them toward others". Some modifications of structural realism have

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[1] Scholars use the word "theory" to refer to three different things: realism as a large and complex tradition; subschools within the realist tradition, such as neorealism, as well as specific realist theories like the balance of power or security dilemma (Wohlforth 2008: 131).

[2] However, it is possible to point out some characteristics related to realism as a whole: 1) *Groupism* which means that politics take place within and between groups, and for realists the most important human groups are nation states, 2) *Egoism* that is rooted in human nature, 3) *Anarchy* that means the absence of world government and results in a self-help system, 4) *Power politics* that is a result of three former characteristics; the intersection of groupism and egoism in an environment of anarchy makes international relations a politics of power and security (Wohlforth 2008: 133).

[3] According to the idea of K. Waltz, the structure of the international system is determined by the ordering principle, namely anarchy, and the distribution of capabilities among states which are seen as functionally undifferentiated actors. K. Waltz argues that the world exists in a state of perpetual international anarchy. The anarchy of international politics – the lack of a world government – means that states must act in a way that ensures their security above all or else risk falling behind.

been made by John Mearsheimer, who disagreed with K. Waltz on the question of how much power states want. K. Waltz emphasized that there are limits in states' search for power and security, while J. Mearsheimer (2009: 243) said that the state's goal is to become the hegemon of the system and that the state will always look for the opportunities to gain more and more power. Waltz also stresses that great powers should not attempt to gain hegemony, either in their own region of the world or around the globe. States should not attempt to maximize their share of world power, because the other great powers in the system will join together in a balancing coalition and stop them in their track. According to the idea of J. Mearsheimer (1993: 5–49), "daily life is essentially a struggle for power, where each state strives not only to be the most powerful actor in the system, but also to ensure that no other state achieves that lofty position".

Apart from this disagreement, both K. Waltz and J. Mearsheimer share the assumption that compliance can be only achieved under hegemony. Only the most powerful state in the world (which is not a world government) can organize the international system of governance. As K. Waltz (1999: 693–700) pointed out, globalization is not ruled by markets but still by governments and because of this fact also the system of global governance should be governed by the most powerful state in the system. The theory of neorealism has little to say about the pieces of global governance because for its representatives only nation-states are the most influential international actors. According to J. Mearsheimer (1993: 5–49; 1995: 82–95), international institutions have little influence on state behavior and therefore "hold little promise for promoting stability in the post-Cold War world". As the product of the most powerful states, institutions (for realists) tend to reflect the prevailing distribution of power in the world and, as a result, states will always choose to obey their rules.

For realists, international (and global as well) governance can only be explained as a product of hegemonic power, and the establishment of any world order will always be an expression of one specific state's hegemony. Order is unstable as inter-state rivalry always threatens to disrupt economic relations and to generate armed conflicts for supremacy (Koenig-Archibugi 2011: 318–330). Realists believe that there is no force that can hold back the logic of anarchy which dominates the international system. It is also worth mentioning that the most influential representatives of neorealism – K. Waltz and J. Mearsheimer – do not use the term 'global governance' while describing the global institutional system. K. Waltz (1999: 693–700) used only the phrase 'governance', and only once – in the title of his article.

The second popular theoretical perspective is liberalism that denotes a shift from a system dominated by states to a disaggregated model described by the term 'global governance'. Liberalism traces its roots back to idealism and holds that human nature is basically good. In addition, liberal theory assumes that people can really influence their conditions of existence. The most prominent representative of liberal IR theory is A. Moravcsik (2002: 159–204), who has also proposed three 'hard core' features of the 'liberal scientific program in international relations'[4]. Because the liberal scientific program places state-society relations at the center of the study area, the first assumption is related to the nature of actors of international politics and stresses that the fundamental actors in international relations are rational individuals as well as private groups. The individuals and groups make efforts in order to organize and to promote their interests. This assumption creates a 'bottom-up' view of politics, which is standard to the liberal approach. The second assumption is that "states represent some subset of domestic society, whose weighted preferences constitute the underlying goals (state preferences) that rational state officials pursue via foreign policy". Representative institutions act like a 'transmission belt' by which the preferences of the social groups are translated into the policy of a state. Finally, the third assumption is that the configuration of state preferences influence and shape state behavior in the international system.

The liberal variant of global governance is strongly associated with the assumptions formulated by A. Moravcsik. The most essential feature of this understanding is the belief that international relations in the global era should reflect the rules and principles of the nation state's society. In addition, it strongly emphasizes the role of non-state international actors. A. Moravcsik's intention is to take the liberal IR theory back from the normative assumptions, and he also believes the global governance concept should not be considered as only a normative idea, but rather as a visible project of international society.

In this view, the nation state is not a unitary actor. Therefore, while analyzing their foreign policies, we have to include all the social forces that may influence them. Within this view, global governance is perceived as an idea that has been developed since 1945 and one which, after the end of the Cold War, has come into prominence. International cooperation, that is in the centre of this under-

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[4]   The term 'program' is used by A. Moravcsik in the sense of Imre Lakatos's idea about the scientific research program that delineates the 'hard core' assumptions and 'protective belt' of auxiliary propositions (2002: 159–204).

standing, is also for all liberal IR theorists of paramount importance and because of this fact, they very often use the term 'global governance' while describing the post-Cold War world order.

In addition, this perspective strongly emphasizes the issue of democratic legitimacy of international organizations and institutions attempting to show that really existing global governance is not free from difficulties or inaccuracies[5].

Neoliberal institutionalism, the next IR theory, shares some assumptions related to world politics with structural realism. However, the scholars associated with neoliberal institutionalism have espoused the theory as a response to K. Waltz's claims. R. Keohane, together with J. Nye, admit that the global system is anarchical in its structure and that states are the primary actors in the international system. However, international non-state organizations and institutions also play a significant role. The main difference between structural realism and neoliberal institutionalism is the assumption related to the possibility of cooperation between the actors in international relations. The representatives of neoliberal institutionalism strongly believe that cooperation (which does not mean harmony) between states is possible and often occurs under the auspices of international institutions (Axelrod, Keohane 1993: 85–115). Neoliberal institutionalism focuses on states, their interests as well as the possibility of cooperation under anarchy[6]. In addition, theorists associated with neoliberal institutionalism are focused on the role of international institutions and on the formation of cooperative regimes.

The understanding of global governance created by representatives of neoliberal institutionalism assumes that formal international regimes, rules and institutions can govern international affairs[7]. The publications associated with the theory of neoliberal institutionalism are trying to answer the question of why, in absence of coercion, would states subject themselves to the constraints of international institutions (McGrew 2002: 265–289). The idea of complex

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[5] This situation is so on account of the fact that it is not easy to define the idea of transparency, accountability and democracy when it comes to the multilateral institutions that cannot be compared to ideal democratic systems. The answer to the question of whether global governance can be democratic must not be based on only philosophical assumptions but on social science evidence as well (Moravcsik 2004: 1–28).

[6] According to the representatives of neoliberal institutionalism, states always seek absolute, not relative gains (Jervis 1999: 42–63).

[7] In order to explain their main assumptions, neoliberal institutionalists have developed a lot of middle-level theories like: regime theory or collective goods theory.

interdependence perfectly suits this view of global governance which may be described as a horizontal self-coordination view. R. Keohane together with J. Nye (2003: 386–411) have distinguished four models of global governance ('statist', 'international organization', 'transnational-actors' and 'polity-network') that should not be seen as alternatives. Each model brings new layers of complexity to global governance. "The statist model brings domestic politics, the second model introduces international organizations, the transnational-actors model introduces multinational firms and NGOs and the policy-network model takes into account the facts of state power and chains of delegation to analyze how horizontally organized networks affect outcomes along with the hierarchies of states and international organizations".

The international reality under conditions of complex interdependence and under the influence of globalization process blends all these four models and creates one horizontal model of global governance. This model promotes cooperation, because as R. Keohane (2001: 1–13) has pointed out, "interdependence and lack of governance make a deadly mixture". This kind of governance model is the most approximate to the concept presented by J. Rosenau and is called a "governance without government".

The last theoretical perspective is the social constructivism – the approach that has strong roots in sociology and that is relatively new to international relations. The main assumption of the theory of social constructivism is that the behavior of individuals, states and other actors is shaped by shared beliefs, socially constructed rules and cultural practices. According to Ian Hurd, four features of constructivism distinguish it from other approaches. Firstly, the constructivist approach is an alternative to materialism. The fundamental principle of constructivism is that people act toward objects, including other actors, on the basis of the meanings that the objects have to them[8]. This assumption has several extremely important consequences for the analysis of world politics. The meaning and practices of human behavior vary over time and space; they are never fixed and should never be taken as stable objects. Consequently, also some ideas strongly related to the area of international relations (such as, for instance, the idea of sovereignty) are changing and are always in flux. The second assump-

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[8]　This characteristic of constructivism has been developed on the basis of Alexander Wendt's observation that 500 British nuclear weapons are less threatening to the United States than 5 North Korean nuclear weapons, because the British are in a friendly social structure with the United States whereas North Korea is not (Hurd 2008: 298).

tion of social constructivism is that interests are socially constructed, influenced by the culture, norms, ideas as well as domestic and international interactions. As J. Legro and A. Moravcsik (1999: 5–55) stress: "new foreign policy ideas are shaped by preexisting dominant ideas and their relationship to experienced events". The third assumption is related to the problem of agent-structure relations. This relationship is strongly related to the idea of 'co-constitution', which goes beyond recognizing that there are interactions between the unit and the system level. It suggests that the actions made by states (units) contribute to making the norms and institutions of international life (system) and these norms and institutions contribute to influencing and socializing states. Finally, the last characteristic of social constructivism is the multiple logics of anarchy. While criticizing K. Waltz's idea of anarchy, A. Wendt has pointed out "that rivalry under the condition of anarchy is a social relationship that is not fixed or permanent". As a social construction anarchy can assume different characteristics and as A. Wendt (1995: 298–305) has stressed, "an anarchy of friends differs from one of enemies".

The representatives of social constructivism present us with another understanding of global governance mainly because of the fact that they place a great deal of importance on institutions defined as being embodied in norms, practices and formal organizations. This view pays a great deal of attention to the social content of international organizations, the development of collective identities, as well as the role of epistemic communities. Martha Finnemore (1996: 5), while analyzing the role of The International Committee of the Red Cross, noticed that "states are socialized to accept new norms, values, and perceptions of interests by international organizations". This goes to show that, for constructivists, international organizations are of paramount importance while creating norms and rules which, in fact, are pieces of global governance system. They perceive international organizations as being influential and purposive actors with independent effects on the international system (Karns, Mingst 2004: 50–52).

According to the assumptions of social constructivism, the pieces of global governance are 'socially constructed'. Their identities and interests are results of socially shared norms and values. In contrast to realists, who see interests as being invariable, constructivists treat them as a product of a never-ending social process. Constructivists see global governance as a way of acting in globalized international system and their attention is focused on how the understanding of global governance can influence the behavior of international actors. The perception of global governance can determine the international actors' attitude towards it. The basis of global governance are norms, mainly because of the

fact that they can define and shape the actors' interests. After the process of emergence, as defined by M. Finnemore and K. Sikkink (2001: 391–416), norms provide a basis for a governance system being perceived as valid and effective. Constructivists agree that communicative processes (interaction, communication and discourse) can influence the determination of national interests by creating a shared understanding and structures that can both constrain and enable choices (Gupta 2002: 361–388).

All IR theories are trying to answer the question of how the process of globalization has changed world politics and, as a consequence, also our understanding of the international system. Each IR theory deals with the question 'who governs', therefore, each IR theory touches on the issue of 'global governance'. The representatives of the four above-mentioned perspectives explain that current international relations have something to say about global governance. However, they are formulating their assumptions on the basis of the main ideas espoused by each theory. It proves that, within IR, almost each case can be perceived from different perspectives and each of them exposes different aspects of the analyzed phenomenon. Some scholars believe that this situation (this is especially typical for the social sciences) can provide us with a better understanding of the phenomenon. However, after the 20-year-old debate about global governance there still is no certainty that these different views have helped us to understand the phenomenon or to solve the problems related to it.

Table 1: Four theoretic models of global governance

	Realism	Liberalism	Neoliberal institutionalism	Social constructivism
Global governance view	Hegemonic	Liberal	Self coordination	Socially constructed
Pieces of global governance	States	States, IGOs, NGOs, individuals, networks	States (most influential), IGOs, NGOs, TNCs, networks	States, IGOs, NGOs, TNCs, epistemic communities
Mechanism of governance	Hierarchy	Coordination	Coordination	Mobius-web mechanism of governance

The concept of global governance in the academic debate

As mentioned above, after the end of the Cold War, the academic as well as the political discussion centered around the issue of international (and global) governance. Since the 1990s, the emphasis of the debate has been changing and the discussion about the structures of global governance has revealed the

problems of its effectiveness (Keohane 2006: 219–224) and its legitimacy as well (Grant, Keohane 2005: 29–43). The four various understandings of global governance presented above show that not only do the authors associated with different IR theories stress the changing nature of international system, but also they try to characterize this nature using their own attributes typically associated with each theory. In addition, they show that global governance can be understood in different ways and prove that there is no single view of global governance. Moreover, within the IR literature there are many different opinions about it, because academics still manifest their attitudes toward its effectiveness in various ways.

According to Markus Lederer and Philipp S. Müller, there is no single definition of global governance but the situation is accepted by all or by the majority of scholars as well as policy makers (2005: 22). They also stress that there is no need for such a definition. Within the social sciences, many terms do not have one, single definition and so this situation is not as problematic or questionable as it may seem to be. In addition, M. Lederer and Ph.S. Müller stress (2005: 1–20) that defining 'global governance' is a political act. Therefore, the fact that there are differing and sometimes opposing views of global governance can be perceived as being a positive sign (Polus 2008: 43).

This situation, however, can cause some confusion because it is extremely difficult to talk about one global governance discourse. In order to clarify our understanding of 'global governance', we have to answer the question "how do we use the term of global governance" (Müller, Lederer 2005: 14). In addition, the discussion about the definition of global governance seems to be 'a neverending story' that does not result in a stable understanding of the term. On the contrary, all the definitions are so elastic that scholars are becoming unable to define what global governance is and what it is not.

According to K. Dingwerth and Ph. Pattberg (2006: 185–203), we can distinguish two main understandings of global governance. Firstly, some scholars use the term 'global governance' as a conceptual reference point while analyzing the current international system for their occupation with world politics. This group of scholars uses the term 'global governance' as an analytical perspective that stresses the changing role of the nation state together with the growing position of non-state actors in world politics. According to Th. Weiss, the term 'global governance' is seen as being 'a heuristic device' that helps to capture and to describe the profound transformation in the global era. This corresponds with the idea that "political governance in modern societies can no longer be

conceived in terms of external governmental control of society, but emerges from a plurality of governing actors" (Marin, Mayntz 1991: 258). In other words, while the idea of 'inter-national' relations is conceptually based on an "often unquestioned preference for the nation state as the basic unit of analysis, the study of global governance acknowledges that a plethora of forms of social organization and political decision making exist that are neither directed toward the state nor emanate from it. More precisely, the concept of global governance departs from more traditional views" (Dingwerth, Pattberg 2006: 185–203). Globalization has created a need for a new vocabulary that enables us to describe the international world and, for scholars, the term 'global governance' seemed to be a kind of promise that would allow them to describe the globalized world politics.

Secondly, another group of publications defines global governance using the normative approach. Authors of these publications regard global governance as being a political concept and a vision that should help to govern the process of globalization. A great number of global problems (e.g. weapons of mass destruction, global financial crises, the persistence of poverty, climate change, ethnic conflicts, as well as failed states) cannot be managed by sovereign states acting alone, but they need cooperation among governments and non-state actors. In addition, some of them require the active participation of ordinary citizens or the establishment of new mechanisms of cooperation. The final report of the Commission on Global Governance can be perceived as being the normative approach towards global governance. The Commission (1995: 380) maintains that a "global civic ethic to guide action within the global neighborhood, and leadership infused with that ethic, is vital to the quality of global governance". The Commission comes to the conclusion that we need "more global governance" and that "implementing global governance" is the real problem. Not only do the authors associated with the normative view of global governance stress that better forms of governance should be implemented, but they also emphasize some imperfections of the really existing global governance, such as, for instance, the lack of democratic procedures and the issue of accountability (1995: 380).

These two different understandings[9] of global governance result in a great number of misinterpretations and they are also a source of problems for scholars and students who are facing the issue of global governance. Because of the fact

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[9] However, some scholars have distinguished three categories of global governance studies: global governance as a phenomenon: managing global problems; global governance as a project: the growth

that we do not have one single definition of global governance, we should always be precise about what kind of global governance we are talking about and what we understand by this term.

This situation can be explained by the fact that the global governance discourse has been developed among scholars as well as among politicians simultaneously. As some scholars have pointed out, there are two global governance discourses: an academic and a political one. In academia, global governance has been developing as a framework that enables scholars to conceive of the global realm, and for policy makers global governance is a term of political vocabulary that is referred to in order to legitimize political interventions (Dingwerth, Pattberg 2006: 185–203).

In regard to the academic discourse, it should be mentioned that the nature of this debate has changed since 1992. The concept had been previously perceived as a great promise, a new term that would enable us to talk about the globalized political realm. During the 1990s, however, the global governance concept was mainly associated with a result of global change that was characterized by the rise to prominence of non-state actors, the increased formation of both IGOs and NGOs, as well as the changing role of TNCs. A great number of articles and books [e.g. the publications of R. Cox (1996: 298), M. Desai (1995: 7), D. Held and A. McGrew (1993: 261–285), J. Rosenau (1992: 1–29), R.A.W. Rhodes (1996: 652–667), G. Stoker (1998: 17–28), O. Young (1990: 337–346)] published during the 1990ˢ stressed the changing nature of world politics and the international system that was no longer dominated by nation states. After the end of the Cold War, the defeat of the Soviet challenge together with the technological revolution and the victory of the democratic political system were perceived as facilitating a possible, depoliticized version of global governance. Therefore, myriad publications devoted to the global governance concept announced a profound institutional transformation, which has (in fact) never taken place. The changing popularity of the term 'global governance' is presented in Table 1.

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of liberal world order; global governance as a worldview: new analytical approach (Hoffmann, Ba 2006: 1–14).

Table 2: Academic popularity of 'global governance' 1991–2013

Years	Number of hits
1991–1995	849
1996–2000	5 010
2001–2005	16 900
2006–2010	20 300
2011–2013	18 000

Number of hits in Google Scholar search with 'global governance' anywhere. August, 20th 2013
A similar table is presented in: H. Overbeek, K. Dingwerth, Ph. Pattberg, D. Compagnon (2010: 696–719)

In the course of 1990s, the term 'global governance' was used more and more frequently. After 1992, the turning point was the year 1995, when the UN Commission on Global Governance published its report *Our Global Neighborhood* and the new academic journal ("Global Governance") was founded. However, at the beginning of 21st century, the term 'global governance' started to lose its attraction. The authors of publications related to the global governance concept from the beginning of the 21st century started to ask about the nature of the really existing global governance. They also asked if existing governance systems should be reformed, and which existing governance systems should be reformed etc. This changing nature of the debate, as well as the new topics that have been emerged (for example: legitimacy, accountability and effectiveness of global governance), prove that the authors have shifted their focus of attention from defining global governance to the problems of its effective functioning. There are two levels at which the challenges have arisen. Firstly, the level of actors of global governance has to be legitimate, accountable and effective. Secondly, the whole system of global governance needs to have these attributes. This change can be seen in the publications of R. Keohane and J. Nye. In the late 1990s they publicized many articles related to the changing nature of international relations and at the beginning of the twenty first century they started to draw readers' attention toward the problem of accountability and legitimacy of global governance (Keohane 2003: 130–159; Keohane, Nye 2003: 386–411).

This change can be perceived as being a result of a changing globalization discourse. The globalization process during the late 1990s and during the early years of the new millennium has been described in terms of further liberalization, de-statification and de-territorialization – processes that are currently seen as

untenable. Because of this, the global governance as well as the academic debate related to it must have changed. We still cannot expect that global governance will announce a profound institutional change at the global level. In fact, by using the term 'global governance' the academic world used to describe, in reality, the set of international institutions that were established after 1945 and which since that time were only slightly reformed. Every era has its own trends and perhaps global governance can be perceived as being a sign of this trend within the IR debate. Perhaps it can be described as a term that, in fact, has only stressed the changes brought about by the process of globalization.

Since the beginning of the new millennium, scholars have begun to emphasize that global governance is not necessarily virtuous and should not be viewed as being apolitical. In addition, they have started to question the harmony of international relations, as well as the willingness of countries to engage in international cooperation. Recent studies have also questioned the role of non-state actors in global governance and started to highlight the power relations lying under global governance mechanisms.

The conclusions that can be drawn from this short analysis of the global governance debate are as follows: 1) there is still a problem with creating one definition of global governance and that situation may plague the discussion about it (Waters 2009: 25–58), 2) there are a myriad number of differences in the global governance discourse as well as in the globalization debate, 3) these differences can be linked to the different foci of analysis, such as, for instance, the position of the nation state, the role of non-state actors, the issue of accountability within global governance, the issue of democratic procedures within global governance, the idea of legitimacy and the geographic bias in the debate.

Because of the fact that the concept is still imprecise and vague[10], it should be better historicized and ought to be placed within the third world as understood by Karl Popper's concept of it. The third world contains products of thought and it includes abstract objects such as scientific theories, stories, myths, tools, social institutions and works of art. Therefore, while talking about global governance, we should always stress the historical context in which it is being used.

One of the main arguments of this text responds to the question of why the term 'global governance', so popularly and so frequently used in the 1990s, has not resulted in a stable concept. There are several answers that can be

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[10] And according to some scholars, it is also misleading (Overbeek, Dingwerth, Pattberg, Compagnon 2010: 696–712).

formulated: 1) the concept was developed within two different discourses (academic and political) which have often been mixed, 2) the concept has always been imprecise and its definitions have been too broad, 3) the new concept ('global governance') has been used while describing the old system of norms and institutions (established after 1945) and only while announcing profound institutional transformation.

The debate related to globalization as well as associated with global governance is placed within a specific discourse, constructed and contested by academics. The initial publications related to global governance highlighted images of harmony, the development of global civil society, as well as global common problem-solving. According to Doris Fuchs and F. Kratochwil (2002: 1–23), "these beliefs also have been underlying the modernization discourse, so that the global governance discourse postulates a repetition of the modernizations of states and societies on a global scale". This approach has, however, overestimated the apolitical character of global governance and underestimated the role of regional and local levels of cooperation. At the beginning of the new millennium, scholars started to show that mechanisms of global governance have a myriad number of defects and sometimes lack democratic procedures and legitimacy.

CONCLUSIONS

On the basis of above-mentioned materials, the conclusion can be drawn that within the global governance literature there are numerous variants and typologies of governance mechanisms. According to the assumptions of J. Rosenau (1999: 289), all typologies are created only in order to organize our thoughts. The situation is typical for the international relations debate, which is also full of numerous inaccuracies.

In addition, it should also be mentioned that it is extremely difficult to indicate some common assumptions related to global governance created by representatives of different IR theories, and to distinguish between certain common assumptions about the global governance concept within the publications associated with four different theories. Only the theories of liberalism and neoliberal institutionalism can be seen as exceptions to the rule.

The differences about the global governance concept that are perceived while analyzing the global governance debate are so radical and essential that it is impossible to make any synthesis. Different IR theories define the term 'global

governance' in different ways and ascribe different role to the global governance mechanisms.

While attempting to answer the question about the really existing global governance, academics as well as politicians stress the fact that after the beginning of the new millennium the processes of further liberalization, de-statification and de-territorialization have been stopped, step by step. Moreover, the global economic crisis that began in 2007, as well as new geoeconomic and geopolitical tensions (such as, for instance, the ongoing shift of gravity of global economy away from the Atlantic and towards the Pacific), strongly signal the end of 'the unipolar moment' and call for the nation states to get back to action.

According to H. Overbeek, "in light of the re-emergence of geopolitical rivalries […] and in light of the return of the state at the managerial center of the capitalist economy, we must wonder whether the pendulum has not already begun to move in the other direction making the discussion about global governance a debate among historians rather than social scientists" (2010: 702).

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