



## POST-NATIONAL REVOLUTION AND ITS POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES

REWOLUCJA POST-NARODOWA  
I JEJ POLITYCZNE KONSEKWENCJE

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— ABSTRACT —

Western Europe of the early 21<sup>st</sup> century is going through a process that is sometimes referred to as “the arrival of the Third Wave civilization”, that is the information civilization. The civilizational transformations result in two “revolutions” – *post-national* and *post-industrial*. Just like the 19th-century national and industrial revolutions, they involve deep social changes and consequently provoke resistance and a wave of counter-mobilisation against the upcoming “new order” – global, post-national, and post-industrial. The basic assumption of this article is that the classical theoretical schemes developed by Stein Rokkan and Seymour Lipset may come as analytical tools useful in explaining contemporary political phenomena. Rokkan’s theory seems to be the analytical model that is still helpful in explaining the election behaviours as well as political conflicts and divisions present within current political systems, and its heuristic power is high.

— ABSTRAKT —

Na przełomie dwudziestego i dwudziestego pierwszego wieku kraje wysoko rozwinięte przechodzą proces, który określany jest niekiedy mianem „nadejścia trzeciej fali cywilizacyjnej”, związanej z rewolucją technologii informacyjnych. Ta transformacja cywilizacyjna skutkuje procesami, które można określić mianem „rewolucji post-industrialnej” oraz „rewolucji post-narodowej”. Podobnie jak miało to miejsce w wypadku nowoczesnej rewolucji narodowej i przemysłowej, tak samo dwie „ponowoczesne” rewolucje wywołują głębokie zmiany w strukturze społecznej, prowokując tym samym opór wobec zmian i nadchodzącego „nowego porządku społecznego”. Podstawowym celem artykułu jest zwrócenie uwagi na heurystyczne możliwości modelu analitycznego zaproponowanego przez Steina Rokkana i Seymoura Lipseta do badania podziałów społecznych politycznie doniosłych. Autor argumentuje, że Rokkanowski model może być przydatny w próbie wyjaśniania współczesnych zjawisk politycznych.

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**Keywords:** post-national revolution, hybridity, multiculturalism, globalization, global governance, social cleavages

**Słowa kluczowe:** rewolucja post-narodowa, hybrydyzacja, multikulturalizm, globalizacja, globalne zarządzanie, podziały społeczne

Noticing and realizing the increasing pace of civilizational development which has taken place in the last few decades due to information revolutions, we face the problem of understanding and describing the changes occurring in our surrounding. These changes are not limited to particular countries or regions but concern the whole globe. Technological revolution and intensification of globalization lead to the questioning of current forms of organization of social life, which implies that the issues related to it need to be reconsidered. At the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> century and the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century our social-political world has undergone fundamental transformations and the processes modifying structures and mechanisms have intensified. There is a common feeling that we are about to face radical transformations of the current social order. A great number of social science works constitute attempts at analysing and comprehending the processes that change our social world and contribute to its profound transformation (cf. Albrow, 1997, 2014; Castells, 2007, 2008, 2009; Held, McGrew, Goldblatt, Perraton, 1999; Held, McGrew, 2007; Robertson, 1992; Rosenau, 1990; Scholte, 2005; van Dijk, 2012).

We could say, making some simplification, that there are at least three processes defining the framework of the dynamics of social changes: 1) transnationalization of societies – happening slowly as a result of integration processes (abolition of borders and removal of other obstacles to freedom of movement and work, “mixing” of nations, common initiatives and organizations); 2) globalization of societies, that is a comprehensive influence of the globalization processes on the societies, communities and individuals – a process increasing but with a different degree in various regions and countries; 3) networking – which creates a new, extremely dense network of contacts and relations between people and organizations (general access to telecommunication network, transfer rate, interactivity are the essential features). It means that the present organization of our societies is affected by three factors: cross-border (removal of political and administrative barriers), globalism (globalization of the scope of perception and human activity), ability to establish contacts (multi-contacts and multi-interactions) (Zacher, 2006). These three elements cause the erosion of modern

social and political institutions and at the same time a particular vulnerability connected with the fact that we do not know how to replace them.

The greatest research challenge for contemporary humanities and social sciences is the attempt to recognize the effects of civilizational changes connected with information revolution and the creation of global information society. A rapid transformation of our social reality constitutes a particular challenge for social sciences. A complex character of the appearing changes causes the difficulties with an adequate explanation of the changes happening in the sphere of politics. We live in times between two eras: industrial and information. We do not really know what a “mature” information society will be and there are still more questions than rational answers to the appearing doubts. The pace of economic, social and technological changes is too fast. We may observe many manifestations connected with the transition to information society and try to “insert” it in a certain analytical chart so as to give meaning to the surrounding social reality. A predicted arrival of information society is connected with a complex reconstruction of structures and social institutions. One thing seems to be certain – that the present transformation of industrial civilization into information civilization causes deep and comprehensive changes of social existence, similarly as it happened during the transformation from agricultural to industrial civilization. As a result, a society with specific ways of organizing social, political and economic life will be formed.

While trying to introduce order into analyses concerning the changes occurring in the sphere of politics, one may attempt to find such a research chart which would have the greatest heuristic possibilities. The basic assumption of the article is that a useful analytical role may be played by classical theoretical charts developed by Stein Rokkan and Seymour Lipset.

In his area of academic interests, a Norwegian political scientist Stein Rokkan focused on the issue of election behaviour. During his academic research he became interested in the issue of historical studies on the processes of creating political framework within which voters make their decisions. He paid attention to the importance of history in the process of understanding the roots of contemporary divisions and political differences formed in post-war European party systems. He studied the sources of economic, social and political cleavages and soon created his comparative studies devoted to the creation of basic social cleavages as well as historical analysis of their formation in particular countries of Western Europe. Rokkan's theory of social cleavages became popular thanks to a book *Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-national Perspective*, edited

together with Seymour Lipset (1967). Stein Rokkan and Seymour Lipset recognized that a fundamental basis of political phenomena are long-term process of evolution of a social structure and undertook an attempt to conceptualize a relation between great historical processes, cleavages in a society and institutionalisation of a party system.

They analysed the processes of democratization and formation of party systems happening in the countries of Western Europe in a historical perspective. They were interested in the issues concerning the formation of a hierarchical system of social cleavages, politically important, mutual connections among them, the occurrence of relations between the system of these divisions and a party system, what, as a result, led to indicate the role of political parties in the process of structuring and stabilizing political behaviours (Herbut, 1993). The notion “cleavage” refers to a specific kind of conflicts occurring within the framework of democratic politics, having its source in the transformation of social structure caused by macro-level processes. At the moment when “social cleavages” are used for political mobilization and when their institutionalisation within the party system happens, they create stronger alliances and political loyalties which are reproduced until the moment when another transformation of social structure happens.

Until today “Rokkan’s” notion of social cleavage is one of the most popular analytical models explaining the changes occurring within party systems. This model has had a central role in the literature devoted to European political systems and contemporary political behaviours for years. The strength of this notion lies between its abilities to logical connections between individual political behaviours (micro-level) and great historical processes (macro-level). Thanks to this, the theory of Rokkan and Lipset has become very popular among researchers. Its popularity is confirmed by many works and articles referring to “Rokkan’s” notion of “cleavages” (cf. Karvonen, Kuhnle, 2001). According to contemporary conceptualisation, a political division must comprise three elements to constitute cleavage: a) A *social-structural* element, such as class, religious denomination, status or education; b) an element of *collective identity* of this social group, and c) an *organizational manifestation* in the form of collective action or a durable organization of the social group concerned (Bartolini, Mair, 1990; Bartolini, 2005). A cleavage is thus necessarily a “compounded divide”, encompassing interest, normative or attitudinal outlooks, and a strong organizational base (Bartolini, 2005; Deegan-Krause, 2006, 2007).

Stein Rokkan and Seymour Lipset realized that in order to understand the existing political divisions and conflicts, we have to refer to the processes of evolution of social structure. They argued that modern political and party systems in Western Europe have been formed by series of historical conflicts connected with the formation of nation states, religious transformations and formation of new social structures, which were happening in the period between the Reformation and Industrial Revolution. These social changes have caused particular consequences on a political level.

According to the thesis of Rokkan and Lipset, the overlapping of conflicts connected with: 1) reformation and counter-reformation; 2) national revolutions in the 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> century, as well as 3) industrial revolution contributed to the creation of distinctive and separate identities, social institutions as well as the patterns of political competitions, which explain both “national variations” of political systems in Western Europe and stability or “freezing” of these systems.

Lipset and Rokkan indicated the key importance of two revolutions connected with European modernity: national and industrial. These revolutions contributed to the formation of four critical lines of social cleavages due to the fact that modernization processes caused by industrial and national revolutions prompted the resistance and counter-mobilization of the groups endangered by the processes of civilizational changes. Two of these cleavages were the products of what was defined as a national revolution: a conflict between *a central culture connected with the formation of a nation state* and an increasing resistance of *the subordinate groups*, different in terms of ethnicity, languages or religion, located in the province and peripheries of the country; a conflict between centralizing, standardising and mobilizing *nation state* and a historically consolidated corporate privileges of *the Church*. Two of these divisions are the products of industrial revolution: a conflict between *the interests of landowners* and a forming class of *industrial entrepreneurs*; a conflict between *owners and employers* on the one hand, and *renters, agricultural workers and workmen* on the other hand. Rokkan and Lipset paid attention to the fact that majority of the history of Europe from the beginning of the 19<sup>th</sup> century can be described in terms of interaction between these two processes of revolution changes (Lipset, Rokkan, 1993).

The analytical chart proposed by Lipset and Rokkan seems a useful tool by means of which one can undertake the attempt to explain the current political processes connected with the transformations on the political scene and changes of the election behaviours which take place all over Europe. On applying this tool, a question arises as to whether information revolution resembles industrial

revolution and whether the two periods can be juxtaposed. Despite all differences, one can find an analogy between Europe at the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century and Europe of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. In the 19<sup>th</sup> century, Europeans faced the civilizational changes connected with the break-up of social and political structures formed during agricultural era and the arrival of modern industrial civilization. National and industrial revolution also reflected these changes. In the 21<sup>st</sup> century, citizens of the most developed countries (Europe, USA, Japan) have come to face civilizational transformations resulting from the revolution of information technologies and the related reconstruction of modernity (Freeman, Louçã, 2001; Winston, Edelbach, 2006). What is more, the two revolutions – industrial and information – are stages in the development of a modern society.

While using Rokkan's model of the formation of social cleavages, one may assume that contemporary deep transformation of economic and social life is connected with the second industrial revolution (computerization, automatization, robotization), as well as globalization processes driven by the progress of IT will have its reflection in a social structure, and therefore in political behaviours. Western Europe at the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century experiences a process that is often defined as "the arrival of the civilization of the third wave", that is the information civilization. The article assumes a hypothesis that just as it happened in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, we are now experiencing two revolutions that are the result of the occurring civilizational transformations: *post-national* and *post-industrial*. These two revolutions, similarly to previous national and industrial revolutions, are the source of deep social changes, and therefore they provoke resistance and the waves of counter-mobilization against the upcoming "new order": global order, post-national, post-industrial.

Both processes of *post-industrial* and *post-national* revolutions have their interesting manifestations and consequences deserving a deeper analysis. The analysis requires thorough empirical studies that could confirm the assumed hypothesis. The main aim of this article is to draw attention to the heuristic possibilities of Rokkan's analytical model that was created for the purpose of studies on party systems in Western Europe. The model still seems to be a useful tool when trying to comprehend contemporary political phenomena and the creation of new boundaries of social and political divisions. The possibilities offered by Rokkan model may be shown, for example, in the analysis of the processes and phenomena defined as *post-national revolution*, one of the key elements of contemporary civilizational transformation. Many social theorists have suggested that we are currently living in a period in which the identities

of past are becoming increasingly irrelevant and in which new identities, and new identity formation, are being created. The major identity colossus forged in the nineteenth century, and subsequently spread over much of the globe – nation-state identity – has been the subject of particular debate; and theorists have attempted to identify alternative, *post-national* identity construction (cf. Appandurai, 2005; Giddens, 2002, 2008; Turkle, 1997; Werbner, Modood, 1997). The aim of the article is to pay attention to the political process and phenomena accompanying *post-national revolution*, especially to the process of creation new socio-political cleavages.

It seems that it is the *post-national revolution* concerning the two basic pillars of our social existence: political institutions as well as identity sphere have the greatest potential for political mobility. What is *post-national revolution* and what areas of our life does it concern? *Post-national revolution* (denationalization) is connected with the unusual ability for new technologies to break down all the barriers, both physical and social. In the dimension of political barriers, post-national revolution manifests itself as a tendency to create *supranational* political and social groups taking over the competences of a current *nation state*. In a social dimension, *post-national revolution* contributed to the intensification of the intercultural contacts and the processes of cultural diffusion. The facilitations connected with global movement of people, images and ideas caused the mesh of civilization, as well as the formation of hybrid (multicultural) societies and hybrid individual identities drawing from many sources and various cultural practices (cf. Habermas, 2001; Appandurai, 2005; Joppke, 2008; Parekh, 2008).

While emphasizing the political significance of *post-national revolution*, it is worth remembering that it was a national revolution which was one of the most important consequences of economic and social transformations connected with the arrival of modernity. The term “national revolution” refers to two mutually connected processes: the creation of modern state and nation. The creation of a state concerns the processes of forming particular tangible institutions – army, police, bureaucracy, ministers, and so on. However, the creation of nation is the creation of the feeling of national identity, which will replace the feeling of loyalty of individual people towards tribes, villages, regions or ethnic groups (Fukuyama, 2015). Both processes were mutually connected with each other as the creation of a nation had a decisive importance for the success of the creation of the statehood. Despite the fact that a nation state consisted of several sectors, it supported the formation of one dominant language and a superior

national culture, thanks to which the demands of classes and subcultures were moved away and therefore loyalty towards the most universal identity – national identity – was assured. In state nationalism, a state limited by territory assumes loyalty which goes beyond the loyalty towards the family, relatives, culture group or ethnic identity.

The analysts dealing with the research on the processes of modernization and formation of modern nations link the formation of nationalism with modernization emphasizing that in practice the issues of “identity” did not exist in post-modern societies. In hunter-gatherer and rural societies, the social mobility was so low and the work division was so limited that an individual did not have too many choices in terms of their relations with others. It was the tribe, village or caste which decided about important choices in man’s life. As a result, an individual did not have to ask questions concerning their identity – “who am I?”. The situation changed along with the development of Eastern European modernization driven by the invention of a printing press and the increase on the book market. The printing press rapidly decreased the price of written communication and enabled the printing of the books in national languages. Benedict Anderson wrote that the appearance of printed national language enabled the creation of “an imagined community”, that is people who are the participants of the same culture due to common language. Thanks to reading, people who had never gone beyond the borders of their villages, could finally realize the connections between them and other people, in other remote villages (Anderson, 1997). Ernest Gellner paid attention to the fact that nationalism was created as a result of deep social changes connected with the transformation from agricultural economy to industrial economy in the 19<sup>th</sup> century. The increase in the division of work caused by the process of industrialization created incentives to social unification. It created the foundation for the modern nationalism, when the “national” culture based on common language became a central, unifying source of social unity. In state nationalism, territorially limited “nation” state assumed loyalty which went beyond the loyalty towards family, relatives, cultural group or ethnic identity (Gellner, 1991).

National revolution caused a vast objection and counter-mobilization of social groups which defended the current order. In his analyses of social cleavages which structured political scene of the highly developed countries, Stein Rokkan paid attention to the fact that one of the most important processes which affected the formation of Western party systems was *national revolution*. It was a source of many social and political conflicts as the idea stating that territorial



borders should refer to cultural ones required the formation of new assimilation borders of subpopulation with a dominant culture or physical relocation of all the populations. None of these processes occurred without the use of significant violence. Therefore, it seems that political and social consequences of *post-national revolution* should be analysed with due diligence due to their potential for conflict.

Contemporary *post-national revolution*, being the consequence of technological revolution, concerns one of the most important areas of our existence: it concerns the way of functioning of political institutions – a state and a collective and individual identity. It is connected with two processes concerning the institutional and identity dimension of our social life. First of all, it is connected with the reconstruction of the type of state – *centralised nation state*. Its place is taken by new forms defined as *network-state*, created by a complex network of interactions between nation states, co-national and transnational institutions, regional and local governments, and even non-government organizations (cf. Keohane, Hoffman, 1991; Beck, 2005; Castells, 2008). Secondly, it is connected with the reconstruction of forms of identification defined as *national identity* in favour of the creation of *hybrid identity*. Free movement of goods, people and ideas all over the world causes that human societies become more complex, heterogenic and multicultural (cf. Smith, 1990; Jameson, 1991; Hall, 1992; Back, 1996; Cohen, 1999; Modood, 2007).

The first of these processes is connected with the transformations occurring in the sphere of organization of political institutions, and mostly states. The formation of centralised nation states was one of the effects of European modernity. Centralized and complex nation states, perceived as a unity of three elements: territory, people and sovereign authority, dominated political structure of a modern world. There was a point of reference of a corporate identity of both social groups and particular individuals. They created the framework for the development of modern industrial relations. Nation state was an institutional “giant” of modernity era, constituting mainly a collection of political power and central political institutions defining the institutional framework of political and social behaviours and defining the rights and obligations of the citizens.

In recent years, the changes of social and political life have made a progress; a state limits its power, giving some of its competences to local communities and municipal units (decentralization of management) as well as private entities (privatization of public services). International subjectivity of the state is also subject to limitations. By accepting the obligations resulting from the norms

of international law as well as agreeing to the existence of international and transnational institutions, states, on their own initiative, transfer a part of their sovereignty in their favour. While analysing the transformation of a modern nation state, one may distinguish several elements which affect the current institutional political order to the greatest extent. First of all, economic globalization of the world and neoliberal political thought which is legitimising it contribute to the weakening of the current nation state. New rules of global economy “based on knowledge” forced the state to resign from its current status and commercialization of current “sphere of regulation”, that is agendas, tasks and function of the state. Global economy requires the state institutions to share their authority with other economic actors and limit the possibility of the state to create economic politics. Secondly, technological and telecommunication revolution enables an immediate access to information in every sphere of human activity and the ability to use it multiplies the number of players and decrease the number of those who have the authority. Globalization of media and electronic communication is equivalent to denationalization and denationalization of information, what causes that the humanity enters the era of extra-territorial communication, independent of the state, which loses its ability to control over “symbolic” space. Thirdly, due to the development of transport and telecommunication network, there has been an increase in the movement of people (migrations) and cultural movement (information). Migrations free people from spatial relations and allocations. People who participate in this form of mobility are included in the stream of population circulations coming across new cultural experiences. On the other hand, media create unobstructed, effective, territorial channels of communication which endless stream of information, contents and cultural forms go through. A world which is a “mosaic” of a variety of groups and communities, mutually connected diasporas of people begins to form. Fourthly, the civilizational development of humanity has led to the appearance of issues of global reach encompassing all the continents and societies. Global threats force the state entities to coordinate their activities on a transnational level. The character of global threats caused that individual safety may be assured only by collective, mutual activities and agreement. It creates a totally new situation for a modern nation state.

Transnationalization of social, political and economic processes forces the institutional change as current nation states are not able to deal with the problems of the modern world. The transformation of the state (institutional systems) is a complex phenomenon and will result in global change of configuration of

power and identity. The times of modern state have ended but it is still unknown what will replace it. One can indicate a few tendencies accompanying a current institutional change. First of all, we have to deal with the formation of structures and mechanisms of steering social life on a global scale (Rosenau, 1999; Karns, Mingst, 2009). In contemporary international environment, there is a multi-layer structure of “global management”, encompassing many levels and various actors, connected with one another in global space. Global management may be understood as a gathering of activities, rules and mechanisms, formal and informal, occurring in various and intermingling levels of contemporary world. This notion refers to a vast variety of cooperative agreements between particular actors in order to solve global problems which go beyond the possibilities of individual actors. In that respect, it is rather an attempt to coordinate governance than government. *Global governance* means management and administration of global politics without the participation of centralised government. A system of global governance forms due to acceptance by the elites of the political fact that the number of areas and problems which cannot be effectively solved by the activity of an individual actor increases.

As our societies become more liquid and more complex, it has become necessary to work out new mechanisms and methods of governance which would be based less on the hierarchical state institutions minimizing the difference between the state and society, between what is global and what is local (cf. Rosenau, 2002). *Post-modern* state is characterized by the development of multitude of the structures of authority. Within the framework of *post-modern* political institutions, a model of a multi-level governance encompassing subnational, national and transnational bodies as well as government and non-government actors is realized. It is a new polyarchic system of power, which is characterized by a multitude of sources of the authority and a nation state is only one of these sources.

The second of these processes connected with *post-national* revolution concerns the issues of individual and group identity. Our social identities become more liquid, we move from one to the other easily. While creating “me”, we experience a variety of patterns and stimuli resulting from a more and more complex surrounding. Our social identity has become multi-dimensional and today it is difficult to define the borderline between “we” and “them”. Together with *post-national revolution* we experience the process of reconstructions created in the times of modernity forms of identifications defined as *national identity* in favour of the creation of *hybrid identity* (Kraidy, 1999, 2002, 2005).

Free movement of goods, people and ideas on a global scale causes that human societies become more and more complex, heterogenic and multicultural (cf. Gilroy, 1993). Despite the fact how great the degree of geographical isolation of societies used to be, it ceased to be a reality a long time ago, along with the beginning of long-distance travels and the spread of commerce. Spatial borders between societies have never been stable or impossible to intermingle. Objects, ideas, genes and people have always travelled through these borders. The processes of cultural diffusion have accelerated together with the industrial revolution, and information revolution and globalization processes connected with it have created almost unlimited possibilities for global movement of goods, ideas and people. It results in the situation that, at present, notions such as “society”, “culture” and “nation” turn out not to be too precise – these three notions are neither synonymous nor homogenous. The notion of hybridity is supposed to reflect the essence of contemporary identity: changeable, having a variety of sources, and being constructed.

Taking into consideration a multitude of various identities which a contemporary man encounters, he may create his own “me” in a very peculiar way. A contemporary man faces the issues of constructing his identity having too many choices of patterns, styles and ways of life. We deal with a structural change in the ways of constructing own identity, which more and more often assumes the hybrid forms under the influence of present globalization tendencies. Hybridization is one of the notions by means of which “the spirit” of our times is reflected. The notion of “hybridization” refers to a dynamic process of the mixing of cultures. The state of a contemporary man can be characterized by a multitude of belongings to groups and a multitude of identities, and every man is also a representative of several groups. Globalization is a vast, interactive process of transcultural exchange in which people smoothly move from one identity to another.

The formation of hybrid identities constitutes an essential challenge for the formation of contemporary societies. Telecommunication revolution and, as a result, globalization have created the basis for the formation of a smoother and fragmented “me”, especially in people who spend most of their social-professional activities in transnational space, in which various identities come into contact with one another. In a global world dominated by transnational migrations and cultural movements, further hybridization seems an inevitable process. Individualism and modern reflectiveness support striving for self-realisation, self-improvement and forming own identity, “authenticity” of which becomes

a paramount value. Under the conditions of mutual connections between various cultures, the choices of lifestyles are almost unlimited.

*Post-national revolution* and the reconstruction of our political institutions and identities seem particularly essential as its mobilization power is very great. It was already Lipset and Rokkan who paid attention to the fact that national and industrial revolution affected significantly the structures of social divisions, but it was mostly national revolution which resulted in the deepest and fiercest oppositions as national revolution forced wider circles of people to take a position in conflicts concerning values and cultural identities (Lipset, Rokkan, 1993). It is the same with post-national revolution, which is connected with *the crisis of nation state*, and a nation state defined the institutional frameworks for our activities as well as *the crisis of identity*, and identity is for people the source of sense and experience.

Some researchers predict that we are awaiting the period of *post-nationalism*: nation state will become a thing of the past and other forms of loyalties and identities will take its place. A real multiculturalism will conquer the artificial unity of a nation state (Appandurai, 2005). Regardless of the fact that such statements may be overrated, the consequences of the upcoming changes raise concerns, anxiety and a trial to protect the existing institutions and structures. Rapidly changing reality generates newer and newer spaces for conflicts and social divisions. Along with the wave of changes, there is also a wave of counter-mobilization created by these actors whose position is worse or their conditions are devalued and/or stigmatised by a dominating logics of *post-national* and *post-industrial* revolution. While writing his trilogy *The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture*, Manuel Castells emphasized that the observed revolution of information technologies and the restructuring of capitalism created a new form of society – a network society. It is characterized by globalization of key strategic economic activities; cross-linking form of organization; elasticity and instability of employment and individualization of work; culture of “real virtuality” created by ubiquitous, internally connected media system; and finally, a transformation of material foundations of life, space and time due to defining the space of movement and timeless time as the expressions of dominant activities and controlling elites. This new form of social organization in its ubiquitous globality has spread all over the world, as it happened in the 20<sup>th</sup> century due to industrial capitalism. It shakes the institutions, transforms cultures, creates wealth and poverty, stimulates voracity, innovativeness and hope, but at the same time

imposes suffering, stimulates despair and also resistance towards globalization and cosmopolitanism (Castells, 2008).

Post-modern “revolutions” create new lines of social and political cleavages. “Anti-modernising” tendencies are a constant element of political scene in European countries. The wave of counter-mobilisation occurs in the whole of a developed world, which as the first one enters the post-industrial era. It seems that the empirical confirmation of the fact that at present we deal with the formation of new social cleavages caused by *post-national* and *post-industrial* revolution are successes of populist and anti-establishment social and political movements. Their successes are the manifestation of counter-mobilization and resistance against the changes connected with the arrival of information civilization. One question arises: what is the basic subject of the defiance and resistance?

In case of post-national revolution, the subject of dissent is a new political order, which consists of a complex network of interactions between nation states, co-national and transnational institutions, regional and local authorities, and even non-government organizations.

It is very characteristic that all anti-establishment parties in Europe defy present politics of European integration supporting either a deeper reform of European institutions or exit from the EU and return to the idea of sovereign nation state. Anti-Europeanism, understood as an opposition towards transnational social and political integration, is a characteristic feature of political appeal of majority of anti-establishment parties, which think that the creation of the European Union has led to the situation when European nations have been deprived of their sovereignty and gradually it has been given to Brussels technocrats, who were not elected by anyone and who are not held responsible before anyone. For a reason, the leader of French National Front Jean-Marine Le Pen described the British referendum on the exit from the EU, so-called Brexit, as the victory of freedom. Donald Trump said that “the British has regained their country”, and Victor Orban described his victory as “regaining the country”.

In a growing number of cases, the political scene of the most developed countries witnesses the emergence of political parties and movements whose main element of political mobilisation is reference to the defence of “national identity” against globalisation and global elites. The motif of “regaining” the country from the comprador, cosmopolitan elites constitutes one of the key elements of political appeal of contemporary anti-establishment movements. One may point at the opposition between a centralized nation state and its *traditional national elites* connected with the territorial idea of sovereignty and autonomy,

as well as *cosmopolitan elites* of new types functioning in transnational space and separated from a particular territorial location. The subject of the attack is what is global, universal and homogenous, however, what is national, sovereign and diversifying is glorified. The subject of the attack are *cosmopolitan global elites* acting to the detriment of *national interest* and also *union technocrats* imposing their will from a political centre which Brussels has become.

It is worth emphasising that a contemporary post-modern conflict between what is global (unifying, homogenous, European) and what is regional (national, diversifying) is very similar to a modern conflict between what is national (unifying, homogenous) and what is local (particular, diversifying). The forming lines of division are reflected in the election appeal of political parties (in the political sphere we encounter an increasing resistance towards a deepening European integration and anti-union rhetoric). What remains in the sphere of speculation is whether political movements created by “the anti-European” wave will grow and transform into permanent political groups.

Secondly, the subject of dissent is globalization of culture, which results in the hybridization of identity. We may point at the opposition between *post-modern hybrid global culture* and *traditional sources of identities rooted in local culture*. Mass influx of people (migrations) from so-called the South to the developed countries of the North as well as the politics of multiculturalism are criticised. A stable element of the election appeal to a majority of anti-establishment movements is a definite opposition towards anti-establishment movements connected with the formation of hybrid, multicultural societies in which a multitude of identities to which a citizen may refer forming his own “me” and defining his own identity will occur. More and more often political parties and politicians build their political appeal based on the criticism of the politics of multiculturalism and opposition against immigrants. The threat of the influx of culturally alien immigrants who undermine traditional social values and are the source of crimes and the threat of terrorism have a growing mobilising power. A permanent element of an election appeal of most of anti-establishment movements is now so-called “new racism”, or “cultural racism” and a definite opposition towards the processes connected with the formation of hybrid, multicultural societies in which a multitude of identities to a citizen may refer to forming his own “me” and defining his own identity will appear.

A strong wave of counter-mobilization expressing in (re)construction of identities on the basis of nationality, always affirming against the foreigners, may have a key significance for the formation of social cleavages. In the 20<sup>th</sup> century

Europe violence and conflict resulted mainly from the class divisions (which were often connected with other types of cultural identity). However, in the 21<sup>st</sup> century Europe violence and conflict may result from the ethnic and religious divisions connected with the issue of what we define as an identity.

The explanation of a present political success of anti-establishment movements requires the application of a multi-dimensional analytical model. Treating their social popularity as an effect of “rising wave of populism” is not a sufficient explanation as it does not explain the most important issue, namely the sources of a present wave of populism. It must be stressed that the use of the word “populism”, which in a common understanding has a pejorative meaning and is mostly used in political journalism, is a simplification of a limited heuristic value. We do not encounter “a wave of populism” but rather “a wave of counter-mobilization” towards the social transformation, which is towards so-called third civilizational wave. Moreover, it is worth highlighting that anti-establishment political movements formed on the basis of the wave of counter-mobilization have at their disposal a coherent and well-justified political programme whose hard core is the idea of building “a non-liberal state on national foundations”. Due to historical and cultural differences occurring between particular countries, the idea of “a non-liberal state on national foundations” may adopt various shades and put an emphasis on various elements but the common subject of dissent is universalist and cosmopolitan liberalism.

Rokkan’s model of explanation of political divisions by means of macro-level processes seems to be useful for the analysis of the phenomena occurring within the framework of a contemporary party system, at least in highly-developed countries. It seems that in order to explain the current processes connected with the transformations happening in the sphere of politics, it is necessary to locate them in a macro-level context of *post-national revolution* and *post-industrial revolution* and the wave of resistance towards the social cleavages caused by them. “Anti-modernising” tendencies have become a permanent element of a political scene in European countries. The wave of counter-mobilization occurs in the whole of the developed world, which as the first one is entering the post-industrial era. The successes of populist anti-establishment movements are the manifestations of counter-mobilisation and resistance against the changes connected with the arrival of information civilization.

The hypothesis stating that we deal with a political “wave of counter-mobilization”, which is the effect of the reaction towards *post-national* and *post-industrial revolution*, should be confirmed by solid empirical research. The



analysis of the elections in particular countries and the comparison of their results should give empirical basis for further generalisations. There is still no time perspective which could show to what extent the observed trends are stable and to what extent they are just a temporary phenomenon. A present wave of counter-mobilization is a reality *in statu nascendi* and its consequences are unknown. It is an open question whether new borderlines of social cleavages are a temporary phenomenon connected with the process of transition from an industrial civilization to a post-industrial one and whether they will remain in a longer perspective and will constantly structure the political scene of the future information societies.

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