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Journal

Athenaeum. Polskie Studia Politologiczne

2022 | 76 | 207-223

Article title

Nuclear Weapons as an Instrument for Achieving International Dominance by the Russian Federation

Authors

Mirosław Banasik

Content

Full texts:
articles-2163358.pdf.pdf

Title variants

PL
Broń nuklearna instrumentem osiągania przez Federację Rosyjską dominacji międzynarodowej

Languages of publication

Abstracts

PL
Celem badań, których rezultaty przedstawiono w niniejszym artykule, było wyjaśnienie zasad stosowania broni nuklearnej oraz mechanizmów odstraszających w celu osiągania przez Federację Rosyjską dominacji w środowisku bezpieczeństwa międzynarodowego. Do rozwiązywania problemów badawczych zastosowano podejście systemowe oraz metody: analizę i krytykę literatury, obserwację nieuczestniczącą oraz elementy studium przypadku. W procesie badawczym ustalono, że Federacja Rosyjska będzie prowadziła kampanie podważania obowiązującego porządku bezpieczeństwa międzynarodowego przy użyciu środków militarnych, w tym broni nuklearnej. Komponent nuklearny jest nieodłącznym elementem polityki Federacji Rosyjskiej kształtującym międzynarodowe środowisko bezpieczeństwa i jednocześnie stanowi kluczowy czynnik w holistycznej koncepcji przymusu. Odstraszanie strategiczne jest mechanizmem osiągania dominacji międzynarodowej w czasie pokoju, sytuacji kryzysowych i wojny. Jego celem jest doprowadzenie do ustępstw i wymuszanie zachowania zgodnego z interesami strategicznymi Federacji Rosyjskiej. Broń nuklearna stanowi ostateczną gwarancję strategicznej dominacji Federacji Rosyjskiej w świecie. Z drugiej strony stale obniżany próg jej użycia prowadzi do degradacji środowiska bezpieczeństwa i naruszenia jego stabilności.
EN
This article presents the results of research which set out to clarify the principles of the use of nuclear weapons and deterrence mechanisms in order to achieve dominance by the Russian Federation in the international security environment. Analysis and criticism of the literature, nonparticipatory observation and elements of case study were used to solve the research problems. The research process established that the Russian Federation will conduct campaigns to undermine the existing international security order using military means, including nuclear weapons. The nuclear component is an inherent element of the Russian Federation’s policy shaping the international security environment and at the same time is a key factor in the holistic concept of coercion. Strategic deterrence is a mechanism for achieving international dominance in peacetime, crisis situations, and war. Its purpose is to bring about concessions and coerce behavior consistent with the strategic interests of the Russian Federation. Nuclear weapons are the ultimate guarantee of the Russian Federation’s strategic dominance in the world. On the other hand, the constantly lowered threshold of its use leads to the degradation of the security environment and the violation of its stability.

Keywords

EN
PL

Publisher

Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek

Journal

Athenaeum. Polskie Studia Politologiczne

Year

2022

Volume

76

Pages

207-223

Physical description

Dates

published
2022

Contributors

author
Mirosław Banasik
  • Jan Kochanowski University in Kielce

References

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Document Type

Publication order reference

Identifiers

DOI
10.15804/athena.2022.76.11
Biblioteka Nauki
2163358

YADDA identifier

bwmeta1.element.ojs-doi-10_15804_athena_2022_76_11
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