Analiza struktury blokowania jako alternatywa dla stosowania matematycznych indeksów siły głosu

• Authors: Marcin Kleinowski

Title variants

EN

Analysis of the Structure of Blocking as an Alternative to the Application of the Power Index Approach

Abstracts

PL

Artykuł przedstawia analizę struktury blokowania, oryginalną technikę badawczą bazującą na teorii gier głosowania, ale odchodzącą od założenia, że wszystkie możliwe koalicje są równie prawdopodobne. Analiza koncentruje się na zdolności graczy do budowania koalicji minimalnie blokujących i strukturze blokowania dla gry głosowania. Koalicja blokująca jest pojmowana jako kolektywny gracz wetujący, który zgodnie z obowiązującą zasadą głosowania może zablokować zmianę status quo. Proponowana technika badawcza stanowi alternatywę dla zastosowania matematycznych indeksów siły głosu w badaniach takich gremiów decyzyjnych jak np. Rada Unii Europejskiej, w których decyzje wypracowywane są przede wszystkim w drodze negocjacji pomiędzy koalicjami graczy. Stąd też celem pracy jest wypełnienie metodologicznej luki w badaniach nad systemami głosowania.

EN

The article presents the analysis of structure of blocking, an original research technique based on the voting games theory, but departing from the assumption that all possible coalitions are equally likely. The analysis is focused on the players’ ability to build minimal blocking coalitions, and thus on the structure of blocking for voting game. Blocking coalition is understood as collective veto player, which have the right, under voting rule, to block change of the status quo. The proposed research technique provides an alternative for the application of the power index approach to the voting bodies such as the Council of the European Union. Hence, the aim of this work is to fill methodological gap in the research on the voting systems.

Keywords

PL

Rada Unii Europejskiej; koalicje blokujące; siła głosu; gry głosowania; indeksy siły

EN

Council of the European Union; blocking coalitions; voting power; voting games; power indexes

• Publisher: Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek
• Journal: Athenaeum. Polskie Studia Politologiczne
• Year: 2023
• Volume: 78
• Pages: 159-182

Dates

published

2023

Contributors

author

Marcin Kleinowski

• Uniwersytet Mikołaja Kopernika w Toruniu

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Identifiers

DOI

10.15804/athena.2023.78.09

Biblioteka Nauki

25805883