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Slavic mutuality, Turkish-Slavic political connection and the vision of General Edmund Taczanowski

Słowa kluczowe: Edmund Taczanowski; Turcja; polityka; legiony; Bułgarzy

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Abstract: The article is devoted to the discovered Greater Poland Military Museum in Poznań, the unpublished text of the memorial in French, which General Edmund Taczanowski, intended to address to the Turkish Sultan, in the hope of creating Bulgarian-Turkish troops, which were then to be used in battles with Russia.



Pic. 1. A photograph of Edmund Taczanowski, sygn. MNP/WA 8176, pic. Poznan National Museum, 2018

„Has the envoy from Lechistan arrived yet?” asked a court official on the Ottoman Sultan court,¹ during official ceremonies involving the diplomatic corps. This question not only reflected the fact that Turkey did not accept the partitioning of Poland, but also emphasized the awareness of the importance of Poland, which used to act as a buffer against Russian imperialism. At the same time it was a loud yet veiled voice, informing about the disagreeing with Russian expansionism.² However in the context of the figure of the Polish general, one of the leaders of the January Uprising, and most importantly a citizen of Greater Poland (Wielkopolska), the above words take on a real dimension. Edmund Taczanowski (1822–1879), visited Turkey a number of times.³ A fruit of these trips, especially one of the last ones, is a written document that I discovered, the most complete of the three preserved versions of the memorial that Taczanowski directed – or intended to do so – to the sultan.⁴

The document was originally kept in the archive of the Choryń mansion near Kościan, where Edmund Taczanowski died. After the manor was sold by his son Władysław in 1912, the archive was moved to the nearby Czerwona Wieś, from where it was evacuated in 1939. After WWII it ended up in the Greater Poland Mili-

¹ M. Wilamowski, K. Wnęk, L.A. Zyblikiewicz, *Leksykon polskich powiedzeń historycznych*, Kraków 1998, p. 119. The message about the inquiries by Turkish officials about the presence of Polish deputies during the partition period is of an uncertain nature, despite the fact that it functions quite commonly in the general consciousness.

² D. Kołodziejczyk, *Ottoman-Polish diplomatic relations (15th–18th century). An annotated edition of 'adnames and other documents*, Leiden 2000; W. Konopczyński, *Polska a Turcja 1683–1792*, Kraków 2013.

³ Taczanowski's journey may be seen in the perspective of his fascination with Turkey and the Orient. The three journeys that he made to the Bosphorus – at the turn of 1863 and 1864, and later in 1866 and 1867 – were not only the time of implementing his political intentions, but also a chance to get acquainted with the culture and art of the region. Jan Reychman points out, that the initial interest with Turkey resulted not from the temptation with the Orient, but also from the desire to visit the ancient monuments, especially the ruins of Troy, that were just discovered at that time. The awakening of such interest was fuelled by the rich travel literature, just to mention *The travels of Anacharsis the younger in Greece* by Jean Jacques Barthélemy, *Voyage au Propontide* by Jean-Baptiste Lechevalier or the work of Edward Raczyński – *The Diaries from a Journey to Turkey* – which was especially popular in Wielkopolska. The Taczanowski's legacy was not analysed in this context, as it will be the subject of a separate study.

⁴ Wielkopolskie Muzeum Wojskowości [Greater Poland Military Museum], MNP/WA/10117, sygn. 6. Ze spuścizny po Edmundzie Taczanowskim. Emigracja 1864–1866 [From the legacy of Edmund Taczanowski. Emigration 1864–1866].

tary Museum in Poznań. Currently the three versions of the manifesto are included in the set of documents that covers a wide legacy of Edmund Taczanowski. The text that will be described here was written on seven large format pages. The calligraphic writing indicates that it is a text that was re-written by somebody else, perhaps from the original Taczanowski's manuscript.

For the researchers of the Polish-Turkish relations, their history and cultural significance, as well as for the scientists exploring the history of the slavophilic interests in the Greater Poland region,⁵ Taczanowski's figure has never been of much interest.⁶ It was and still is connected primarily with his military activities and the January Uprising.

Edmund Taczanowski was born on the 23rd November 1822 in Wieczyn. As a child he met Adam Mickiewicz, which influenced his later life, as well as the appearance of fascination with Turkey. In 1832 he started studying in the Maria Magdalena Secondary School in Poznań. After his graduation he joined the 5th artillery brigade, and then studied in the Combined Artillery and Engineering School (*Vereinigte Artillerie- und Ingenieurschule*). After passing the relevant examinations in 1842, in the middle of 1843

⁵ Wielkopolska (lat. *Polonia Maior*) – a geographical region and one of the historical districts of Poland located in the western part of the country. It is the cradle of Polish statehood and the local Piast dynasty. The capital of Wielkopolska, and earlier on of the Polish state, is Poznań (this is where the burials of the first Polish rulers took place, as well as the first seat of the episcopate). In 15th and 16th century the region enjoyed its heyday. At that point the Lubrański Academy was founded in Poznań, the first University in this part of Poland. Due to the partitions of Poland from 1772–1795 Wielkopolska was occupied by Prussia. In mid-19th century it was the most developed region of the former Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, in agricultural, economic, and cultural terms. In 1918 the Wielkopolska Uprising broke out, which resulted in the area regaining independence.

⁶ J. Reychman, *Podróżnicy polscy na Bliskim Wschodzie w XIX w.*, Warszawa 1972; H. Topkaś, *Osmánsko-polskie stosunki dyplomatyczne*, Kraków 2017. Taczanowski's efforts were mentioned by some of the older Bulgarian researchers, who saw the activities of the Polish immigrants including Langiewicz and Taczanowski, as weakening the Bulgarian independence aspirations: „Те представят на Портата проект за създаване на български отреди при туската армия командвани от поляци; отредите биха могли да бъдат използвани и за борба срещу българските чети” – wgotе Ванда Смоховска-Петрова, *Михаил Чайковски – Садък Пауа и българското възрождение*, София 1973, p. 155. Such a statement is completely unjustified, bearing in mind Taczanowski's attempts to consolidate the existing Bulgarian units within the Slavic-Turkish ones. It is also difficult, also in the context of propagating the idea of unifying the Orthodox Bulgarians and Catholics, to maintain a conviction, that together with the activities for the union there were to be also actions aimed at the weakening of the national liberation aspirations of the Bulgarians – this is not supported by the Taczanowski's archival legacy.

Taczanowski received an officer patent and returned as a lieutenant to the brigade stationed in Glogau. During the Spring of Nations (and in the Prussian partition during the Greater Poland Uprising) he commanded an artillery unit. The unit was defeated and Taczanowski went to the field hospital. Unable to communicate with his father, and wanting to grab his sword again, he obtained a passport and at the end of 1848, through Berlin and Geneva, he left for Italy, where he enlisted in Giuseppe Garibaldi's unit. He served in artillery as a captain. He was responsible for fortifying the castle of St. Angel, Porta Angelica, Monte Pincio, Porta St. Paulo, Porta Porteze and Monte Testaccio. In recognition of his battle feats he was promoted to the rank of a major. The military experience that he gained meant that he also had many opponents, who saw his actions as being against the Church State, that was opposing the unification tendencies of the Apennine Peninsula. After his return from Italy he was active in Greater Poland. During the January Uprising (1863–1864) he was entrusted with the command on the territory of the Kalisz province. After the defeat of the uprising emigrated to France. He was sentenced to death in absentia by the Prussian authorities, at the same time the Poles tried to hold him responsible for the defeat of the uprising in the Kalisz area. After a short stay in Paris he moved on to Turkey on the 6th December 1863. The insurgent government hoped to have Turkey persuaded to engage in military and material help for the insurgents. Taczanowski's mission, together with that of Zygmunt Miłkowski, who was already active in Turkey, was to serve this purpose.⁷ As already mentioned, he visited Turkey at the turn of 1863 and 1864, and then in 1866 and 1867. Having returned to France, in 1870 he obtained an amnesty and settled in his family estate. He died there on 14th September 1879.⁸

Taczanowski's memorial against the background of the Slavic fascinations of Greater Poland

Edmund Taczanowski's interests in Slavdom, and in particular in Bulgaria,⁹ reflected the slavophilic tendencies that were present in Greater Poland from the 1840s. The 19th century was a unique period in the history of Greater Poland. The time

⁷ J. Drożdż, *Polacy w armii tureckiej w XIX w.*, [In:] *Polacy i osoby polskiego pochodzenia w siłach zbrojnych i policji państw obcych*, ed. A. Judycka, Z. Judycki, Toruń 2001, p. 120.

⁸ J. Staszewski, *Generał Edmund Taczanowski*, Poznań 1936.

⁹ K. Popek, „Niewygodny acz bezsilny partner”. *Współpraca Hotelu Lambert z bułgarskimi działaczami narodowymi w latach czterdziestych XIX wieku*, *Zeszyty Naukowe Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego. Prace Historyczne* 144 (2017), no. 1, pp. 119–135.

of „the longest war in modern Europe”, as it was called in later years, was connected with and related to the turning point, which was determined by organic work, sudden modernisation of agriculture and industry (which matched the Prussian achievements in this field), the transformation of socio-proprietary relations, and finally the creation of a unique cultural and social model. In such an atmosphere, of a relatively high autonomy – especially with respect of thoughts and printed matter – fascinations emerged with the idea of Slavic mutuality, which was gaining a large group of supporters. Most researchers perceive this category as a synonym of Slavophilism or pan-slavism.¹⁰ However, while these terms have a common denominator, which was basically consolidating and learning about Slavdom, in my opinion that in principle the Slavic mutuality received a very specific character, particular to Greater Poland, making it justifiable to be treated as a specific category. When trying to find the answer to such a state of affairs, one should first recall the emergence of two social strata in which the interest in Slavic culture was particularly vivid. The first was a well-off middle class, townspeople and socio-cultural activists, while the second was the landowners, in the Polish reality having a unique position and performing a special role in almost every aspect of Poland’s functioning during the partitions. It should be emphasized that both these groups – in mutual relations – differed significantly from their counterparts in the Austrian partition, let alone on the areas of the Kingdom of Poland, which was ruled by Russia.

When analysing Taczanowski’s text one may ask a question, where did he get his knowledge from, about Turkey¹¹ and its relations with Slavdom in general, and with

¹⁰ T. Lewaszkiwicz, *Między ideą wspólnego języka słowiańskiego i słowiańskimi mikrojęzykami literackimi*, *Poznańskie Spotkania Językoznawcze* 27 (2014), pp. 73–84.

¹¹ The interest in Turkey was one of the most popular ‘fashions’ in 19th century, common to the representatives of many social strata and professions. They left a number of travel accounts. The following works should be recalled: Józef Rogosz, *Wrażenie z wycieczki na Wschód* [*The impression from the trip to the East*], Warszawa 1887; Ignacy Domeyko, *Kronika rodzinna* [*A family chronicle*], Warszawa 1884; Stanisław Belza, *W stolicy padyszacha* [*In the capital of Padishah*], Warszawa 1898; Jan Grzegorzewski, *Z pod nieba wschodniego* [*From underneath the Eastern sky*], Lwów–Warszawa 1902; Stanisław Koźmian, *Podróże i polityka* [*Travels and politics*], Kraków 1905. Scientific expeditions to Turkey of the following scientists should also be noted: Zygmunt Minoyka, Mikołaj Wislocki, Gejza Bukowski, Ludomir Sawicki, Tadeusz Vetulani, Jan Rostafiński, Stefan Przeworski or Tadeusz Kowalski. In addition, we can recall the works of Orientalists and travellers, such as: Antoni Muchliński, Edward Rzewuski, Ignacy Hołowiński, Manswet Aulich, Zygmunt Skórzewski, Jadwiga Zamoyska, Zygmunt Miłkowski, Władysław Jabłonowski, Karol Brzozowski, Antoni Muchliński, Karol Lanckoroński, Jacek Malczewski, or artists: Stanisław Chlebowski, Juliusz Zarzecki, Kazimierz Pochwalski, and Henryk Sienkiewicz.

the Bulgarians in particular? He learned more about the Ottoman empire during his visits to the country of the crescent. However it was not the only source. The Slavophilic atmosphere of Greater Poland influenced the Taczanowski family. Edmund's father – Józef – was friends with Adam Mickiewicz, so he probably learned the poet's thoughts about the mission and historical destiny of the Slavs. The Slavophilic interests of Edmund's brother – Władysław (1825–1893) who was a member of the Wrocław Slavic Literary Society, were not without significance. It was probably thanks to him that the Choryń book collection contained a number of works on the Slavic and Turkish issues:

Tabele 1. Slavophilic works and works related to Turkey in the Taczanowski family collection

Works on Slavdom	Works on Turkey
<p>Zygmunt Miłkowski, <i>Udział Polaków w wojnie wschodniej (1853–1856) z przypisami o powstaniu ludowym na Ukrainie w 1856 r.</i>, Paryż 1858. <i>Pielgrzym w Dubrowniku</i>, cz. 1, Leszno 1843, cz. 2, Poznań 1848. [Participation of Poles in the Eastern War (1853–1856) with footnotes about the peasant uprising on Ukraine in 1856, Paris 1858. A pilgrim in Dubrownik]</p> <p>Franciszek Duchński, <i>Rodowody Słowian. Polska i Ruś</i>, Paryż 1861. [Slav pedigree. Poland and Rus]</p> <p>K.P., <i>Czarnogóra pod względem statystycznym, geograficznym i historycznym</i>, Lwów 1869. [Montenegro in statistical, geographical and historical terms]</p> <p>Jean-Henri Abdolonyme Unicini, <i>Les Serbes de Turquie, études historiques, statistiques et politiques sur la principaute de Serbie le Montenegro et les pays serbes adjacents</i>, Paris 1865.</p> <p>Leon Chrzanowski, <i>O dążeniach i polityce Moskwy oraz o potrzebie stanowczego powstrzymania jej zabórczych działań</i>, Kraków 1866. [On Moscow's aspirations and policy and the need to firmly stop its offensive activities]</p> <p>Polonus Poznaniensis, <i>Die Polen und die Orientfrage, ein Mahnruf an Europas Voelker</i>, [b.m.w. – przyp. E. P.] 1877.</p> <p>Leon Rogalski, <i>Dzieje Księstw Naddunajskich</i>, Warszawa 1861. [History of the Danubian Duchies]</p>	<p>Michał Czajkowski, <i>Kozaczyzna w Turcyi</i>, Paryż 1857. [Cossacks in Turkey]</p> <p>Moritz Busch, <i>Die Turkei. Reishandbuch für Rumelien, die untere Donau, Arabien, Syrien, Palestinen, Rhodus und Cypern</i>, Triest 1860.</p> <p>Georg Dempwolff, <i>Konstantinopel. Ein Führer für Reisende nach Stambul</i>, Leipzig 1860.</p> <p><i>Eisenbahn, Post- und Dampfschiffs nebst Eisenbahnkarte Mitteleuropa.</i></p> <p><i>Generalkarte von der europäischen Türkei. Nach allen vorhandenen Originalkarten und itinerarischen Hilfsmitteln bearbeitet und gezeichnet von Heinrich Kiepert</i>, Berlin 1853.</p> <p><i>Karte des türkischen Reiches in Asien. Nach den besten und neuesten Hilfsmitteln entworfen und gezeichnet von Heinrich Kiepert</i>, Berlin 1853.</p> <p><i>Plan de Constantinople, avec ses faubourgs, le port et une partie du Bosphore.</i></p> <p><i>Parte de environs de Constantinople</i>, Paris 1829.</p>

Prepared by E.P. on the basis of the original inventory of the Choryń library.

Of only a few works mentioned above, what should be mentioned are the thorough analyses of Rogalski or Unicini, giving a holistic picture of individual nations and states. Equally important, and perhaps even decisive in Taczanowski's creation of a specific Slavic worldview, were the press reports of the leading Greater Poland titles, which – as shown by archival sources – were subscribed by the Taczanowski family. At that time, the most widely read was “Przegląd Poznański”, which published the following articles:

Table 2. Slavophilic articles published by “Przegląd Poznański” between 1845 and 1865

Year, volume	Topic
1848, vol. 3, pp. 189–253	<i>O Słowianach w Turcyi</i> [On the Slavs in Turkey]
1853, vol. 16, pp. 425–439	<i>Tureckie Źródła do dziejów Polski</i> [Turkish sources on the Polish history]
1853, vol. 17, pp. 481–486	N.A. Kubalski i jego poszukiwania historyczno-statystyczne dotyczące narodów słowiańskich, Węgrów i Bułgarów [N. A. Kubalski and his historical and statistical research related to the Slavic nations, Hungarians and Bulgarians]
1853, vol. 17, pp. 425–439	Ogłoszenie przedplaty na dzieło Ignacego Pietraszewskiego pt. <i>Nowy przekład dziejopisów tureckich dotyczących historii Polski</i> [Advance payment announcement for the work of Ignacy Pietraszewski: A new translation of the Turkish historians on the history of Poland]
1854, vol. 18, pp. 289–290	Oświadczenie redakcji „Przeglądu Poznańskiego” nt. sytuacji w Turcji [Editorial statement of “Przegląd Poznański” on the situation in Turkey]
1856, vol. 22, p. 565	Katolicyzm w Turcji [Catholicism in Turkey]
1859, vol. 27, pp. 562–563	Kronika wydarzeń w Kościele katolickim w Turcji [Chronicle of events in the Catholic church in Turkey]
1860, vol. 30, pp. 583–587	<i>Ruch religijny między Bułgarami</i> [Religious movements amongst the Bulgarians]
1861, vol. 31, pp. 108–114	<i>Pojednanie Bułgarów z Kościołem</i> [The rejoice of the Bulgarians with the Church]
1861, vol. 31, pp. 387–390	<i>Postanowienia hierarchii kościelnej u Bułgarów unitów</i> [The decisions of church hierarchy at the Bulgarian Uniates]
1863, vol. 35, pp. 245–248	Kościół w Bułgarii i pomoc dla niego niesiona przez poznańskie Bractwo Błogosławionego Józefata [The Church in Bulgaria and the help for it carried by the Brotherhood of Blessed Józefat from Poznań]
1863, vol. 35, pp. 337–433	Hieronim Kajsiewicz, <i>O Unii Bułgarskiej</i> [On the Bulgarian union]

Prepared by E.P. on the basis of an analysis of the particular volumes.

The titles cited above mainly refer to the ecclesial relations between Bulgaria, Turkey and the Roman Catholic Church. There are basically two reasons for this. The first is the ultramontanist optics of “Przegląd Poznański”, while the second is an idea directly emerging from it, of the union of Catholics and Orthodox believers, which was particularly supported by the Resurrectionists, propagators of ultramontanism, as well as the national activists who were closely associated with “Przegląd Poznański”. In 1863, they created the first Catholic missionary and junior high school led by Father Paweł Smolikowski (1849–1926) in the village of Odrin (Adrianopol, nowadays Turkish Edirne). Greater Poland, where ultramontanism found a particularly fertile ground, was also a region with the strongest (press) Slavophilic interests, which eventually adopted the formula of Slavic mutuality.¹² Therefore the widespread presence in dozens of press titles of extensive accounts from the Balkans relating not only to political issues, but also to the economic situation, social issues,

¹² J. Skowronek, *Sprzymierzeńcy narodów bałkańskich*, Warszawa 1983.

religious issues, and especially noteworthy – culture, and in particular literature, are not surprising. The cultural contacts between Greater Poland and the Balkans were extremely intense and diverse at the same time. The aversion to Austro-Slavism and Pan-Slavism naturally directed the attention of the Greater Poland Slavophiles to the previously mentioned mutuality based on conservative ultramontanistism. For Taczanowski – himself a zealous Catholic, but also a soldier fighting against the papal armies – a resident of a region characterized by Prussian discipline permeating almost every aspect of public life, and at the same time a die-hard democrat, Slavic mutuality gained a special significance. As the repeatedly evidenced in the memorial (which will be discussed below), he saw the political benefits of Uniate activities, without losing sight of the national interest, in the implementation of which the benefits were to be achieved by the South Slavic nations, as enslaved as Poland.

The political context of Taczanowski's Turkish mission

For Taczanowski, the fall of the January Uprising was followed by three consequences. The first and most personal were the repercussions on the part of the Prussian state, resulting in the omission of Edmund in family inheritance, as well as a death sentence in absentia. In the political sphere, Taczanowski was met with criticism of his actions as a commander. This in turn resulted in the third circumstance, namely emigration and seeking further opportunities to act for the liberation of Poland and the Slavdom. He was eventually released from the accusations of being responsible for the defeat of the uprising, and decided to attempt to organize insurgent troops in Turkey, at the same time outlining a broad program of consolidating the Slavs in the fight against Russia. The heading of numerous immigrants towards the Bosphorus¹³ as well as the leaders of the Polish national movement was dictated by the conviction that due to the existing traditions of Polish-Turkish contacts, it would be possible to win the Sublime Porte for the Polish cause and, as a consequence, a joint attack on the Tsarist empire. Tadeusz Oksza-Orzechowski travelled to Turkey with such a mission. Romuald Traugutt's plea was to seek to "encourage the Porte to covenant with us and help us" and "[...] to obtain everything in Turkey and the Danube Principals for the organization of our military. The works in the Caucasus,

¹³ Henryk Służalski, who accompanied Adam Mickiewicz in Turkey wrote: "There are more Poles than Turks here, they just wander around and talk about politics, even worse than in Paris" – see also: J. Reychman, *Podróżnicy...*, pp. 42–43.

especially Serbia, Dobruja and Eastern Slavs by their very nature and because of the current situation had to set aside".¹⁴ The Taczanowski's Manifesto is a testimony to the efforts to combine both the previously mentioned objectives. Let us add that neither Orzechowski's nor Taczanowski's missions were the first and only ones. Already in 1853, the chances of obtaining sultan's support were verified by Zygmunt Milkowski,¹⁵ who set himself the ambitious task of creating the Polish Legions (also Adam Mickiewicz, Karol Brzozowski and Waclaw Wołodźko attempted to create Slavic Legions in Turkey), which were to enter the Polish territory from the east and support the insurgents. Their substitute was a unit of Cossacks formed by Michał Czajkowski, who after conversion to Islam took the name of Sadyk Pasha.¹⁶

Taczanowski departed for Turkey on December 6 1863. After six days he arrived in Constantinople. He was welcomed there by the emigre community. He also made contact with Sadyk Pasha, through whom he tried to find out Turkey's position on the Polish cause. The contacts between the two Poles were friendly (but not without fear¹⁷), as evidenced by the preserved correspondence in which Sadyk gives a clear testimony of his commitment to the idea of resurrecting Poland:

I received the General's letter, I read it and read it with real pleasure of heart, not because he pleases my love of authorship, but because a Pole of action and dedication, like you are General, a real Polish nobleman, such that I would like

¹⁴ J. Staszewski, *General...*, p. 135.

¹⁵ H. Batowski, *Dyplomatyczna misja Milkowskiego w r. 1864*, *Zeszyty Naukowe Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego* 7 (1956) no. 2, p. 165.

¹⁶ В. Смоховска-Петрова, *Михаил...*

¹⁷ This is evidenced by the fears that Sadyk had about the mission of Oksza-Orzechowski, Taczanowski and Różycki, see: A. Lewak, *Dzieje emigracji polskiej w Turcji (1831–1878)*, Warszawa 1935, pp. 184–185. Also Kazimierz Dopierała writes about Sadyk's cool attitude towards Taczanowski during his visit in 1866, see: K. Dopierała, *Emigracja polska w Turcji*, Lublin 1988, pp. 217. The literature on the subject mentions reserved relations between the two commanders, which was motivated by the fear that Taczanowski might be a competition for him to exercise leadership over the formation of the Cossacks. The testimony of Władysław Jabłonowski contained in his *Memoirs* is also confirmation of a certain distance towards Taczanowski. He writes in them about Sadyk's fears resulting from the authority enjoyed by Taczanowski as a commander from the time of the uprising and feeling a certain discomfort with the presence of Edmund, who set himself the goal of assessing the usefulness of the Cossack regiment. Jabłonowski adds that Sadyk showed the visitor around the camp and its surroundings with considerable diplomatic dexterity, and seemed to distance him in some way from his intentions. See: Władysław Jabłonowski, *Pamiętniki z lat 1851–1893 [Memoires 1851–1893]*, Wrocław–Warszawa–Kraków 1967, pp. 195–197.

to see more. It does not deny me this rightness, even though a Muslim, that I have served, I serve and I want to serve with all my heart, with all my soul, this sacred cause, our great, though unhappy homeland, and therefore, without much ado, without any introductions, I start to talk about this our matter with the General.¹⁸

During his first trip to Turkey Taczanowski met also Omer Basha, at that time the commander-in-chief of the Turkish army. In a letter to his wife of December 25th, 1863 he wrote:

There is quite a lot of Poles in Constantinople. I met Czajkowski (Sadyk Bega), who greeted me very politely and ordered the squadrons of Sultan Cossacks to parade in my honour. After the drill I was given a breakfast by the Cossack officers who are Poles, among them also my former colleagues from Italian times. I am meeting Kościelski (Sefer Basha), who has very nice horses and carriages. Two days ago I was at Omer Basha's the commander-in-chief of the Turkish army. I was talking to him at length about our war.¹⁹

The initial enthusiasm soon gave way to a kind of boredom, which resulted from the inability to meet with the people who would be able to present his case to the Sultan. On January 14, 1864, he wrote: "I am terribly bored here and I am looking forward to the moment when I will be able to leave this land. Sadyk invites me to hunt in Chya, to the Polish colony Adamówka [...]. The journey from Constantinople to that Polish colony takes only 6 hours". Not being able to receive an audience or an opportunity to present his concept in greater detail, he returned to Paris in February 1864.²⁰

The first, a quarter-long stay in Turkey, was aimed at learning about the reality of the Ottoman state and to find out more about the possibility to have the Sublime Porte interested in the potential Polish-Bulgarian alliance under the sultan's sceptre:

Of all the countries Turkey is the most effective field of activity for emigration,

¹⁸ Wielkopolskie Muzeum Wojskowości [Greater Poland Military Museum] MNP/WA/10117, sygn. 1. Ze spuścizny po Edmundzie Taczanowskim. Emigracja 1864–1866, list Sadyka Paszy do Edmunda Taczanowskiego z 16 maja 1863 roku [From the legacy of Edmund Taczanowski. Emigration 1864–1866, the letter of Sadyk Pasha to Edmund Taczanowski from May 16th, 1863].

¹⁹ MNP/WA/10117, sygn. 1. Ze spuścizny po Edmundzie Taczanowskim. Korespondencja rodzinna z lat 1835–1866. List Edmunda Taczanowskiego do żony Anieli z 25 grudnia 1863 roku [From the legacy of Edmund Taczanowski. Family correspondence from 1835–1866. Edmund Taczanowski's letter to his wife Aniela from December 25th, 1863].

²⁰ J. Staszewski, *Generał...*, p. 142.

because a well-understood Turkish policy should strive to the liberation of Poland. If Fuad Basha wants to save Turkey from the threatening disintegration, he can only do so by strongly supporting the Polish cause which due to the collapse of our uprising and the recent Muscovite partitions in the Caucasus, has weakened Turkey again as much as Moscow has grown.²¹

The common idea of Taczanowski and Czajkowski was to increase the Cossack regiments. For Czajkowski it was also a chance to win a Polish general, whom however he saw at his side as a colonel. He sought to maintain his position and at the same time to be able to join the troops in France and Italy. At the same time he was aware of the growing weakness of the Cossack troops, which might have been attractive to the immigrant youth, but which, in fact, did not have the full support of the Turkish authorities, who did not want to strengthen the position of Sadyk Pasha. After leaving Turkey, Taczanowski's hopes for the involvement of the Sultan forces did not disappear, and Sadyk continued to reassure him in a letter to the General on June 25, 1865:

We are a Turkish, Christian and Slavic army of the Sultan – we are not legions and it is to our advantage. The past and present opponents of Poland, if they are sensible, should not be against us – under the Banner, we will not go to sow anxiety in their property one by one, and if they enter into a war with our Monarch, we will fight like an army – both from Medina and from America Poles will come, if their country will be concerned [...].²²

It can be assumed with certainty that it was their contact that encouraged Taczanowski to return to Turkey again, all the more so as a new Austro-Prussian conflict appeared on the horizon. However, before he reached Constantinople, he went to Bucharest, “to look closely at those relations there.” Once again Taczanowski left for Turkey in the first days of May 1866. He arrived in Constantinople on May 24. He had to spend a few days on his own in the city, as Sadyk was away in Adrianopol. After quite a long wait, both Poles were received by the Grand Vizier, who, however,

²¹ MNP/WA/10117, sygn. 6. Ze spuścizny po Edmundzie Taczanowskim. Emigracja 1864–1866. List Sadyka Paszy do Edmunda Taczanowskiego z dnia 25 czerwca 1865 [From the legacy of Edmund Taczanowski. Emigration 1864–1866. Sadyk Pasha's letter to Edmund Taczanowski from June 25th, 1865].

²² MNP/WA/10117, sygn. 6. Ze spuścizny po Edmundzie Taczanowskim. Emigracja 1864–1866. List Sadyka Paszy do Edmunda Taczanowskiego z 28 czerwca 1865 roku [From the legacy of Edmund Taczanowski. Emigration 1864–1866. Sadyk Pasha's letter to Edmund Taczanowski from June 28th, 1865].

did not give the General an unequivocal answer that would suggest the possibility of realizing the aspirations of the Polish emigrant. At that point he wrote in a letter to his wife that the vizier suggested to wait patiently, due to the emergence of a pro-Russian faction among the Turkish people, sceptical of Napoleon III's moves. In June he returned to Paris, as he did not receive any answer that would give him any hope. Unable to use his Italian lobbying at that time, he tried to acquire the support of Alexander Walewski, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, who was to draw the attention of the embassy in Constantinople to the activities of the Pole. In the meantime, the ongoing war between Austria and Prussia took Taczanowski's thoughts away from the Turkish mission for a moment. However, when the conflict ended, the idea of Polish-Bulgarian legions in Turkey returned. In the autumn of 1867 Edmund arrived in Turkey for the third time. This stay turned out to bring the most miserable results due to Sadyk's absence, as well as the Turkish authorities deceiving the Pole with subsequent unrealistic deadlines for an audience and response, which resulted in a frustration of the former insurgent. On January 31, 1868, he wrote from Constantinople to his mother:

As I already started my business with the Turks, I would not like to leave Istanbul with nothing. I would like to receive a clear "yes" or "no" answer from the government. But I can't even get those two words from the Turks. Inactivity is their normal condition. It will kill them, it will hand them over into Moscow's hands.²³

In April 1868 he left Istanbul, never to return again.

Edmund Taczanowski's memorial to the Sultan

The memorial was addressed to Abdülaziz (1830–1876), who ruled the country between 1861 and 1876. Taczanowski's letter would not have any sense, were it not for the author's conviction that he could have the sultan interested in it, who – just like his predecessor and brother Abdülmecid I (1823–1861) – showed great interest in the West. The expression of occidental aspirations was the implementation of state reforms that covered almost all areas of life. Sultan's numerous foreign travels,

²³ MNP/WA/10117, sygn. 4. Ze spuścizny po Edmundzie Taczanowskim. Powstanie styczniowe 1863. List Edmunda Taczanowskiego do matki z 31 grudnia 1868 roku [From the legacy of Edmund Taczanowski. The January Uprising 1863. A letter of Edmund Taczanowski to his mother from December 31st, 1868].

for example to the British Isles or to France were a testament to Turkey's opening to Europe. A series of failures in the implementation of modernization plans, partly related to the loss of political and administrative background that was responsible for putting the intentions of both sultans into practice, and partly due to the loss of political support provided by France, now weakened by the defeat in the war with Prussia, prompted Abdülaziz to resign from modernization attempts and to move towards the centralisation of power and absolutism. During his rule, unrests occurred in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which then spread to Bulgaria. According to the Sultan, Russia was inspiring the rural revolts. At the same time the country was shaken by the Young-Ottoman movement, and later by agricultural disasters and the resulting collapse of state finances.

Provided below is the translation of the memorial from the French original, which was written in Constantinople during the second Taczanowski's visit there:

Your Majesty,

I have the honour to present to Your Highness the following projects that seem to me of being of utter importance. They are summarized here as short as possible, taking into account the numerous activities of Your Majesty and the short time that You may have to get acquainted with this memorial.

As a Pole, a former Prussian and Italian line artillery officer, as well as a general during the last uprising in my country in 1863, I hope that I will be able to concentrate Your Majesty's kind attention on two issues: the deep sympathy that my nation feels towards Turkey as well as the experience in the matters that I dare to talk to Your Highness about. I am addressing Your Majesty not only in my own name. I returned to Constantinople at the insistence of my comrades-in-arms who wanted to serve Turkey, because they are convinced and have the right to be so, that these two matters are inextricably linked.

I understand to what restraints the Ottoman Government is obliged to, and I do not intend to deepen its problems by imprudent advices, what I am asking for may be completely masked [hidden] and take on the form of internal measures, and only come to light in the last moment, when the circumstances would support open actions.

Of course, this moment is approaching. I know Russia, Your Majesty, and I know that it learned from the last defeat that it could use. Russia understood perfectly that the defeat was primarily attributed to the difficulties that it experienced in the rapid concentration of its forces. That is why it has designated operational bases close to Turkey and is actively working to connect them via

communication routes with the borders that it wants to attack. Let Your Majesty take a look at the map of Russia. You will notice the iron railways, which, like sinister arms, are getting longer and longer towards the Orient. Just like Prussia before the last war, so Russia is secretly and actively gathering its forces and finds pleasure in the dream of an eastern Sadowa.

What is important for Turkey is to not await the storm in inactivity, which has led to the defeat of Austria.

Aren't Polish human resources one of those, that Turkey should prepare in advance and always have available?

I dare say that until now the Turkish policy has not included Poland in its accounts to the right extent. There is something more than sympathy between Poland and Turkey – there are the bonds of the most important goal [lit. interest]: their life or their death are at exactly the same point. The Turkish government undoubtedly has other allies, more powerful than Poland, but does it not take into account how many accidents, how many plans can change their attitude?

Does it not see these alliances today, which are sometimes shaky with a blow of a mysterious wind? But does Poland have a goal that can divert it from the one it shares with Turkey – the destruction of Russia?

The situation of conquered Poland is far from being made unnecessary for Turkey: it is a sensitive point in Russia, which the Turkish Government neglects. Why doesn't it give Russia a blow for a blow. Since it [i.e. Russia] is interfering in the affairs of the Slavic countries of the Ottoman Empire, such as Bulgaria and Serbia – why doesn't it worry Poland? Of course, it offers the Turkish policy a more fertile field than that cultivated by Russia on both sides of the Balkans. It would allow the Sultan to be perceived as the defender of the Slav race with equal rights, and even more than that of the Russian emperor.

There is one fact that should strike all those who analyse the last annals of Turkey and Poland – that these two countries would have avoided many misfortunes if they acted together. But up to now every impulse in Poland seems to inevitably correspond with the moment of Turkey's inactivity and vice versa. In 1828 the Ottoman Empire fights, Poland is calm. In 1830 Turkey takes a breath after the loss, Poland fights. From 1853 to 1856 the Crimean war, the inertia of Poland. From 1862 to 1864 Poland is bleeding, Turkey is watching.

Is it not high time to synchronize the efforts of the two countries that will prevent Russia from oppressing them one by one; to connect Poland with Turkey with a fuse in such a way that the same spark would spark a fire against Russia from the shores of the Black Sea to the shores of the Baltic Sea. The fire, which by multiplying Turkey's material strength, will raise the prestige of

heroism and holiness in the eyes of the Catholic and liberal world, due to joint action with Poland.

The above mentioned fuse should be hidden from all the looks, I admit it. But among the parts that make up Turkey, I see one that can strengthen the Polish activity in favour of the Ottoman Empire, and in which it can also hide in such a way that it does not serve as an excuse for complaint.

It is the Bulgarian part:

It seem to me obvious, that the Turkish Government would not want anything more than acquire the forces that awake in this large and strong nation. Instead of a meagre tribute, it could win complete armies.

At the same time I was told that despite the friendly manifestations of the Bulgarians, the Government did not trust them. It is not for me to tell the Turkish ministry to what degree of trust of the Bulgarian people it can count on, let me just say that the army rarely rebels, much less frequently during a war than during peacetime. Including the youth of a country in the system of discipline and obedience is to secure the nation's driving forces. This is especially true for the Bulgarian people, within whom political thinking is not yet strongly awakened. Russia and Prussia are undoubtedly more afraid of the Poles than Turkey of the Bulgarians, yet they do not hesitate to use the Poles as soldiers. Prussia has its 5th army corps almost entirely composed of Poles. This is the corps that had the main share in the successes of the last campaign. The same Prussia just created three new armies from the nations of the recently occupied countries, while France is using Arab regiments without any fear.

But would Poles only serve Turkey here, joining to it a strong Bulgarian part? Could the Turkish government form a Slavic army corps which would include Polish youth who would be ready to offer their services to Turkey? They are a noble and intelligent youth, Your Majesty, they are the survivors in this heroic struggle that has aroused Europe's admiration for over a year.

These young people would be more than soldiers for Turkey, they would be missionaries who would pour hatred of Russia and attachment to Turkey into the hearts of their Bulgarian comrades – under their influence the Turkish Government would create troops to which they would without doubts incorporate Bulgarian masses. These are the troops that shape the spirit of the army: this principle, true everywhere, is especially so when it comes to a race that is as passive as the one that inhabits Bulgaria.

Your Majesty may tell me that the Cossack regiments did not achieve the goal I mentioned. The reason for this is easy to understand: For one reason or another, the regiments could not take on the skilful and dedicated staff of the

Polish émigré officers who would be able to understand the highest mission that they were to serve as an obstacle between Bulgaria and Russia.

Please, let Your Highness be so kind as to consider these projects and tell me if I should present You with a detailed plan of the organization of the Polish-Bulgarian troops, or, if this name does not please Your Highness, the plan of a Bulgarian military organization.

I would like to stress once again that I am not acting in my own interest. I am on a mission to offer the Turkish government a group of people who will serve it faithfully and with devotion, because in the flapping of the Ottoman flag they will hear a breath of hope for Poland.

By submitting the above-presented projects to Your Highness, I hope that You will wish to familiarize me with Your opinion in this regard and will accept the words of deep respect and great devotion –

with which I have the honour of being

Your Highness's

humble servant

Altesse

J'ai l'honneur d'exposer à Votre Altesse – les idées suivantes, qui me paraissent d'une importance réelle. – Elles sont ici resumées [résumées]²⁴ le plus brièvement [brièvement] possible, vu les nombreuses occupations de Votre Altesse et peu de temps qu'Elle a à parcourir ce mémoire. –

Polonais, ancien officier d'artillerie de ligne prussienne et italienne et général pendant la dernière insurrection de mon pays en 1863, j'espère réunir [réunir] deux titres à la bienveillante attention de Votre Altesse: la sympathie profonde que ma nation ressent pour la Turquie et l'expérience de choses, dont je prend[s] la liberté d'entretenir Votre Altesse. – Ce n'est pas d'ailleurs en mon seul nom que je m'adresse à Votre Altesse. Je suis venu à Constantinople sur les instances de mes frères d'armes, desireux [désireux] de servir la Turquie, car ils sont convaincus et ils ont le droit de l'être, que ces deux causes sont indissolublement liées. –

Je sais a [à] quelles réserves le Gouvernement Ottoman est obligé, – je ne voudrais pour rien au monde augmenter ses embarras par conseils téméraires, ce que je demande peut être parfaitement voilé par la forme d'une mesure inté-

²⁴ The correct spelling and grammatical forms in square brackets were given by Jerzy Styczyński.

rieure et peut ne pas paraître [paraître] que dans un moment définitif [définitif], quand les circonstances favoriseront une action ouverte. –

Evidemment ce moment approche. Je connais la Russie, Altesse, et je sais qu'elle a retirée [retiré] de sa défaite [défaite] dernière des enseignements dont elle a su profiter. – Elle a parfaitement compris que son désastre doit-être surtout attribué aux difficultés qu'elle éprouvait [éprouvait] à concentrer rapidement ses forces. – Aussi s'est-elle [s'est-elle] assignée [assigné] des bases d'opérations [d'opérations] rapprochées de la Turquie et elle travaille activement à les joindre par des voies de communication aux frontières qu'elle veut attaquer. Que Votre Altesse jette les yeux sur une carte de la Russie. Elle y remarquera les chemins de fer qui pareils à des bras menaçants s'allongent de plus en plus vers l'Orient. Comme la Prusse avant la dernière guerre, la Russie réunit sourdement et activement ses moyens et se complait [complait] dans le rêve d'un Sadova oriental. –

Il importe à la Turquie de ne pas attendre l'orage dans l'inactivité qui a perdu l'Autriche. –

L'élément polonais n'est-il pas un de ceux que la Turquie doit préparer d'avance et toujours tenir sous sa main? –

J'ose dire que jusqu'à ce jour la politique turque n'a pas assez fait entrer la Pologne dans ses calculs. – Entre la Pologne et la Turquie il y a cependant quelque chose de plus qu'une sympathie, – il y a des liens d'un intérêt suprême: leur vie ou leur mort se trouvent exactement dans le même point. Le gouvernement turc a certainement d'autres alliés plus puissants que la Pologne, mais ne prévoit-il pas combien d'accidents, combien de calculs peuvent modifier leur [leurs] dispositions? –

Déjà [Déjà] aujourd'hui n'aperçoit-il pas ces alliances vaciller parfois au souffle de quelque vent mystérieux [mystérieux]? Mais la Pologne a-t-elle un intérêt qui puisse la détourner de celui qui lui est commun avec la Turquie, – la destruction de la Russie? –

La situation assujettie de la Pologne est loin de rendre celle-ci [celle-ci] inutile à la Turquie: elle crée au sein de la Russie un endroit sensible que le Gouvernement turc néglige trop d'exploiter. Pourquoi ne rend-il pas à la Russie coup pour coup. – Si celle-ci s'intime [s'immisce] dans les pays slaves de la Turquie comme Bulgarie et Serbie, – pourquoi ne trouble-t-il pas la Pologne? – Certes, celle-ci offre à la politique turque un champ aussi fertile que celui cultivé par la Russie de deux côtes du Balkan. – Elle permet au Sultan de s'ériger avec autant de droit, avec plus de droit même que l'empereur de Russie en champion de la race slave. –

Il est un fait qui doit frapper tous ceux qui considèrent les dernières annales de la Turquie et de la Pologne.

C'est que ces deux pays auraient évité bien des malheurs s'ils avaient agi de concert. Mais jusqu'à maintenant chaque mouvement de la Pologne semble fatalement correspondre à un moment d'inaction de la Turquie et vice-versa. En 1828 l'Empire ottoman lutte, la Pologne est immobile. – En 1830 la Turquie reprend haleine [haleine] après sa défaite, la Pologne combat. – De 1853–56 guerre en Crimée, sommeil de la Pologne. De 1862–64 la Pologne s'ensanglante, la Turquie regarde.

N'est-il pas temps d'établir entre les efforts des deux pays une simultanéité qui empêche la Russie de les accabler l'un après l'autre; d'unir la Pologne à la Turquie par une trainée [trainée] de poudre, de manière que la même étincelle allume contre la Russie un seul incendie des bords de la mer Noir [Noire] à ceux de la Baltique. – Un incendie qui en multipliant les forces matérielles [matérielles] de la Turquie, lui donnerait aux yeux du monde catholique et du monde libéral [libéral], à cause de son action commune avec la Pologne, un prestige [prestige] d'heroïsme [d'héroïsme] et de sainteté [sainteté]. –

La susdite trainée [trainée] de poudre doit être derobée [dérobée] à tous les regards, j'en conviens. Mais parmi les éléments qui composent la Turquie, j'en vois un que l'action polonaise peut animer au profit de l'Empire Ottoman et dans lequel aussi elle peut se cacher de manière à ne pas provoquer des prétextes aux réclamations. –

C'est l'élément bulgare: –

Il me semble évident, que le Gouvernement turc ne demanderait rien de mieux, que de s'assimiler les forces qui se éveillent [réveillent] dans ce peuple nombreux et robuste. Au lieu d'un maigre tribut, il pourrait tirer de la Bulgarie des armées.

Mais on me dit, que malgré les manifestations amicales des Bulgares le Gouvernement se defie [défie] d'eux.

Ce n'est pas à moi à enseigner au ministère turc quelle quantité de fidélité il peut retirer de la nation bulgare, je dirai seulement:–

Qu'une armée se revolte [révolte] rarement, et bien moins en temps de guerre qu'en temps de paix. Incorporer la jeunesse d'un pays dans un système de discipline et d'obéissance [d'obéissance], c'est s'assurer des forces vives d'un peuple. – Cela est surtout vrai en ce qui concerne le peuple bulgare, chez lequel les idées politiques ne sont pas encore fort éveillées [éveillées]. La Russie et la Prusse ont certainement plus à craindre des Polonais que la Turquie des Bulgares, cependant elles n'hésitent [n'hésitent] pas à se servir de Polonais comme

soldats. – La Prusse a son 5^{me} corps d'armée presque entierement [entièrement] composé de Polonais. – C'est ce corps qui a eu la principale part dans le succès [succès] de la dernière campagne. – Cette même Prusse vient de former trois nouvelles armées avec les populations des pays nouvellement annexés et la France se sert sans aucune inquiétude de régiments arabes. –

Mais n'est-ce pas ici que les Polonais serviraient à la Turquie en lui attachant le puissant élément bulgare? Le Gouvernement turc ne pourrait-il pas former le cadre d'un corps d'armée slave, dans lequel il verserait la jeunesse polonaise qui s'offre à la Turquie? C'est une noble et intelligente jeunesse, Altesse, ce sont les survivants de cette lutte héroïque qui pendant plus d'une année a excité l'admiration de l'Europe. –

Ces jeunes gens seraient pour la Turquie plus que des soldats ils seraient les missionnaires qui infuseraient au coeur de leurs camarades bulgares la haine pour la Russie et le dévouement pour la Turquie, – sous leur influence le Gouvernement turc formerait des cadres dans lesquels il pourrait sans crainte verser au moment convenable les masses bulgares. – Ce sont les cadres qui forment l'esprit d'une armée: cette maxime vraie partout, l'est surtout quand il s'agit de la race encore si passive qui habite la Bulgarie. –

Votre Altesse me dira peut-être que les régiments cosaques n'ont pas atteint le but que j'ai en vue. – La raison en est facile à comprendre: Pour un motif ou autre ces regiments [régiments] n'ont pas pu puiser ses officiers dans le personnel intelligent et dévoué de l'emigration [émigration] polonaise, qui seraient capables de comprendre la haute mission qu'ils avaient de servir d'obstacle entre la Bulgarie et la Russie. –

Je prie Votre Altesse de vouloir bien prendre en consideration [considération] ces idées et de me dire, si je dois lui communiquer un plan détaillé [détaillé] de l'organisation d'un cadre polono-bulgare, ou, si cette dénomination déplaît [déplaît] à Votre Altesse, un plan d'une organisation militaire des Bulgares. –

Je répète que je n'agis pas pour mon compte personnel. – J'accomplis la mission d'offrir au Gouvernement turc une phalange qui le servira avec fidélité et devouement [dévouement] car dans les plis du drapeau ottoman elle entend fremir [frémir] l'espoir de la Pologne. –

Soumetant [soumettant] à la haute appreciation [appréciation]

de Votre Altesse les idées ci-haut exposées

j'espère qu'Elle voudra me faire con-

naître [connaître] son avis à leur égard, et qu'Elle

acceptera l'expression du profond respect

et de parfaite consideration [considération] –
 avec lesquelles [lesquels] j'ai l'honneur d'être
 de Votre Altesse
 le humble [l'humble] serviteur –

By starting his manifesto with recalling the historically lasting Polish-Turkish relations, as well as confirming the sympathy of the Poles towards the nation of Suleiman the Magnificent, Taczanowski points to the clearly underground nature of his mission. What is important – especially from the point of view of the strategist, who the Polish general really was – one of the first comments on the then Russian-Turkish relations (crucial for the fate of the Slavs) concerns railway lines and the need to intensify their construction. Julius Verne has already described the rail network running through Turkey. From Constantinople it was possible to reach Adrianopol and Yambol by rail. The Varna–Rutschuck line connected with the Romanian railways, which in turn made it possible to reach Iasi, Chisinau, Kharkov, and Taganrog. The Tbilisi–Poti line was led along the Black Sea coast, reaching up to the state border.²⁵

Taczanowski's comment on the steadily growing Russian railway network is of great importance. Their development signified a far greater economic development than that of the Ottoman Empire. According to Necla V. Geyikdağı and Yaşar M. Geyikdağı the Turkish railways were a several dozen years behind when compared to Tsarist Russia.²⁶ What is not certain though, is if Taczanowski was aware of major railway line construction taking place in Turkey in 1860s, such as Chernovoda–Constanza, Varna–Rutschuck. As noticed by the researchers cited above, intensive industrialisation took place during the reign of sultan Abdülmeçid, which was made evident by a series of investments in new railway lines. The researchers

²⁵ Van Mitten, one of the characters of *Keraban the Inflexible* by Julius Verne, described one of the Turks in such a way: "He is a real Osmanlis, one of those old-school Turks who would not want to hear about any novelties, redefinition of concepts and habits, protesting against all inventions of modern industry; they would prefer to travel by a stagecoach than by rail, to sail on a tartan rather than on a steam ship. For the twenty years that I have been making business with him, I did not notice a shadow of my friends views or ideas; when he visited me in Rotterdam three years ago he would travel with a stagecoach, which took him a month instead of eight days. I knew many stubborn people, but of such stubbornness I have never heard before". Jules Verne, *Keraban the Inflexible*, <http://jv.gilead.org.il/zydorczak/ker-pl00.html> [accessed: 7.01.2020].

²⁶ N.V. Geyikdağı, M.Y. Geyikdağı, *A Comparative Study of Foreign Direct Investment. Ottoman and Russian Empires*, Contemporary research in economics and social sciences 2 (2018), no. 1, p. 74.

point out however, that the majority of these investments were performed by foreigners.²⁷ Taczanowski emphasizes the expansion of Russian fortifications close to the Turkish border. How meticulously planned this action was can be shown by the long period in which these strongholds were being constructed, all the way into the 1880s with particularly intensive works taking place in the years 1877–1878:

Table 3. Locations of more significant Russian garrisons as part of the 1877–1878 warfare.

Russian garrison	Battle routes on the Ottoman territories
Alexandropol (now Giumri in Armenia)	Vizinkov → Kars → Sarighamish → Zivin
Iğdır (now in Turkey)	Bayazid → Diyadin → Gharakilisa → Gayar → Hasankale → Erzurum
Akhalkalaki (now in Georgia)	Ardahan → Artvin
Ozurgeti (now in Turkey)	Batum
Poti (now in Georgia)	

Prepared by E.P.

His further words, that “Turkish policy has not sufficiently included Poland in its plans so far” can be referred to the Sublime Port’s relatively neutral attitude towards the uprising in Poland. Although the Sultan did not declare his neutrality towards the opponents of the uprising, but at the same time he reserved many freedoms to the Polish emigrants and military organizations. It is understandable especially when taking into account the desire to retain friendly political and economic relations with Russia as much as possible, to be guided by the general European opinions on the Polish uprising and, finally, to Turkey’s moderate Occidentalism in the time of the reforms (Tanzimat) between the years 1839 and 1876. Despite the great kindness towards the Poles, the Sultan government had to manoeuvre between Russia and the support for Poland. This resulted in General’s bitterness, but also understanding, which is why Taczanowski considered his first visit to Turkey as an opportunity to learn about the Turkish political and social relations. Even after his return to Paris and later on to Switzerland, Edmund maintained regular correspondence with Sadyk. Their contacts were particularly intense due to the Turkish-Russian rapprochement, for which the Turkish-Polish alliance was to be an alternative.

When he was writing about the instability of Turkey’s alleged allies, Taczanowski expressed good understanding of the very fragile consensus between the Sublime Port and Russia or France. He tried – still, without using any arguments other than

²⁷ Ibidem, p. 75.

the historiosophical ones – to point to the convergence of efforts of both Poles and Turks in the weakening of the state of the House of Romanov. Interestingly, when he was writing about Poland in the memorial, he focuses primarily on the Polish Kingdom: “The situation of conquered Poland is far from making it unnecessary for Turkey: it is a sensitive point in Russia [...]”. At this opportunity, Taczanowski tried to flatter the sultan, suggesting to him the possibility of taking over the protectorate over the Slavic peoples, who until now have customarily been under more or less direct protection of Russia. Taczanowski primarily meant Bulgaria and Serbia, historically, culturally and customarily associated with Russia, as they both belonged to the Orthodox Church. Probably not fully understanding the complexity of these relations and their deep historical roots, he proposed that the sultan take over protection of the Slavic peoples of the Balkans.²⁸ An opportunity for this would be the establishment of a Polish-Turkish alliance, which – as Taczanowski points out – has hitherto been characterized by a lack of symmetry between the two countries. And so he points out that in 1828 there was no Polish reaction to the Turkish-Russian war. It seems that Taczanowski forgot that it was on the wave of Turkish successes that the Polish conspirators formed an alliance under the leadership of Piotr Wysocki, who two years later sparked the November Uprising.²⁹ And when it broke out, Turkey faced the need to recognize Greece’s independence or grant autonomy to Serbia, Moldova and Wallachia.³⁰ Another moment recalled by Taczanowski was the Crimean War of 1853–1856. Poland did not support these fights, but adopted a wait-and-see attitude. In the face of Russia’s defeat, its loss of influence over the Caucasus and the Danube principalities, Poles hoped for the fights to be joined by the Polish troops formed by Władysław Zamoyski and Sadyk Pasha. During the January Uprising, Turkey adopted a wait-and-see strategy. Depending on the movement of European powers, she considered joining the anti-Russian coalition, but did not want to come up with this idea, either alone or as the first one.

²⁸ It seems obvious, however, that Taczanowski knew about Hotel Lambert’s efforts to support the idea of the Uniate Church (which was to ultimately weaken Russia’s position). Most of the activists that times were aware of the ties between the Orthodox communities, including the strong position of Russian Orthodox Church. Despite this, actions aimed at militarily and politically opposing countries connected by a religious community were not abandoned.

²⁹ It was probably not a deliberate action, especially in the context of the cited memorial itself, the purpose of which was to mobilize the Turks to act and warn about the negative consequences of political and military passivity.

³⁰ Č. Popov, *Istočno pitanje i srpska revolucija 1804–1918*, Beograd 2008, p. 18.

Further on he talks about a mutual alliance “from the shores of the Black Sea to the shores of the Baltic” directed against Russia, which is an interesting testimony to the *Intermarium* policy. In his further words Taczanowski presents a bold claim that the military activities of the above-mentioned alliance would result in the “raising in the eyes of the Catholic world and the liberal world, due to joint action with Poland, its prestige of heroism and holiness.” Such a statement has some basis in the political situation of that time, especially with respect to the Southern Slavdom, for which Christian Russia was the important element of ecclesiastical and cultural identification. Poles (including Czajkowski in the service of Hotel Lambert) proposed to Turkey in the 1840s that they support the separateness of the Bulgarian Church. At the same time, they promoted the Bulgarians in order to reduce the dominant influence of the Greek clergy and win the Orthodox Bulgarians to the Sultan. Russia – obviously – was claiming to be the protector of all Orthodox Christians in the Ottoman Empire, but treated the rights granted to it in this regard as an instrument of a political game with Istanbul and an ideological basis for Pan-Slavic ideas. The distinctiveness of the Bulgarian Church was not an end in itself for Russia – there was a fear that the new Bulgarian hierarchy might be directed towards Rome and the ecclesiastical union.

Taczanowski adds in his statement that a possible military action should be prepared in secret and based on the human resources of the Bulgarians, in relation to which, according to the General, “the Turkish government would want nothing more than to acquire the forces that are awakening in this large and strong nation”. He recalls the information that he heard about the alleged pro-Turkish Manifestations of the Bulgarians. This is a surprising statement, especially if one recalls the efforts of Georgie Savy Rakovsky to create the first Bulgarian legion in Belgrade, the revolt of 1862 under the leadership of Haji Stavrev, which broke out in Veliko Tarnovo, the capital of the second Bulgarian tsarist state, or the activity of the Chetnik groups formed at that time (Cheta – Bulg. чета) – an armed group recruiting from mass mobilisation, fighting guerrilla warfare) lead by Panteylemon Kisimov or Kostia Evtimov.³¹ In 1864 troops were formed on Romanian territories, which, having crossed the borders of Bulgaria, were to encourage its people to rebel against Turkey. In the summer of this year, a cheta was formed under the command of Stojan Rakovsky entrusted him with the task of killing the Tyrnovo patriarch, who was acting against the insurgent movement. Due to the strong fortification of the patriarch’s

³¹ *История на българите*, [ed.] Д. Зафиров, София 2007, pp. 267–268.

palace, the Chetniks abandoned the intention of attack and headed for the mountains of Stara Planina, where Haji Dmitry took over command. Also in 1864 a cheta of Christo Makedonsky and Petyr Stojanov was formed.³² Just as the one mentioned earlier, also this cheta moved to Romania after formation and waited for a convenient moment to return to Bulgaria. In 1864–1867, troops of Panajot Hitov and Vasil Levski were formed. They covered the towns of Kotel and Sliven. Their activity in 1867 motivated the inhabitants of Tulcea, Varna, Plovdiv, Kazanlak, Yambol, Kariobat and Stara Zagora for action.³³ In 1866 another cheta was formed by Filip Totju, and year later by Zelju Tsernev and Petyr Petkov.³⁴ More prominent groups were also formed by Jeremij Bulgarov and Ivan Kulin, Stefan Karadja. Taczanowski recall the rebellion in Belogradchik (Белоградчик) that lasted less than five days in August 1836 or similar uprisings in Pirot (Пирот) (Пиросска буна) and Berkowica (Берковица), where the so-called Манчова размирица broke out. From April 5th to April 26th, 1841, a Serbian-Bulgarian uprising took place in Niš (Нишко въстание), led by Miloje Jovanović and Nikola Srndaković-Sandak. The Turks' response was radical and ended in the burning of over 200 villages and the escape of nearly 11,000 Christians. The alleged pro-Turkish attitude of the Bulgarians, which Taczanowski mentions (and believes in), could be associated with information about a group of Chorbadzhiya, peasantry people, often undergoing Islamization and assimilated by the Turks, to whom the majority of Bulgarian society had a negative attitude.³⁵

Taczanowski's conviction about the possibility of the Polish-Bulgarian-Turkish alliance against Russia was based on previous attempts by the Hotel Lambert and the fight against Pan-Slavism.³⁶ In his memorial, Taczanowski followed the line of action towards Bulgarians undertaken in previous decades. The purpose of the memorial was to obtain Turkish support for Polish-Bulgarian military formations which were presented as possible to be established. It also echoes the efforts made during the Crimean War in the formation of the Sultan's Cossacks by Czajkowski. The unit

³² Ibidem, p. 268.

³³ Ibidem, p. 270.

³⁴ Ibidem, p. 274.

³⁵ J. Rubacha, *Bułgarzy i Bułgaria w ostatniej ćwierci wieku XX w publikacjach Jana Grzegorzewskiego (kultura, ludność, gospodarka)*, Studia z Dziejów Rosji i Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej 51 (2012), no. 1, pp. 23–48.

³⁶ J. Skowronek, *Polityka bałkańska Hotelu Lambert (1833–1856)*, Warszawa 1976; H. Wereszycki, J. Zdrada, *Polska działalność polityczna (1860–1900), Historia dyplomacji polskiej, 3: 1795–1918*, ed. L. Bazylow, Warszawa 1986, pp. 679–692.

consisted of Polish soldiers and recruited from South Slavs – most often Bulgarians. The reality of creating troops was probably reinforced in Taczanowski's reflection by Czajkowski.

Arguing for the need to pay more attention to the Bulgarian population, Taczanowski proposed (himself a declared democrat) a universal conscription, which meant that Turkey would include Bulgarians "in the system of discipline and obedience" which would provide "the driving forces of the nation". According to the author of the manifesto, the legitimacy of creating national troops under the Turkish flag was evidenced by a similar situation in Prussia, which maintained completely Polish units, such as the 5th Corps, or, for example, Arab regiments fighting alongside France.

The sentence provided below presents the gist of his vision, that is the formation of Polish legions in Turkey, to which Bulgarian population would be incorporated. According to him Poles would be:

[...] more than soldiers for Turkey, they would be missionaries who would pour hatred of Russia and attachment to Turkey into the hearts of their Bulgarian comrades – under their influence the Turkish Government would create troops to which they would without doubts incorporate Bulgarian masses.

He goes on to talk about the role of the Poles as those who foster battle spirit in the armies (and perhaps – which is not made explicit in Taczanowski's statement – also national spirit), so badly needed by the Bulgarians recognized by the Pole as "a race that is still as passive as the one that inhabits Bulgaria". The close contacts with Czajkowski, who was probably responsible for making Taczanowski aware that the Cossack units he formed did not have as much independence as the former commander of the January Uprising believed they did, may have influenced Edmund's extremely diplomatic commentary indicating that these units were not under Polish command. He was afraid that also the Bulgarian troops would not be led by their native commanders. This was necessary, because only such commanders "would be able to understand the highest mission." In the context of a fragment of one of the letters cited, the Taczanowski's memorial takes on a unique sense. In the letter, he anticipated that at the time of Sadyk's death, the command of the Cossack regiments would pass to "[...] Turkish hands, or to a random commander who could be bribed by Moscow and then lose the Polish element of the regiments, and introduce a schismatic-Bulgarian one, so nice and accommodating to Moscow." Probably for this reason, Taczanowski devoted a lot of attention to the Bulgarians and the possibility

of including them under the Turkish sceptre into the Polish troops that would deal a blow to Russia. Edmund saw a chance to convince the Bulgarians about the Polish cause in the Uniates. Their presence was due to the ultramontanist Congregation of Resurrectionists, which was financially supported by the community of Greater Poland. However, Taczanowski thought quite naively that “every Bulgarian joining the union would become favourable to Poland, and therefore an enemy of Muscovites.”

In the last words of the memorial, Taczanowski asked for an opportunity to present a detailed plan for the organization of Polish-Bulgarian troops (or Bulgarians military organization), which would suggest that such a document was prepared by him. The currently preserved legacy of Taczanowski does not include such a document.

The importance of Taczanowski’s manifesto

The significance of Taczanowski’s manifesto, and in the broader context of his extreme activity with respect to propagating the idea of Slavic mutuality (although serving firstly the idea of a nation) is due to several reasons. His person is present in the current Slavic studies discourse and he has been noted in the context of the Polish-Turkish diplomatic and military contacts. The analyzed source text, which is the manifesto, thus supplements the existing studies in which Taczanowski is noted and positively valued. A certain personal feature of the General should also be seen as significant, namely a kind of departure from the democratic-republican idea towards monarchism, superficial as it may be and yet exposing Turkey’s dominant role in the Balkans and Slavic area.³⁷ Taczanowski was not a supporter of ultramontanism, but he was aware of the utilitarianism of the Uniate movement that he promoted, whose bastion in the Balkans was Bulgaria. Among all the territories of partitioned Poland, Greater Poland was the region where knowledge about this mission was particularly widespread.

The manifesto itself is an interesting testimony of Slavophilic literature. On the one hand, it is part of a series of similar activities undertaken by post-uprising emigrants, on the other, it is a unique work. Its creation was undoubtedly influenced by Taczanowski being encouraged by the Poles living in Turkey to come back to Turkey, as well as his contact with Czajkowski. In the archives preserved I did not find an answer to the General’s manifesto, suggesting two possibilities: lack of interest of the Sultan authorities or the fact that it has not been sent. Taczanowski’s talks

³⁷ H.G. Majer, R. Lauer, *Osmanen und Islam in Südosteuropa*, Berlin 2014.

with the Vizier and the military commanders did not bring the desired result, which probably ultimately discouraged the Polish emigrant from further actions.

The presence of Poles in Turkey fluctuated – a great wave of them appeared there after the Crimean War, while in the period after the January Uprising far fewer Poles got there. In this context, Taczanowski's stay is also a part of this tendency, although it can also be seen as an extension, or even one of the last (but not the last)³⁸ accents of the mission of the Poles in the Balkans and Turkey, that lasted for several decades.

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Résumé

Slavic mutuality, Turkish-Slavic political connections and the vision of General Edmund Taczanowski

The article is devoted to the discovered Greater Poland Military Museum in Poznań, the unpublished text of the memorial in French, which General Edmund Taczanowski, one of the leaders of the January Uprising, intended to address to the Turkish Sultan, in the hope of creating Bulgarian-Turkish troops, which were then to be used in battles with Russia. The memorial was probably created during Taczanowski's trip to Istanbul in December 1863, where, using the knowledge of, among others, with Sadyk Pasha. In his hometown region of Greater Poland it was a period of a lively fascination with the Slavic region, which was in line with the idea of searching for concepts of "Slavic reciprocity" alternative to Russian Pan-Slavism and Austro-

³⁸ It should be remembered that in the Balkans, epigones related to the Hotel Lambert group were active at a later time. Their activities were interrupted by the defeat of France in 1870. However, attempts to create Polish legions in Turkey appeared again during the Russo-Turkish war of 1877–1878.

Slavism. In an attempt to answer the question about the sources of knowledge that the Polish commander had, the inventory of the court library in Choryń, which was used by Taczanowski and his family, was examined. When analyzing the manifesto, attention was drawn to the political situation in Turkey during the mission that Taczanowski carried out on its territory. The manifesto showed the will to weaken Russia politically and militarily, in which Taczanowski saw, like many Polish activists of that time, an opponent of the idea of independence of Polish lands. In this context, the manifesto is one of the most interesting testimonies of yet another scenario of national liberation, which – purely instrumentally – treated the Bulgarian population, pointing to the Polonocentric nature of Taczanowski's idea.

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