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## Education for Security: What Every EU Citizen Should Know about CSDP?

### Abstract

The contemporary world is full of threats. Their scale, variety and dynamics make single countries, especially those smaller and less wealthy, unable to prevent them. Also former leaders of world politics such as France and Great Britain find this harder and harder. That is why, among integrating European countries there appeared the idea of Common Security and Defence Policy. Its assumption was strengthening cooperation in these spheres, coordination of positions or the creation of rapid reaction forces, which may lead to common defence. Bearing in mind the events happening just outside the EU (North Africa, Middle East, Ukraine) and inside the EU (Paris terrorist attacks in 2015) there is a question what assumptions have been accomplished? What can the EU do to protect its citizens? These are the issues the article deals with.

### Keywords:

security, defence, military capabilities, CSDP.

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As an international organization associating 28 member countries, the European Union (EU) would like to play the role of a leader co-shaping international relations on the global arena. Although for many years, first the European Communities (EC), and currently the European Union, have been able to play a key role in economical and trade relations of the world (and in spite of the current debt problems, they still do), yet ambitions of European leaders are also directed towards EU's leading role in political and military matters, including conflict management. All these in order to move away potential threats from the EU borders and simultaneously to enlarge the sense of security among its citizens. Nevertheless, interesting is the fact, that despite the will to create the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the European Union by the leaders, it still is more of an intergovernmental tool rather than a Union tool, and national interests often have the upper hand over common interests (Norheim-Martinsen, 2013; Shepherd, 2012).

Difficulties, problems and ambiguities concerning the CFSP also concern the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), being its component. On one hand, some member country leaders would like to add to the set of EU's external activities in a broad sense the *hard-power* tools, which would allow for quick and effective military actions all over the world. However, in the EU there are countries characterized by very restricted political will of acting in this regard, refusing the possibility of utilizing force or threatening to use it in international relations (Laporte, 2012; Faleg, 2013), which results in rejecting the aforementioned vision of the development of EU's military capacity and aspirations to retain EU's status as *soft-power* or *normative power* (Howorth, 2010). Perhaps then, as a means of compromise, the EU will be evolving towards the *smart power* concept, which was described by Hillary Clinton as utilizing the whole range of tools – diplomatic, economic, military, political, legal and cultural – remaining at disposal of an international relations entity, by choosing one of them or their combination in order to match them to a specific situation (Matthiessen, 2013).

Conflicts that happened right next to the EU (e.g. the Balkans), as well as emergence of new threats for the European safety (e.g. terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, asymmetrical, ethnic or regional conflicts), made European leaders realize, that the EU is not able to counteract them quickly. Therefore, each member country individually never was and still is not able to stand up to such challenges. Only thanks to a coalition, a group, a broader cooperation of countries, can the unfavorable situation be changed (Rogers, 2011, p. 19). The Treaty of Lisbon was very forward-looking in terms of such actions, thus facilitating and detailing the conditions concerning the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union. It is thus worth to consider

whether it was the same with the CSDP. How have the regulations concerning the CSDP been modified? What are the results of it? Do current legal foundations allow the EU for acting efficiently and effectively beyond its borders? And finally, can the EU be considered a key participant in not only economic, but also political-military international relations? These are the matters looked into in the hereby article.

## **1. ORIGINS OF THE EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY**

Development of any integration processes in such a vital area as safety and defense is always faced with significant difficulties, which is associated with perceiving these matters as a key element for state sovereignty and care for national interests (Bailes, Messervy-Whiting, 2011). Nonetheless, on October 24th 1950, René Pleven, the then Prime Minister of France, presented to the public the plan for creating European defense structures. Establishing the European Defence Community (EDC) was assumed, the purpose of which was guaranteeing Western Europe means of defense against a potential attack from the USSR, becoming independent from guarantees of safety granted by the USA and engaging Germany in the development of the continent, thus preventing bringing back to life the nationalistic movements in that country. All this was supposed to happen under the supervision of common organs and with a common army. However, in 1954, due to parliamentary arguments in France and rejection of the EDC program, further actions in this regard as well as works in order to establish the European Political Community were canceled.

After a few years, on October 19th 1961, again thanks to the French (in the person of Christian Fouchet), the integration ideas in matters of security and defense were resumed. The planned political union was supposed to run a common foreign policy of intergovernmental action character as well as a defense policy. However, the plan was not implemented, as some countries (e.g. Belgium, Netherlands) were afraid of diminishing the position of NATO in Europe. On January 13th 1962 the Fouchet Plan II was presented, which assumed the established union coordinating foreign, defense, economic and cultural policy of member countries. All of this was underlined by a typically French accent of making Europe independent from the USA. Nevertheless, this concept also was not broadly accepted, which led to the situation, in which NATO was the foundation of defense for the Western Europe countries. Until the implementation of the Maastricht Treaty the only multilateral consultation forum for member countries of the three European Communities in

terms of foreign policy was the European Political Cooperation and the European Council, legally authorized in the Single European Act.

The Treaty on European Union established the Common Foreign and Security Policy, the range of which was supposed to include all matters concerning EU's safety, along with gradual defining of the common defense policy, and if member countries decided to do so, also common defense. The Western European Union (WEU) on the other hand, was recognized as EU's armed force, realizing the so called Petersberg tasks. Therefore, it became an inherent part of Union integration processes of a political-defense character (Przybylska-Maszner, 2011, p. 46). Nonetheless, the ineffectiveness of the adopted solutions became really evident during the Balkans conflict in the 90's of the 20th century, when it turned out that the EU is not able to intervene quickly and effectively even in direct proximity of its external borders.

The Amsterdam Treaty on the other hand introduced the office of High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, who at the same time was the Secretary General of the EU Council. Under the Secretariat of the EU Council a Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit was established. Moreover, the Treaty included regulations, thanks to which the CFSP since then included all the matters concerning EU's safety in a broad sense, which in consequence led to the EU taking over more competences, which previously belonged to the WEU.

A breakthrough in the development of EU security policy was the French-British agreement regarding the intensification of defense cooperation (December 3–4th 1999, Saint Malo). Its most important result was the establishment, during the EU Council summit in Helsinki (December 10–11th 1999), of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) as an executive tool for CFSP. The purpose of this policy was providing the EU with the capacity of conducting own independent foreign missions, strengthening the common military dimension of the EU, as well as rationalization and coordination of military potentials of member countries. At the same time the program called Helsinki European Headline Goal 2003 was established<sup>2</sup>, which included the stipulation for creating EU's own rapid reaction forces, able to act on their own. By 2003, member countries acting together in operations supervised by the EU were supposed to acquire the capacity

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<sup>2</sup> The program was finally approved at the summit in Nice in 2000. However, due to increasing difficulties in realization of that program, in June 2004 it was replaced by the 2010 Headline Goal, which significantly extended the time to prepare the EU to the realization of foreign military missions (until 2010). Moreover, so called Battle Groups were supposed to be established, being far smaller units (in the number of 7–9, 1500 soldiers each), ready to engage in 48 hours and being led for 10–15 days (Stańczyk, 2009; Lindstrom, 2007).

of dislocating (within 60 days since making proper decisions) and maintaining armed forces of 60,000 soldiers for at least a year. These forces would serve the purpose of conducting the Petersberg tasks.

The Treaty of Nice included regulations establishing the Political and Security Committee, as well as the Military Committee and the Military Staff. On the basis of a special authorization from the EU Council, the first of these gained the capacity of decision making in terms of matters aimed at preventing crises. The Treaty also eliminated all the regulations concerning the WEU as an armed formation of the EU, and it was possible, because the EU had already acquired its own institutional-decision making and implementation system, which meant that the WEU structures were not needed anymore. At the summit in Laeken on December 14–15th 2001 a declaration about EU's operative capacity was adopted. A year later a common EU-NATO declaration regarding the ESDP was announced. Then 2003 brought the development of rules for military strategic planning<sup>3</sup>, procedures of reacting in emergency situations, program of military training, and procedures for civil-military cooperation, logistics, and rules of utilizing force. At that time another important matter was adopting the European Security Strategy (summit in Brussels, December 2003) and signing an agreement with NATO (*Berlin Plus*) in march 2003, which allowed the EU for utilizing the strategical capacity and logistic resources of NATO during own foreign military missions. By the Decision of the EU Council from July 12th 2004 the Agency for the Development of Defence Capabilities, Research, Procurement and Armament, usually referred to as the European Defence Agency, was established (CEU, 2004).

## **2. COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY AFTER THE TREATY OF LISBON**

According to art. 42 sec. 1 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) (EU, 2010a) the Common Security and Defence Policy is, since the Treaty of Lisbon, an integral part of the Common Foreign and Security Policy. Moreover, the CSDP provides the EU with operative capability based on civil and military resources granted by member countries for the purpose of realizing objectives set forth by the EU Council (art. 42 sec. 3 par. 1 of TEU). All of the above measures were supposed to allow the EU to utilize them in peacekeeping, conflict prevention and international

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<sup>3</sup> More details in: L. Simón, 2011; A. Mattelaer, 2011.

safety missions conducted beyond its borders, according to the conditions of the United Nations Charter.

The CSDP includes gradual defining of common defense policy of the European Union (art. 42 sec. 2 of the TEU). This matter is also touched upon in art. 24 of the TEU, granting the EU with competences including all areas of foreign policy and all matters concerning Unions security, including gradual defining of common defense policy, which may lead to common defense. This record is confirmed in art. 2 sec. 4 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (EU, 2010b), which grants the EU competences in terms of defining and implementing the CFSP, including gradual defining of common defense policy. Establishing common defense in the future will be possible thanks to a unanimous decision of the European Council, which in this case would allow the member countries to adopt proper decisions according to their internal constitutional requirements. Such a legal state causes for legitimization of the CSDP in the area of intergovernmental cooperation (Aleksandrowicz, 2011).

However, an important restriction was introduced in that matter, thanks to which it was possible to adopt any treaty regulations on matters concerning security and defense. The EU CSDP can not violate the specific character of security and defense policies of certain member countries. It is supposed to respect the obligations resulting from the North Atlantic Treaty of those countries, which acknowledge that their common defense is realized within NATO and conforms the common security and defense policy adopted in this regard (art. 42 sec. 2 par. 2 of TEU). At the same time, art. 42 sec. 7 of the TEU excludes the aforementioned clause with regard to mutual duties of member countries in case of armed aggression on one of them on its territory. As a result, in the area of defense and security the obligations stemming from membership in NATO have priority over the ones stemming from membership in the EU (Laursen, 2009; Emerson, Kaczyński, 2010), and the Coalition remains the main forum for organizing collective defense by Europe and North America under integration (Biscop, 2011).

Therefore, the Treaty on European Union was rather enigmatic in explaining the functions of the CSDP, assuming the creation of common defense in indefinite future (Góralski, 2009, p. 78). In the meantime member countries obliged themselves, according to art. 42 sec. 3 par. 2 of the TEU, to gradually improve, in cooperation with the European Defence Agency, their military capabilities, among others by implementing any useful means of reinforcement of the industrial and technology base of the defense sector. The point is not only to identify the possibility of collaboration, but also to convince member countries to participate in common armament projects (Coelmont, Biscop, 2014).

The issue of EU's foreign missions ought to be investigated in more detail<sup>4</sup>. This matter is therefore directly connected to a series of political and economical interests of member countries, as well as their military capabilities allowing to perform such actions. It is no secret though, that the interests of countries within the EU are often divergent, which results in the will to or reluctance towards foreign operations. It has thus been decided to regulate this matter in the TEU in two ways. *Primo*, according to art. 42 sec. 5 and art. 44 sec. 1 of the TEU, the EU Council can commission conducting a mission to a group of member countries, which are willing to do so and have at their disposal the capabilities required for that mission. Thanks to this, interests of individual participating countries can be considered, as well as their actual capabilities in this regard. *Secundo*, art. 42 sec. 6 of the TEU establishes a permanent structural cooperation within the EU. Member countries, that are involved in it and fulfill the criteria mentioned above concerning military ability, and that have incurred further obligations in this regard, considering even the most demanding missions, have the right to establish such cooperation. Then the countries notify their intentions to the EU Council and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. On the basis of this the EU Council adopts a proper decision (by the qualified majority), establishing the whole structural cooperation and a list of cooperating member countries.

These member countries, along with the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, agree with each other the means of managing the mission, and moreover, regularly inform the EU Council about its progress on their own initiative or on request of another member country. If performing a mission would cause major consequences or require a change of purpose, range or conditions of a mission defined in previous decisions, the participating countries are obliged to immediately inform the EU Council about it and the EU Council adopts necessary decisions (art. 44 sec. 2 of the TEU).

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<sup>4</sup> According to art. 43 sec. 1 of the TEU the EU dispatches the following missions to the crisis areas: a) common disarming actions, b) humanitarian and rescue, c) military consulting and support, d) preventing conflicts and maintaining peace, e) armed, for the purpose of crisis management (including peace restoration missions and operations in order to stabilize the situation after a conflict). It ought to be emphasized though, that all kinds of missions can help fight terrorism (Margaras, 2010; Biscop, Coelmont, 2010a).

**Table 1. Types and number of EU's foreign missions**

| <b>Number of mission: 35, including:</b> | <b>Completed missions: 17</b>       | <b>Ongoing missions: 18</b>                                   |
|--|-------------------------------------|---|
| <b>Military: 13</b>                      | <b>6</b>                            | <b>7</b>  |
|  | ARTEMIS (DRC)                       | EUFOR ALTHEA (B&H)  |
|  | CONCORDIA (FYROM)                   | EUNAVFOR Atalanta (Somalia)                                   |
|  | EUFOR (DRC)                         | EUNAVFOR MED (Mediterranean)                                  |
|  | EUFOR (Libya)                       | EUMAM (CAR)   |
|  | EUFOR (CAR)                         | EUSEC DRC   |
|  | EUFOR (Tchad / CAR)                 | EUTM (Somalia)  |
|  |                                     | EUTM (Mali)   |
| <b>Civilian: 22</b>                      | <b>11</b>                           | <b>11</b>   |
|  | AMM monitoring mission (Indonesia)  | EUAM (Ukraine)  |
|  | EUAVSEC (South Sudan)               | EUBAM (Libya)   |
|  | EJUST LEX (Iraq)                    | EUBAM (Moldova and Ukraine)                                   |
|  | EJUST THEMIS (Georgia)              | EUBAM Rafah (Palestinian Territories)                         |
|  | EUPAT (FYROM)                       | EUCAP NESTOR (Kenya, Djibouti, Somalia, Seychelles, Tanzania) |
|  | EUPM (B&H)                          | EUCAP SAHEL (Mali)  |
|  | EUPOL DRC                           | EUCAP SAHEL (Niger)   |
|  | EUPOL Kinshasa (DRC)                | EULEX (Kosovo)  |
|  | EUPOL PROXIMA (FYROM)               | EUMM (Georgia)  |
|  | EUSSR (Guinea Bissau)               | EUPOL Afghanistan   |
|  | Support to AMIS II (Darfur / Sudan) | EUPOL COPPS (Palestinian Territories)                         |

DRC – Democratic Republic of Congo; B&H – Bosnia & Herzegovina; CAR – Central African Republic; FYROM – Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

Source: European External Action Service. (2015). *Missions and operations*. Downloaded from: [http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/index\\_en.htm](http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/index_en.htm).

## 2.1. PERMANENT STRUCTURAL COOPERATION

etailed requirements in terms of permanent structural cooperation<sup>5</sup> were specified in art. 1–2 of Protocol no. 10 to the Treaty of Lisbon (EU, 2010c). On the basis of these regulations permanent structural cooperation<sup>6</sup> is available to each EU member country, which obliges itself to: a) initiate more intensive increase of its defense capabilities, through the development of its national contributions and participation, if required, in multinational forces, in main European programs of

<sup>5</sup> More details in: S. Biscop, J. Coelmont, 2010b; P. Wouters, 2008.

<sup>6</sup> One may even say that structural cooperation is a particular kind of enhanced cooperation within the EU (Kubin, 2010).



armament and the activity of the European Defence Agency; b) have the ability to provide on country level or as part of multinational armed forces, of specialized armed units for planned missions, the structure of which is established in the tactical plan as a tactical group with elements of support, including transport and logistics, able to start a mission in 5 to 30 days, especially in response to the demand of the United Nations and which can perform operations initially for 30 days, with the option of extending this period to at least 120 days.

Member countries that will decide to participate in the permanent structural cooperation on the other hand, are obliged to: a) cooperate in order to achieve the agreed objectives concerning the level of investment expenditure on armament and regularly submit these objectives for review in terms of security status and EU's international obligations; b) if possible, bring their defense systems near, especially through unification of identification of military needs, combining and, if need be, specialization of their resources and military capabilities, as well as encouraging to cooperation in terms of training and logistics; c) undertake certain measures in order to increase availability, interoperability, flexibility and capability to deploy forces, especially through defining common goals in terms of utilizing forces, including the ability to reanalyze national decision making procedures; d) cooperate in order to provide undertaking of measures necessary to replenish, also within the multinational approach and without detriment to obligations of those member countries within NATO, shortages stated under the Capability Development Mechanism; e) if required, participate in the development of main common or European programs of armament within the European Defence Agency.

In recent years there was a trend of shrinking EU member countries' budgets rather than developing them. The economic crisis, which started in 2008, only made this trend more permanent. And that is the chance for structural cooperation, as it can lead to a decrease in repetition<sup>7</sup> and an increase in the degree of unifying defense capabilities, even through common projects and research and development initiatives. Moreover, close cooperation in technical matters can provide added value in the future, leading to common training or formulating military doctrines. However, it is the member countries that decide about practical implementation of the premises of permanent structural cooperation. It would require serious changes in the mentality of government elites and the addition of community dimension

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<sup>7</sup> And a lot of examples can be named – multirole combat aircraft, self-propelled howitzers, attack helicopters, tanks, missile defense systems, various battleships, etc.

to the so far sovereign nature of defense projects. Time will show whether it will become an effective tool for EU member countries, nevertheless past experiences do not allow for optimistic expectations in this regard (Margaras, 2010).

## **2.2. INSTITUTIONAL, DECISION MAKING AND IMPLEMENTATION MECHANISMS OF THE CSDP**

Thanks to its intergovernmental character the EU Council has been recognized in the TEU as the institution with the right to set CSDP's objectives, make decisions about undertaking foreign missions (including their objective, range and general conditions of conducting those missions), make decisions about trusting commencing of missions to a group of member countries, to update and change decisions concerning foreign missions and make decisions about the participation of countries in permanent structural cooperation including receiving notification about its initiation (Stie, 2010). In this context certain competences need to be emphasized, which the European Council is entitled to, and concerning the common defense policy. This is the case, because the European Council has the right to make directional decisions for the purpose of establishing common defense and advising the member countries their adoption in a manner proper for their constitutional order.

The CSDP decision making mechanism is based on two types of tools, i.e. Union tools and country resources. The former, due to CSDP remaining an integral part of the CFSP, are common for both policies, as the EU Council can utilize the decisions within the scope it received on the basis of art. 25 of the TEU. With regard to country measures they should be considered as civil and military capabilities of the member countries, utilized by the EU for the purpose of realizing own interests through foreign missions. In agreement with the Political and Security Committee and under the direction of the EU Council the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy coordinates civil and military aspects of the aforementioned missions (art. 43 sec. 2 of the TEU). Moreover, despite the general prohibition of adopting and implementing of legislative acts, it should be indicated, that only the High Representative and member countries can submit proper decision initiatives of the EU Council remaining within the gesture of the CSDP. The High Representative is also notified by member countries about the intention to establish permanent structural cooperation and the EU Council consults with him or her the final shape of a decision establishing such cooperation (art. 46 sec. 1–2 of the TEU).

When making decisions within the CSDP the EU Council has to be unanimous (art. 42 sec. 4 of the TEU), similarly to the European Council with regard to com-

mon defense policy. The EU Council uses qualified majority<sup>8</sup> on the other hand regarding decisions establishing permanent structural cooperation and decisions about a member country joining such cooperation at a later date (art. 46 sec. 3 of the TEU). It ought to be emphasized that in case of extending permanent structural cooperation by another EU member country or suspending the participation of one of them, only members of the EU Council representing the participating countries take part in voting on the forum of the EU Council (art. 46 sec. 3–4 of the TEU). However, when a participating country wishes to withdraw from permanent structural cooperation, it forwards its decision to the EU Council, which confirms that the participation of the member country has come to an end (art. 46 sec. 5 of the TEU).

The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, along with the European Commission, is responsible for the implementation of the CSDP. They are supported by *sui generis*<sup>9</sup> organs and EU member countries (Mérand, Hofmann, Irondelle, 2010; Justaert, Keukeleire, 2010). The roles of entities indicated within the CSDP are obviously varied and dependent on performed implementation functions. Firstly, the High Representative, in cooperation with the Political and Security Committee, coordinates civil and military aspects of the performed missions, inspires the utilization of country resources or Union tools for the purpose of implementation of the adopted CSDP objectives, and participates in establishing permanent structural cooperation. Secondly, member countries have the obligation to make their civil and military capabilities available to the EU, gradually improve their abilities in this regard, aid another EU member country if it falls victim to armed attack, participate in missions commissioned to a group of countries by the EU Council (only if they have enough capabilities and agree to perform them), and participate in permanent structural cooperation, as long as they fulfill the standards of Protocol no. 10 to the TEU. Thirdly and finally, the European Defence Agency has implementation tasks within the CSDP. Therefore, according to art. 45 sec. 1 of the TEU, the Agency has to: a) contribute to defining member countries' military capabilities and evaluating the completion of obligations in terms of capabilities undertaken by member countries; b) support unification of operational requirements and establishing effective and consistent methods of making orders; c) submit multilateral projects in order to achieve military capabilities objectives and provide coordination of programs implemented by member countries and manage specific cooperation programs;

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<sup>8</sup> The qualified majority is established according to art. 238 sec. 3a) of TFEU.

<sup>9</sup> More on this topic in: S. Vanhoonacker, H. Dijkstra, H. Maurer, 2010.

d) support the research on defense technologies and coordinate and plan common research activities and studies over technical solutions suitable for future operational requirements; e) contribute to define any effective measures supporting the industrial and technological foundation of the defense sector and increasing the effectiveness of military expenditure, and, if required, implement these measures.

### **2.3. SOLIDARITY CLAUSE**

A few words of attention is due to the solidarity clause mentioned in art. 222 of the TFEU. According to this article, the EU and its member countries act together in the spirit of solidarity if any of the member countries becomes the target of a terrorist attack, falls victim to a natural disaster or a catastrophe caused by mankind. For this very purpose the EU mobilizes all tools at its disposal, including military resources made available by the member countries. All this for the purpose of preventing terrorist threats to the territory of member countries, defend democratic institutions and civilians from a possible terrorist attack, aid an attacked member country on its territory (and as requested by its political authorities), aid a member country on its territory, as requested by its political authorities, in case of a natural disaster or a catastrophe caused by mankind. Assistance of member countries ought to be coordinated in the EU Council. In these efforts it is supported by the Political and Security Committee, additionally supported by structures established within the CSDP and a committee mentioned in art. 71 of the TFEU<sup>10</sup>. The indicated organs submit common opinions to the EU Council. On the other hand, in order to allow for undertaking effective actions by the European Union and its member countries the European Council regularly evaluates threats to the EU as an organization.

### **2.4. EUROPEAN COUNCIL SUMMIT IN DECEMBER 2013**

For many years it has been discussed that there is a need to prepare a special summit of leaders of the integrating European countries concerning the reformation of the CSDP, so that it becomes more effective. As a means of preparation to this meeting, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Catherine Ashton, in cooperation with subordinate services and the Euro-

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<sup>10</sup> According to art. 71 of the TFEU, within the EU Council a permanent committee has been established for the purpose of providing support and reinforcement of operational cooperation in terms of internal safety in the European Union. It facilitates the coordination of actions of proper organs of member countries, and the representatives of EU organs and organizational units concerned may participate in its work.

pean Defence Agency, wrote a special report indicating key problems and challenges that the CSDP needs to face. The geopolitical context also influenced the course of the sessions (e.g. Ukraine, Syria). Emphasis was laid in the necessity to guarantee peace to the citizens of the EU, safety at its external borders, and most of all on increasing EU's military capabilities and the need to strengthen the competitiveness and innovativeness of the European technological sector in terms of armament (Fiott, 2013). And although expectations of the public and of the experts were higher, and the expected future military role of the EU in the world was not indicated, the summit did not end as a complete failure (Faleg, 2014; EDA 2014). A few technical decisions were made however<sup>11</sup>, albeit they need to be perceived as a tiny drop in a sea of needs.

Why? Because military capabilities, both already possessed and the ones being aimed for, ought not to be discussed separately from current events on the international arena, as “they refer to the ability to achieve specific effects that are ultimately determined by political reality” (Coelmont, Mattelaer, 2013, p. 67). In case of the EU, events taking place within the last few years in its direct proximity allow for a statement that European defence is practically inexistent and is in a critical condition. And yet, we still allow for almost any individual member country, in the name of national interest, establish its own armament systems and various military equipment, which is another obstacle making it difficult to intensify and rationalize integration processes. We have reached a point in which in the EU there is a far greater (2 to 6 times greater, depending on the size of armed forces) number of projects and open production lines in Europe than in the USA (Briani, 2013). Yet it is not very revealing to ascertain that European countries could gain much more if they spend their money collectively, creating certain added value (Ciupiński, 2013).

### 3. FINAL NOTES

Since the dawn of European integration processes after World War II matters of security and defense were considered as the most problematic. It seems that the stimulus which mobilized the European Union to undertake more dynamic actions

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<sup>11</sup> The European Defence Agency received support to, among others, implement four programs: Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS), Air-to-Air Refuelling, Satellite Communications and Cyber Defence.

was the conflict on the territory of former Yugoslavia, which evidently revealed the EU's inability to act even in direct proximity of its borders. The same applies to the recent events in North Africa or the currently ongoing situation in Ukraine. The progressive increase of external threats caused such intensification of the feeling of insecurity in Europe, both in organizational and civil sense, that the EU started to develop the already possessed (insignificant) capabilities within the CSDP. As indicated by Beata Przybylska-Maszner, "consistency of Unions reactions (...) is key to effective functioning in international relations" (2011, p. 75). It seems however, that in spite of all the efforts and the progression of transforming the CSDP into a better and more effective tool of the European Union, significant shortages and weaknesses are still evident, concerning both military and civil aspects of its functioning (Whitman, Wolff, 2012).

There is a number of serious challenges associated with developing EU's potential within the CSDP, both ahead of the EU and its member countries. The European Security Strategy really needs to be updated (Koziej, 2011), creation of Battle Groups needs to be hastened, new implementation mechanisms established on the basis of the Treaty of Lisbon need to be tested (or at least practiced), the means of financing foreign missions needs to be reformed, etc. Most of all however, for many member countries the key matter would be finding within the CSDP<sup>12</sup> such solutions, that would guarantee decision making autonomy in the EU to the European NATO members, or such that would allow for a broader inclusion of standpoints of neutral countries, countries that are not interested, and other countries that are willing to participate in operations of crisis management.

Witold M. Góralski specifies the regime-system CSDP, along with its decision making system, as very consolidated, basing on relations between the European Union and its member countries established by treaties (2009, p. 82). It is important to note that the countries are obliged to support the EU in performing its most important task in this matter, namely counteracting, overcoming and managing crises threatening the organization and its citizens. Some time will pass until the resolution of the dilemma, whether the Lisbon compromise made in this matter, between the supporters of the EU as an independent international relations entity and the supporters of a confederation model, will be effective. If the EU wishes to get rid of the image of a military minor, and turn from a global actor (defined as global presence) to a global force (defined as global influence), it requires for this purpose a global action strategy going far beyond the contents of the European

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<sup>12</sup> Broader about ideas and visions of France, Germany, Italy, Poland, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom concerning the reformation of the CSDP in: F. Santopinto, M. Price, 2013.

Security Strategy (Lorca, 2007; Biscop, Coelmont, 2012; Rogers, 2011, p. 25). A strategy that would not only show how to react, but also what needs to be done, by who, why, when, and using what means, and at the same time a strategy indicating Union ambitions on the international arena (Coelmont, 2012). So far this is clearly missing. Paradoxically, the events in Ukraine, those concerning the Islamic State or terrorist attacks in Europe can contribute to the increase in the dynamics of defense integration within the EU, and its ineffectiveness will finally cease to be tolerated. For the security of all citizens - let us hope so.

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