David Hume’s Theory of Action

• Authors: Justyna Van den Abbeel

Abstracts

EN

The main goal of this paper is to reconstruct David Hume’s theory of action from the perspective of the second book Of the Passion in his work A Treatise of Human Nature. My paper will proceed in three steps. In the first part I present the main assumptions of Hume’s views on action together with a general outline of his theory. I show that for Hume action has a uniform character and that there is a constant relation between action and the motive which can be understood as desire or aversion. Next, in the second part, the main elements involved in the process of human activity will be outlined, such as: passions, will, liberty, and reason. Although Hume emphasizes that the passions are the main motive of action, since they have the power to initiate and withhold action, reason also plays an important role. In order to come to a better understanding, I will consider the functions which these elements are playing in human action and some of the problematic issues which are connected with them such as, whether each of the passions can motivate a person to action, what the relationship between passions and will is, and what kind of relation between passions and reason can be found. Finally, in the third and last part of my paper, I will conclude with a schematic outline of human action and the relation between different components engaged in the process of action.

Keywords

EN

theory of action; motivation; passion; reason; will; liberty; necessity; human nature

• Publisher: Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek
• Journal: Kultura i Edukacja
• Year: 2016
• Issue: 2(112)
• Pages: 53-65

Dates

published

2016

Contributors

author

Justyna Van den Abbeel

References

• Árdal, P.S. (1966). Passion and Value in Hume’s Treatise. Edinburg: Edinburg University Press.
• Brown, Ch. (1988). Is Hume an Internalist? Journal of the History of Philosophy, 26 (1), 69 87.
• Capaldi, N. (1975). David Hume. The Newtonian Philosopher. Boston: Twayne Publishers.
• Capaldi, N. (1992). Hume’s Place in Moral Philosophy. New York: Peter Lang Publishing.
• Hampton, J. (1995). Does Hume Have and Instrumental Conception of Practical Reason? Hume Studies, 21 (1), 57 74.
• Hume, D. (2000). A Treatise of Human Nature. Oxford: Oxford Philosophical Text.
• Hume, D. (2005). Traktat o naturze ludzkiej, [A Treatise of Human Nature] Warszawa: Fundacja Aletheia.
• Grzeliński, A. (2005). Kategorie „podmiotu” i „przedmiotu” w Dawida Hume’a nauce o naturze ludzkiej. [Categories of „Subject” and „Object” in David Hume’s Theory of Human Nature] Toruń: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Mikołaja Kopernika w Toruniu.
• Jenkins, J., Lewis, P., Madell, G. (1992). Understanding Hume. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
• Mackie, J.L. (1980). Hume’s moral theory. London and New York: Routledge, 1980,
• Millgram, E. (1995). Was Hume a Humean? Hume Studies, 21 (1), 75 94.
• Radcliffe, E.S. (1999). Hume on the generation of motives: Why beliefs alone never motivate, 25 (1 2), 101 122.
• Schmidt, C.M. (2003). David Hume: reason in history. United States of America: The Pennsylvania State University Press.
• Schafer, K. (2008). Practical Reasoning and Practical Reasons in Hume. Hume Studies, 34 (2), 189 208.
• Shaw, D. (1989). Hume’s Theory of Motivation. Hume Studies, 15 (1), 163 183.
• Shaw, D. (1992). Hume’s Theory of Motivation Part 2. Hume Studies, 18 (1), 19 40.
• Shaw, D. (1992). Reason and Feeling in Hume’s Action Theory and Moral Philosophy. Hume Studies, 18 (2), 349 368.
• Smith, N.K. (1966). The Philosophy of David Hume: A Critical Study of Its Origins and Central Doctrines. New York: St. Martin’s Press.
• Smith, M. (1987). The Humean Theory of Motivation. Mind, 96 (381), 36 61.
• Smith, M. (2010). Humeanism About Motivation. W: C. Sandis, T. O’ Connor (red.), A Companion To The Philosophy of Action (s.153 158). Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
• Stalley, R.F. (1986). The Will in Hume’s Treatise. Journal of the History of Philosophy 24 (1), 41 53.
• Stroud, B. (2003). Hume. London and New York: Taylor & Francis e¬Library.
• Żuradzki, T. (2012). Internalizm i eksternalizm w metaetyce. [Internalism and Externalism in Metaethics] Kraków: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego.

Identifiers

DOI

10.15804/kie.2016.02.04

Biblioteka Nauki

2010385