

ALLA ATAMANENKO ▶▶

National University of Ostroh Academy

ORCID ID: <https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4940-1625>**MARIIA AVHUSTIUK** ▶▶

National University of Ostroh Academy

ORCID ID: <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9510-5715>

Forced Migration from Ukraine during the Russian-Ukrainian War: impact on the EU and Ukraine

Forced migration from Ukraine during the Russian-Ukrainian war: impact on the EU and Ukraine

Abstract

The full-scale invasion of Russia into Ukraine on February 24, 2022, which was accompanied by the violation of humanitarian law and the demolition of civilian infrastructure, has led to the emergence of forced migration. Millions of people left the country within a short period. On March 4, the EU Temporary Protection Directive was reactivated in response to the unprecedented flow of migrants from Ukraine. EU countries have opened their borders to migrants from Ukraine, providing them with shelter and assistance. Poland and its neighbouring states, such as Romania, Moldova, Hungary, as well as the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Germany, Austria, received the highest quantity of migrants.

The wave of migration has had a noticeable influence on the functioning of labour markets and employment, even in those regions of Ukraine which have not been exposed to military activity. Comprehensive studies show that external migration, among other factors, will significantly affect the demographic situation in Ukraine due to the increase in the number of people who do not plan to return from abroad. A key

factor in the crisis is the fact that the majority of these people is youth of employable age and children. Besides, educational migration from Ukraine to EU countries has also increased significantly.

The influx of immigrants who have established themselves in the nations of the European Union have significantly impacted the labour markets of these countries, putting a considerable strain on the public funds of the host countries. The question of Ukrainian immigrants' ability to engage in activities such as schooling (including access to educational opportunities for children), employment, residence, and healthcare in both the immediate and long-term future is coming to the fore. Ukrainian and international scholars alike have done numerous studies on external migration from Ukraine; nonetheless, the forced migration resulting from the full-scale military invasion of Ukraine has yet to be adequately examined. Subsequently, the article is intended to examine the displacement circumstances in Ukraine and the EU and to evaluate the consequence of compulsory external migration in Ukraine and the EU.

Keywords: full-scale invasion, forced migration, foreign migration, migrants, refugees, external migration, Ukraine, EU countries

Вынужденная миграция из Украины во время российско-украинской войны: влияние на ЕС и Украину

Аннотация

Полномасштабное вторжение России в Украину 24 февраля 2022 года, сопровождавшееся нарушением агрессором гуманитарного права, разрушением гражданской инфраструктуры, привело к вынужденной миграции. За короткое время страну покинули миллионы людей. Беспрецедентный поток мигрантов из Украины привел к возобновлению 4 марта Директивы ЕС о временной защите. Страны ЕС открыли свои границы для мигрантов из Украины, предоставив им кров и помощь. Наибольшее количество мигрантов приняла Польша, а также другие соседи Украины – Румыния, Молдова, Венгрия, а также Чехия, Словакия, Германия, Австрия и другие.

Волна внешней миграции существенно повлияла на функционирование рынков труда и занятости даже в тех регионах украинского государства, в которых не ведутся боевые действия. Исследования показывают, что внешняя миграция, помимо прочих факторов, существенно повлияет на демографическую ситуацию в Украине из-за увеличения количества людей, которые не планируют возвращаться из-за границы. Важным кризисным фактором является то, что мигрантами являются в основном молодые люди трудоспособного возраста

и дети. Значительно увеличилась и образовательная миграция из Украины в страны ЕС.

В то же время мигранты, обосновавшиеся в странах ЕС, влияют на изменения на рынке труда и сфере занятости, создают дополнительную нагрузку на бюджеты принимающих стран и т.д. Встает вопрос доступа украинских мигрантов к таким сферам жизни, как образование (в том числе доступ к образованию детей), доступ к рынку труда и жилью, здравоохранению в краткосрочной и долгосрочной перспективе.

Внешняя миграция из Украины неоднократно становилась объектом исследований украинских и зарубежных ученых. В то же время вынужденная миграция, связанная с полномасштабным военным вторжением в Украину, является недостаточно изученным явлением. Целью статьи является анализ миграционной ситуации в Украине и ЕС, определение влияния вынужденной внешней миграции на Украину и ЕС.

Ключевые слова: полномасштабное вторжение, вынужденная миграция, международная миграция, мигранты, внешняя миграция, Украина, страны ЕС

Introduction

One of the challenges of the modern world, especially during the last decade, is mass migrations, largely caused by military actions in some regions of the world. A large number of migrants looking for protection cross the borders of the European Union. The Kremlin has used a 'migration weapon' in its hybrid war against the EU. The migration crisis of 2015, initiated by Russia in the Syrian armed conflict, posed a great challenge on the region. The influx of migrants into the EU has resulted in substantial challenges both in the political (i.e. strengthening the positions of far-right parties) and socio-economic (i.e. causing significant expenses for the maintenance of refugees) spheres.

The armed aggression of the Russian Federation in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions in 2014 caused internal migration, and war-related changes in the economy of the state caused external migration. The start of a full-scale war against Ukraine on February 24, 2022, has already caused a powerful wave of internal displacement and numerous external migrations from Ukraine. The majority of external migrants left for the EU countries. As of mid-May 2023, according to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 8,255,288 refugees from Ukraine were registered in

European countries, and 5,140,259 people received Temporary Protection or similar national protection in Europe (UNHCR: *Ukraine Refugee Situation*, 2023). Taking into account the likelihood of double registration of one person in two or more EU countries, or the return of such person to their homeland, the current influx of migration from Ukraine is the largest in the 20th and 21st centuries, although the accuracy of the data may be questionable. Considering that the Ukrainian population is being deported from the occupied territories to Crimea, as well as to the territory of Russia and Belarus, it can be assumed that demographic losses caused by migration processes are significant, and this may have negative consequences for Ukraine and therefore needs the development of a strong state policy aimed at encouraging migrants to come back to their homeland after the end of the war. Thus, it is necessary to analyse the adaptation process of Ukrainian migrants in the host countries, the effects of a large number of qualified workers on the labour market and other economic and social indicators in the EU countries. The research problem is to identify and assess the threats to Ukraine and EU countries presented by the present migration situation.

Characteristics of migration from Ukraine from 2014 to the full-scale war with Russia and state attempts to regulate migration processes

Between the late 1980s and the start of the 1990s, a strong wave of labour migration occurred in Ukraine, brought about by the declining economic conditions and the availability of overseas travel. In this wave, two stages of the increase in the number of migrants can be distinguished: the initial (the late 1980s – early 1990s) and the middle of the second decade of the 21st century, when the nature of migration slightly changed, with highly educated and professional youth taking part. In 2014, the Russian Federation launched an armed attack against Ukraine on the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, followed by the occupation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, yet this initially did not lead to a major outflow of people, as most of them from the affected regions moved to other parts of Ukraine. At the same time, as a result of the war, the economy of Ukraine was seriously affected, even though the hostilities covered only some parts of the territory. This brought about a rise

in the inflation index compared to 2013, reaching 143.3% in 2015 and 112.4% in the following year. The unemployment rate has also increased (*Економіка України за 2016 рік*, 2017). In general, the economic recession of 2014 – 2016 stimulated migration among the population (*Українська міграція у часи кризи*, 2016, p. 14). A study of statistics reveals that the influx of Ukrainian migrants to Poland since pre-war 2013 has multiplied by 6.5 times. In 2016, 1.3 million job offers were extended to Ukrainians in Poland, in contrast to the mere 180,000 job offers in 2010 (*Аналітична доповідь*, 2018, p. 54). In addition, in the 2016/2017 academic year, the number of Ukrainians in foreign universities increased by 56% compared to the 2012/2013 academic year. Consequently, in 2017, Ukrainian students represented 53% of all international students enrolled in higher education in Poland (*Аналітична доповідь*, 2018, p. 53). The process of increasing the number of students and labour migrants intensified in the following years. Thus, according to the Ambassador of Ukraine to the Republic of Poland, Andrii Deshchytsia, in 2021, almost 1.5 million Ukrainians worked in the country and about 50,000 students from Ukraine studied there. He additionally declared that if in 2014 there were 680 Ukrainian-owned enterprises in Poland, by 2021 that number would have risen to approximately 16 000 (*LB.ua: Посол назвав число*, 2021).

The vectors of external migration between 2014-2021 was directed both to Central and Western Europe and the Russian Federation (which was the major recipient country of the Ukrainian workers in 2012), although the trend of migrants moving in a north-eastern direction has gradually decreased. Typically, citizens from the western parts of Ukraine sought out employment in the EU countries, yet that ratio has shifted gradually (*Українська міграція у часи кризи*, 2016, p. 22).

After the beginning of the armed conflict in 2014, some of the displaced people from the occupied or front-line territories also sought refuge abroad. Thus, the number of submitted applications for asylum increased significantly in 2014, with Russia receiving a dozen times more applicants than the EU (CEDOS: *Українці просять притулок*, 2016). The majority of asylum seekers in the EU during that period saw their requests denied, mainly on the basis of the potential to relocate to another region and be able to find safe haven there (CEDOS: *Українці просять притулок*, 2016).

In order to ensure the appropriate control of external migration and to reflect the necessity of altering Ukrainian law associated with the possibility of acquiring a visa-free regime, the Law of Ukraine “On External Labor Migration” was passed in November 2015. It enabled the regulation of state policy in matters of external labour migration and the establishment of conditions conducive to the return of labour migrants and their family members to Ukraine and their successful reintegration into society (*Закон України*, 2015). Despite its merely declarative nature, the adoption of the Law served as the initial milestone on the path to more tightly regulating labour migration. In April 2017, the government issued an order approving the Plan of measures to preserve the reintegration of labour migrants into society, which was also largely declarative. In July 2017, the Government approved the State Migration Policy Strategy of Ukraine for the period until 2025. Acknowledging both pros and cons of international migration, it outlined such issues as outflow of highly skilled individuals and youth, conversion of temporary labour migration into permanent, insufficient regulation of the internal migration, the lack of incentives for Ukrainians abroad to return, the low attractiveness of Ukraine for migration, and the unregulated migration of foreigners (*Стратегія*, 2017).

With a view to achieving the goals proscribed in the Document, it is necessary to diminish bureaucratic obstacles to the liberty of motion of the citizens of Ukraine, to minimize the adverse implications of emigration from Ukraine and to optimize its beneficial effects on the growth of the country by steadily eliminating economic, social and other factors of public life that lead to emigration, providing opportunities for temporary legal employment abroad, stimulating educational exchange programs, raising public awareness of migration opportunities to promote legal migration, ensuring protection of the rights of citizens working and living abroad (*Стратегія*, 2017).

Establishing the essential conditions for the re-entry and absorption of Ukrainian emigrants was an essential goal for Ukraine, which included, inter alia, the introduction of national and regional initiatives to assist with their return, as well as taking into account the potential of introducing a state credit system for migrants, setting up additional advantages for those who will establish their own businesses and undertake activities that are intended to help re-emigrant children to adjust to the Ukrainian schooling system

(*Стратегія*, 2017). The strategy also provided measures to attract foreign migrants to Ukraine and integrate them into Ukrainian society. As a consequence of the armed conflict in Ukraine, the plan has not been successfully implemented on a large scale, thus, no significant economic expansion has been achieved, thereby hampering the ability to diminish migratory trends. The migration policy of neighbouring countries did not contribute to the reduction of migration either.

The President's 2018 Analytical Report to the Annual Message to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine "On the Internal and External Situation of Ukraine in 2018" took into account the grave implications of the population decrease, which includes departures abroad. Thus, it was evidently acknowledged that intensive labour migration is an obstacle to the development of the national economy (*Аналітична доповідь*, 2018, p. 54), and a separate section was devoted to the challenges of labour migration, a topic which has been addressed in similar documents before (*Аналітична доповідь*, 2018, pp. 229–236).

Much less attention was paid to the problem of demographic losses due to labour migration in a similar document of 2020, but it has been observed that a number of European countries, which are the primary receiving countries for Ukrainian emigrants, are liberalizing their employment regulations for Ukrainians, considering them to be desirable migrants due to their educational qualifications and occupational abilities as well as their cultural familiarity (*Аналітична доповідь*, 2020, p. 9). Simultaneously, it was recorded that the abatement in quality of life intensified the population of migrant workers relative to 2005–2008 (*Аналітична доповідь*, 2020, p. 28). In 2021, internal migration was not an individual point of emphasis within a comparable document; though, a considerable level of attention was devoted to resolving matters that could improve life in Ukraine (*Аналітична доповідь*, 2021).

Following a dip in the migration rate from Ukraine in between 2008–2013, a notable growth in immigration from Ukraine was noticed from February 2014 to February 2022. Among the migrants were those who were looking for earning opportunities or a higher standard of living in the EU countries, as well as those who were seeking an asylum. But the quantitative indicators of migration were closely correlated with the previous years, which, along with the economic problems in Ukraine, allow us to consider

the labour-related years to a greater extent. This affirms the state's adoption of the migration regulation.

Characteristics of the migration wave after February 24, 2022

It is believed that during its history, Ukraine experienced four mass migration waves to the West: at the end of the 19th century, during the Liberation Struggles of 1917–1921, at the end of the Second World War, with the fall of the 'Iron Curtain' in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Bearing in mind certain caveats, the departure of students and professional youth abroad during the second decade of the 21st century can be considered as a emigration wave. Nevertheless, as the Russian invasion of Ukraine began, an enormous influx of migrants from Ukraine commenced, which was quite distinctive and posed a considerable issue for the EU, while simultaneously creating numerous challenges and risks for Ukraine. In the first days of the invasion, the situation in Ukraine was unpredictable. A large part of the territory was occupied; the frontline regions were (and many remain) frequently bombarded. Beyond the front, no place was secure from missile or drone fire. In the winter of 2022–2023, Russia's deliberate destruction of infrastructure facilities caused a deficiency of electricity, water, and heat supply to the inhabitants of the cities.

The largest outflow of migrants from Ukraine occurred in the first month of hostilities. The investigations that were conducted within the framework of the Cedos Research Centre project discovered that the displacement of people within the country was intermittent, with the intensity of the migration varying in accordance to how close a region or settlement was to the conflict (CEDOS: Філіпчук, Ломоносова, Сирбу, Кабанець, 2022). The possibility of migration to the relatively peaceful territories of Ukraine was complicated, because the humanitarian passages were not always reliable, and the pathways of travel were often subjected to shelling. Both personal vehicles and evacuation trains of the railway "Ukrzaliznytsia" and evacuation buses were used as means of departure. At the same time, according to the International Organization for Migration, there are 7,134,000 internally displaced persons in Ukraine as of May 23, 2022 (Міжнародна організація з міграції: *Звіт*, 2022).

According to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, from February 24th, when Russia began its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, to March 22nd, 3,626,546 people left Ukraine, of which the majority (i.e. 2,144,244 people) had migrated to Poland gradually. Nonetheless, the emigration of refugees had started to decline, although not completely, by the end of March. As a result, according to data as of May 23, 2023, a total of 8,255,288 people crossed the borders, while 5,140,259 people issued permits for temporary protection, the most in the EU countries – in Poland (1,605,738 persons), the Czech Republic (519,964 persons), Germany (945,218 persons), Spain (177,228 persons), Italy (175,107 persons), Bulgaria (159,225 persons), Romania (132,362 persons), Slovakia (116,718 persons), the Netherlands (89,730 persons), Ireland (83,922 persons) (UNHCR, *Protection Risks*, 2023). The UNHCR and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine present varying statistics on crossing the borders between Ukraine and the EU as a result of distinct calculation approaches employed. Due to the circumstances, at the moment it is impossible to establish the number of persons relocated to Russia from the occupied territories, which is why the UNHCR data here cannot be considered as accurate. Moreover, it is impossible to establish the number of people who entered the EU countries through the Russian Federation.

Since the commencement of the full-scale invasion, the topic of Ukrainian migrants has been extensively explored both within Ukraine and in other countries. Considering the intricacy, ambiguity, duration and territorial scope of the phenomenon, researchers have now united to look into the matter of forced migration from Ukraine. Thus, in November 2022, the newly created Research Network on Ukrainian Migration at the United Nations University-Merit in Maastricht, The Netherlands, was launched. The Research Network on Ukrainian Migration is a collaboration between the Centre of Migration Research, University of Warsaw; Migration Policy Centre, EUI; Maastricht University; and the United Nations University-MERIT (Centre of Migration Research, 2022). Other institutions have been running a range of investigations, including surveys, enabling us to form an understanding of the broad features of Ukrainian migration for 2022–2023.

According to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in European countries, the results of the surveys conducted among

migrants suggested that the majority of refugees are women aged between 18 to 59. In terms of percentage, the proportion of children among all refugees was 35% and this proportion was equal for both genders. In Ukraine, the majority of migrant women (54%) were employed, 18% were of retirement age, 12% were housewives, 5% had their own business, 5% were unemployed and 4% were undergoing higher education (UNHCR: *Protection Risks*, 2023). In terms of family composition, adult refugees who left without relatives made up 21%, one parent (mainly mother) with children – 37%, single elderly persons – 14%, two adults – 9%, two adults with dependants – 19% (UNHCR: *Protection Risks*, 2023).

The survey also showed that refugees from Ukraine have a high level of education. A total of 54% of respondents have higher education. Of them, 13% have a bachelor's degree, 24% have a specialist degree, and 17% have a master's degree or even a PhD. However, the survey also showed that, in addition to Ukrainian (97%) and Russian (83%), only 17% of migrants speak English, 11% – Polish, and 2% – German. The latter means that to get a job, most of the refugees need to learn the language of the host country. As the survey shows, the majority of migrants were from those areas where Russian aggression first spread and shelling and immediate threat to life were frequent (UNHCR, *Protection Risks*, 2023).

A survey of 511 refugees from Ukraine was conducted by the sociological service of the Razumkov Centre across 30 countries (including 111 refugees in Poland, 85 in Germany, 231 in other EU countries, and 63 outside the EU). Just as in the UNHCR study, it was found that women predominate among refugees (93%). The most populous age groups among respondents were those between 30 and 39 (42%) and 40 and 49 (29%). Results reveal that 74% of those surveyed ventured abroad with children, 4% with grandchildren, and 45% of those who returned to Ukraine during April-May 2022 were accompanied by children. (Центр Разумкова: *Настрої та оцінки*, 2022). A substantial majority (83%) of migrants possess a degree or are in the process of completing higher education. The most represented social groups among the respondents are highly qualified specialists (30%), the CEOs of enterprises and their divisions (14%), entrepreneurs (14%), skilled workers (12%), and housewives (11%) (Центр Разумкова, *Настрої та оцінки*, 2022).

The EU Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2022/382 of March 4, 2022 entered into force and Council Directive 2001/55/EC of July 20, 2001, on temporary protection for Ukrainians was activated, which provides temporarily protection to Ukrainians leaving their home country after February 24, 2022, and staying in the EU countries for a period of one year with the possibility of extension to three years. Individuals with a temporary status of protection shall be granted the permission to work, as well as comprehensive access to healthcare, educational and social welfare services. Denmark, which has the features of EU membership, has adopted a special law that also provides opportunities for employment, education, and medical and social welfare benefits (European Commission: *New Danish law*, 2022). In the states included in the Temporary Protection Directive 2001/55/EC, supplementary regulations were approved to deal with the plight of Ukrainian migrants. Upon arrival in the host nation, the refugees had the option to gain varying statuses, from refugee to those seeking temporary protection and asylum. Asylum-seekers are persons who have applied for asylum, but their application has not yet been considered. Simultaneously, the researchers from OPORA are accurate in their assertion that it is necessary to consider that some Ukrainians can stay in other countries without taking advantage of international legal statuses, for instance as tourists or with a visa for another purpose, as some migrants have the authorization to remain in certain countries for the purpose of study or work. It has been noted, that during the year some migrants, especially from the western regions of Ukraine, have chosen to return or made short visits to the country.

Risks and challenges for Ukraine of the modern migration crisis

Forced migration of inhabitants from Ukraine creates several risks and threats. A key concern is that a considerable share of the migrants may not return to Ukraine after the war, thus leading to a substantial depletion of human capital and, consequently, drastically diminishing the chances for economic growth.

Varying surveys performed by separate organizations present diverse statistics on the non-return of migrants. A well-known Ukrainian sociologist, director of the M.V. Ptukha Institute of Demography and Social Research of

the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, Ella Libanova, believes that the results of surveys conducted by the Warsaw School of Economics and German sociologists, claiming that 90% of refugees from the country plan to return to Ukraine, are exaggerated. Bearing in mind the statistic of repatriates following the World War I and II of the 20th century, when the percentage of those who returned was 30-40%, the researcher indicates that a higher number of Ukrainians should come back after the war, yet not as much as 90%. Her conclusion is based on the observation that a sizable number of Ukrainian migrants do not seek asylum, yet are instead accepted under temporary protection, realizing they are subject to the time constraints of their stay in the destination country (Forbes: Федорчук, Давиденко, 2023). Simultaneously, it must be taken into account that the beneficiary of temporary protection may not return to Ukraine, as certain host nations provide pathways for legalizing continued residence when gainful employment is established. Concurrently, the prolonged contemplation of the grounds for gaining refugee status does not provide the option of obtaining employment, traveling, and other vital undertakings for migrants.

Surveys carried out in August 2022 by the EU-funded research organization Gradus Research together with the Centre for Economic Recovery reveal that the share of external migrants who want to return home as soon as possible is still declining. The proportion of those wishing to go back to their home country stood at 55%, whereas 20% of respondents expressed the intention to remain and settle in a foreign nation. Also, at this time, the share of people who hesitate to answer the question about return has increased (up to 25% of respondents). Simultaneously, 69% of the survey participants indicated that they had the ability to stay abroad, whereas only 10% lacked such option. (Research Company GRADUS: *Міграція*, 2022, p. 3).

E. Libanova delineates the influence of the war's length on repatriation attitudes, correlating both to the exacerbated destruction of infrastructure leaving people with no place to return, and to the intensification of assimilation of migrants in receiving countries, such as education of children (Forbes: Федорчук, Давиденко, 2023), employment, language knowledge and a deeper acquaintance with the possibilities of the host country. The detrimental impact of the extended period of disconnection between the two partners and the family as a whole, which may be exacerbated if a physical

border is established between them, can be added to the accumulation of negative elements which can lead to the breakdown of some marriages. In this situation, a female living in a foreign country may commence a new marriage, which will not lead to a desire to return home. An additional factor in determining whether to go back or stay away is the discrepancy between the lifestyle in war or post-war Ukraine and the countries which people have moved to, which encompasses not only financial comfort but also the chances it provides for individual development. And so, it can be assumed that a number of families separated today may be reunited not in Ukraine, but rather in a foreign country.

If the difficulties experienced by contemporary migrants are not dealt with adequately, it will inevitably lead to their repatriation. Among these, most often reported in the surveys are the following: longing for the homeland (70%), problem of not speaking the language of the host country, which restricts communication with the local population (65% of respondents, but in some countries language courses are offered, which was noted by 36%), difficulties with acquiring employment (42%), issues with renting housing (32%), complications with receiving treatment and medical care (31%), problems with arranging children's education (14%), etc. (Центр Разумкова: *Настрої та оцінки*, 2022).

It is important that among the factors that determine the desire to return to Ukraine, in addition to safety (56%), the availability of housing (32%) and paid labour (40%), the polls also mention a love for Ukraine (45%), the desire to live and develop in Ukraine (38%), availability of prospects for development in Ukraine (21%), reunification with family (35%), resumption of business in Ukraine (15%) (Research Company GRADUS: *Міграція*, 2022, p. 18). These indicators indirectly increase the probability of migrants returning home. Investigation of the return of migrants from the western parts of Ukraine from March to April 2022 implies that, with the homeland being safe, the possibilities for return will increase.

To facilitate the return of migrants, policies regarding repatriation and subsequent reintegration of migrants into Ukrainian society should be developed. Herein lies the potential of rapid and high-quality protection of the territories, the construction of high-quality modern housing in place of the destroyed one and the likelihood of purchasing it with a soft loan

or acquiring it on a long-term lease, initiating new jobs, developing the transport, housing, social, administrative infrastructure of cities and other settlements, developing preschool and school education, enhancing the health care system, etc. It is necessary that conditions be created that are not worse than those of the migrants in the country of the host. Bearing in mind that some of the migrants may not repatriate to Ukraine, largely comprising of young individuals with offspring, this could potentially result in an alteration in the sex-age composition of the population and a decrease in its size (CEDOS: Філіпчук, Сирбу, 2022), it is essential to craft a policy of welcoming migrants from other nations to occupy the labour market, thereby hastening the economic development of the country. At the same time, sociological studies of Ukrainian youth, conducted on the eve of the war in Transcarpathia, demonstrate (Токап, 2021) that Ukraine needs elucidatory endeavours on the need to attract migrants to preserve and develop the labour market to form a tolerant perception of migrants. Moreover, implementing support for Ukrainian education for the children of migrants should become a priority.

Ukraine should also be aware that there are currently destroyed settlements in the Luhansk and Donetsk regions, the complete restoration of which (if a decision is made) will require considerable amount of time, which will impede the return of those who have been displaced. Therefore, it is worth considering changes in the structure of economic development by region, encouragement of business to develop enterprises in accordance with regional and national needs, the attraction of foreign investments, the return of Ukrainian business to the foreign market, to simplify the process of starting business, its operation, and introduction tax benefits. Violations in the ecological system caused by the war will also become a problem for Ukraine, which must also receive a feedback from the government; otherwise part of the territories will be suitable for life just in theory.

Encouraging the return of migrants to Ukraine will reduce the problems associated with the demographic crisis in the post-war Ukraine (i.e. a noticeable acceleration in the aging population, a decrease in the number of working population with an amplified pressure on the pension system, a tightening of the internal market and, as a result, a shrinking of the labour market). By bringing back our citizens or attracting migrants from outside,

we can significantly enhance the possibilities for economic progress from the increase in the labour market. The experience gained by migrants in the EU countries will contribute to the development of production technologies in non-traditional types of business activities in Ukraine and enhance the effectiveness of those which are already in place.

The European Union and forced migration from Ukraine

For the countries of European Union, the support of migrants from Ukraine became a kind of challenge to the European unity, which was successfully overcome. With the intention of expressing solidarity with the Ukrainian refugees, the EU has taken a series of steps by establishing transport and information hubs at the main border crossings, as well as facilitating the transport of humanitarian aid (European Council: *Impact of Russia's invasion*, 2023). For the first time in its history, the European Union activated the Temporary Protection Directive setting the legal rules to help in facilitation of the considerable influx of people. Simultaneously, the European Commission moved swiftly to collaborate with EU nations in order to accumulate data regarding the circumstances on the ground and to inhibit the trafficking of human beings. The Directorate-General on Migration and Home Affairs (DG HOME) is actively coordinating the Solidarity Platform, which brings together the EU countries, external partners, and the EU agencies in order to guarantee the implementation of the Temporary Protection Directive. Through the EU Migration Preparedness and Crisis Blueprint, essential data including the influx of refugees is collected to effectively direct migration management response (European Commission: *Migration management*, 2022). To explain the provisions of the Temporary Protection Directive and the Council's implementing Decision in the context of granting temporary protection to people fleeing the war in Ukraine, on March 21, 2022, the Commission issued Operational guidelines. The Solidarity Platform has been set up to ensure the provisions of the Temporary Protection Directive in close collaboration with all parties mentioned below. Its role is to monitor the needs identified in EU countries and coordinate an operational response. The Solidarity Platform also provides a general forum for discussion to support the implementation of the 10-Point Plan (European Commission,

Migration management, 2022). The Solidarity Platform, coordinated by DG HOME, brings together the EU countries, Schengen Associated States, the EU Agencies (in particular, the EU Agency for Asylum, Frontex and Europol), IOM, UNHCR and other partners, including civil society organizations in specific meeting formats, Ukrainian authorities, International partners (European Commission: *Migration management*, 2022).

Estimates of the migration profile of refugees from Ukraine, made by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), indicate high possibilities of replenishing the European labour market with highly qualified specialists (in contrast to the wave of migration to the EU in 2014-2017). Although the projections are made in the context of high level of uncertainty, across all European countries, the labour force is expected to increase by approximately 0.5% by the end of 2022. The biggest increase in the number is seen in the Czech Republic (2.2%), Poland (2.1%), and Estonia (1.9%) (OECD, *The potential contribution*, 2022). In addition, the data confirm the information that the majority of migrants are women with children. At the same time, the number of children with migrant women is smaller, the further the recipient country is from Ukraine.

Some problems slow down the process of employment and adaptation of migrants: 1) psychological trauma of the war and unpreparedness for external migration; 2) language; 3) some migrants lack documents confirming their level of education and qualifications; 4) internal competition in the labour market; 5) differences in labour markets and lack of work experience in European conditions; 6) weak internal ties with someone in the host country and ignorance of the labour market, which reduces their chances of finding a qualified job; 7) low level of unemployment in part of the recipient countries, which limits the labour market and makes employment in several industries impossible (OECD, *The potential contribution*, 2022).

In addition, the numerous rather unexpected forced migrations from Ukraine led, especially in the first month of the escape, to oversaturation of the population of some cities of neighbouring countries, in particular, Poland, which created an additional burden not only on the country's financial system, but also on the medical, educational, and housing infrastructure, and caused the need to redirect the population to other cities and countries. Considering the possibility of employing refugees, there is a danger of increasing

unemployment and competition in the labour market, although analysts of the Ukrainian Institute for the Future claim that migrants complement local labour resources, rather than compete with them (Український інститут майбутнього, *Боротьба за людей*, 2022). Global challenges related to the war and the heightened demand for goods in countries with a great number of immigrants can lead to an increase in the level of consumer prices, in particular, for food items.

Nevertheless, according to analysts at the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, there is a notable disparity between refugees from Ukraine and those from elsewhere, which should make it easier for them to find employment, consequently bestowing advantages on both the migrant and the host nation: 1) a high percentage of people with higher education among migrants, which should greatly ease their integration into the European labour market; 2) the capability to quickly comprehend the language, in comparison to those who are not well-educated or illiterate persons; 3) the presence of labour migrants from Ukraine on the labour market of certain EU countries, in particular Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, the Baltic states, provides evidence of the potential for getting employment in the EU countries and suggests that job seeking can be expedited, especially if one has knowledge of the language; 4) a significant number of students from Ukraine in the EU countries; 5) the availability of relevant information in social networks, which creates the possibility of being aware of the functioning of the labour market; 6) geographical and cultural proximity to the population of host countries; 7) obtaining the status of a person who has acquired the right to temporary protection enables quick employment instead of waiting for the status of a refugee with corresponding restrictions; 8) the need of the host countries for a workforce that will fill the gap in the labour market created by the current demographic situation (OECD: *The potential contribution*, 2022).

Providing possible support to migrants from expatriates is indispensable both in terms of the adaptation process and for comprehending the possibility of staying in the EU rather than returning to Ukraine. Based on the Eurostat's figures, at the close of 2020, there were an estimated 1.6 million Ukrainian citizens who were in possession of a legitimate residence permit in the EU Member States, signifying the third-largest group of citizens from

non-EU countries, after Morocco and Turkey (Eurostat, 2022). At the same time, a significant number of Ukrainians had the right to legal residence in Poland (over 500,000), Italy (223,000), the Czech Republic (165,000), Spain (80,000), Germany (80,000) and other countries (OECD, *The potential contribution*, 2022). Ukrainians who obtained citizenship in such countries should be included in these statistics. As a result, labour migrants and Ukrainians living outside of the country are considerably influential in providing migrants with aid in searching for housing, employment, as well as emotional and economic support, which is an essential factor in the adaptation process. Moreover, diaspora organizations support everyone who asks for help (П'ЯТКОВСЬКА, 2022).

By supplying both financial and logistical resources, the European Union has gone far in assisting Poland, Romania and Moldova, all of whom have willingly accepted the greatest number of refugees. At the organizational level, unified standards of support for refugees and children are being devised, granting access to educational and medical services, providing refugees with information on the Internet and other resources, all in Ukrainian. A network of Ukrainian-speaking psychologists and psychiatrists is being arranged to come together and join efforts in providing assistance to children from Ukraine. Rigorous outreach is being undertaken to combat the exploitation of refugees. To simplify adaptation in the recipient countries and integration into their society, several decisions have been made regarding the simplified procedure for the recognition of educational and other documents, the possibility of redirecting funds from European structural and investment funds and the Fund for European Aid to the Destitute to help refugees is provided (Українські біженці війни, 2022).

Some EU countries, supporting migrants, deliberately take steps that will contribute to the improvement of their demographic situation. Thus, in Bulgaria, ethnic Bulgarians are offered not protection, but citizenship. Similar benefits are available for persons of Ukrainian origin from Ukraine in Hungary. Many countries have opened free programs for Ukrainian students, often without requiring funds for accommodation, especially during the first year of the war.

Conclusions

The analysis makes it possible to state that with the beginning of Russia's armed aggression against Ukraine and the occupation of Crimea in 2014, compared to previous years, external migration from Ukraine increased. However, the endeavours of numerous migrants to acquire asylum within the European Union were largely unsuccessful, owing to the fact that military interventions were limited in several areas. Predominantly, migration was associated with economic motivations and was focused on securing employment in the nations of the European Union. Quantitative indicators of migration at this time were completely correlated with previous years. Recognizing the potential danger of population losses due to migration brought about the formation of various documents that sought to restrict the process of migration and to encourage the return of those who had already left. Currently, Ukraine is confronted with a considerable risk that some migrants may not be able to go back to their homes, which is attributed to their migration characteristics, the situation of their previous living conditions, and additional elements. Therefore, the Ukrainian government should make significant efforts to develop and implement refugee return policies. The EU countries managed to overcome the difficulties of the initial stage of the migration wave by joint efforts. Taking into account the assimilation of Ukrainian refugees, who offer a variety of benefits, most European Union countries will be rewarded with an extended labour market, an amplified consumer market, and the replenishment of demographic shortages.

PROFESSOR ALLA ATAMANENKO

Department of International Relations
National University of Ostroh Academy
Seminarska 2, 35800 Ostroh (Ukraine)
alla.atamanenko@oa.edu.ua

DR. MARIIA AVHUSTIUK

Department of International Relations
National University of Ostroh Academy
Seminarska 2, 35800 Ostroh (Ukraine)
mariia.avgustiuk@oa.edu.ua

References

- Center of Migration Research of University of Warsaw: *Research Network on Ukrainian Migration Launch* (2022, November). Retrieved from: <https://www.migracje.uw.edu.pl/wydarzenia/research-network-on-ukrainian-migration-launch-2/>.
- European Commission: *Migration management: Welcoming refugees from Ukraine. Migration and Home Affairs* (2022, March). Retrieved from: https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/policies/migration-and-asylum/migration-management/migration-management-welcoming-refugees-ukraine_en.
- European Commission: *New Danish law for those fleeing Ukraine mirrors EU Temporary Protection Directive* (2022, 16 March). Retrieved from: https://ec.europa.eu/migrant-integration/news/new-danish-law-those-fleeing-ukraine-mirrors-eu-temporary-protection-directive_en.
- European Council: *Impact of Russia's invasion of Ukraine on the markets: EU response* (2023, 31 March). Retrieved from: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/eu-response-ukraine-invasion/impact-of-russia-s-invasion-of-ukraine-on-the-markets-eu-response/>.
- European Website on Integration* (2022, 16 March). Retrieved from: https://ec.europa.eu/migrant-integration/news/new-danish-law-those-fleeing-ukraine-mirrors-eu-temporary-protection-directive_en.
- Eurostat (2022). *Residence permits – statistics on stock of valid permits at the end of the year*. Retrieved from: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Residence_permits_-_statistics_on_stock_of_valid_permits_at_the_end_of_the_year&oldid=546073#NonEU_citizens_with_a_valid_residence_permit.
- OECD: *The potential contribution of Ukrainian refugees to the labour force in European host countries. OECD policy responses: Ukraine tackling the policy challenge* (2022, 27 July). Retrieved from: <https://www.oecd.org/ukraine-hub/policy-responses/the-potential-contribution-of-ukrainian-refugees-to-the-labour-force-in-european-host-countries-e88a6a55/#section-d1e90>.

- OPORA: *The impact of a full-scale war on the migration of Ukrainian people: how the scale of displacement is assessed by the state of Ukraine and international organizations* (2023, 15 February). Retrieved from: https://www.oporaua.org/en/report/viyana/24523-vpliv-povnomasshtabnoyi-viini-na-migratsiiu-ukrayintsiv-iak-masshtabi-peremishchennia-otsiniuiut-derzhava-ukrayina-ta-mizhnarodni-organizatsiyi?gclid=Cj0KCQjw98ujBhCgARIsAD7QeAglUmQvanur0WCPTP-SuC8fpZQF7j4Or4EIJc6GuAYf5RJ9WwlQcO4YaAjRvEALw_wcB.
- UNHCR: *Protection Risks and Needs of Refugees from Ukraine* (27.05.2023). Retrieved from: <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/dataviz/293?sv=54&geo=0>.
- UNHCR: *Ukraine Refugee Situation* (23 May, 2023). Retrieved from: <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/ukraine>.
- Аналітична доповідь до щорічного Послання Президента України до Верховної Ради України* (2021). Київ: Національний інститут стратегічних досліджень. Retrieved from: <https://niss.gov.ua/publikatsiyi/poslannya-prezydenta-ukrayiny/analitichna-dopovid-do-shchorichnoho-poslannya>.
- Аналітична доповідь до Щорічного Послання Президента України до Верховної Ради України «Про внутрішнє та зовнішнє становище України в 2018 році»* (2018). Київ: Національний інститут стратегічних досліджень. Retrieved from: https://niss.gov.ua/sites/default/files/2019-02/Analit_Dopovid_Poslannia_2018.pdf.
- Аналітична доповідь Національного інституту стратегічних досліджень до щорічного Послання Президента України до Верховної Ради України про внутрішнє і зовнішнє становище України* (2020). Київ: Національний інститут стратегічних досліджень. Retrieved from: <https://niss.gov.ua/publikatsiyi/poslannya-prezydenta-ukrayiny/analitichna-dopovid-do-shchorichnoho-poslannya-0>.
- Економіка України за 2016 рік. *Урядовий кур'єр. Газета Кабінету Міністрів України*. (2017, 14 лютого). Retrieved from: <https://ukurier.gov.ua/uk/articles/ekonomika-ukrayini-za-2016-rik/>.
- Закон України «Про зовнішню трудову міграцію»* (2015). Retrieved from: <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/761-19#Text>.
- Міжнародна організація з міграції: *Звіт про внутрішнє переміщення в Україні. Опитування загального населення. Раунд 5*. (2022, 23 травня). Retrieved from: https://ukraine.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbd11861/files/documents/iom_gen-pop-report_r5_ukr.pdf.
- Міністерство соціальної політики України (2016, 5 грудня). Retrieved from: <https://www.msp.gov.ua/news/11946.html>.
- П'ятковська, О. (2022). Українські вимушені мігранти у Польщі. *Геополітика України: історія і сучасність: збірник наукових праць*, Вип. 1(28), ред. кол. Л.М. Газуда та ін. Ужгород: ДВНЗ «УжНУ», 69–79.
- Стратегія державної міграційної політики України на період до 2025 року*. Retrieved from: <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/482-2017-%D1%80#Text>.
- Токар, П. (2022). Ціннісні орієнтири студентської молоді щодо міграції та інших глобальних викликів напередодні російсько-української війни (за результатами соціологічних досліджень). *Геополітика України: історія і сучасність: збірник наукових праць*, Вип. 1(28), ред. кол. Л.М. Газуда та ін. Ужгород: ДВНЗ «УжНУ», 89–97.

- Українська міграція у часи кризи: вимушена і трудова мобільність* (2016). Під ред.: Душана Дрбохлава, Марти Ярошевич. Прага.
- Український інститут майбутнього: *Боротьба за людей: Україна програла битву, але має виграти війну* (2022, 5 жовтня). Retrieved from: <https://uifuture.org/publications/borotba-za-lyudej-ukrayina-prograla-bytvu-ale-maye-vygraty-vijnu/>.
- Українські біженці війни за кордоном (аналітичний огляд)* (2022, квітень). Національний інститут стратегічних досліджень. Retrieved from: https://niss.gov.ua/sites/default/files/2022-04/bizhenci_30042022.pdf.
- Центр Разумкова: *Настрої та оцінки українських біженців (липень – серпень 2022)*. Retrieved from: <https://razumkov.org.ua/napriamky/sotsiologichni-doslidzhennia/nastroi-ta-otsinky-ukrainskykh-bizhentsiv-lypen-serpen-2022p>.
- CEDOS: *Українці просять притулок у ЄС: справді біженці чи економічні мігранти?* (2016, 1 квітня). Retrieved from: <https://cedos.org.ua/researches/ukraintsi-prosiat-prytulok-u-yes-spravdi-bizhentsi-chy-ekonomichni-mihranty/zvit>.
- CEDOS: Філіпчук Л., Ломоносова Н., Сирбу О., Кабанець Ю. *Вимушена міграція і війна в Україні (24 лютого – 24 березня 2022)*. (2022, 29 березня). Retrieved from: <https://cedos.org.ua/researches/vymushena-migracziya-i-vijna-v-ukrayini-24-lyutogo-24-bereznua-2022/>.
- CEDOS: Філіпчук, Л., Сирбу, О. *Вимушена міграція і війна в Україні (24 березня – 10 червня 2022)*. (2022, 27 червня). Retrieved from: <https://cedos.org.ua/researches/vymushena-migracziya-i-vijna-v-ukrayini-24-bereznua-10-cheravnua-2022/>.
- Forbes: Федорчук, В., Давиденко, Б. *Скільки залишилось українців? Хто не повернеться? Яким буде українське суспільство та економіка? Інтерв'ю з соціологинєю Еллою Лібановою*. (2023, 17 січня). Retrieved from: <https://forbes.ua/war-in-ukraine/skilki-zalishilos-ukraintsiv-khto-ne-povernetsya-yakim-bude-ukrainske-suspilstvo-ta-ekonomika-intervyu-z-sotsiologineyu-elloyu-libanovoyu-17012023-11104>.
- LB.ua: *Посол назвав число українських трудових мігрантів у Польщі* (2021, 21 липня). Retrieved from: https://lb.ua/news/2021/07/20/489772_posol_nazvav_chislo_ukrainskih.html.
- Research Company GRADUS: *Міграція та соціально-політичні настрої під час повномасштабної війни Росії проти України – сьома хвиля дослідження (2022, серпень). Аналітичний звіт*. Retrieved from: https://gradus.app/documents/317/Gradus_EU_wave_12_UA.pdf.