THE LATE WESTPHALIAN INTERNATIONAL ORDER

by Marek Pietraś

The international order, denoting in a very general sense the manner of the organization and functioning of the international environment in a given period of time[1], is a dynamic construction that evolves. The feature of the present stage is a transition from its earlier form called the Westphalian order to the future form with qualitatively new features, sometimes called the post-Westphalian order. This process does however mean that the "parameters" of the Westphalian international order are to be replaced by the parameters of the post-Westphalian order. The qualitatively new features of the organization and functioning of the international environment "coexist" with those characteristic of the Westphalian system of international relations. This "coexistence" determines the distinctive feature of the present stage of international relations, which is a hybridity or combining of solutions, often opposing in their logic, relating to the organization and functioning of the international environment. Hence it seems appropriate to term the present stage of dynamics of and change in international relations as the late Westphalian order.

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[1] See. M. Pietraś, *Pozimnowojenny ład międzynarodowy,* [in:] *Międzynarodowe stosunki polityczne,* ed. idem, Lublin 2007, p. 295

SPECIFICITY OF THE WESTPHALIAN ORDER

The international Westphalian order, considering the logic of its organization and functioning, was consistent, organized around the existence and activities of the centralized nation-state. Its rise radically changed the subjective structure and, consequently, the logic of functioning of the international environment. International relations began to be understood as relations between nations organized into states. The state-centric system thus arose, was a qualitative change in the organization of social life as compared with the Middle Ages. The emergence of the centralized nation state meant consolidating the implementation of such values as security, order, stability, and justice within one coherent structure, having exclusive rights to control social life within a specific territory, and independent of other states. This exclusivity "inside the state" and independence "outside the state" was called sovereignty.[2] This idea became the main principle, which organized the functioning of the Westphalian statecentric international environment.

Although the emergence of centralized nation-states, which are the main element of the Westphalian system of international relations, was a centuries-long process, the special, symbolic moment marking the rise of the system is regarded to be the signing of the Westphalian peace on the 24th October 1648, which ended the Thirty Years War (1618–1648). The peace treaties concluded in Münster and Osnabrück confirmed the existence of independent and formally equal states, thus invalidating the idea of the universal Christian community ruled by the Pope. They also confirmed and mutually recognized the sovereignty of states in respect of their territory. The agreements also contributed to the development of diplomatic relations between centralized, territorial and sovereign states and international law as the regulator of their mutual relations and the bond linking the international community.

The developed "model" of organization of social life, called the Westphalian system of international relations, was initially applied to Europe. With the geopolitical expansion of the European powers then, it gradually became a global system.

There are convergent though not identical views on the "parameters" or elements that make up the "model" of the organization of social life called the Westphalian system of international relations. According to Kimon Valaskakis the pillars of the system are made up of: 1) nation-states as the only actor endowed with sovereignty; 2) exercise of sovereign laws by states in the form of control of a specific territory; 3) nation-states as not only the sole sovereigns but also the most powerful actors functioning in the international environment; 4) international law having resulted

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[2] See. T. Łoś-Nowak, *Stosunki międzynarodowe. Teorie – systemy – uczestnicy,* Wrocław 2006, p. 252 et seq.

from agreements between states 5) wars as a legitimate instrument of relations between states.[3] On the other hand Roman Kuźniar believes, that the elements of the Westphalian system of international relations are formed, apart from centralized nation-states, by the principle of sovereign equality of states, by the mechanism of the balance of power intended to prevent hegemony of individual states, and by international law as the regulator of their behavior.[4]

In Marek Pietraś's view, the logic of the organization and functioning of the Westphalian system of international relations is defined by its following elements: 1) form of the organization of political communities was the centralized nation-state, and the international system, which arose, was a statecentric one; 2) states were territorial structures and their functioning was associated with commanding powers over a specific territory delimited with precisely demarcated boundaries; 3) centralized nation states were sovereign and sovereignly equal, which meant their exclusive powers over their own inside and their independence in the international environment, i.e. not being subordinated to another superior authority; 4) relations between centralized and sovereign states were regulated by international law, which replaced religious bonds as the bond cementing the international community; 5) regulation of the functioning of the international environment was implemented by – alongside international law – the mechanism of the balance of power. The above description comprehensively presents the logic of the organization and functioning of the Westphalian system of international relations.

Like the aforementioned centralized nation-states, the other elements of the Westphalian system of international relations were not "decreed" by Westphalian treaties but were the result of the historical process of their development. This does not mean, however, any deprecation of the symbolic and practical meaning of the Westphalian treaties. They did lay specific legal foundations for contemporary statehood and consequently, for the fundamental rules of contemporary international relations. Their central element was the recognition of the right of each ruler to govern his territory without external interference. This right laid the foundations for the sovereignty of states and, as a result, for their formal independence. The idea of sovereignty therefore served to protect centralized states. Its founder, Jean Bodin, in his work *Six Books on the State* (1576), defined sovereignty as the absolute and perpetual power vested in the state, which is the supreme structure of control. He regarded the

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[3] K. Valaskakis, *Westphalia II: The Real Millennium Challenge,* http://www.paricenter.com/library/papers/valaskakis01.pdf

[4] R. Kuźniar, *Stosunki międzynarodowe – istota, uwarunkowania, badanie,* [in:] *Stosunki międzynarodowe – geneza, struktura, funkcjonowanie,* eds. E. Haliżak, R. Kuźniar, Warszawa 1994, p. 16.

state as the supreme authority within its territory, independent of another authority and formally equal in relation to other states. He treated sovereignty as an attribute of the state as such rather than that of an individual or government.[5]

The Westphalian system emphasized the principle of territoriality as an attribute of contemporary states, which were "bound" to territory. The principle meant that sovereign commanding powers applied to a strictly specified territory and were associated with reigning over it. In other words, sovereign political power is located within a strictly demarcated territory, it has exclusive commanding powers within this territory, which excludes the commanding powers of another sovereign.

The Westphalian Treaty can be also regarded as a symbolic moment of the change of the cementing bond of the international community. Religion ceased to be that bond while international law became one. Europe ceased to function as *Republica Christiana*, and it started to function as the European community of secular states regulating their relations through international law. The Westphalian treaty became the first expression and at the same time confirmation that such a community existed.

The main way of regulating the functioning of the international system then became the mechanism of the balance of power. As a principle it did not arise in Europe but it was already utilized in ancient Greece or China. What was novel was that it applied to the development of relations between centralized sovereign states. In political practice it consisted in building coalitions serving to form a counterbalance to the powers with hegemonic ambitions. It therefore served to counter hegemony in the international system then, and consequently, to preserve the political independence of individual states and the pluralist European international community. The application of this mechanism in practice was confirmed by the coalition of the European states opposing Napoleon's hegemonic attempts.

The primary goal of the mechanism of the balance of power was to prevent hegemony and domination of some states over others, and only later to prevent conflicts that might have destabilized the international order. While the mechanism of the balance of power was comparatively effective attaining the former objective, it tended to fail with the latter. Furthermore, wars were started in order to restore the disturbed balance of power. The more so that after the Westphalian peace in Europe a system of contending states developed that started to pay attention to the potential of other states and the size of territory they had. The latter became "the stake in the game" of centralized states "bound" to a territory. It stimulated conflicts and wars which stemmed from some states striving to enlarge their territory at the expense of others. While in the Middle Ages the main motive for wars were dynastic

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[5] See R. Mansbach, *The Global Puzzle. Issues and Actors in World Politics,* Boston, New York 1997, p. 47 et seq.

conflicts, under the Westphalian system of international relations, this motive was to counter the upsetting of the balance of power or to strive to capture a specific territory. In this way a frequent occurrence in international relations were wars, which expressed the sovereign will of states and were not prohibited by international law until 1928, when the Kellog-Briand Pact was signed.

THE FACTORS IN THE LATE WESTPHALIAN INTERNATIONAL ORDER

The main factor in the change of the Westphalian system of international relations, in shaping its hybridity and the new form called the late Westphalian order are globalization processes and their determinants. They denote the development of the phenomena and processes with qualitatively new features divergent from those characteristic of the Westphalian system of international relations. Consequently, the new, qualitative features of the international environment "coexist" with the "old ones" characteristic of the Westphalian system of international relations. We are not dealing therefore with a homogeneous phenomenon but a hybrid one, which additionally raises the level of its complexity.

The essence of the new quality of social life associated with globalization processes, and at the same time the source of change in the international community and the emergence of the hybrid construction of the Westphalian international order, should be sought in the "time-space compression".[6] This view is generally shared in literature on the processes of globalization. A. Giddens even wrote about the introduction of the fourth dimension of social space in the form of global determinants, which are relatively devoid of place, distances, and boundaries.[7]

The compression of time and pace is manifested in many different ways expressing the qualitative changes in the international environment and contributing to its hybridity. First, there is the deterritorialization of some social phenomena and processes. They occur, in accordance with this mechanism, without distinct location in the territorially defined global space. Moreover, the existing distances are of no significance for their functioning. This denotes a clear departure from the principle of territoriality, characteristic of the Westphalian system of international relations.

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[6] M. Kempny, *Czy globalizacja kulturowa współdecyduje o dynamice społeczeństw post-komunistycznych,* „Kultura i Społeczeństwo", 2000, no. 1, p. 9.

[7] Quoted after: M.G. Schachter, *Civil Society and Globalization: The Investigation of Contested Concepts*, [in:] *The Revival of Civil Society: Global and Comparative Perspectives,* ed. M.G. Schachter, Basingstoke 1999, p. 79.

In accordance with it, as has been said before, phenomena and processes are "bound" to a specific territory. Globalization processes, however, initiate interactions and ties not so much distance-wise, "across" a territory as without distances and comparatively detached from a specific location.[8] In particular, this relates to finance, capital and information flows or global, transborder ecological problems, for example those associated with the depletion of the ozone layer or prospects of climatic changes.

The mechanism of "deterritorialization" significantly increases the "hybridity" of international relations. The "traditional", Westphalian ones, which are interterritorial relations, or interactions that cross borders over geographical distance, exist alongside interactions and "deterritorialized" ties, developed regardless of territorial distances. A view is even advanced that the territorially defined concepts of place, distance and borders are not adequate enough to describe "deterritorialized cyberspace", global warming, or capital and information flows.[9]

The "compression" of space and the mechanism of "deterritorialization" of space and processes of social life in the conditions of globalization do not, however, mean that the territorial factor is no longer significant. A confirmation of this thesis is the demand for territory when population has increased, ethnic conflicts that have a territorial dimension, food production, which requires territory and space in most cases, etc.[10] Globalization processes do not therefore entirely eliminate the importance of distance and territorial boundaries in international relations. But they introduce into them the additional, supraterritorial space, its additional dimension, for instance in the form of cyberspace.[11] This denotes a certain kind of division, hybridity, and, as a result, the coexistence of the traditional, territorially defined space and the space modified by globalization processes, or devoid of place, distances and borders, transforming the world into a single condensed place.

Second, there is the phenomenon of transnational social space, in accordance with which intensive interactions and ties between social groups are maintained, irrespective of territorially defined distances and beyond or under limited control by nation states. This mechanism again denotes a departure from the Westphalian international order because not only are the phenomena and processes not contained within the territorially defined borders of states but they also "fall outside" the control by their governments as the controlling structures. Furthermore, in the condi-

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[8] J.A. Scholte*, Beyond the Buzzword: Towards a Critical Theory of Globalization,* [in:] *Globalization: Theory and Practice*, eds. E. Kofman, G. Youngs, London 1996, p. 49.

[9] Ibidem, p. 16

[10] R.N. Rosecrance, *The rise of the virtual state: wealth and power in the coming century.* New York 1999, p. XIV.

[11] J.A. Scholte, *The Globalization of World Politics,* [in:] *The Globalization of World Politics. An Introduction to International Relations,* eds. J. Baylis, S. Smith, Oxford 1998, p. 18.

tions of a greater penetrability of borders and progressive intensification of transnational phenomena characteristic of globalization processes, the international environment even "flows" into the states and affects their functioning. Information, capital, cultural values, ecological threats, etc. cut across borders as if these didn't exist. And this in turn requires a redefinition of the traditionally conceived principle of sovereignty, which, after all, is the "foundation" of the Westphalian system of international relations. For a part of social life – to use J. N. Rosenau's terminology – is transferred into the post-sovereign space.[12] Another part still takes place in the sovereign space closed by the increasingly porous state borders.

Third, with regard to globalization processes, the world is becoming a single place. According to this mechanism, the world is "felt" regardless of spatial distances because we are "both here and there" at the same time. This metaphor clearly shows the change in the logic of the spatial organization of social life under globalization processes. In the classic Westphalian international environment this space was restricted by state borders. Globalization processes abolish these restrictions. While in the "territorial world" of the Westphalian order distances between states significantly determined the possibility and intensity of contacts between states and societies, under conditions of globalization there appear phenomena and processes that are at least partially independent of the territorially defined space[13], confined by state borders. This also means that the geographical location of states, i.e. the borders between them, is becoming less crucial to social life.

Globalization processes as the factor of qualitative changes determining the emergence of the late Westphalian international environment are conditioned by many variables. To explain them fully requires taking into account the synergistic effect of interconnected political, economic, technological, ecological, psychological and other forces. However, the technological factor and political one require a separate treatment. It appears that the creation of the new quality of social life, different from the principles of the Westphalian international environment, was also effected by a combination, unique in human history, of the previously unprecedented level of technological development with the dominant political order allowing changes generated by the technological factor.

It is above all the technological factor that causes globalization processes, whose qualitative feature is the "compression" of time and space, to be objective processes and, apparently, irreversible ones, independent of the decisions and actions of the

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[12] J.N. Rosenau, *The Dynamics of Globalization: Toward an Operational Formulation.* "Security Dialogue" 1996, no. 1, vol. 22, p. 251.

[13] J.A. Scholte, *Globalization: prospects for a paradigm shift,* [in:] *Politics in globalized world,* ed. M. Shaw, London 1999, p. 11–12.

leaders of particular states and political elites associated with them. This means that the hybridity of the subjective structure and mechanisms of the functioning of the international environment will be replaced, in a hard-to-predict perspective, however, by solutions characteristic of the post-Westphalian order.

Conditions for the operation of the technological factor were actually created by the cumulative development of engineering and technology in the hitherto history of the mankind. However, during the last several decades the world experienced the process of significant technological innovation associated with entering the age of technocapitalism and the resulting historical acceleration unprecedented in earlier human history. Its result are changes in the organization and functioning of social life in the form of the reorganization of world economy, evolution of political processes, new challenges to national identity, new opportunities for communication and migration, etc.[14], which undermine the fundamental principles of the Westphalian international order, such as for instance territoriality and sovereignty.

In J.N. Rosenau's view the satellite television, Internet, optical fiber, etc. have reduced distance to milliseconds. They have caused the words, ideas, and pictures to reach billions of people. Changes in the organization and functioning of social life are accelerating. They are stimulated by four simultaneous and interconnected "revolutions". First, the so-called revolution of skills of "ordinary people", their knowledge and qualifications, contributing to building their subjectivity in social life, including international relations. Second, the so-called explosion of the ability to organize oneself in the conditions of revolution of skills. There has been a dramatic increase in the number of transnational civil society organizations, organizations of human rights advocates, environmental protection, etc., which, already owing to contacts through the Internet, have found new opportunities for organizing themselves and for activities. Third, the revolution in mobility or the possibility of migration of individuals and maintaining relations, but also starting activities in the areas remote from one's place of origin. Fourth, changes in the structures of organization and control of social life. As a result of modern opportunities for migration and communication, in addition to traditional hierarchical structures, horizontal network structures are being developed.[15] The latter can determine the activities of hundreds of social organizations in individual states.

The role of the technological factor thus interpreted relativizes the importance of political determinants and at the same time it points to the irreversibility of globalization processes, yet this does not decide their content, which is and can be the

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[14] D. Kellner, *Globalization and the Postmodern Turn*, http://www.gseis.ucla.edu

[15] J.N. Rosenau, *The Study of World Politics. Theoretical and Methodological Challenges*, vol. 1., New York 2006, p. 7–8.

object of political choice. It would therefore be a mistake to interpret globalization processes and the qualitative changes in political life that they produce, in terms of technological determinism. Technologies are above all a factor that enables transborder flows and the compression of space. But they do not influence the content of globalization processes. This can in turn be modified by political decisions.

As the political factor regards, a view is expressed that globalization processes and the qualitative changes in the international environment produce develop only in the conditions of the so-called. This denotes such a state of relations between states that enables the formation of interrelations and ties over and between national centers of authority. Globalization processes thus understood are dependent on state authorities and their consent, which creates conditions for the development of the world market, activities of transnational corporations and non-governmental organizations. Especially crucial is the standpoint of the dominant liberal superpower (the United States) and liberal political thought. It is liberalism that stimulates and justifies the development of the global market, the subjectification of individuals and social groups, even on the international scale. Liberalism also justifies deregulation of national economies and restriction on the role of the state. Globalization processes are therefore connected with the liberal vision of the organization of social life both on the political and liberal levels.[16] The end of the cold war also created a favorable political climate for those changes that stimulate a departure from the statecentric vision of international relations and contribute to increasing their hybridity.

THE SUBJECTIVE STRUCTURE OF THE LATE WESTPHALIAN INTERNATIONAL ORDER

The emerging late Westphalian international environment is not statecentric and its distinctive characteristic is heterogeneity of actors. A view is even expressed that the 21st-century international system is no longer a system of unitary states that interact with one another through diplomatic relations, international law regulations, and membership of intergovernmental organizations. For apart from the states, less and less centralized and national, there emerges a sector of transnational actors, whose logic of organization and functioning runs counter to the territorial and centralized state. These are organized social groups, autonomous of states, which undertake transborder activities. Their nature is therefore determined by their ability to undertake activities "across" state borders. Hence it is their activities that make

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[16] See. M. Pietraś, *Globalizacja jako proces zmiany społeczności międzynarodowej,* [in:] *Oblicza procesów globalizacji,* ed. idem, Lublin 2002, p. 41.

up the aforementioned phenomenon of the transnational social space. This happens because globalization processes create social, political and even technological (for instance the Internet) opportunities, through which social movements are able to participate in the functioning of the international environment, even on a global scale. On the other hand, globalization processes arouse opposition and defense reactions at a local level, also undertaken by non-governmental organizations. Being subject to aggregation, they create, in R. Falk's view, a phenomenon called globalization "from below"[17]. It is the opposite of globalization "from the top down" associated with market forces, capital circulation, and showing tendencies to unify. Globalization "from below", on the other hand, stimulates diversity, the heterogeneous character of the actorial structure of the international environment.

The process of deepening the hybridity of the actorial structure of the international environment is reflected in the science of international relations. According to I. Clark, the development of transnational actors results in reconfiguration of the anarchic nature of the international environment[18], because, as J. N. Rosenau wrote, apart from states there are sovereignty-free actors.[19] In this context, H. Bull termed the process of emergence of transnational actors as the development of "the new Middle Ages",[20] and M. Shaw wrote about entering the age of post-international relations, in which non-state actors should not be perceived as "intruders in the international environment".[21] The last two views explicitly mean that international political relations cannot be interpreted at present in statecentric terms because the structure of ties between states is complemented with the structure of ties between transnational actors.[22]

J.N. Rosenau treats the existence and functioning of transnational actors alongside the states as an element of the bifurcation process of the actorial structure of the international environment, as a result of which, besides the system of centralized nation states, there has distinctly developed a highly diversified system of transnational sovereignty free actors. This process means – to use Rosenau's terminology – the

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[17] R. Falk*, Predatory globalization: a critique,* Malden 1999, p. 130.

[18] I. Clark*, Globalization and International Relations Theory,* Oxford 1999, p. 4.

[19] J.N. Rosenau, *Turbulence in World Politics. A Theory of Change and Continuity.* Princeton 1990, p. 114 et seq. and 243–288.

[20] H. Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics.* London 1977, p. 254–255.

[21] M. Shaw, *Global Society and Global Responsibility: The Theoretical, Historical and Political Limits of "International Society".* "Millennium: Journal of International Studies", 1992, no. 3, p. 431.

[22] See. M. Pietraś, *Bezpieczeństwo ekologiczne w Europie.* Lublin 1996, p. 28–32.

replacement of the "statecentric world" by the "multicentric world"[23]. Despite the fact that both "worlds" are an integral element of the same international reality they are characterized by many separate special features that emphasize hybridity of the actorial structure of the international environment. "The statecentric world" in comparison with the "multicentric" one is far more mature, crystallized and organized. It is contained in the canons of the Westphalian system of international relations, i.e. sovereignly equal states focusing on their own security and territorial integrity, whose behaviors are regulated by international law. Despite formal equality they are actually highly unequal. They form a hierarchical structure with the dominant role of superpowers. A feature of this system of states is a comparatively high level of institutionalization and the development of ties through diplomatic channels, and a comparatively low adaptability to the changes taking place.

In many ways, "the multicentric world" is the opposite of the statecentric. It is characterized by the low level of crystallized forms of manifestation. Its structure is made up of hundreds of thousands of diverse non-state actors. They focus on problems different from those of the states, as a rule closely related to social needs such as the natural environment, human rights, etc. Leadership is exercised not by the most powerful actors but by the most innovative, which thus have wide opportunities to identify developmental tendencies in social life and to adjust to the changes taking place. The feature of this world is the still low although developing level of institutionalization and formalization of mutual relations and cooperation.

J.N. Rosenau clearly stresses therefore that transnational actors are a part of the actorial structure of the international environment, which has a two-aspect, hybrid character. Apart from states and intergovernmental organizations they create, there are diverse transnational actors. One can thus see the clear departure from the statecentric perspective of analysis of international political relations.

The object of discussion and controversy is the range of transnational actors and the criteria for their identification. B. Hocking and M. Smith have formulated three such criteria: 1) autonomy or freedom of action in the process of attaining goals; 2) being representative of a specific social group; 3) the ability to exert influence on the international environment, on the behaviors of the actors that exist in it.[24] The last criterion also denotes the ability to undertake transborder activities.

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[23] J. N. Rosenau, *Global changes and Theoretical Challenges: Towards a Postinternational Politics for the 1990s*, [in:] *Global Changes and Theoretical Challenges. Approaches to World Politics for the 1990s,* eds. E.O. Czempiel, J.N. Rosenau, New York 1989, p. 8; J.N. Rosenau, *Turbulence…*; idem, *Patterned Chaos in Global Life: Structure and Process in the Two Worlds of World Politics.* "International Political Science Review", 1988, no. 4, p. 327–364.

[24] B. Hocking, M. Smith, *World Politics,* New York 1990, p. 71.

However, the criterion of representativity (or a transnational actor having social legitimacy) is controversial. A crucial question arises here: are the actors of international relations only those socially legitimized? This view does not seem to be well-founded: transnational actors of international relations, those impacting the decisions and action of the states and intergovernmental organizations, are also terrorist organizations, which can enjoy limited local support despite widespread condemnation, and organized crime structures. Either are able to undertake trans-border activities and influence international actions and processes despite having actually no social legitimacy. This means that the hybridity of the actorial structure of the international environment is not defined only by the division: states and transnational actors, but also by the division: legitimized and non-legitimized actors. The former (besides the states) include transnational corporations (the so-called second sector of international relations), non-governmental organizations, or the NGO's (the so-called third sector of international relations), subjectifying civil society in international relations), liberation movements (the so-called fourth sector of international relations), religious organizations, international political movements, so-called Internationals of political parties. The latter, non-legitimized ones, include first of all terrorist organizations and organized crime structures.

THE FUNCTIONING OF THE LATE WESTPHALIAN INTERNATIONAL ORDER

A feature of the functioning of the late Westphalian international order is the simultaneous occurrence of phenomena and processes with qualitatively different characteristics. These include the occurrence at the same time of opposing tendencies that stimulate the growth of non-linearity and instability of international relations, interpenetration and mutual determination of the state's inside and the international environment, the rise of armed conflicts with qualitatively new characteristics, and the development of more and more complex structures of controlling the international environment.

It appears that the most distinctive feature of the emerging late Westphalian international environment is the occurrence of opposing tendencies, phenomena, processes, and actions. They create the conditions for all other phenomena and processes. This means that in the practice of social life there are at the same time processes of its decentralization, fragmentation and disintegration, as well as those of centralization and integration. To name these tendencies, James N. Rosenau suggested the term "fragmegration" or the occurrence of fragmentation and integration processes at the same time. He showed directly that the dynamics of change in the

contemporary international relations is determined by two groups of factors. On one hand, those accelerating the processes of globalization, centralization, and integration of the international environment. On the other hand, those stimulating decentralization, fragmentation, and the development of international phenomena and processes at the local level.[25]

R. Robertson, in turn, used the term "glocalization" to define the opposing tendencies in the functioning of the late Westphalian international environment.[26] The term denotes the interpenetration and interdetermination of the global and the local. He also pointed out the paradox of dialectical interactions between the global/universal, and the local/particularistic. He observed that we are witnessing the universalization of particularism, and the particularization of universalism.[27] This means that the individual/particular is becoming a part of global processes, and vice versa, the global is concretized at the local level, taking into account, however, the specificity and characteristics of a place. The globalization processes thereby make a kind of invasion into localness, in many cases triggering off defense mechanisms and leading to a renaissance of the local. This phenomenon has been called the process of "localized globalization".[28]

In the context of the conception of "glocalization" advanced by R. Robertson, it should be emphasized that a distinct feature of the functioning of the late Westphalian international environment is the interdetermination of the local and the global, regardless of where these phenomena are located in the global space. Victor D. Cha showed that globalization means the spatial reorganization of production, finance and other areas of social life, which cause local social decisions to have global repercussions. The everyday life of local communities, in turn, is determined by global events[29].

This new type of interaction goes explicitly beyond the logic of the functioning of the Westphalian system of international relations. According to this logic, the actors of interaction in the international environment are sovereign states being at the same time the only structures of the organization of social life. And the interdetermination of the local and the global means, in turn, that the state is not only not the sole structure organizing interactions and social ties but it can even be disregarded.

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[25] J. N. Rosenau, *The Study*…, p. 38

[26] R. Robertson, *Glocalization: time-space and homogeneity-heterogeneity*, [in:] *Global Modernities*, eds. M. Featherstone, S. Lash, R. Robertson, London 1995, p. 25–44.

[27] R. Robertson, *Globalization: Social Theory and Global Culture*. London 1992, p. 100.

[28] M. Kempny, *Czy globalizacja*…, p. 17–18.

[29] V. D. Cha, *Globalization and the Study of International Security.* "Journal of Peace Research", 2000, no.. 3, Vol. 37, p. 392.

The occurrence of opposing tendencies in the functioning of the international environment forms the basis for formulating a thesis that the globalization processes conditioning the emergence of the late Westphalian order modify the previously dominant assumption about the linearity of development. The reaction to them is regionalization and emphasis on the local; alongside integration, the fragmentation of social life appears, while centralization processes are accompanied by decentralization. These dynamics, however opposing and hybrid-like, are two sides of the same coin called social life under globalization processes. Thus, while the earlier epochs had a dominant central tendency and structured patterns of behavior, the present functioning of the international environment is often shaped by opposing tendencies and sporadic occurrences.

A distinct tendency in the functioning of the late Westphalian international environment is the blurring of previous clear differences between the state's inside and the international environment. This happens in the conditions of greater penetrability of state borders determined by the new quality of international interrelations. Complex interrelations arise, with the interpenetration of the global, international, national, and the local, which also means the development of transnational interrelations. This leads to the interdetermination of the functioning of the two areas of social life. This happens in the conditions of exceptional and qualitatively new intensification of social relations on the global scale. It consists in the development of ties even between remote local communities to the extent that local events are co-shaped by remote, global phenomena. And the other way round, the global is shaped by the local. U. Beck even believes that the logic of political interactions in the international community changes from those of state – state into global – local. This means that with the increasingly more "porous" borders of sovereign states, people living even in the geographically remote areas begin to share a common fate.[30]

The overlapping and interpenetration of the state's inside and international environment considerably changes the functioning of the two areas of social life. One of these changes is an increase in the importance of mechanisms of transnational penetration. They are a special kind of international influence – reserved for states in the Westphalian international order – exerted by transnational actors. It (the influence) means that transnational corporations but also organized crime structures and terrorist organization penetrate even inside the state, trying to control the social processes occurring there, passing over government structures.

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[30] R. Mansbach, *Changing Understanding of Global Politics: Preinternationalism, Internationalism, Internationalism, and Postinternationalism*, [in:] *Pondering Postinternationalism: a Paradigm for the Twenty-First Century,* ed. H.H. Hobbs, Albany 2000, p. 10.

Another effect of qualitatively new interrelations and of the interpenetration of the state's inside and the international environment is the increasing importance of accidental, non-linear phenomena. This happens because there are still structural differences between the two environments. This means that the processes of the overlapping and interpenetration of the state's inside and the international environ-ment take place in the conditions of disparate organization and incompatibility of the two environments. This is a distinction – in Ian Clark's view – between the community and cosmopolitan perspectives of social life. J.N. Rosenau believes that in such realities the phenomena treated as anomalies should be given more attention because their consequences for the two environments can be significant. Such changes produce crucial challenges to the governing centers in the states because during decision-making processes it is necessary to take into account a larger number of determinant variables. Consequently, instability of social life increases.

The confirmation of the new quality of phenomena and processes characteristic of the late Westphalian international order is the new quality of armed conflicts. During most of the period of the Westphalian system of international relations we were deal-ing with so-called Clausewitzian wars, i.e. those fought between centralized states as centers of power, resorting to the use of organized violence aimed at a clearly defined enemy.[31] The Westphalian system, based on the idea of territorial sovereignty, was therefore conducive to conflicts over territory and sovereignty over it. Wars became a way of implementing the policies of the then states, of fulfilling their aspirations to enlarge their territory, realization of political interest and ambitions. They were also crucial to the strengthening of centralized nation states since the change in the way of using organized violence became a factor stimulating a change in the organization and functioning of the then states. Charles Tilly was therefore right when he wrote that … "wars made the State, and the State made wars". In other words, the change in the way of using organized violence was conducive to the rise of centralized nation states, and these in turn began to resort to war as a way of implementation of politics.

Globalization processes and the gradually emerging late Westphalian international order stimulated by them lead to a significant change in the causes and logic of armed conflicts. The motive behind these conflicts and at the same time a protected value is now the identity of an ethnic group rather than the striving to capture a specific territory and impose sovereign rights upon it. This means stimulating new forms of violence, and the traditional understanding of wars no longer applies to them. Wars started to lose their previous distinctive properties. In K. Holstie's view they have become "de-institutionalized" in the sense of absence of central control, regulation,

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[31] For more on the subject see. O.P. Richmond, *Maintaining Order, Making Peace.* New York 2002, p. 27 et seq.

etiquette, and armaments.[32] This does not mean, however, that the new kind of conflicts has entirely replaced the Westphalian ones. The latter still occur sporadically. In terms of numbers, the late Westphalian ones, with qualitatively new features, clearly prevail. According to figures provided by the International Peace Research Institute in Oslo, in 1989–2004 there were seven armed conflicts between states and 90 conflicts with qualitatively new features.[33]

The departure form the traditional formula of war, characteristic of the Westphalian system, meant that especially in Europe and Africa, on the turn of 1980s/1990s, a new type of organized violence appeared, which took place inside the states. It is termed a new war, a postmodern conflict or a low-intensity conflict.[34] An essential feature of these conflicts is their extraordinary complexity and the blurring of previous differences between war as a form of violence in relations between states, organized crime, and large-scale violation of human rights. Although these conflicts are taking place within particular states, they are distinguished by a huge number of transnational connections, represented for instance by mercenaries, advisers, and volunteers pouring in from the diaspora, etc. These make it extremely difficult to distinguish between the internal and the external, an act of aggression and a response to it, or between the local and the global.[35]

A significant characteristic of the new war is the complexity of actors that take part in them. For this reason they are even called "privatized' or "informal" wars, because, as Mary Kaldor claims, a special kind of privatization of violence is their crucial element. For it is extremely difficult to distinguish between the private and the public, the state-owned and non-state-owned, between the formal and the informal. These conflicts involve paramilitary formations of local warlords, criminal structures, police forces and mercenaries, and regular armies.[36]

These new conflicts examined here are closely associated with globalization processes, which are noticeable while they (the conflicts) last. They involve the presence of the media, which can turn a conflict into a spectacle watched on TV by viewers all over the world, even in real time. Humanitarian organizations from almost all over the world are also present there, as well as non-governmental organizations,

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[32] Quoted after: I. Clark, *The post-cold war order. The spoils of peace.* Oxford 2001, p. 198.

[33] See. M. Pietraś, *Istota i specyfika konfliktów niskiej intensywności,* [in:] *Konflikt niskiej intensywności w Naddniestrzu,* eds. M. Celewicz, J. Kłoczowski, M. Pietraś, Lublin 2006, p. 30

[34] For more see: M. Kaldor, *New and Old Wars. Organized Violence in a Global Era.* Cambridge 1999, p. 1–2.

[35] Ibidem, p. 2.

[36] Ibidem, p. 8.

arms dealers and the aforementioned mercenaries, military advisers and volunteers from the diaspora. These conflicts are therefore local and global at the same time.

To sum up, we should point to three distinctive features of conflicts taking place in the conditions of globalization processes and of a gradual departure from the parameters of organization of the international environment, characteristic of the Westphalian system. First, the grounds for conflicts are the aspirations for power most often motivated by reasons of national or religious identity. Second, a feature of these wars-conflicts is the change in the way of fighting them and in the means used. In traditional wars the objective of operations was to conquer a territory through battles, which had a decisive significance. The purpose of military operations is to control the population by expelling or exterminating people of different identity. Third, these conflicts are accompanied by the functioning of global transnational corporations, which supply arms to the warring parties.[37]

The structures and mechanisms of controlling the late-Westphalian international environment are of a hybrid character. Those characteristic of the Westphalian order "coexist" with those with qualitatively new features. The mechanisms and structures formed in the conditions of the Westphalian international order were associated mainly with the hegemonic but also imperial domination by superpowers, the mechanism of the balance of power, and later also with institutional development in the form of intergovernmental organizations and international law regulations. It should however be remembered that globalization processes determining the emergence of the late Westphalian international order do not entirely eliminate the aforementioned controlling mechanisms and structures characteristic of the Westphalian order but they add new ones to them. Therefore, there are elements of continuity and change here, but also those of the hybridity of the functioning solutions.

Globalization processes, which are the main factor determining the rise of the late-Westphalian international environment, co-shape the qualitatively new features, inter alia, as the blurring of differences between the intrastate and the international. These changes create challenges to the existing mechanism of control, the more so that for the late-Westphalian international environment to function, a more and more important role is played by a triad of the following actors: 1) governments of states and intergovernmental organizations; 2) market forces represented by transnational corporations; 3) actors of civil society, who also contribute a transnational element to the process of controlling. Thereby, in comparison with the Westphalian international order, the scope but also the diversity of actors broaden, which take part in the processes of controlling the international environment. The state's west-

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[37] Ibidem, p. 8–9.

phalian monopoly on these processes is therefore being overcome because transnational actors play a more and more crucial role at the same time.

In the conditions where the "Westphalian" structures and mechanisms of controlling the international environment continue to exist and function: hegemony of superpowers, the mechanism of the balance of power, international law and international institutions, the "late-Westphalian" ones are developing. Their characteristic "call sign" is the idea of global governance. It is the result – as Tanja Brühl and Volker Rittberger stress – of the non-hierarchical network of intergovernmental and transnational institutions. Its distinctive feature, unlike the controlling of the international environment characteristic of the Westphalian order, is to take into account non-state actors to a greater and greater extent, and to create a hybrid structure. Moreover, this governance in the conditions of interpenetration of the state's inside and the international environment, characteristic of globalization processes, is becoming multilevel governance since it is implemented not only on the government level, but also local, regional, and global.[38]

Thus defined, global governance is designed as an alternative to market mechanisms typical of globalization processes, based on the idea of self-regulation and at the same time deregulation of the functions of contemporary states. This also expresses the tendency to maintain the primacy of the political level over the economic level in international relations, which is systematically gaining in importance in the conditions of globalization processes.

A significant element in implementing the concept of global governance and increasing the hybridity of the structures of controlling the international environment is a departure from hierarchical control, characteristic of the Westphalian order, and introduction of horizontal structures. Especially representative of the latter is the mechanism of transnational networks. They reconstruct the functioning of the international community. They are a kind of horizontal ties between individuals, social groups, non-governmental organizations, and social movements, developed across the state borders. They are thus outside the area of their (states') jurisdiction. They become a part of the restructuring of space and a new form of social organization or even social identity in the conditions of globalization processes. They lead thereby to debordernization (the concept of the world without borders).[39]

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[38] T. Brühl, V. Rittberger, *From international…*, p. 2

[39] B. Axford, *Enacting globalization. Transnational Networks and the deterritorialization of social Relationships in the Global System*, [in:] *Borderlines in a globalized world,* eds. M. Bös, G. Preyer, Dordrecht 2002, p. 99–101.

According to Manuel Castells, the networks of transnational actors rapidly become the new social morphology of the globalizing world.[40] They pose a challenge to the principle of territoriality characteristic of the Westphalian order. Hence, they are becoming a more and more characteristic feature of the globalizing world because they contribute to an increase in transborder ties and exchange between individuals, groups, business structures, and social movements. These ties mean that governments lose the "Westphalian monopoly" of representing societies in international relations. Furthermore, the new actors and their characteristic structures of ties are becoming more and more influential on the global arena, for instance by forming specific kinds of coalitions and creating challenges to the previous intergovernmental activities. Moreover, as compared with intergovernmental organizations and international law, they mean a decrease in the degree of formalization of ties in international relations. Apart from those with a high degree of formalization like intergovernmental organizations and international law, those with a low degree of formalization like network structures and the so-called soft law in the form of political norms are being developed. The development, under globalization processes, of the mechanisms of global governance and its characteristic transnational networks shows clearly that these processes force a new way of analyzing authority in international relations. In Jadwiga Staniszkis's view it is necessary to shift the emphasis from the relational, hierarchical authority interpreted in terms of a superiority-subordination relationship, characteristic after all of the Westphalian order, onto authority as a synthetic property of the system. The issue is the controllability of the system as a complex institutional whole, the authority of the system over itself rather than only domination of some persons over others. The Authority is a property of the system rather than an attribute of the position of individual persons or institutions.[41]

A LATE WESTPHALIAN INTERPARADIGMATIC DEBATE

Globalization processes relate not only to objective changes in the international environment but also to the way of thinking about international relations. They create a challenge to the hitherto dominant ontological, methodological, and epistemological solutions in the science of international relations. In the process, they clearly start a new, fourth interparadigmatic debate. This is, however, a different debate from the previous ones that took place as part of the same quality of the

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[40] M. Castells, *The Rise of the Network Society*. Oxford 1996, p. 469.
[41] J. Staniszkis, *Władza globalizacji*. Warszawa 2003, p. 16.

international environment, defined with the formula of the Westphalian system of international relations. Globalization processes, through the new quality of changes and by leading to the rise of the late-Westphalian international environment, start a debate in the science of international relations with qualitatively new features.

For Thomas Kuhn, who introduced the concept of "paradigm" into scientific studies, it denotes, in fact, a set of consistent worldviews but also a set of instruments, methods, and ways of identifying research problems and solving them.[42] In this context the hitherto development of science of international relations took above all the form of interparadigmatic debates. The first took place between idealists and realists, the second between traditionalists and so-called scienticists, who were proponents of the use of behavioral methods, and the third between positivists and post-positivists, also called a debate between mainstreamers and so-called dissidents.[43]

According to T. Kuhn's view, the interparadigmatic debates were not the effect of permanent accumulation of objective knowledge gained through the use of objective research methods but they were stimulated by the emergence of new paradigms. They rejected the previous research standards, proposing new assumptions, new research questions and new methods. Consequently, each paradigm meant a departure from earlier studies and a new delineation of their area. When, however, the boundaries of this area became blurred and the level of acceptance of earlier assumptions declined, this meant that the conditions reached a point where the paradigm needed to be changed, or, as T. Kuhn wrote, a scientific revolution had to start.[44]

We have to emphasize, however, the specificity of previous interparadigmatic debates in the science of international relations. Although they contained a combination of various views on the ontology, epistemology, methodology and the normative aspect of international relations, their common denominator was the Westphalian system of these relations, which meant the same quality of the international environment. Moreover, the previous debates were concerned first of all with research methods, therefore they did not result from qualitative changes in international relations, although it must be admitted that they did not remain indifferent to those changes.

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[42] T. Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolution*, Chicago 1970, p. 23 et seq.

[43] See. Y. Lapid, *Third Debate: On the Prospects of International Theory in a Post-positivist Era,* "International Studies Quarterly" 1989, vol. 33, p. 235–254; A. Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics,* Cambridge 1999, p. 39 et seq.

[44] R. Sil, *The Questionable Status of Boundaries. The Need for Integration,* [in:] *Beyond Boundaries? Paradigms, and Theoretical Integration in International Studies,* eds. R. Sil, E. Doherty, New York 2000, p. 7–11.

The fourth interparadigmatic debate, now commencing, is determined first of all by the new quality of changes in the international environment caused by globalization processes. These changes mean a departure from the Westphalian system of international relations. Thus, this is a debate different from the previous ones. It is going on between the proponents, on the one side, of research approaches (three debates) developed as part of the Westphalian system of international relations, whom James Mittelman calls *keepers*.[45] The other side is composed of theorists, whom Kenneth Waltz called *globalizers*.[46] The former maintain that globalization processes do not lead to the rise of a new paradigm in the science of international relations, and they can be explained within the current research orientations. The latter hold an exactly opposite view.

The trend of the keepers is diversified and composed of representatives of different research orientations. They include neorealists, proponents of the theory of interrelationships, proponents of neoliberal institutionalism, and some world-system theorists. For these orientations, global processes are either not a new phenomenon or "not within" their research perspective, i.e. they are unable to explain them.

For many realists, globalization processes lead to the limitation of the role of force and security in international relations. They also lead to overemphasizing the role of economy and technology, and eliminate the mechanism of the balance of power from international relations.[47] Kenneth Waltz believes, however, that despite globalist assertions, politics still dominates over economy. And the deepening of interrelations, characteristic of globalization processes, does not result in their new quality, unlike when the earlier simple interrelations led to the complex ones.[48] It should be also explicitly stressed that realism or neorealism are unable to grasp the complexity of globalization processes, which they examine from a statecentric perspective. For example, the phenomenon of force is analyzed in association with the centralized nation state. And in the conditions of globalization processes, it is transnational corporations that have become wielders of force, but apart from that, it can be also located in global social formations organized within the network.

In "Westphalian" research orientations special emphasis is put on the argument that globalization processes do not lead to qualitatively new changes in the international reality that would justify the starting of a new interparadigmatic debate.

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[45] J. Mittelman, *Globalization: An Ascendant Paradigm,* "International Studies Perspectives" 2002, no. 1, p. 3.

[46] K. N. Waltz, *Globalization and Governance*, "Political Science and Politics" 1999, vol. 23, p. 693–700.

[47] See. I. Clark, *Globalization and International Relations Theory.* Oxford 1999, p. 2.

[48] K. W. Waltz, *Globalization…*

Furthermore, their proponents believe that these processes can be explained by reference to the previous research traditions. In this context, researchers of international interrelationships such as Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye believe that the analysis of interrelations, which they carried out in the late 1970s, can be applied to study globalization processes at the turn of the 20th and 21st centuries.[49] Likewise, neoliberal institutionalists treat globalization processes from the perspective of the tried and tested, currently used patterns of research. They do not therefore regard these processes as a new phenomenon that requires a new research perspective. A similar view is advanced by proponents of the world-system theory, including Immanuel Wallerstein. In his view, there is nothing new in globalization processes because they can be traced back to the early period of the development of capitalism several centuries ago.[50]

The circle of the main *globalizers,* or proponents of the thesis that globalization processes lay the foundations for the rise of a new paradigm in the science of international relations, includes first of all Philip Cerny, Ian Clark and Jan Aart Scholte. P. Cerny argues that in the process of looking for an alternative to the realist school, especially in the conditions of comparatively radical changes in the international environment, the choice fell on a set of views that makes globalization processes the object of analysis. They are thus perceived as an alternative to the realist paradigm, and hence as an element of search for a new research orientation.[51] I. Clark, in turn, maintains that studying globalization processes creates not only the framework of analysis of political change in international relations, but also makes it possible for a theory of change to arise.[52] Change, which, one should presume, means the emergence of a new research perspective in the science of international relations. This view is explicitly formulated by J. Scholte, for whom globalization processes come down to a change in the paradigm of this science, and an irreversible one.[53]

A more moderate stand concerning the emergence of a new paradigm in the conditions of globalization processes is represented by James Rosenau, and Morten

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[49] See. R. Keohane, J. Nye, *Globalization: What's New? What's Not? (And so What?),* "Foreign Policy" 2000, vol. 118, p. 109.

[50] See. *Globalization or the Age of Transition? A Long-Term View of the Trajectory of the World System.* "International Sociology" 2000, vol. 15, p. 249–265, quoted after: J. Mittelman, *Globalization: An Ascendant…,* p. 4.

[51] P. G. Cerny, *Globalization and Other Stories: The Search for a New Paradigm for International Relations,* "International Journal" 1996, vol. 51, p. 618.

[52] See. I. Clark, *Globalization and International Relation Theory.* Oxford 1999.

[53] See. J.A. Scholte*, Globalization: prospects for a paradigm shift*, [in:] *Politics in globalized world*, ed. M. Shaw, London 1999, p. 9 et seq.

Ougaard and Richard Higgott. Having analyzed the change in the parameters of the international environment due to globalization processes, and especially the blurring of previously distinct divisions between the state's inside and the international environment, J. Rosenau showed that these processes form a starting point for the emergence of a new paradigm.[54] M. Ougaard and R. Higgott believe, in turn, that globalization processes determine the emergence of a new global polity, which is also made up, apart from the states, of non-governmental actors. These changes cause some Westphalian concept of international relations such as the conception of international community or international systems to retain limited usefulness in the conditions of globalization processes.[55] Consequently, this means that these processes create alternative solutions to them.

The analysis of the late-Westphalian interparadigmatic debate allows three conclusions. First, the debate is clearly going on between the research orientations arisen out of the analysis of the Westphalian system of international relations and those that make globalization processes the object of analysis. Second, globalization processes are not compatible with the profile of traditional research orientations, which are unable to explain the new quality of social life associated with them. Hence many of them treat these processes as a change that is not a new quality. Third, the Westphalian system of international relations and the theoretical paradigms associated with it create conceptual and methodological limitations on the analysis of globalization processes, mainly in the form of the dominant static approach to the dynamic, radically changing international reality.[56]

To sum up, it should be emphasized that the present analysis clearly states that the feature of the current stage of evolution of international relations and forms of organization is a transition from the earlier form called the Westphalian order to the future form with qualitatively new features, sometimes called the post-Westphalian order. This process does not mean, however, that the "parameters" of the Westphalian international order will be entirely replaced by the "parameters" of the post-Westphalian order. The qualitatively new features of the organization and functioning of the international environment "coexist" with those characteristic of the Westphalian

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[54] J.N. Rosenau, *Along the Domestic Foreign Frontier: Exploring Governance in a Turbulent World.* Cambridge 1997, p. 80 et seq.

[55] M. Ougaard, R. Higgott*, Introduction. Beyond system and society – towards a global polity?,* [in:] *Towards a Global Polity,* eds. idem, London 2002, p. 10.

[56] M. Albert, T. Kopp-Malek, *The Pragmatism of Global and European Governance: Emerging Forms of the Political "Beyond Westphalia"*, "Millennium: Journal of International Studies" 2002, no. 3, vol. 31, p. 453

system of international relations. This "coexistence" makes hybridity or combination of often logically opposing solutions relating to the organization and functioning of the international environment a distinctive feature of the present stage of international relations. This confirms the two-aspect nature embracing the world of states and the world of transnational actors, its (environment's) actorial structure and the progressive complexity and variety of phenomena, processes as well as structures and mechanisms of controlling this environment.