

**NEW CONDITIONS AND CHANGING IMAGE OF  
MILITARY FORCES IN THE EARLY 21<sup>ST</sup> CENTURY.  
READINESS TO UNLIMITED VIOLENCE?**

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**A BIG CHANGE**

Today's world undergoes unbelievably rapid changes in the main spheres of social life. Nearly everyday we can see spectacular socio-political, economic, cultural, science and technological transformation. Rules previously typical for an industrial society<sup>1</sup> became obsolete. The third wave of civilization development and information society emerges. Increasingly more often production capacity enables manufacturing goods considerably saturated with modern knowledge to develop into highly advanced technologies. New forms of production developed, including software, media, advertising, consulting, and public relations. Consequently, the stage of relative stabilization comes to its end and threats result from the lack of ability to follow continuous changes.

It seems that never in its history had humankind possessed such huge knowledge, qualifications, resources and opportunities to make the world better. Access to information enables increased participation in governing systems for larger groups

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<sup>1</sup> See: A. Zając, *Poland's Cultural Capital at the threshold of European Integration – conclusions for education*, [in:] *The world of Education, Pedagogy and Tourism* (ed. E. Kameduła, I. Kuźniak, E. Piotrowski), Poznań 2003, p. 67; J.O. Green, *New Era of Communication*, Warsaw 1999, Cf. A. Mattelart, *Information Society*, Krakow 2004, p. 105–110.

of people. Unfortunately, it is so vivid that pessimistic perception of the world is still valid. It is still the fact that (...) *a widely spread sense of anxiety and concern about the changes prevail; changes which overlap not fully accommodated changes of recent decades – add to the uncertainty.* (...). *A tragedy of our situation is that still we are able to utilize our current potential. We can see mismanagement of the world and its resources; however, we are put at ease by the self-satisfaction of our leaders and our own inertial and resistance to changes*<sup>2</sup>.

Unfortunately, a hasty diagnose of only one dangerous state rather than many of threats adds to the complexity of the situation. After September 11th, 2001, international terrorism is considered the threat number one for the contemporary world<sup>3</sup>. While trying to identify major reasons of modern threats we tend to recognize only those posed to the world that we proudly describe as western. It only seems huge from the point of view of our own achievements. It seems that its various aspects, from acts of terrorism to guerrilla internal conflicts and interstate wars, the forms of violence may be combined and lead to the final clash of civilizations<sup>4</sup>. Dangers of the contemporary world are placed in the political context. The policy depends much on the civilization itself; a civilization which for nearly five hundred years dominated others. While using technological achievement and easily accessible knowledge and information, the information society tries to establish its security to the extent possible. Thanks to the fast flow of information we are more aware of poverty, famine, natural disasters and other calamities bothering people all over the world and at the same time we are guided by our own, national, and state interest<sup>5</sup>. While watching people dying of hunger, victims of natural disasters and wars with very minor delay due to satellite transmission, societies of wealth stick to their standards. The variety of threats does not lead to readiness to give up some of specific perfection and freedom (autonomy). In the name of security the international community need to undertake actions aimed at eliminating sources of terrorism, reducing those resulting from poverty, famine, and lack of sustainable development. Do all countries or

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<sup>2</sup> Quoted: A. King, B. Schneider, *The First Global Revolution. How to Survive? Report by the Rome Club Council*, Warsaw 1992, p. 26.

<sup>3</sup> G.J. Rattray, *Strategic War in Cyber Space*, Warsaw 2004, p. 35–41; Cf. A. Żwoliński, *War. Selected Issues*, Kraków 2003, p. 21.

<sup>4</sup> See: S.P. Huntington, *The Era of Muslim Wars*, "Newsweek Polska", No 16–17, 23.12.2003, p. 154.

<sup>5</sup> See e.g.: B. Chyrowicz, *Ethics in the Jungle of Information. Introduction*, [in:] *Information Society: an Opportunity or Threat?*, (ed.) B. Chyrowicz, Lublin 2003, p. 5–8.

all people share the same system of values? Will an African state, where several percent of people are infected with HIV/AIDS, or a state threatened with a natural disaster due to climate changes respect those values?<sup>6</sup>

### IS WAR NECESSARY?

War has always accompanied men. Profits, political ambitions, hurt feelings, and conflicts of interests are the reasons for which people resort to weapons and fight for their goals. This way of solving contentious issues has remained unchanged for centuries, only manners of combat evolved. The art of war evolved together with the reality around us.

In the last twenty years of the 20th c. military actions gradually and unnoticeably changed their nature<sup>7</sup>. A classical war led by states, which to a large extent defined the cold war competition, seem to become obsolete. States, the true monopolists of war, abdicated and became replaced by quasi-state structures, or even individual “military entrepreneurs”<sup>8</sup>. Many of them run wars for their own benefit. People who try analyzing them are not capable of explaining the background of such wars. Their background frequently consists of private interest related to trafficking in drugs, command of natural resources, or even deriving benefits from humanitarian aid. Already today and certainly in the future, this boosts gradual independence of forms of violence, subordinated to military requirements. This leads to the loss of control over military actions by regular armies and their states. Wars and various forms of military interventions remain a part of international world of globalization<sup>9</sup>. And these are not only crisis reaction operations.

Each generation develops their own specific way of military actions. They also determine their nature. Spread of democracy, human rights and open market economies do not contribute to eliminating classical wars. Such wars will also be run

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<sup>6</sup> See: J. Simonides, *United Nations and Challenges and Threats of the 21st Century. Between the Necessity and Possibility of a Reform*, “International Relations” 2004, No 3–4 (Vol. 30), p. 19–39.

<sup>7</sup> J. Piątek, *Tactical Dimension of Military Conflict*, Toruń 2005, p. 208–242.

<sup>8</sup> Reference is made to local leaders, guerrilla groups of unidentified political inspiration, and also global companies offering mercenaries and international terrorist networks for which war has become the main job.

<sup>9</sup> B. Balcerowicz, *Theories and War (and Peace) Concepts after the Cold War*, [in:] *International Order of the early 21st c.*, (ed.) R. Kuźniar, Warsaw 2005, p. 470, Cf. *Global Trends 2015: A Dialogue About the Future With Nongovernmental Experts*, <http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/globaltrends2015/index.html>, 25.04.2008.

by democracies and these will not only be wars of necessity but also wars of choice. The wars are not necessarily to defend oneself but to maintain or introduce a specific international order. States, which believe that participating in such wars is within their interest, must be prepared for them as regards military capabilities, as well as political justification and costs. Disregarding the process will not free anyone from its consequences<sup>10</sup>. The process clearly and finally disturbed the remains of symmetry in international relations<sup>11</sup>.

The changing of the attitude towards a military conflict involved an increased possibility of using modern means of combat. The way a means will be used in action largely depends on goals of combat (war) as emphasized Francois Heisbourg<sup>12</sup>. The orientation system developed for centuries changes, traditional views and expectations fail, and the whole structure of traditional thinking transforms<sup>13</sup>. According to M. van Creveld, a new era of so called intensity wars started. In it, wars for a long time slowly develop. A place which in Clausewitz's theory is occupied by politics was taken over by the war itself as described by van Creveld. In the opinion of van Creveld, wars are not run but continuously develop<sup>14</sup>. Probably for the next twenty five years we will witness combat action in various categories of military conflicts<sup>15</sup>. The capacity and ways of solving those conflicts may cause mixed feelings<sup>16</sup>.

A question should be asked on how military forces are prepared to such actions, or more precisely whether we have necessary skills to run such wars. Analyses and assessments of the war" capability frequently show numerous threats to security,

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<sup>10</sup> N. Chomsky, *Who's a Terrorist?*, "Gazeta Wyborcza. Gazeta Świąteczna", 7–8.10.2006, p. 18–20.

<sup>11</sup> A political system based on symmetry which developed in Europe since the end of the Thirty Years War was an exceptionally durable formation. However, within the system wars were still present and borders moved, but it was capable of preventing forms of wars that could threaten the system or at least reduced those to peripheral locations keeping them far from the centre. The symmetry, which was a basis for the political system, proved efficient at three levels. However, at one of them asymmetry started growing while others were capable of taking over and balancing such an asymmetry at a very early stage. These were the levels of military strategy, political rationality and legal and international legitimization.

<sup>12</sup> F. Heisbourg, *War*, Warsaw 1998, p. 7.

<sup>13</sup> Tools of war may significantly vary. This for instance can be seen on television. On the one hand, we have the Gulf War during which video techniques were used on a large scale, on the other Rwanda where primitive machetes killed more people than any "intelligent weapon" in Iraq. Not complicated ground mines kill and wound thousands of people.

<sup>14</sup> M. van Creveld, *Cold Faces of War. From Marna to Iraq*, Poznań 2008, p. 318–329.

<sup>15</sup> F. Heisbourg, *War...*, p. 22–38.

<sup>16</sup> A.D. Rotfeld, J. Simonides, *The System of Security Based on Cooperation and Peace Culture*, [in:] *Preventing Conflicts*, Warsaw 2000, p. 13–23, Cf. J. L. Addis, *Prevention Strategies*, Warsaw 2007.

sovereignty and stability of a state<sup>17</sup>. Socio-economic and technological development that result in life style changes, as well as technological novelties and inventions force strategists to accommodate combat methods to the actual situation. Of course, it also works the other way round and frequently military inventions make the civil world more modern. It seems that only people themselves decide about the use of contemporary miraculous inventions. Provided we keep other people in mind and our capability to change the world treat as a means, which happens on a global scale only after a long period of threat, we can be optimistic about our future.

The continuous scientific and technological advancement, so transparent in the era of the information society, in particular in material engineering, electronics and computer science, resulted in introducing military systems of multiple use by leading military armies in the world. Such systems are highly automatic and provide “optimists” with assurance of military means<sup>18</sup>.

Recently the factors that determined questions about armed forces were the description of mass war readiness and the ability to absorb technological changes. For the next decades the role of military staffs has been increasing because the barriers that military units faced were becoming more difficult and complicated.

The rule of symmetry in military actions (symmetry of military strategy) recently ensured safety (certainty) concerning the force relation assessment of individual countries – starting from armed force size, through armament to the size of the military budget. It allowed comparison with own potential and ensure, by creating certain coalitions in time, that a potential opponent doesn't take military advantage. The military forces in Europe were similar in principle; therefore it was possible to compare them by using simple counting. This sometimes led to an arms race, more often, however – to stable constellations of war policy. For each side the efforts of the opponent were a measure of its own military struggles. The arming was not against an imaginary enemy, but against a real opponent. Its virtue was that it was possible to easily state and correct a state of advantage or its lack.

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<sup>17</sup> For the state it seems to be a laugh of our times. The more globalization moves nations, the stronger they try to rebuild and stabilize their sovereignty and internal cohesion. According to the majority of analysts and political scientists, in the post Cold War world we increasingly frequently deal with stronger international integration in economic relations. Frequently we forget about citizens, and refer to them as consumers. Cf. M. Król, *Helplessness of liberals. Liberal thought against Conflict and War*, Warsaw 2005, p. 99–108; more in: P. Mazurkiewicz, *Violence in Politics*, Wrocław 2006, p. 137–169.

<sup>18</sup> T. Donnelly, *Time of New Missions!*, “International Political Review”, 2003/2, p. 15–23, Cf. I. Eland, *Emporium Attacks. New Imperialism and its Mistakes*, “International Political Review”, 2003/ 2, p. 51–54.

### THE CHANGING SIDE OF ARMED FORCES

During the bloody 20th century wars and armies so got into our lives that we consider their sizes, costs and incomes as natural. According to Edward Gibbon history is 'nothing but a registry of crimes, madness and misery'<sup>19</sup>. The last decade of the 20th century started changing the international and military environment. The last decade of the 20th c. witnessed changes in the international community including those in the military one<sup>20</sup>.

The first campaign after the cold war – war with Iraq in 1991 – showed that the armed forces' structure and their equipment do not allow using them effectively in conflict, in which the opponent is not clearly defined. The restrictions also concerned the region of action. A transformation of the armed forces became necessary, because they were able to act in random places on the globe, achieving this ability as quickly as possible and with minimum engagement of force and resources.

The tasks of the armed forces had to be modified<sup>21</sup>. The Americans were first to reform. They were to carry the financial weight of freeing Kuwait in 1991 and they were the first to draw conclusions from this war. The intervention at the Persian Gulf, along with the phase of preparing and withdrawing the forces, was waged for many months and consumed huge amounts. The land Operation lasted but for a couple of days<sup>22</sup>. Such a relation between the effects and costs could not be accepted even by the United States. The decision crew in Washington understood that the modern army has to be universal. That is why they created a new concept of military force usage<sup>23</sup>. Third wave war – this term was used in A. H. Toffler's<sup>24</sup> publication, with reference to the war at the Persian Gulf in 1990–1991, led by coalition forces. Changes in action performing were important and concentrated on precision when determin-

<sup>19</sup> Quote from: W. Polk, *Neighbors and Strangers*, Warszawa 2000, p. 95.

<sup>20</sup> A. Toffler, *Future Shock*, Poznań 1998, p. 140.

<sup>21</sup> In consequence, new requirements for battle resources were formulated. This led to development and introduction of armament programs, such as FCS or FRES. We will see its results only in the next few decades of the 21st century. Those programs are expected to develop a new generation of battle systems that allow the army to use light force with the possibilities of a heavy one along with a proper orientation level.

<sup>22</sup> The main part of the 'Iraqi Freedom' operation lasted for 25 days (i.e. from March 19th to April 13th 2003). The actions of a 130-thousand concentration of land and air forces of the American–British–Australian coalition lasted a few weeks.

<sup>23</sup> It was based on few basic determinants: the integration of all armed forces' actions (connected actions); achieving information domination; gaining advantage on the selected directions; the ability of immediate reaction at any place on the globe; participation in the actions of international forces.

<sup>24</sup> A. Toffler, H. Toffler, *War and Antiwar*, Poznań 2006, p. 29–32.

ing the aim as well as adjusting the resources in such way that the losses were minimal; knowledge, information and data start to compete with weaponry. The authors point at numerous parallelisms between the characteristics of the new economical order and those of war waging. According to them, military science became motivated by the changes in the information and economical society. The changes of the economical order also left an imprint on war<sup>25</sup>.

A 'morning star' is what people tend to call revolution in army matters which in consequence should allow the return to symmetry. The RMA (Revolution in Military Affairs)<sup>26</sup>, means an unusual development in military technology, armament and army potentials connected with a general civilization, computing and technological progress, which leads to crucial changes in battle waging, its planning, equipment training methods and organization.

Thanks to new research in computing, automation, robotics and nanotechnology<sup>27</sup> it is possible to produce battle equipment with such precision and reliability that a change in war perception became necessary. When it comes to army issues, the RMA concentrates around the following rules:

- range<sup>28</sup>
- durability<sup>29</sup>

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<sup>25</sup> H. Münkler, *Wars of our Times*, Kraków 2004.

<sup>26</sup> See: E. Sloan, *The Revolution in Military Affairs*, Ottawa 2002, cf. R. Scalesa Jr., *Yellow Smoke*, New York 2002.

<sup>27</sup> <sup>7</sup> Nanotechnology – the ability to manipulate single molecules or even atoms during the production of microscopic machines. There is also a simultaneous miniaturization of microprocessors and their efficiency taking place.

<sup>28</sup> We are talking about a global interaction. There is, however, a restriction to be made. Such a vision of war of ultramodern technologies concerns a narrow team of countries that are economically the strongest. Can poor and backward countries that are using primitive technologies take part in those phenomena? It is not possible or even probable, however, that those countries are powerless. We can see the proof in the Vietnam or Afghanistan war, where ultramodern technologies did not ensure victory for the two superpowers. We can use special actions (including terror) for compensating the chances as well as guerrilla actions – war for 'the weak'. Furthermore, during World War II, the whole row of countries that were technologically backward have worked very hard to acquire nuclear weaponry and they sometimes sacrificed their economical growth or life standards' increase to do so. Today, they can abandon the theory and practice of peasant wars, because they possess arguments with which they can smite the superpowers located on the opposite part of the globe. Cf. P. Bracken, *Fire in the East, the Birth of Asian Military Power and the Second Nuclear Century*, Warsaw 2000.

<sup>29</sup> Almost eliminating the weakest factor at war which is the soldier and avoiding psychical restrictions that come from stress during battle as well as weariness from the realization of monotonous and often dangerous objectives. The tasks of radio-electronic reconnaissance,

- precision<sup>30</sup>
- miniaturization and automation<sup>31</sup>;
- speed and stealth operation (untraceable by the radar)<sup>32</sup>
- ambush<sup>33</sup>
- awareness<sup>34</sup>;
- simulation<sup>35</sup>

monitoring the area of activity or tactical data transmission can be realized successfully without the presence and readiness of a soldier.

<sup>30</sup> Military men started planning the operations in a way to limit casualties within their own ranks as well as outsiders. Some tragic mistakes could not be avoided. For example, the destruction of a shelter with 300 civilians inside in Baghdad in 1991, the bombardment of a passenger train along with the bridge and refugee column in Kosovo in 1999 or the Afghan civilians in 2002. On the one hand, the solution of the problem could be overwhelming the opponent without taking any lives and on the other – affecting the non-living matter that could lead to damage of selected armament systems and infrastructure. For example, on DPM 1 section (February 24th 1991, west of Wadi al Batin) 30 minute fire assault preparation was carried out. In that time, the rocket launchers and artillery cannons fired about 1000 tones of ammo, which responds to a single air raid of 60 B-52 airplanes. Tactical teams on the first defense line of the Iraqi army were developed, but possessed about 50% of its personal condition. The Iraqi resistance was short in that section.

<sup>31</sup> J.G. Roos, *Research on Battlefield Robotization*, “Armed Force Journal” 2002, No. 1, p. 28–31, cf. G.W. Goodman, *Unmanned Air Battleships*, “ISR Journal” 2002, No. 3, p. 49–50 and P. Lewis, *Robot War*, “Flight International” 28.01.2003, supplement, p. 2–4.

<sup>32</sup> The main part of the ‘Iraqi Freedom’ operation lasted for 25 days (i.e. from March 19th to April 13th 2003). The actions of a 130-thousand concentration of land and air forces of the coalition (with over 300 000 soldiers) lasted a few weeks. The coalition infantry reached a fast offensive pace on combat groups, reaching 120–200 km/24h; on the other corps sections it varied from 20–50 km/24h.

<sup>33</sup> Avoiding the same pattern, flexible planning and operation, using force in appropriate ways and places with maximum effectiveness, using landing operations for capturing communication junctions and forming support bases – those were the factors that ensured success the opponent could not foresee.

<sup>34</sup> The case of social support loss for leading military operations that led to casualties in civilians of the opponent took place in January 1945, when the bombardment of Dresden by English airplanes was revealed (135 thousand killed). Thanks to the reaction of the public opinion, this was one of the last carpet bombings. A similar situation took place between the 60’s and 70’s in Vietnam. The public opinion pressure gradually led to decreasing the participation of American forces and finally to Parisian agreement pacts’ signing. More: J. L. Addis, *Refraining strategies*, Warsaw 2007.

<sup>35</sup> Battle robots allow limiting the casualties among own soldiers during battle, thus it is possible do the same when it comes to the living force of the enemy, especially civilians. See: E. Bendyk, *Future Fighters*, “‘Politics’ Intelligent Person Manual” 2008, No. 14, p. 28–32, cf. [www.comw.org](http://www.comw.org).



New weaponry based on those rules allows reaching very distant targets, placed hundreds of kilometers away from the command post, higher mobility of the fighting units along with less threat of being tracked by the enemy, lowers the necessity of replenishment in the battlefield and, what is most important, 'shortens the time gap between tracking the target and its neutralization'<sup>36</sup>. This means, that tracking a hidden enemy (e.g. a terrorist) and its neutralization takes only a few moments and not as before, a few days<sup>37</sup>. The RMA solutions enable replacing the soldier. The creation of so-called intelligent weapons (self-tracking or laser-tracked), their accuracy and speed allow firing a missile from large distances instead of sending a man into that dangerous area. Therefore the most sad eventuality of war, the soldiers' (or civilians') death, is minimized<sup>38</sup>.

The biggest dimension of the current war revolution is the IT war. The 21<sup>st</sup> century is the era of computers. It is impossible to imagine a bank, institution or company without IT solutions or internet access. Those allow the functioning of strategic lines such as: power industry, transport, telecommunications, banking or even medical and rescue services. By properly leading a paralyzing attack on the IT network it is possible to stop a country from normal functioning, not mentioning its defense coordination against threats. The side which achieves such an objective gains an unbelievable advantage without firing a single missile.

Analysts expect that the above solutions will develop a new way of battle waging. The characteristics of a modern war are:

1. Emphasizing the necessity of fast approach at the conflict area in order to achieve victory in its early stages<sup>39</sup>;

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<sup>36</sup> S. Koziej, *Transformation of Security Systems, Impact of Military Campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq on International and National Security*, "Military Thought" 2006, No. 6, p. 16.

<sup>37</sup> In principle, special forces are used for reconnaissance, sabotage and diversion operation on the very rear of enemy grounds. During the Afghan operation they also realized many infantry tasks. Its confirmation were the actions from November 30th 2001, when a group of 100 Rangers supported by the air forces lead a battle in order to form a safety zone in the Babi Sahib area (south of Kandahar). On the same day, the Delta Force commandos led an assault on the Khandahari buildings and ended up with three dead soldiers and nine wounded. The objective was to capture the Al-Qaida leaders.

<sup>38</sup> It seems that the philosophy of war has changed. If until now it was led in a way to maximize the losses of the opposing army with minimum own casualties, today it is important to minimize the enemy's casualties as well.

<sup>39</sup> The 'Iraqi Freedom' operation was really a logistic operation. A considerable part of the army was the security units as well as battle and logistic crews. The American army confirmed and redeployed 90 000 National Guard and regular soldiers to Iraq. Pessimists foretold struggles that would last for many months and cause thousands of deaths on both sides.

2. Gaining a considerable advantage over the enemy by moving faster, i.e. using tactical helicopters in a way that would make it impossible for the enemy to make decisions and take time to react successfully<sup>40</sup>;
3. Achieving the ability to track the enemies' moves to compensate for its overwhelming numbers<sup>41</sup>;
4. Gaining information about the location of enemy forces in order to properly place own soldiers<sup>42</sup>;
5. Ease (therefore not needing acceptance from time-consuming staff procedures) – the moving of small units that by using IT equipment do not have to remain visible to each other<sup>43</sup>;

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<sup>40</sup> During the land and air campaign, choppers turned out to be highly resourceful also for combat and transport. They were constantly present on the battlefield, they overpowered the Iraqi defense posts, destroyed fortifications, digged tanks and armored transports. They also allowed the commanding crew to immediately react for changes in the combat situation. Thanks to helicopters, more captives could be individually taken for the first time in the history of war. Equipped with modern avionics and navigation systems the assaults could be led at every time of day, with limited vision. They showed a high precision in leading the attacks also when a group of 2 to 4 choppers destroyed a pack of twenty enemy tanks in a single flight. One chopper formation destroyed 50 Iraqi tanks in a single battle. Using choppers for destroying rear-front drops on such a large scale increased the dynamism of infantry and by using them for transport it was possible to form support bases deep in the enemy territory. This could take place already on the second day of land offensive and considerably make front units independent on deliveries made by land. Choppers ensured a smooth delivery for the fighting units, allowing a constant assault.

<sup>41</sup> For the final result of war, to is not the most important to gain material advantage, but acquire elements such as: surprise, advance, threat, disinformation, camouflage etc. New conditions impose the necessity of setting aside the theoretical and practical solution of mass armies, annihilating battles of tight groups in aid of sophisticated and flexibly led intermediate actions.

<sup>42</sup> The coalition forces used a wide range of reconnaissance resources, which allowed them to see into enemy territory, whilst the command of Iraq did not possess the means to detect activity beyond the contact lines. The computerized system that uses satellite connection had an advantage in speed and effectiveness over the Iraqi command system, seriously damaged during a few days' air attacks. Accurate reconnaissance of enemy groups and its correct analysis allowed the adoption of suitable tactical solutions, which were practiced before performing land offensive. Assault tactics of individual groups developed during the preparing period appeared to be extremely effective.

<sup>43</sup> Usage of precise weapons based on GPS coordinates (for stationary purposes) as well as TV or laser-guided (for mobile purposes). Using such warheads allows selective attacking with air armament or artillery missiles even on settled areas. However, it does not always prevent from accidents such as the destruction of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in May 1999.

6. The ability of precise firing to any place from different locations (from air, land, sea, space and cyberspace)<sup>44</sup>.

The modernity of contemporary weapons requires developing the nature and structure of the armed forces. The long anachronistic recruitment army, unfortunately still active in some countries (also Poland) has to become history as quickly as possible. High-class technological systems in high-class equipment need perfectly trained users – experts, not accidental amateurs.

Apart from technological changes, a change of threat scale also took place. The specter of a great, global war was brushed away, thus the necessity of keeping expensive and big armies is lower. The more valuable from 'possession and dislocation of an army is its high ability to react to various, unexpected threats as to time and place, such as terrorism'<sup>45</sup>.

The revolution phenomenon avoids clear-cut assessments. On the one hand the progress is inevitable, thus it should be satisfying that it aims at lowering not only material, but also human casualties. On the other hand, according to R. Kuźniar it is normal to think that 'more countries will become interested in war waging if they are to be so safe and painless for those, who initiate them'<sup>46</sup>. It is also clear, that the main author and user of the RMA are the armed forces of the USA<sup>47</sup>. No other country, even as powerful as Germany, Japan or China allocates such amounts for this field.

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<sup>44</sup> Constructive works are led mainly on the field of airships, which is a result of the leading role of air forces on the modern battlefield, where the main objective is not only gaining advantage in the air, but also supporting land and navy forces. This broadens the structural solution range and its tasks. At first, the systems carried out simple monitoring of land and underwater objects. Later, more specialized technical solutions began to appear and they were designed to optimize tactical and technical methods for specific missions. Today, they lead a multipronged reconnaissance tasks (e.g. optical, radar, laser, mass destruction contamination, radio-electronic radiation emission or meteorological). Research clearly shows that unmanned airships (UCAV) will also be a part of the armament. They will carry out especially dangerous tasks such as the neutralization of enemy anti-air defense or attacking heavily protected spot targets. Currently, constructions such as X-45, X-46, X-47 or SHARC are in a test phase. More: *Editorials: UGCV revealed*, "WTO Report" 2003, No. 4, p. 54 and Eurorobots, 'Armed Force Journal' 2002, no. 1, p. 34–37 and J. Garstka, *Landmine Sweepers*, "WTO Report" 2002, No. 12, p. 52–57, cf. [www.nati.int](http://www.nati.int).

<sup>45</sup> S. Koziej, *Transformation of Security Systems...*, op.cit., p. 7.

<sup>46</sup> R. Kuźniar, *Politics and power*, Warszawa 2001, p. 287.

<sup>47</sup> In 2001 the United States spent as much funds for military purposes as the next eight countries altogether; in 2002 – as many as fifteen countries total and this year it is said that it will be an amount equal to twenty budgets. This trend will probably still remain.

Therefore, the question is what will happen if the USA begins using its dominant position not only for 'spreading and defending the ideals of democracy'? What if e.g. terrorist organizations start using the same methods? This is what threatens the asymmetrical constellations. The armaments are aimed against imaginary threats, not a real enemy<sup>48</sup>.

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<sup>48</sup> G. Soros, *The Bubble of American Supremacy*, Kraków 2004, p. 46.