
THE ROLE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION IN SHAPING OF THE COUNTRY'S SECURITY

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The issues of foreign policy and internal security have been intentionally excluded from the analysis of the role of the president in the federal administration – due to their crucial importance and also due to the fact that the president performs his tasks mainly through the specific and politically strong body of the Security Council of the Russian Federation. The importance of the Security Council requires that the discussion of its political and legal status and the presentation of its composition and main functions precedes the analysis of the range of power of the president in shaping of the foreign and defence policy as well as internal security. In the course of the analysis of the role of the president there will be also shown the influence of the people directly managing the armed forces and internal security apparatus on the president.

The dependence of the president on the heads of the units forming the coercive apparatus is not the quality obvious only for Vladimir Putin's presidency; it was also visible in the activity of president Boris Yeltsin, which has for many years escaped the attention of many of the scholars studying Russia. Today it is easier to notice the influence of the ethos and interests of the coercive apparatus in the activity of the president, but it

does not mean that in the studies the characteristics of Yeltsin's presidency which seem to be more hidden for common awareness should be omitted.

I. THE SECURITY COUNCIL OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION AND ITS IMPORTANCE

The Constitution of the Russian Federation equips the president with extensive powers and places serious duties on him in the spheres of foreign policy and security of the country. The performance of these duties is to take place with the assistance of the constitutional and political bodies, among which a special role in the sphere of security has been attributed to the Security Council of the RF (referred to in Art. 83 (g) of the Constitution). The existence of this multifunctional and pan-departmental body and the fact that the president presides over it is obvious. Not only due to the need, common in many countries, to decide about national security at the highest level, with the significant degree of confidentiality with respect to procedures and content of the decisions. It is so also because of the political system traditions in Russia itself (both the older and the newer ones) and the specific moment in Russia's history: the decline of the land empire of the country, which for centuries had increased its territory and whose location (in Asia and Europe) has confirmed the conviction of its elites of the significance of long-term and variant, strategic thinking in terms of "our country and our world". The Security Council was exactly the place of this way of thinking and the decisions based on it.

The similar role was played by the Defence Council in the USSR of the post-Stalinist period, composed of the highest rank leaders of the CPSU (Communist Party of the Soviet Union), the prime minister, the heads of the departments of foreign affairs, defence and security, sometimes also of the minister of internal affairs and from time to time also of one or two people appointed to join this circle by the secretary general of the CPSU. Its composition corresponded to a significant degree with the so called small Politburo – the group which in isolation from other members of the Politburo, and much less the whole Central Committee and

the government, made the most important strategic decisions¹. Such an informal institution allowed the secretary general to easier control the whole Politburo by creating different inner circles. The secretary general decided about the subject of the decision of the full composition of the Politburo, the small Politburo or the Defence Council. However, this institution served another important purpose – it enabled the coordination of the activity of the “force” departments and the civilian control by party politicians over people in uniforms². The effectiveness of this civilian control was, however, different, and the degree of politicized generals of the armed forces and KGB was so high that often it was them who had shaped the decisions which were then presented to the head of the party to approve³.

When Mikhail Gorbachev reformed the communist party he aimed at moving the decisions concerning the most important state issues from the Defence Council to the state apparatus; not wanting, however, to lose control over state defence issues, he caused the establishment – this time completely formally and openly – of the Security Council with the president at its head. This Security Council, established in the constitution of 26 December 1990 at that time as an auxiliary body of the president of the USSR, it dealt with foreign affairs, national defence, different aspects of internal security, including natural disasters, extraordinary situations and stability of the legal order in the state. M. Gorbachev invited also experts from outside the party to cooperate with the Security Council, thus creating the new tradition of all-party cooperation on the state secu-

¹ M. Galeotti, *The Age of Anxiety: Security and Politics in Soviet Union and Post-Soviet Russia*, London 1995, p. 13.

² G.E. Hudson, *Soviet National Security Policy*, Boston 1990, pp. 152–154.

³ Some scholars claim that the decision of December 1979 on the invasion of Afghanistan was actually shaped by the minister of foreign affairs, minister of defence and the head of KGB, and then only approved by Leonid Brezhnev. D. Cordovez, P. Harrison, *Out of Afghanistan*, Oxford 1995, p. 48. It is a disputable example, as other scholars claim that generals and the officers corps of the armed forces believed that this operation was pointless from the military point of view, that the army was forced by a command to start what ended as an embarrassing failure. Preparation for the invasion of a greater number of troops started already in the summer 1979, but at that time the command with a detailed combat task was not yet issued.

rity. He also strived for the new division of competence between the government departments, for example the department of armament control was moved from MoD (Ministry of Defence) to MFA (Ministry of Foreign Affairs).

The USSR Security Council from the period 1990–1991 was a paradigm to which many amendments to the constitution in the union republics quickly referred to in 1991. After the dissolution of the USSR the new states, which chose also the presidential system of the government, maintained this institution. The same happened also in Russia.

Yeltsin's decision to establish the Security Council was not only influenced by the soviet tradition connected with the activity of the Defence Council, or the working style of the USSR Security Council. It was influenced by the president's problems with the reform of the security apparatus, that is the Ministry of Security and of course KGB. The president needed his own apparatus (in the President's Administration) in order to attempt to significantly reconstruct the internal security apparatus and form anew the Russian armed forces, which after the fall of the USSR experienced the state of institutional chaos, deficiency of financial resources and inaccuracy of the war doctrine.

The Act on the president of 24 April 1991 (Art. 5) provided for the Security Council of the RSFSR (Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic) (as a Russian institution), and the amendment of 24 May 1991 to the Constitution changed it into a constitutional body. President B. Yeltsin appointed (on 19 July 1991) the commission which developed a draft of the structure and functions of the Security Council. Later the draft was worked on by parliamentary commissions of the Supreme Soviet which on 5 March 1992 passed the "Act on Security"⁴, regulating in detail the legal status, composition, the

⁴ The Act on Security was amended a few times (by decrees of 25 December 1992, of 24 December 1993, of 25 July 2002 and the federal act of 7 March 2005). Despite these amendments the official text of the act on security Article 12 (which was amended in 2005) still mentions the Supreme Soviet, the long inexistent body of the Soviet Russia, and it orders to treat the decisions of this inexistent Supreme

procedure of formation and the main tasks and forms of activity of the Security Council. The tasks provided for in this Act included: strategic problems of military, economic, social, information and ecological security, protection of legal order and internal order, preventing natural disasters and protecting the health of the society⁵. However, verbal acknowledgement of the importance of, for example, health security, was not accompanied by concrete decisions – the narrow understanding of security still dominated, extended only to include economic security.

President Yeltsin, with the decree of 3 June 1992, gave the Security Council its final shape, which was maintained also after the Constitution of the Russian Federation was adopted in December 1993. The decree defined the tasks of the Security Council very broadly, as an institution established in order to: “ensure the fulfillment of the function of the President of the Russian Federation in running the country, shaping the internal, foreign and military policy in the sphere of security, maintaining the state sovereignty of Russia, maintaining social and political stability in the society, protecting rights and freedoms of citizens”. In the decree also the duties of the Security Council Apparatus were defined and it was established that its structure would include: the strategic security management, planning and coordination management and the analytical and information centre. The personnel to man the Security Council which after it was established amounted only to ten people quickly increased to 80 people.

Soviet as the basis of shaping “forces and means of ensuring security”. Moreover, Articles 14 and 17 of the act after amendments mention the Supreme Soviet and do not mention the State Duma, which reflects badly on the legislative technique, see http://www.scrf.gov.ru/documents/decree/1992_2446.shtml (updated: 20.09.2012).

⁵ The first list of tasks of the Security Council mentions health care, but the minister of health was not indicated as the permanent member of the Council. Health security is of course a part of modern and broadly understood security and including this issue reflects the willingness to depart from the Soviet tradition of narrow understanding of security as the field of responsibility of the armed forces, special forces, internal security apparatus and different types of the Militia forces. However, there was no consistency in this respect.

Soon the structure expanded even more, amounting to 200 people working for it only in the President's Administration (excluding those who dealt with the needs of the Security Council in the government department).

In accordance with the Act on Security, the Security Council consisted of the chairperson, who was the president, vice-president, secretary, permanent members (with the right to vote) and members (in an advisory capacity). In the years of *interregnum*, the period of transition from Russia the Russian Federation (1992–1993), all members of the Security Council – apart from the president and vice-president – had to be approved by the parliament, which showed the very unstable line-up between the president and the parliament. After adoption of the Constitution the function of the vice-president of the Russian Federation ceased to exist, and the president on his own, without bargaining with the parliament, decided about the composition of the Security Council. Permanent members of this Council, apart from the president and the secretary were: the prime minister, the ministers of defence, foreign affairs and internal affairs, the director of the Federal Security Service and the head of the President's Administration. All permanent members of the Security Council are equal and the decisions are taken with a simple majority of votes. The number of permanent members is small and it resembles the former Politburo of the CC CPSU. And it soon began to be described in this way in the media. This analogy was indicated by Juri Skokov, the first secretary of the Security Council, from April 1992 to May 1993⁶. The members of the Security Council in an advisory capacity were: some of the ministers (e.g. of justice, finance, extraordinary situations and natural disasters), the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces, the Public Prosecutor General, the chief of foreign intelligence, the chief of Federal Agency of Government Communications and Information (FAGCI), the Chief of the Federal Protective Service and the president of the Russian Academy of Sciences.

At the beginning there were seven inter-departmental commissions formed in the Security Council as well as the scientific council with a broad range of analytical and political activity. The work of working

⁶ E. Bacon, *Russia's Security Council: Institutional Continuity During Transition*, [in:] *Contemporary Political Studies*, ed. J. Stanyer, G. Stoker, Nottingham 1997.

bodies was coordinated by the Council's secretary. At least once a month plenary meetings were supposed to take place, and more often the operational meetings, meetings connected with the issues of strategic planning as well as working meetings organized by the Council's secretary. Only the plenary meetings required the presence of the president whose irregular participation in meetings gave the secretary the chance to show what he could do and play the tensions between the departments represented in the Council, and above all between the management of the MoD, more conservative and more Russian national interest-oriented and Andrei Kozyrev, a more reformatory, pro-western head of the MFA⁷.

The key figure in the daily work of the huge apparatus of the Security Council and the inter-departmental commissions was the secretary, who presented to the president the decisions prepared by different working groups. Only after the acceptance by the president the decisions came into force and could be implemented. Secretaries changed very often: within seven years, by the end of the presidency of Boris Yeltsin there were as many as nine secretaries, among them also the future president Vladimir Putin (from 29 March 1999 to 9 August 1999)⁸. The reasons for changing secretaries were different, but usually connected with the course of fighting between the departments which were included in the Security Council; only exceptionally it meant the change of political orientation in a significant scope of the Council's activity. The greatest instability of the position of the secretary can be seen in the final part of the second term of B. Yeltsin's presidency, when the former president clearly lost control over the institutions of power and through frequent changes tried to regain the control over the situation. The longest presiding secretary of

⁷ A. Kozyrev wrote about it in his memoir *Demokratyczna transformacja*, Warszawa 1995.

⁸ Consecutive secretaries of the Security Council were: Jury Skokov (3 April 1992–10 May 1993), Jevgeny Shapovnikov (11 June 1993–18 September 1993), Oleg Lobov (18 September 1993–18 July 1996), Aleksandr Lebedz (18 July 1996–17 October 1996), Ivan Rybkin (19 October 1996–2 March 1998), Andrei Kokoshin (3 March 1998–10 September 1998), Nikolai Bordiuzha (14 September 1998–19 March 1999), Vladimir Putin (29 March 1999–9 August 1999), Sergey Ivanov (15 November 1999–28 March 2001), Valery Rushaylo (28 March 2001–9 March 2004), Igor Ivanov since 9 March 2004.

the Security Council in the period of the B. Yeltsin's presidency was O. Lobov⁹ who met with the president at least once a week. As one of Russian journalists wrote: "the president thinks that the Security Council is mainly O. Lobov, his man, but it is a group of different politicians, experienced, shrewd and able to calculate, who have their own interests and goals"¹⁰.

In the period 1998–1999 the composition of the Security Council itself, apart from secretaries, was quite stable, but its importance diminished. Ministers from departments represented in the Council did not at that time need an intermediary in the person of the secretary of the Council, and anyway the president less frequently dealt with the strategic problems of the country.

The characteristic of the activity of the Security Council during the presidency of B. Yeltsin was extending its activity to issues quite loosely connected with the state security and foreign affairs. The Council had, for example, a commission for privatization and in the reports concerning economic security indicated numerous irregularities, and also expressed political dislike for these politicians in B. Yeltsin's team who were responsible for privatization. It also dealt with the causes of the decrease of the value of Ruble in October 1994¹¹. The content of the reports was not always convenient for the president, but his dependence on "chekists"¹²

⁹ Before that Oleg Lobov was a not very successful minister of the economy and president Yeltsin appointed him to be the secretary of the Security Council when he failed to put there for a longer period general Jewgeny Shapovnikov who did not play an important role in shaping new military doctrines and a strategy of foreign policy. The new concept of foreign policy was accepted by the president in April 1993. The document was created when the secretary of the Security Council was still Jury Skokov, with whom the minister of foreign affairs Andr Kozyrev disagreed considerably. After Shapovnikov the second officer on this position was general Bordiuz, and the third colonel Putin. The others were civilians.

¹⁰ W. Wyżutowicz, *The President's Armed Escort*, "Moskowskije Nowosti" 25.12.1994, p. 13 (translated into English in "Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press" 1994, No. 52).

¹¹ See information in the Russian Press, "Siegodnia" 04.11.1994; "Izwestia" 02.04.1994.

¹² This is not a malicious name as people included in this category call themselves "chekists" and it is difficult to say to what extent it is a conscious reference to the tradition

(their conduct in October 1993 during the armed clash of B. Yeltsin with the parliament turned the scales) made him tolerate their hardly reformatory views on many state issues.

A less visible – although important – role of the Security Council was to isolate the Duma from foreign affairs and limit it to necessary, in accordance with the Constitution, activities, such as for example: ratifying treaties, debates on the main directions of foreign policy, presentation of candidates for ambassadors. For the president the Duma was not a strong partner in matters of security; its two main standing commissions – of foreign affairs and defence – demonstrated a significant tendency to compromise, apart from the refusal to ratify the Russian – American treaty START II, negotiated in 1993 with president Bill Clinton and ratified by the Congress.

After a difficult reelection for the second term, in spring 1996, the importance of the Security Council decreased, as the president could not deal with the variety of ambitions and interest in his closest political circles. In order to deal with the results of the disputes with the minister of foreign affairs Jevgeny Primakov about the attitude towards the West, or the consequences of general Aleksandr Lebed's decisions (numerous resignations in the internal affairs and defence department in the summer 1996), the president decided to take steps which increased the overgrowth of institutions. Under pressure of circumstances and his own associates he created a few additional bodies in the President's Administration, differing slightly in their personal composition and giving the chance to show what they can to other ambitious people. He appointed the Foreign Policy Council (it operated from December 1995 to autumn 1997), the Defence Council of eighteen members (from 26 July 1996) and the State and Military Inspectorate (1996–1998), which meant the strengthening of the position of Anatoly Chubais and general Nikolai Baturin fighting against general Aleksandr Lebed and general Aleksandr Korzakov over the influence on the president's decisions concerning the security strategy, promotions in the uniformed services and financial resources for these

of the services created by Feliks Dzerzhinsky and to what extent a simple professional pride.

purposes. Personal rivalry within the President's Administration overlapped with the conflicts between the MFA and the MoD. Moreover, the chief of the MFA A. Kozyrev had to constantly defend the autonomy of his department against the interference on the part of the President's Administration: for example, in September 1992 influential people from the President's Administration convinced Yeltsin to cancel in the last moment his visit to Japan during which A. Kozyrev was ready to make concessions about the status of the Kuril Islands in exchange for economic aid and Japanese investments in Russia. The appointment on 2 March 1998 of Andrei Kokoshin, the former civilian deputy minister of defence, as the secretary of the Security Council allowed to include the Defence Council and the State and Military Inspectorate again in the structures of the Security Council; however when after the financial crisis in August 1998 A. Kokoshin suggested that the new prime minister should be the mayor of Moscow Jury Luzkov, the president considered it a personal disloyalty, dismissed him from the position of the secretary and appointed general Bordiuzha in his place.

The Security Council is an institution in whose activity the general tendency of Yeltsin's presidency was manifested: instead of institutionalizing the relations of power the personalization of new institutions took place. Personal sympathies, ambitions or connections came to the foreground, and the rules and principles of functioning of institutions were pushed into the background. President B. Yeltsin did not completely understand the reason for institutionalizing power, especially his power, and was not aware that he himself was an institution and a person. When he trusted someone personally he did not pay heed to institutional rules of the game and decision making procedures. In this way an informal role of generals of former KGB strengthened in the nearest circle of the president, as he placed a great personal confidence in these people. It concerned, for example, the former KGB general A. Korzakov, the chief of the president's Protective Service, who was not a member of the Security Council, but had a great influence on president's opinions. He competed for this extra-institutional influence with another KGB officer, general Michail Barsukov who was an important figure in the President's Administration and the chief of the Main Administration for the Protection of

the Russian Federation (*Głównoje Uprawlenije Ochrany* – GUO). There were 44 thousand people under his authority protecting important politicians, all federal authorities' buildings in Moscow and numerous holiday and tourist facilities for the ruling elite from the Soviet times. The rivalry of former KGB officers over the influence on B. Yeltsin concerns also general Grigory Rogozin, performing the function of the chief of the analytical and research centre in the President's Administration (where 60 to 100 people worked, including a lot of officers from special forces). President Yeltsin had in his closest circle a good deal of "chekists", although only some of them were connected with the Security Council. This extra-institutional influence of former KGB officers was sometimes stronger than the influence of the institutional mechanisms within the Security Council¹³.

Also the subsequent secretaries of the Security Council (it concerns general Aleksandr Lebed the most) were directed by the personal ambitions and caused disputes and turmoil in the managing elite of the departments which were the basis of the existence of the Council. Coordination activities often changed into personal wars. The "Bermuda triangle" of the bureaucratic wars of that period constituted: the president, the secretary of the Security Council, the chief of the MoD and the chief of the MFA, with the internal security services in the background.

While analyzing the first period of the security policy Neil Robinson accurately noticed that: "thanks to the broadly defined tasks the Security Council became the parallel cabinet, whenever B. Yeltsin wanted it to be so"¹⁴. The Security Council had its own political dynamics and internal changeability of roles, dependant on the president, personal ambitions of subsequent secretaries who in the name of the president systematically run its structures, and on the game of departmental interests played permanently for the whole period of the institutional chaos. However, the Security Council was not a very strong coordinating body as – dependant

¹³ In 1995 general A. Korzakov was considered as the fifth person in the country, which had nothing in common with his institutional position. Personal relations were stronger than institutional rules and their normative power.

¹⁴ N. Robinson, *The Presidency: The Politics of Institutional Chaos*, [in:] *Institutions and Political Change in Russia*, ed. N. Robinson, London 2000, p. 25.

on internal interdepartmental fighting – it played with a great difficulty the role of the place were reasonable and sustainable compromises were supposed to be developed. At the same time institutional structures of the MoD, the MFA and MIA (Ministry of Internal Affairs) strengthened, becoming individual players on the political map of the Kremlin games of influence.

Presidency of V. Putin brought stability to the position of the secretary and the work mode of the Security Council. Personal wars between the MFA and the MoD calmed down, and the people of the security apparatus (“chekists”) gained strong positions. In the meantime the redefinition of foreign policy took place and the differences of opinions in the circle of people dealing professionally with the problems of security decreased. It facilitated consensual functioning, enabled by president V. Putin’s reserved and calm style of leadership.

The topics of plenary meetings of the Security Council in the years of Putin’s presidency are worth noticing, as they show the evolution of interests of Russia’s political elite. In the year 2000 the dominant themes included: military doctrine, foreign policy conception, rebuilding of the institutions of the state apparatus as well as of the social and economic sphere, information security doctrine, the principles of the armed forces reform, the conception of protecting national interests by the state, relations with Ukraine and ensuring security in the Caspian Sea region. These were the issues with which president V. Putin began his policy of strengthening the state and reintegration of its *cielostnost*. The year 2001 saw the continuation of these tough dimensions of security policy, as the Security Council dealt in the following order with: space programmes, control of Russian export, combating drug trafficking and drug addiction, perspective planning of the defence industry development by 2010 and for further years, mobilization readiness of the armed forces as well as export of arms and military equipment. In 2002 the meetings concerned in the following order: the situation in Chechnya, the strategy of science and technology development, combating international terrorism, the armaments industry, economic security, international cooperation and the security of the far east area. The Security Council in the subsequent years dramatically decreased the number of plenary meetings: in 2000

there were 9, in 2001–9, in 2002–7, in 2003–3, and in the years 2004–2005 only 2.

In 2003 there were only three topics: military and technical policy by the year 2015, the security of the federal Siberian area and nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Since 2004 the topics connected with the security of particular areas or regions of Russia ceased to appear. In 2004 after another election of V. Putin for the president, only two issues were discussed at the meetings of the Council: innovativeness in the economy and policy in the sphere of the Commonwealth of Independent States. In 2005 only two questions appeared – the perspectives of the relations with NATO and migration policy.

It seems surprising that the Council never dealt with soft dimensions of security, for example: ecological, health, demographic or legal security. What appears equally interesting is that the agenda of the meeting never included corruption problems or any forms of crime, every day threatening millions of citizens and the quality of governance and legitimization of power. While during B. Yeltsin's presidency internal security dominated, V. Putin's presidency brought increased interest in international security and strengthening the national interest of the Russian Federation in the global dimension (which was manifested by the successful attempts to gain a position in the Group of 8, an informal club of the most economically powerful western countries).

Why did the Security Council meet much less frequently than the Act on Security provided for requiring one meeting a month? There are a few explanations. The first says that president Putin controlled the “presidential bloc” of departments in a different way and did not need the Security Council in the role of a parallel cabinet so much. Another explanation refers to the fact that other forms of the Council's work became more regular. Mainly the interdepartmental commissions dealt with the preparation of topics and theses for plenary meetings. Also the role of the scientific council at the Security Council increased¹⁵. Its reports are submitted to the president for consideration and are analyzed, which was

¹⁵ The scientific council at the Security Council was formed by president B. Yeltsin with a decree No. 1807 of 1 November 1993. At the beginning it had 27 members.

rare in the years of B. Yeltsin's presidency. The chairperson of the scientific council is ex officio the secretary of the Security Council, and work of the members is not subject to remuneration. They also work in sections, their plenary meetings are rare (one or twice a year). Nowadays the scientific council has eight sections which deal with: strategic planning, international security, the problems of the Commonwealth of Independent States, scientific and technical security, defense and industry security, social and economic security, military security, information security as well as the problem of counteracting internal threats to national security. Some experts work in a few sections at the same time. Sections give their opinions on the drafts of normative or strategic and analytical documents, before they are put forward to the president for acceptance. Participation of experts is significant in these works, for example, their share in the preparation of the meetings of the Security Council in the period 2002–2004 dedicated to the development of science and technology and developing the bases for innovativeness in the Russian economy. The scientific council deals also with forecasting military and non-military threats to security. The scientific council after 2005 was composed of 80 eminent scholars, including 17 members of the Russian Academy of Sciences; most of the people appointed to be the members of the council (over 70%) hold a post-doctoral degree. In their work they are in close contact with the heads of the independent organizational units of the President's Administration.

Yet another explanation of decreased frequency of the Security Council meetings is an indisputable fact that numerous strategic documents had already been developed by the Council and the departments represented in it and there was no urgent need to change them. The list of documents created and documents in force is vast and there are few countries in the world which have such a comprehensive, published collection of strategic programme and normative documents¹⁶. During the rule of President Putin the following strategic documents were developed

¹⁶ These basic documents can be found in the website of the Security Council, www.scrf.gov.ru. Moreover, after its every meeting short resumes are published on the Internet of the decisions taken and official evaluations of particular security problems. All these documents are approved with decrees and have a normative force of federal law.

or seriously renewed: the conception of national security (10 January 2000), the conception of foreign policy (28 July 2000), the doctrine of information security (9 September 2000), the war doctrine (21 April 2001), the marine doctrine by 2020 (27 July 2001), the bases of the policy in the field of science and technology (30 March 2002)¹⁷, the doctrine of ecological security (31 August 2002), the bases of the policy in the field of chemical and biological security (4 December 2003), the bases of the policy of nuclear and radiological security by 2010 (4 December 2003), the principles of regional policy, the conception of the ethnic policy and the bases of the border defense policy, the conception of border cooperation (order of the federal government of 9 February 2001) and new acts on combating terrorism and counteracting extremist activity passed by the Duma. In the auxiliary bodies of the Security Council since 2005 works were conducted on the new conception of Russia's national security, taking into consideration new threats and challenges as well as the achieved level of state consolidation and of the initiative of the civil society.

In connection with the President's reintegrating activity there was also a standing consulting body formed at the Security Council of the RF. It was a committee of secretaries of security councils of the Collective Security Treaty Organization, which includes some countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States. Effectiveness of this body is little, especially after the "orange revolution" in Ukraine and the "pink" one in Georgia, which caused loosening of cooperation with the authorities of the Russian Federation.

Hence, it cannot be said that nowadays the Security Council is the substitute of the federal government or the second government. It is rather a tool for coordinating and strategic planning in all areas of state security, excluding those that have not been dealt with yet by the Council. Certainly it facilitates the performance of the president's constitutional duties of the head of the armed forces, the guarantor of the constitutional order in the state and the fundamental governing entity who in fact defines the main

¹⁷ The achievement of president Yeltsin's rule has been the still binding strategy of economic security (decree of 29 April 1996). It is a very general document which rather lists goals than indicates means and stages of their implementation.

directions in foreign and internal policy. This modern planning an strategic body, performing its mission in accordance with the Constitution of the Russian Federation is not, however, a counterpart of the Politburo of the CPSU, nor a private office of Russian tsars.

II. PRESIDENT AND THE INTERNAL SECURITY APPARATUS

In Russia the term security is associated by people with special forces, intelligence, counterintelligence, militia rather than with armed forces and foreign policy. With reference to this part of the complex of “siloviks” whose members call themselves “chekists” the constitutional position of the president is not as strong as with reference to the foreign service or the army. The president is not a constitutional head of the internal security apparatus, however, he is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, with numerous powers defined in federal acts on defence, military operations or mobilization. However, president Yeltsin introduced the custom (and consolidated it with decrees) that in the “presidential bloc” there are exactly all the internal security departments included (department of internal affairs, department of security, department of justice, department of intelligence as well as counterintelligence, and other special forces). Including these departments into the scope of coordinating activity of the Security Council helped to integrate them under the supervision of the president, and at the same time created the field for interdepartmental game of influence over the president and his strategic decisions.

Some presidential documents established departments (e.g. already in the middle of 1991 when the USSR still existed, the presidential decree established the ministry of security and internal affairs), and others destroyed the structures inherited from the USSR (e.g. dissolution of KGB and division of its functions between a few new agencies and federal services). It was an exceptionally difficult task, which was manifested by the example of the difficult birth of the new Russian department of internal affairs. After the president issued the decree establishing the new department, the Ministry of Security and Internal Affairs, created by

combining functions of two departments, the Supreme Soviet rejected the idea almost unanimously (with only one vote against). It demanded the president to refrain from any decisions on the future of KGB and other services until the parliament – after completing the work in commissions – passes a relevant resolution. The president did not wish to hear any suggestions from the Supreme Soviet. However, the Constitutional Court deemed his decree illegal, canceled and repealed it¹⁸. The Ministry of Security and the Ministry of Internal Affairs remained hence separated like in the USSR. And they started peculiar rivalry for president's favour, simultaneously cooperating quietly with the anti-presidential opposition in the parliament.

All these departments tried to convince the president of the superiority of their ideas for combating crime, and especially corruption. It was obvious that the main concern of the president would not be “*hunting spies*”, but prosecuting mafia and dishonest officials. Homicides to order became the way entrepreneurs competed on the emerging market. Organized criminal groups had trans-national connections and that had to be dealt with as well.

The president attempted to reform KGB, however without success¹⁹. After the Janayev's putsch, the president simply dissolved this structure, divided it into a few smaller ones and – more importantly – at least partly separated from each other so as not to become again “*a state within a state*” beyond any control. In this way the following institutions were created: Federal Agency of Government Communications and Information (FAGCI), Federal Counterintelligence Service (FCS), in 1995 renamed as Federal Security Service (FSS), Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), Main Administration for the Protection of the Russian Federation (GUO) and Federal Border Guard Service. These five organizations are simply former KGB directorates, after redundancies and personal reshuffle. All of them received different chiefs and statutes, but not all of them were

¹⁸ “*Izvestia*” 24.02.1991.

¹⁹ J.M. Waller, *Secret Empire: The KGB in Russia Today*, Boulder 1994. It is probably the best book about this formation in the period of the early democratization of the post-Soviet Russia.

subordinated directly to the president, some of them became a part of the empire of the minister of foreign affairs.

The 12th KGB directorate was transformed into the FAGCI (*Fiedieralnoje Agienstwo Prawitelstwiennoj Swjazi i Informaciji*), that is the Federal Agency of Government Communications and Information. It is mainly the counterintelligence protection of the highest state officials dealing with matters so varied as deciphering the codes of classified communication, the black box with access keys to units equipped with nuclear weapon, special governmental telephones with codes hindering tapping from the outside (so called *viertushka*) or even control of bank accounts of the people from the ruling elite. FAGCI became a part, first, of the Federal Government Apparatus, but quickly was transferred to the President's Administration where it has remained. People employed in the President's Administration were aware that they were under discreet surveillance of FAGCI, but they did not know which employees of particular organizational units are simultaneously members of this structure. Probably the president himself did not know that either. It is probable that FAGCI infringed the new law forbidding to use phone tapping without the consent of the court in order to verify the loyalty to the state of officials and high rank figures from the presidential circle and the government's administrative and political elite.

A close partner for FAGCI in the President's Administration was the Main Administration for the Protection of the Russian Federation (*Gławnoje Uprawlenije Ochrany* – GUO), led by general Michail Barsukov and the Protective Service – specially created formation led by general Aleksandr Korzakov. These three services operated close to the president in Kremlin and at the Staraya Square where offices of lower rank employees of the President's Administration were placed. GUO is an especially important structure, a kind of a praetorian guard protecting the president and the most important figures in the country. There were special military units, elite Alfa and Vypel subordinated to the head of GUO, which proved their loyalty towards the president during the coup d'état in 1991 and the pacification of the parliament in October 1993. Simultaneously apart from the official protective institution the president wanted to have his own, as it were personal protective institution and that is why he

employed general Korzakov, a bodyguard for Boris Yeltsin of long-standing, a praetorian proven in crisis situations²⁰.

Unlike GUO the Protective Service was not a heritage of KGB, but was created anew to an order of the president for general Aleksandr Korzakov. General A. Korzakov had a lot of room for maneuvers and unlimited financial resources; there were 1,500 people under his command – not only officers, but also the president's chefs and photographers. In the summer 1995 Korzakov gained control, with President's consent, over GUO and general Michail Barsukov. It was the peak of his might after which there soon followed the dismissal inspired by general Aleksandr Lebed and Anatoly Chubais.

In the closest presidential circle there was also a third KGB general – Grigori Rogozin, the head of the analytical and information centre in the President's Administration. It shows that "chekists" were not scarce, which contradicts the idea that it was president Putin who introduced them into the Kremlin power circles. President B. Yeltsin had many "chekists", whom he knew personally and trusted, who were to help him to institutionalize the disintegration of KGB and also the whole Ministry of Security.

The overgrowth of the institution was a result of the activity based on the criterion of personal trust – the president did not place confidence in institutions as such, but looked for additional guarantees of loyalty and unconditional obedience. Again it is visible how personalization of institutions took place, and there were even instance of establishing institutions for particular people and their uncontrolled growth until president's personal trust persisted. Through institutions the president formalized his informal relations (e.g. with general A. Korzakov), and indirectly caused the situation in which a lot of institutional principles having only temporary validity, could not gain political legitimization and social respect. This is one of the causes of the incompleteness of institutionalization of power

²⁰ Critics of B. Yelcin claimed that their specific relation was based mainly on a similar inclination to alcohol, which seems to be a trivial simplification. General A. Korzakov, dismissed from the presidential elite after the defeat in the war in Chechnya, published memoirs with a very severe critique of the style, manners and habits of the president, but also showed that their cooperation had important, substantive reasons. A. Korzakov, Boris Jelcin: ot raswieta do zakata, Moscow 1997.

in Russia: there were a lot of institutions and numerous new ones were established, but their legitimization was low; since its main source were President's changeable personal preferences and not impersonal rules of the game, which are established by the law and respected as the law, and not to the president's order expressing his individualized relation with a particular person. Eugene Huskey accurately noticed that: "an institutional project may be in accordance with the law, but it is not legitimized – at least in the eyes of the influential opposition forces"²¹. The personal factor allowed for permanent oscillating between formal and informal mechanisms of power and in this strange chaotic way in the short-term stabilized the power relations around the increasingly weaker, already very unpopular president. In the long-term this inclination to personalize power hindered its deeper legitimization and the consolidation of new institutions²².

The President's biggest problem was to get rid of the Ministry of Security which he was rightfully afraid of, not believing in loyalty of its chiefs. Viktor Barannikov, the chief of the Ministry of Security and a former USSR minister of internal affairs, was dismissed only in July 1993 when it became clear that he cooperated with the opposition in the Supreme Soviet. The President appointed a "chekist" Nikolai Golushko to this position, who had served in KGB for over 30 years. In 1993 the president dissolved this department with a decree²³. In its place he established the Federal Counterintelligence Service (*Fiedieralnaja Szuzbza Kontrrazwiedki* – FSK), and a special unit in the President's Administration was to monitor and control the activity of FSK in order not to allow for autonomy of this institution. After a short period at the position of the head of FSK

²¹ E. Huskey, *The Presidential Power in Russia*, New York 1999, p. 217 (The institutional design may be lawful but not legitimate).

²² This problem is discussed systematically in the next chapter concerning legitimization of political institutions in Russia and the personal role of presidents in establishing the bases for this legitimization. Timothy J. Colton believes that Yeltsin's superpresidentialism is conditioned by cultural backwardness (*Superpresidentialism and Russia's Backward State*, „Post-Soviet Affairs” 1995, No. 2, p. 144–148), but it seems to be a simplified explanation.

²³ J.M. Waller, *Secret Empire*...., p. 119 and further.

general Nikolai Golushko lost the position of minister. It showed President's determination in the case of final institutional decomposition of the old, Soviet security apparatus. After the purge among high FSK officers (it was not deep, as out of 227 controlled only 13 were dismissed), in March 1993 the president dismissed general N. Golushko and appointed as the chief a civilian politician Sergei Stepashin. In April 1995 FSK was again reorganized; it was renamed as the Federal Security Service, and three months later its new chief became a trusted "chekist", general Mikhail Barsukov from the President's Administration.

The methods of governing used by president Yeltsin were (already mentioned) frequent personal changes, especially at the crucial positions, requiring special loyalty. It happened also so in case of FSB: in June 1996 general Mikhail Barsukov replaced Nikolai Kovaliov, and two years later Vladimir Putin became the chief of FSB, after a few years of work in the President's Administration. In the meantime Sergei Stepashin became (in 1997) the minister of justice and in August 1998 was transferred to the more important "force" department and became the minister of internal affairs.

President's efforts made in the period 1991–1993 to take control over the "force" departments were only partially successful – he did not have enough political power succeed. Already in March 1993 the president wanted to introduce the state of emergency with a decree, dissolve the parliament and establish the presidential rule, but he encountered the opposition even in his own circles (the secretary of the Security Council Jury Skokov opposed it). The confrontation was moved in time only by a few months and in autumn 1993 the clash with the parliament took place during which the MIA military forces, and then under pressure also the MoD forces, supported the president and pacified by force the rebellious parliament. It was a fact of a great significance for the difficult friendship between the president and "chekists" and for his not easy relations with the generals' elite in the army.

With reference to President's objective to disintegrate security forces, the motives of counteracting their position of the "state within a state"²⁴,

²⁴ Vadim Bakatin, the man of president Mikhail Gorbachev who still in USSR tried to reform KGB, and after the Yanayev's pouch divided KGB into five parts, believed that

and also preventing the threat which they could pose for himself, were accompanied by the memory of earlier events – Gennady Yanayev’s pouch and confrontation with the Supreme Soviet. The President could not totally distance himself from his praetorians, especially those who he believed were personally loyal to him as the president of Russia and a man. However, many people from B. Yeltsin’s political elite (among others Gennady Burbulis) believed that it was a mistake not to dissolve KGB and not trying to establish these forces anew on different basis and with new people²⁵. President’s inconsistency in this matter is overtly manifested in his decision of September 1992 allowing for the establishment of a new official status for KGB officers who wished to operate in business or politics²⁶. This new status is active reserve: an active reservist could maintain the position and KGB privileges and simultaneously enter an economic or political organization. It blurred the boundary between a former and a present officer of security forces and facilitated infiltration of new institutions by old control apparatuses of loyalty towards the Soviet state. It created favourable conditions for the continuation of policy of infiltration of the society. The president could not be unaware that he agreed to such consequences.

The president felt the need to expand the praetorian armed units from the beginning of his rule. Due to that fact at the beginning of the 1990s the armed forces of the ministry of internal affairs increased in numbers, despite a significant reduction of other armed forces. In 1995 they amounted to over 400,000, which constituted a pretty large part of the armed forces of Russia and were commanded by general Anatoly Kulikov,

the security apparatus became such a “state within a state” and this is why it required a radical change. (19 September 1992 he gave an interview to J.M. Waller. Quoted after: J.M. Waller, *The KGB and Its Successors*, “Perspective” 1994, Vol. 4, No. 4, www.bu.edu/iscip

²⁵ G. Burbulis’s statement of 15 December 1993 for television, quoted after: V.J. Yasman, *Security Services Reorganized: All Power to the Russian President?*, “RFE /RL Research Report” 1994, Vol. 3, No. 6, p. 8.

²⁶ Quoted after: A. Rahr, *Reform of Russia’s State Security Apparatus*, “RFE/RL Research Report” 1994, Vol. 3, No. 8, p. 28. Rahr’s sources are white as it is information from the Russian Press of that period and updated: to it today is difficult, quoted after: Radio “Free Europe”.

a friend of the president. The Protection Service of general A. Korzakov, equipped with similar improvements as FSB and MIA forces, amounted to 1,500 people, and FSB had over 100 thousand of officers prepared for police operations. Plus there should be added the uniformed Federal Border Guard Service (about 200 thousand people, that is three-fourths of the potential from the USSR times) and FAGCI forces (about 50 thousand²⁷). The complex of security forces was significantly complemented with SVR (*Śłużba Wnieszniej Razwiedki*) built on the personnel and documentation potential of the first management of KGB. The intelligence service was a little reduced, 30–40 foreign residencies were closed, mainly in the countries of limited strategic importance in the Third World. Its tasks probably concentrated rather on economic as well as scientific and technical intelligence, and to a smaller extent on the military and political one. There is, however, no available, reliable data on this issue and that is why it cannot be firmly stated where and what kind of intelligence activity is conducted by the Russian authorities.

The presence of the security apparatus in the Russian public life under the rule of president Yeltsin was not little. Lots of former officers entered the new economic elites, especially in the regions. According to some Russian journalists in the 1990s there were former KGB officers involved in the 80% of *joint venture* companies²⁸. There existed – and no doubt still exist – numerous connections between former and present “chekists” and the underworld of organized crime²⁹. KGB people were seen also in the political life. In many parties important positions were taken by former and present officers of the security apparatus. In connection with the elections to the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist

²⁷ Quoted after J.M. Waller, *Secret Empire...*

²⁸ An interesting analysis of the role in the whole strategy of the transformation of the political system of USSR and other former communist countries was conducted by J. Staniszkis, *Postkomunizm*, Gdańsk 2001. Information on 80% of companies taken over by former KGB people, quoted after: A. Rahr, *Reform of...*, p. 28.

²⁹ There are so called *kryshe* created for strong entrepreneurs. They are composed of people from the security apparatus and gangsters who are such a developed subculture that they have their own style of building gravestones and funeral rituals for those who lost lives fighting for the interests of the mafia and business configurations.

Republics (1990), KGB organized a special operational group to manipulate the election process and conducted training courses for candidates in order to facilitate their victory. There were 2,756 candidates officially announced in the elections as KGB officers and 86% of them received seats in the first round of voting. And in the Russian elections for the Duma 57% of candidates officially announced as security officers won in the first round of voting. A lot of candidates did not disclose their connections with the security apparatus and also succeeded in the elections³⁰.

The report of 1995 prepared for the Federation Council on the basis of the data of the the MIA, the Security Council, the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of the Economy stated that corruption in the authority apparatus is the greatest threat to the economic security of the country³¹. Only further places in the report list of threats were occupied by dramatic fall of national income and organized crime. Admittedly organized crime occupied only the third place in the report among the economic threats to the security of the country, yet the information presented there was alarming. It was indicated that organized groups controlled 40% of Russian GDP, 41 thousand of economic organizations, including 550 banks, 4 thousand holdings and 1,500 state enterprises. Moreover, over 700 companies were established by mafia only for the purposes of money laundering³² (money laundering on a great scale took place already in the period 1989–1991 and it was mainly the money of the CPSU used to corrupt some governments in the West of Europe)³³.

³⁰ A. Rahr, Kryuchkov, The KGB, and the 1991 Putsch, "RFE/RL Research Report" 1993, Vol. 2, No. 31, p. 19.

³¹ In accordance with the report in the period 1993–1994 state officials for received in total 100 billion dollars for issuing decisions concerning export licenses, company registration or enabling the purchase of property .

³² Data from the report quoted after J.M. Waller, V.J. Yasmann, Russia's Great Criminal Revolution; The Role of the Security Services, "Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice" 1995, Vol. 11, No.4, available online at the website of the American Foreign Policy Council www.afpc.org/pubs/crimerev.shtml (updated:20.09.2012).

³³ The activity involved transfers to bank accounts in Switzerland and the United Kingdom. A.P. Surkov who conducted the investigation in this case in 1992 said that the communist party corrupted, among others, governments and administrative systems of Italy, Greece and Portugal. In the final stage of its existence the CPSU elite, through KGB

The reaction to such alarming information was, on the one hand, criticism (in a way self-criticism) of nonfeasance and the lack of effects of combating dangerous pathologies, and on the other hand – increased resources for formations dedicated to combating crime. President Yeltsin in his address about the state of the country in 1997 admitted: “we announced the war with organized crime, but we have not really even started it yet”. Sergey Kovalov, resigning from the function of the Ombudsman wrote in a letter to President Yeltsin in January 1996: “You announced the fight against organized crime loudly. For this purpose you gave extraordinary power to force structures, beyond the law and equity. The result? Criminals are at large, law abiding citizens instead of receiving security are forced to tolerate the tyranny of people in uniforms”³⁴.

In the budget for 1997 the amount 8.8 billion dollars was allocated for the security apparatus, which was three times the sum for science and agriculture together. Despite large resources for 14 different formations dedicated to prosecute crime, employing nearly 1.8 million people, and despite the existence of over 25 thousand private security companies employing over 100 thousand people, the state of affairs was disastrous. Crime rate increased even faster than the security formations. In the period 1991–1994 the number of crimes increased ten times³⁵.

Especially bitter – and referring not only to the inability of results to keep up pace with the expenditure – is the conclusion of numerous studies of Michael Waller on security in B. Yeltsin’s Russia: “Russia is today further from having a national security apparatus, accountable in the light of the law than it was during the turmoil connected with the Soviet fall. In 1991 there was at least some political will to give the system a firm footing. Today nearly nobody speaks of eliminating the KGB heritage. It

people, transferred to the West and deposited in different places at least 60 tons of gold, 8 tons of platinum, 150 tons of silver and money resources of 15 to 50 billion dollars. J.M. Waller, V.J. Yasmann, *Russia’s Great...*, p. 13. There is also a lot of evidence of drug trafficking with the participation of the security apparatus of Russia In the 1990s.

³⁴ Russian Organized Crime, ed. W.H. Webster, A. de Borchgrave, F.J. Ciluffo Washington 1997, p. 64.

³⁵ J.M. Waller, V.J. Yasmann, *Russia’s Great...*, p. 13.

has become a part of the post-Soviet landscape”³⁶. Those who associate the “militarization of the country” or “FSB-ization of the elite” only with V. Putin’s presidency are not right³⁷. It started with the previous president and had more oppressive manifestations for citizens.

Directly after the presidential elections in March 2000 the new president took FSB under control, which employed 80–90 thousand people. Only in the spring 2001 president V. Putin started to take control over the internal security structures. The whole Yeltsin’s “old guard” was dismissed, including the minister of internal affairs, the chief of Federal Tax Police FSTP. The greatest shock, also in the president’s KGB friends’ circles, was caused by the nomination of a civilian with parliamentary experience, Borys Gryzlov for the function of the MIA³⁸. It should be reminded that in the defence department the president exchanged a marshal with a civilian minister. After the April decision appointing B. Gryzlov, the presidential decree of 4 June 2001 reformed the MIA. Firstly, the federal committee for criminal offences (created by the former minister) was eliminated as well as a top secret structure called the “P agency”, entangled in blackmails, bribe extortions and unclear business with private companies which were monitored during the previous president’s rule. In this place president V. Putin established the criminal militia service. Another civilian, Mikhail Fradkov (later a prime minister) was appointed as the

³⁶ J.M. Waller, *Russia’s Security Services: A Checklist for Reform*, “Perspective” 1997, Vol. VIII, No. 1, p. 9, www.bu.edu/iscip (updated: 20.09.2012).

³⁷ O. Kryshatanovskaja, *Anatomie der russischen Elite: Die Militarisierung Russlands unter Putin*, Koln 2005. It is a very reliable book, but it underestimates the fact that the described tendency has already been several years old, and with president Putin it was only deepened and more diligently institutionalized. It is not V. Putin who started it, it is rather the people of the security apparatus who participated in creating Putin as the president, and now he further “pushes” them as “chekists” say.

³⁸ However, MIA did not have a civilian chief for a long time. On 9 March 2004 Rashid Nurgaliyev the minister became, a former army general, holding a PhD in economics, educated in Karelia, where he started his work for KGB. Since 1995 he was in the central apparatus of FSB counterintelligence, in the period 1998–1999 worked in the Control Management of the Administration of first President B. Yeltsin’s and then V. Putin’s. In 2000 he was the deputy chief of FSB, and in 2002 the first deputy of the minister of internal affairs.

chief of the federal tax service which was previously believed to be an exceptionally corrupt office. In May – June 2001 plenipotentiary representatives of the president in the regions received significant powers to control regional security services³⁹.

To hinder corruption, on the President's initiative the Duma passed in June 2001 the whole package of acts limiting the number of controls in companies by different state inspections, which used to appear whenever someone felt like receiving a bribe. For example, a new rule was introduced that an audit could not take longer than two months and could not be required more often than once a year. Before, officials could harass companies with audits a few times a year. Among 500 federal and over 100 regional economic licenses only 120 were maintained⁴⁰. Small wonder that the president had to break pretty large resistance to these changes in the federal government, and then in the Duma⁴¹.

Further steps of the president, apart from the consolidation of the Security Council and closer presidential control over all security services, took place in March 2003. The border guard service with its almost 200 thousand people, planes, helicopters, armoured vehicles and patrol boats was included in the Federal Security Service. The same happened to the greater part of FAGCI, a great structure of all wire taps and surveillance, employing nearly 39 thousand military personnel and 15 thousand of civilian staff. Since August 1999 army general Nikolai Patrushev replaced V. Putin and became the director of FSB. In 1998 he was the deputy chief of the President's Administration (president Yeltsin's then), and at the same time Putin was the first deputy of the chief of this structure. There is no doubt that Patrushev was well known to the future president.

³⁹ N.A. Simonia, Peculiarities of Corruption in Russia and the Challenges Involved, "Connections" 2002, Vol. 1, No. 2, p. 28–29.

⁴⁰ In accordance with the estimates of Russian Press these licenses allowed ministerial officials to receive from companies 170–200 million Rubles a year. Cf. "Siegodnia" 03.03.2001.

⁴¹ There are much more changes like that. The ones mentioned here show that they are liberal and might (although they do not have to) have an anticorruption effect even in the country with such endemic corruption as was Russia after a decade of Yeltsin's reforms.

The reforms integrating three great structures were quite commonly assessed as rebuilding of the old might of KGB. Critics of these presidential decisions indicated that no political nor civilian power would be able to control such an institutional giant. After these consolidating changes the autonomy was kept only by foreign intelligence and GUO and protective service in the President's Administration. The motives of the reintegrating reform do not seem difficult to guess; simply president V. Putin, unlike his predecessor, was not afraid of the services, because he knew them well and assumed that he could control them successfully. Moreover, there were also so to speak objective reasons for this consolidation: first of all, after the second war in Chechnya a wave of terrorism rose, and as a result also social approval for strengthening of the role of force structures in the state. It is worth reminding that citizens trust in honesty of FSB is currently higher than in other officials, including prosecutors and judges.

Further institutional changes in FSB took place on 11 June 2004. The president changed the management, raised the position of the chief of FSB to the rank of minister, reduced the number of his deputies from 12 to 4 and gave them the rank of deputy ministers. He simplified the structure of FSB also as instead of tens of departments eight independent services of clear official hierarchy were formed⁴².

The president's control over the MIA was strongly advanced – he appoints not only the minister and all deputies, but also directors of departments. President's nomination decrees do not leave any doubts that it is a department of generals. For example, the nomination decree of 15 February 2005 appointed 15 generals and one militia colonel to the positions of department directors in the federal MIA⁴³.

The president showed a lively interest in the work of other law enforcement bodies. He regularly took part in working meetings with his colleagues from the department of justice and public prosecutor's office. On such a working meeting in the public prosecutor's office on 3 February 2006 the president pointed out to its chiefs serious flaws: in 2005 the

⁴² E. Schneider, *Die FSBisierung Russlands?*, „Russlandanalysen“ 2005, No. 78, p. 3.

⁴³ See official website of the MIA www.mvd.ru/index.php?docid=32696 (updated: 20.09.2012).

number of especially serious offences rose and every second of such crimes remained uncovered, and perpetrators not punished (in 2005 about 5,000 murderers were not caught); 70 thousand citizens were gone missing and the security apparatus did not find out anything in these cases; women and small children trafficking increased; manifestations of xenophobia, national and racial intolerance intensified. The president reviled also small effectiveness of combating criminal, artificially arranged bankruptcies of private companies; reminded that the protection of intellectual property is very weak (70% of video products and 90% of computer programmes on the Russian market were fake or illegally distributed copies)⁴⁴. Such a picture is far from the expectations concerning effective protection of the society.

More and more key positions in the country and economy are occupied by FSB people. In the federal government they were the chiefs of the MoD and the MIA. In the MFA it was the deputy of the secretary of the standing committee of the Union State of Russia and Belarus, the secretary general of Eurasian Economic Community, the regular representative of Russia to NATO, which may suggest that these fields of foreign affairs were of special importance to the president. In the composition of the Duma of the fourth term there were 16 deputies with the career in KGB/FSB (the chairperson of the Duma and the chairperson of the “ruling party” “United Russia” also originated from this circle)⁴⁵. In the Federation Council FSB people occupied the key positions, for example, the chairperson of the foreign affairs commission, deputy chair of the defence and state security commission. At the regional level many main inspectors (including those in Tatarstan and Karelia) are FSB officers. They are also governors and vice-governors and, as has already been mentioned, constitute the majority of *polpreds* in federal areas⁴⁶. Also the number of companies important for the state security where FSB people are presidents or management board members increased.

⁴⁴ www.president.kremlin.ru (updated: 20.09.2012).

⁴⁵ Russian journalists who like to joke write about the members of “United Russia” as “jedoki Rossiji”, which indicates their appetite for eating the country.

⁴⁶ Data quoted after: E. Schneider, *Die FSBisierung...*, p. 3.

Hence, with this indisputable tendency to fill the sectors that the president considered as the most important with people from the security apparatus, is it not the time for a decisive diagnosis? Is it a “state within a state”, or maybe “colonization” of the whole Russian state by this segment which never really lost power, even after the fall of the USSR? The question asked in this way cannot be answered yet. After the presidential elections in 2008, when the new president will have become established in his office, there will be time for a deepened study of stability of this tendency. Maybe it is not only a relic and part of the USSR heritage, but a new tendency to create a police state which is to support an unstable and scarcely competitive Russian capitalism. This question about the tendency should be asked. Gunnar Myrdal, a Swedish Nobel Prize winner, used to say that facts kick. The facts presented in this chapter are really thought-provoking and make one ask questions.

Abstract

The overall objective of this paper is to outline how president of Russia performs his tasks in the area of security mainly through the specific and politically strong body of the Security Council of the Russian Federation. The result of this analysis is pointing out the role of the people directly managing the armed forces and internal security apparatus in influencing the president. More and more key positions in the country and economy are occupied by FSB people indisputable tendency to fill the sectors that the president considered as the most important with people from the security apparatus. The dependence of the president on the heads of the units forming the coercive apparatus is not the quality obvious only for Vladimir Putin's presidency; it was also visible in the activity of president Boris Yeltsin, which has for many years escaped the attention of many of the scholars studying Russia.