
SOURCES OF THE CONTEMPORARY STRATEGIC THINKING. READINESS TO UNLIMITED VIOLENCE

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I. THE STRATEGY IS MORE IMMEDIATE FOR THE ART THAN THE DENSE KNOWLEDGE

Relationships between the United States and the Soviet Union not only wielded enormous influence on almost half century of international relations, but freed also an entire number of analyses and strategic theories, which and in our times have their bigger or smaller references. Stopping the expansion was recognised as fundamental axioms of the politics and the strategy. Danger was treated unusually seriously. The conflict of interest between the communism and the capitalism constituted the element of unavoidable and complicated rivalry. Three main factors determined order of world on in it and next: personality of chief leaders of world powers; the special blend of ideological, doctrinal and geopolitical motivations, and the politics.

For the leader they could put to the compromise. Their wrong decisions could have disastrous consequences. The bipolarity of nuclear world became a source of new opportunities for the security policy and the

strategy of both military powers (nuclear blackmail), but also with her ultimate limiting (ultimate extermination-balance of fear)¹.

States refrained themselves from the war by keeping the relative balance of their ability (economic, military and political) which could against themselves have at their disposal. It is possible to express this state with determining the “balance of power” and it has often been used for describing the that kind of state of the relation between states. The atom bomb created the political new reality, in which two superpowers had an option of destruction of all civilizations. During the potential conflict a fact of having at one’s disposal the greater potential by the opponent, but the awareness wasn’t an obstacle to using for her the nuclear arsenal isn’t guaranteeing the victory. A huge probability that it can lead not only to destroying one state, but also the entire world existed.

It outlined the vision of world with time with the arms race and manners of the effective disarmament.

Cold war in one’s for the political plane and military was the “golden age” for the strategy. For the author of the most interesting strategic analyses, with which in the huge rank it isn’t possible to comprehend, as only historical formed the strategic action appealing above all to Clausewitz and Lenin. The strategy is pointing, how a victory refers through the war, it isn’t possible so, of course, to ponder issues of the strategy until they determine, what the war is. According to the famous Clausewitz definition, the war is an act of violence, being aimed at forcing the opponent to fulfil of our will. This expression contains two crucial elements. Firstly, the war assumes the violence what is distinguishing her from other forms of political, economic or military rivalry. Secondly, it isn’t the pointless slaughter, but the tool being used to achieve the political purpose.

¹ Some political scientists are using this expression for diversifying the situation in the world after the World War II. The balance of terror as the date were used for the first time by Lester Pearson in June 1955 in 10. anniversary of signing the charter of the United Nations. Expression the “balance of terror” is usually applied with reference to the nuclear arms race between the USA and the USSR in the period of the cold war. He is describing the dubious room which existed between both with countries caused with horrifying prospect of the global triggered cataclysm war nuclear.

Clausewitz, thought that the war wasn't [...] with effect of living power on dead mass, [but] with always colliding of two living powers². War, unfolding according to her personal dynamics, is a tool quite clumsy, rather resembling the mace than the rapier. By his/her nature he/she is rolling uncontrollably and even a counteraction of the other side can in it foil the most basic cells. When we are trying to use force to force the opponent to fulfil our will, he will also be trying by force to make us do something. Our effectiveness in the war depends, so not only from our actions, but also from action of the opponent. The course of the war is developing through interaction what seriously controlled using military power is hampering. Clausewitz thought that strategic decisions were being taken – anyway should undertake – rationally.

He wrote [...] “we aren't beginning the war or, more sensibly, we should not for her start without putting a question, what we want to oneself by she [...] to achieve [and how we are going to lead her]; the Success in the war depends, so from bright determining political objectives which can next to be transferred into the appropriate strategy...” came into existence [...] aspiration of imposing principles upon running the war, rules, not to say systems. For itself a positive purpose was put, without the satisfactory of keeping an eye on endless problems, what running the war in this respect is presenting. The war is dispersing, how we already demonstrated it, in everyone almost directions, without prescribed limits; everyone however system, every scientific structure is located in tight border syntheses and because of that a contradiction is arising not for removing between such a theory and the practice. The strategy is more immediate for the art than the dense knowledge³.

The war is full moreover of passions, inaccurate information and mistakes of the evaluation, a lot is finally happening in it thanks to the case. The politics is keeping the primacy over the strategy, but the potential and restrictions of the military force are also shaping this politics. Political objective – is commanding Clausewitz “he must adapt to the nature of used centres and as a result often changes”. Clausewitz is analysing the war

² K. Clausewitz, *On War*, Warszawa 1958, p. 17.

³ *Ibidem*, pp. 77–81.

from four different points of view: firstly – and most important – the war is a space, in which people are killing and are dying. Clausewitz is rejecting, as the naive idea of the war without bloodshed: “merciful Souls could perhaps easily think that an artificial disarmament or felling the opponent without setting are possible of too many wounds and that to head for it the art of war should.

Secondly, the war is an arena, on which armies, commanders and states are competing.

Thirdly, the war is a tool of the politics. He/she isn't behaving for her for her alone, but due to businesses of the state. Finally fourthly, Clausewitz is showing the war, as the phenomenon of the social life.

Clausewitz is implementing more late reflection over the strategy in it treaty of a lot of notions which to a large extent they shaped. Most important from them it: threesome, identifying the nature of the given war, limited and boundless wars, profit and loss account in the war and “friction”. The threesome is determining nothing else as character of the war, which according to Clausewitz about which he is writing, that “constitutes the strange folded threesome from [...] violences of the element, hates and hostilities, [...] farther, from the game of the probability and the case, [...] finally whereas from [of element of the compliance]. Each of these three aspects of the war – commanded – is usually connected (at least not always) with one of three elements of the social life: “with people, in the Polish edition” nation“; with the army and the government. There are factors starting them extremely in relations of these elements. For of “people” – of “nation” are these are passions. According to the thinker passions refer to people and their feuds, without which they could not move you to the fight⁴.

The probability and the case are a domain of very army – these are above all soldiers are experiencing the uncertainty and the resistance of matter. The rationality is bringing the government in into the war, fixing purposes for her and choosing means of for her leading. Clausewitz is emphasizing that the scale, with which these tendencies are appearing, and their mutual relations can change depending on

⁴ Ibidem, p. 31.

the circumstances of given war: “these three desires [and rules suiting them] are sticking deeply in kind of object [but in addition differ mutual proportion]. The theory which would want to omit one of them or to establish some any relationship between them, would fall immediately in with lacquer contradiction with reality, that already by it alone [would become worthless].

He is setting the theory to hold [balance] between these three notions, supposedly between three points of the attraction. Character determines wars, so interrelation for her three, distinguished by Clausewitz, of elements. Identifying the nature of the given war is a consecutive element constitutes the long-lasting factor of Clausewitz thinking about the war. “first, most important, the most [long-range] with court, which to spend a statesman and a leader should, making oneself aware is, or the planned war accurately [for himself/herself is depicting], whether can also [can see real worlds strange categories essential for her nature or would like to bend her to them]. It is first, most general from all strategic issues”. Identifying the nature of the given war is both necessary and difficult to the nature of the war an interrelation of purposes of both sides, property of people, government and armies of fighting states comprise, finally – attitude of allies and neutral forces.

Easily watering around considering these innumerable and often engaging objects is [with tremendous objective, and their fast and correct evaluation certainly requires the brilliant intuition]. Taking control of this diversity only with the school solution would be completely impossible“. For the example in August 1914 all political and military leaders of European powers thought that the war to which they are walking up, would be tuple, he/she will take place in the limited scale and will finish them with the victory. If knew, around a lengthy war of attrition is awaiting them, from which winner will leave destroyed as the defeated side, dubious, whether would decide generally speaking to begin her during the war in Vietnam amongst American politicians and soldiers an agreement was missing, whether are dealing with the invasion of the international communism of Southern Vietnam or with the civil war between the North and the South of Vietnam, with rebellion in Southern Vietnam.

An available diagnosis of the nature of the war isn't without analysis of own relative advantages over the opponent and grabbing the centre of gravity of the opponent hold of is a key to for her determining in the recognition Clausewitz is reaching the state victory by reaching the centre of gravity of the enemy and the attack on such a point. He recommended to search in enemy army, capital city, principal ally, leaders, finally the public opinion of the hostile country one by one for him. It is about it, in order to [to remember about dominating characteristics of both opponents]. From them [is created] certain the centre of gravity, the centre of power and the move on which the whole depends and on [this point should be concentrated entire our energy]. Clausewitzowska classification of wars is based on two categories: the limited war and the boundless war.

They exist two kinds of the war [...]: or defeating the opponent is a purpose of the war (whether it through [exclusion of the possibility of the manoeuvre in the political sphere], or overpowering [military and forcing in this way to the room at all costs), or they are aspiring (only) up to some haul on border [of him] you or it for having for her permanently, or for getting [of tender advantage in peace negotiations]. Transitional forms between these two kinds must out of necessity happen, [however one should always realize the deep inflectedness of these two sorts of aspirations, pointing at contradictions between them] “: The difference in the scale of established purposes of the war influences the way for her of leading and the form of the end. In limited wars soldiers and policies care about so that the victory on the battlefield is transferred to the political advantage over the opponent, therefore are ready constantly to correct the force of military operations and political requests.

That kind of wars are ending with formal or illicit negotiations with drivers for the approval of fighting sides. The final peace is staying in boundless wars in which they are fighting against knocking the hostile regime down or forcing the unconditional surrender, than imposed than negotiated. Against this background it is worthwhile analysing conflicts in Iraq (1991 and 2003). Profit and loss account in the war are an element of her rationality, and is giving possibilities of adopting to the dominant position that “passions” which is describing “people” whether next causing

a wrong diagnosis of the war, “since the war isn’t an act for the blind woman of passion, but a political objective is ruling her, therefore the value of this purpose should size up of victims, with which we want to pay for him. It is regarding sizes, as well as the duration of the war this way. Since armed effort this way will grow, that the value of the political objective cannot balance it – then one should dispense with it, and with result of it there will be a room.

He is calling for for keeping the proportion between values, what state is expecting to achieve through the victory, and with centres, with which he/she is reaching it. Of you they are ready longer and more fiercely to fight in the defence or for safeguarding one’s basic businesses than for the sake of marginal interests. E. g. Americans retreated from Somalia after the bereavement of 18 soldiers, and stayed in Korea in spite of 33,000 victims on their side. Of you stubbornly are fighting, crossing appointed with rational calculation clause of capitulation, when a prestige of their leaders is possible or when in the society passions will flare up: “primitive aims [political] very within wars are changing and can be by the end completely different just, because influence on not [war events and their probable consequences]”.

Friction (Frikktion) it is one of basic concepts in the treaty “about the war” Clausewitz; more precisely and intelligibly perhaps an expression would convey his contents the “resistance of matter”, although it includes also obstacles, for the accomplishment of established plans what immaterial, but accidental and rather secondary factors are creating “so-so in broad outline which what he is distinguishing determines the real war than paper”. Comprehending the “friction” refers to problems on the war even straightest action is burdened with which. the “Friction” manifests itself in threatening on the part of the enemy, effort it is necessary to induce own powers to which, obstacles associated with physical properties of the environment and the imperfection of the flow of information.

In wars of the last decades not a lack of examples of the effect of the friction, so as – for example — the hugest counter-attack of Saddam’s strength in the Iraqi war of 2003, which, conducted in the morning on 3 April in the area of the strategic bridge across the Euphrates to the south-west from Baghdad, surprised American armies. Sensors of

Americans didn't manage then to spot coming of three enemy brigades in strength of 8000 soldiers of tanks supported by 70 and armoured personnel carriers.

The Clausewitz theory has its reference in our more immediate perspective reality.

The strategy of scaring off has its logic. Robert Aron claimed that there was no scaring off generally speaking, however there is a problem of who can scare off of whom from what, in what circumstances and using what centres. Scaring off which such a significant brand impressed both on strategies or doctrines of the period of the cold war wasn't a new method of the influence on participants in the political life in the international scale. In the most traditional sense it was nothing new. Man from has always applied scaring off in relations from other. In the process from scaring off in the process his widely understood environment was not free. With time he applied them also in reports today regarded international. Tukidydes is mentioning it, describing the effect of ancient Greeks.

The meaning of scaring off simply consists in convincing the opponent that costs and risk associated with given action will exceed benefits, and consequently even the war seems completely unprofitable. However danger associated with the lack of his full effectiveness existed in scaring off always. Always because scared off could in the hidden way recognize our methods and apply counterpunches scaring off.

With condition of the effectiveness of scaring off both in the dimension of formulated strategies and doctrines two factors happened: one financial understood as power, second psychological – threat of for her using.

According to André Beaufre's scaring off is aimed at stopping the hostile power from making a decision to use its weapon or, saying more generally, from acting or reacting to acting in the determined situation. Scaring off is being achieved thanks to having the whole of centres constituting the sufficient threat, with the help, of which they are aspiring for getting the psychological effect. Scaring off is aimed at stopping the hostile entity from making a decision to use its weapon or saying more generally, from acting or reacting to acting in the determined situation. Scaring off is being achieved thanks to having the whole of centres con-

stituting the sufficient threat, with which they are aspiring for getting the psychological effect⁵.

The psychological effect is coming from the combination of the calculation, of comparing the risk with the loss and in fear of danger and unknown conflict. *Modus operandi odstraszejacego* is different fundamentally from a *modus operandi* of the war: scaring off is aimed at stopping from making a decision on intervention, however the war has an extortion on the cell to throw decisions to accept conditions which are wanted. Conflicts which are being prepared for so that in no case they explode.

In the strategy of scaring off a “uncertainty” is a crucial factor. Potential aggressor of scaring off, doesn’t know how the potential victim will behave. It will be disposing him to the carefulness and the circumspection, that is to have a positive effect on an international stability. However it is important all at the same time in order not to exaggerate the level of uncertainty, which “we are founding” for opponent. The excess of the uncertainty can make him excessively nervous with the damage for the stability of scaring off: can also of us alone to do excessively certain.

According to Beaufre it is possible to say about different scaring off: scaring off *obronne-jezeli* is confining himself to stop the opponent from commencing action; scaring off *zaczepne-jezeli* is stopping the opponent from the counteraction oneself for action; truculent or defensive action can be direct [is regarding antagonistic sides] or indirect [is being led for the third side] and total scaring off – if is grasping all instructions for use of power or limited, if is regarding some of them. With time the meaning of scaring off changed. The evolution of scaring off was caused through a few factors: technological innovations specific situations in the form of crises layout of forces.

Structure of the logic of the strategy indirect according to Liddell Harta he is establishing, immediate attacks on positions of the enemy are missing. The stamina straight out thought that they had no meaning and therefore should not be made. In order to defeat the opponent, it is neces-

⁵ A. Beaufre, *Admission to the strategy. Scaring off and the strategy*, Warszawa 1968, p. 250.

sary at first to lead for reducing his potential, however this action cannot be carried out through the main attack, but must be made before the main attack and then perhaps succeed. According to him he is an aim of the strategy, so confusion of the enemy. For her a disintegration of forces of the enemy or facilitated defeating him at the fight can be a result. For reaching strategic objectives, it is for getting the ultimate victory, limiting the fight is necessary in possibly like the large degree, in the process “would be an expression of the excellent strategy achievement of the objective without the serious fight”⁶.

If even about fates a battle was supposed to settle wars, leading is setting the strategy to her in the most favourable conditions, for them whereas conditions will be more favourable, less will be it fights. With which with “indirect actions” is it possible to make it? one should not aspire at all costs for doing a great, deciding battle, but aim at getting the victory above all with indirect methods.

In spite of the criticism both of the one from the period of the “cold war” as well as in our times e.g. of concept of room through power, the indirect strategy is preparing the victory. The indirect strategy aims at achieving the fundamental decision at plagues of other centres than the military victory. A particular aspect in it a freedom of action is picking which up is a feature of the indirect strategy. In relation to the being even if of little freedom of action of power, smaller shares which thanks to that are possible, are picking new meaning up.

In fact, so she is acting as supplementing direct (of total strategy, also nuclear which after all exist, about what to forget we cannot) the indirect strategy is an addition, and in the certain measure antydotum of strategy. For them more he will be developing strategy and as a result of one’s precarious balance to strengthen global scaring off, an indirect strategy will have an all the bigger application. Very much it is hard to control provoked occurrences is an important thing clearly to notice that the safety will depend on factors of the outside manoeuvre. Every own weak point enables the enemy to reach anything, every weak point of the enemy

⁶ J. Lider, *People and doctrines. About theoreticians and wartime doctrines of the west*, Warszawa 1969, pp. 129–147.

is giving possibility of applying the threat of the revenge. On this plain it is necessary so to analyse conditions of safety.

Weak points about terrorist, revolutionary character are very slowly developing, indirect counteractions having a safety on the account should be made very early, similarly to the initiatives taken in order to prevent for threatening on the part of the opponent. The real game of the indirect strategy should start already during the appearance of the first manifestations of conflict, it will be then too late. It is possible to draw examples a lot. Germany in 1918 collapsed to a large extent because of the return of Bolshevik currents, to which of scattering in Russia alone contributed before this year. Move which the Soviet Union counted already in 1921, sometimes on he crossed his predictions and put problems for him in Africa, to which solutions wasn't prepared. The contemporary terrorism and his media faces (Al-kaida) are an effect egotistical and close without the prospect policies⁷.

II. THE STRATEGY BUT THE NEED FOR THE WAR

Today's world undergoes unbelievably rapid changes in the main spheres of social life. Nearly everyday we can see spectacular socio-political, economic, cultural, science and technological transformation. Rules previously typical for an industrial society⁸ became obsolete. The third wave of civilization development and information society emerges. Increasingly more often production capacity enables manufacturing goods considerably saturated with modern knowledge to develop into highly advanced technologies. New forms of production developed, including software, media, advertising, consulting, and public relations. Conse-

⁷ J. Piątek, *Military power but challenges resulting from the globalization* [in:] *Individual society you towards megatrends of contemporary world*, ed. G. Piwnicki, S. Mrozska, Gdańsk 2009, pp. 220–241.

⁸ See: A. Zajac, *Poland's Cultural Capital at the threshold of European Integration – conclusions for education* [in:] *The world of education, pedagogy and tourism*, ed. E. Kameduła, I. Kuźniak, E. Piotrowski, Poznań 2003, p. 67; J.O. Green, *New era of communication*, Warsaw 1999, Cf. A. Mattelart, *Information Society*, Kraków 2004, pp. 105–110.

quently, the stage of relative stabilization comes to its end and threats result from the lack of ability to follow continuous changes.

It seems that never in its history had humankind possessed such huge knowledge, qualifications, resources and opportunities to make the world better. Access to information enables increased participation in governing systems for larger groups of people. Unfortunately, it is so vivid that pessimistic perception of the world is still valid. It is still the fact that (...) a widely spread sense of anxiety and concern about the changes prevail; changes which overlap not fully accommodated changes of recent decades – add to the uncertainty. [...] A tragedy of our situation is that still we are able to utilize our current potential. We can see mismanagement of the world and its resources; however, we are put at ease by the self-satisfaction of our leaders and our own inertial and resistance to changes⁹.

Unfortunately, hasty diagnose of only one dangerous state rather than many of threats adds to the complexity of the situation. After September 11th, 2001, international terrorism is considered the threat number one for the contemporary world¹⁰. While trying to identify major reasons of modern threats we tend to recognize only those posed to the world that we proudly describe as western. It only seems huge from the point of view of our own achievements. It seems that its various aspects, from acts of terrorism to guerrilla internal conflicts and interstate wars, the forms of violence may be combined and lead to the final clash of civilizations¹¹. Dangers of the contemporary world are placed in the political context. The policy depends much on the civilization itself; a civilization which for nearly five hundred years dominated others. While using technological achievement and easily accessible knowledge and information, the information society tries to establish its security to the extend possible. Thanks to fast flow of information we are more aware of poverty, famine, natural disasters and other calamities bothering people all over the world and at

⁹ A. King, B. Schneider, *The first global revolution. How to survive?* Report by the Rome Club Council, Warsaw 1992, p. 26.

¹⁰ G.J. Rattray, *Strategic war in cyber space*, Warsaw 2004, p. 35–41; Cf. A. Żwoliński, *War. Selected issues*, Kraków 2003, p. 21.

¹¹ See: S.P. Huntington, *The Era of Muslim Wars*, *Newsweek Polska* 2003, No. 16–17, p. 154.

the same time we are guided by our own, national, and state interest¹². While watching people dying of hunger, victims of natural disasters and wars with very minor delay due to satellite transmission, societies of wealth stick to their standards. The variety of threats does not lead to readiness to give up some of specific perfection and freedom (autonomy). In the name of security the international community need to undertake actions aimed at eliminating sources of terrorism, reducing those resulting from poverty, famine, and lack of sustainable development. Do all countries or all people share the same system of values? Will an African state, where several percent of people are infected with HIV/AIDS, or a state threatened with a natural disaster due to climate changes respect those values?¹³.

The war as the tool of the politics, the war is not only a political act, but also a real tool of the politics, continuation of political relationships, taking them with other centres. The war is only a certain part of political activity, that is by no means with nothing independent. None of the fundamental plans essential for the war can be drafted without taking political relationships into account and we are actually saying something else completely, than we are going to say, if we are saying, how it often happens, about the detrimental effect of the politics for managing the war. We are criticizing not an influence, but the politics then alone¹⁴.

War has always accompanied men. Profits, political ambitions, hurt feelings, and conflicts of interests are the reasons for which people resort to weapons and fight for their goals. This way of solving contentious issues has remained unchanged for centuries, only manners of combat evolved. The art of war evolved together with the reality around us.

In the last twenty years of the 20th c. military actions gradually and unnoticeably changed their nature¹⁵. A classical war led by states, which

¹² See e.g.: B. Chyrowicz, *Ethics in the jungle of information. Introduction*, [in:] *Information Society: an opportunity or threat?*, ed. B. Chyrowicz, Lublin 2003, pp. 5–8.

¹³ See J. Simonides, *United Nations and challenges and threats of the 21st century. Between the necessity and possibility of a reform*, "International Relations", 2004, No. 3–4, Vol. 30, pp. 19–39.

¹⁴ K. Clausewitz, *On War...*, p. 471.

¹⁵ J. Piątek, *Tactical dimension of military conflict*, Toruń 2005, p. 208–242.

to a large extent defined the cold war competition, seem to become obsolete. States, the true monopolists of war, abdicated and became replaced by quasi-state structures, or even individual “military entrepreneurs”¹⁶. Many of them run wars for their own benefit. People who try analyzing them are not capable of explaining the background of such wars. Their background frequently consists of private interest related to trafficking in drugs, command of natural resources, or even deriving benefits from humanitarian aid. Already today and certainly in the future, this boosts gradual independence of forms of violence, subordinated to military requirements. This leads to the loss of control over military actions by regular armies and their states. Wars and various forms of military interventions remain a part of international world of globalization¹⁷. And these are not only crisis reaction operations.

Each generation develops their own specific way of military actions. They also determine their nature. Spread of democracy, human rights and open market economies do not contribute to eliminating classical wars. Such wars will also be run by democracies and these will not only be wars of necessity but also wars of choice. The wars are not necessarily to defend oneself but to maintain or introduce a specific international order. States, which believe that participating in such wars is within their interest, must be prepared for them as regards military capabilities, as well as political justification and costs. Disregarding the process will not free anyone from its consequences¹⁸. The process clearly and finally disturbed the remains of symmetry in international relations¹⁹.

¹⁶ Reference is made to local leaders, guerrilla groups of unidentified political inspiration, and also global companies offering mercenaries and international terrorist networks for which war has become the main job.

¹⁷ B. Balcerowicz, Theories and war (and peace) concepts after the cold war, [in:] *International order of the early 21st c.*, ed. R. Kuźniar, Warsaw 2005, p. 470. Cf. *Global Trends 2015: A Dialogue About the Future With Nongovernmental Experts*, <http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/globaltrends2015/index.html>. (25-04-2008)

¹⁸ N. Chomsky, Who's terrorist?, „Gazeta Wyborcza. Gazeta Świąteczna” 07-08.10.2006, pp. 18-20.

¹⁹ A political system based on symmetry which developed in Europe since the end of the Thirty Years War was an exceptionally durable formation. However, within the system wars were still present and borders moved, but it was capable of preventing forms

The changing the attitude towards a military conflict involved increased possibility of using modern means of combat. The way a means will be used in action largely depends on goals of combat (war) as emphasized Francois Heisbourg²⁰. The orientation system developed for centuries changes, traditional views and expectations fail, and the whole structure of traditional thinking transforms²¹. According to M. van Creveld, a new era of so called intensity wars started. In it, wars for a long time slowly develop. A place which in Clausewitz's theory is occupied by politics was taken over by the war itself as described by van Creveld. In the opinion of van Creveld, wars are not run but continuously develop²². Probably for the next twenty five years we will witness combat action in various categories of military conflicts²³. The capacity and ways of solving those conflicts may cause mixed feelings²⁴.

A question should be asked on how military forces are prepared to such actions, or more precisely whether we have necessary skills to run such wars. Analyses and assessments of the war" capability frequently show numerous threats to security, sovereignty and stability of a state²⁵. Socio-

of wars that could threaten the system or at least reduced those to peripheral locations keeping them far from the centre. The symmetry, which was a basis for the political system, proved efficient at three levels. However, at one of them asymmetry started growing while others were capable of taking over and balancing such an asymmetry at a very early stage. These were the levels of military strategy, political rationality and legal and international legitimization.

²⁰ F. Heisbourg, *War...*, p. 7.

²¹ Tools of war may significantly vary. This for instance can be seen in television. On the one hand, we have the Gulf War during which video techniques were used on a large scale, on the other Rwanda where primitive machetes killed more people than any "intelligent weapon" in Iraq. Not complicated ground mines kill and wound thousands of people.

²² M. van Creveld, *Cold faces of war. From Marna to Iraq*, Poznań 2008, pp. 318–329.

²³ F. Heisbourg, *War...*, pp. 22–38.

²⁴ A.D. Rotfeld, J. Simonides, *The system of security base don cooperation and peace culture [in:] Preventing conflicts*, Warsaw 2000, pp. 13–23. Cf. J.L. Addis, *Prevention strategies*, Warsaw 2007.

²⁵ For the state is seems to be a laugh of our times. The more globalization moves nations, the stronger they try to rebuild and stabilize their sovereignty and internal cohesion. According to the majority of analysts and political scientists, in the post Cold War

economic and technological development that result in life style changes, as well as technological novelties and inventions force strategists to accommodate combat methods to the actual situation. Of course, it also works the other way round and frequently military inventions make the civil world more modern. It seems that only people themselves decide about the use of contemporary miraculous inventions. Provided we keep other people in mind and our capability to change the world treat as a means, which happens on a global scale only after a long period of threat, we can be optimistic about our future.

The continuous scientific and technological advancement, so transparent in the era of the information society, in particular in material engineering, electronics and computer science, resulted in introducing military systems of multiple use by leading military armies in the world. Such systems are highly automatic and provide “optimists” with assurance of military means²⁶.

Recently the factors that determined questions about armed forces were the description of mass war readiness and the ability to absorb technological changes. For the next decades the role of military staffs has been increasing because the barriers that military units faced were becoming more difficult and complicated.

The rule of symmetry in military actions (symmetry of military strategy) recently ensured safety (certainty) concerning the force relation assessment of individual countries – starting from armed force size, through armament to the size of the military budget. It allowed comparison with own potential and ensure, by creating certain coalitions in time, that a potential opponent doesn't take military advantage. The military forces in Europe were similar in principle; therefore it was possible to compare them by using simple counting. This sometimes led to an arms

world we increasingly frequently deal with stronger international integration in economic relations. Frequently we forget about citizens, and refer to them as consumers. Cf. M. Król, *Helplessness of liberals. Liberal thought against conflict and war*, Warsaw 2005, pp. 99–108; more in: P. Mazurkiewicz, *Violence in politics*, Wrocław 2006, pp. 137–169.

²⁶ T. Donnelly, *Time of new missions!*, “*International Political Review*” 2003, No. 2, pp. 15–23, Cf. I. Eland, *Emporium Attacks. New imperialism and its mistakes*, “*International Political Review*” 2003, No. 2, pp. 51–54.

race, more often, however – to stable constellations of war policy. For each side the efforts of the opponent were a measure of its own military struggles. The arming was not against an imaginary enemy, but against a real opponent. Its virtue was that it was possible to easily state and correct a state of advantage or its lack.

Abstract

Relationships between the United States and the Soviet Union not only wielded enormous influence on almost half century of international relations, but freed also an entire number of analyses and strategic theories, which and in our times have their bigger or smaller references. Cold war in one's for the political plane and military was the "golden age" for the strategy. For the author of the most interesting strategic analyses, with which in the huge rank it isn't possible to comprehend, as only historical formed the strategic action appealing above all to Clausewitz and Lenin. The strategy is pointing, how a victory refers through the war, it isn't possible so, of course, to ponder issues of the strategy until they determine, what the war is. According to the famous Clausewitz definition, the war is an act of violence, being aimed at forcing the opponent to fulfil of our will. This expression contains two crucial elements. Firstly, the war assumes the violence what is distinguishing her from other forms of political, economic or military rivalry. Secondly, it isn't the pointless slaughter, but the tool being used to achieve the political purpose.

It outlined the vision of world with time with the arms race and manners of the effective disarmament?