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**STRATEGIC PLANNING, LIMITS TO GRAND
STRATEGY, AND STRATEGIC REVIEW:
METHODS AND PROBLEMS OF FORECASTING
SOCIAL PHENOMENA**

Keywords: strategic management, strategic planning, grand strategy, tsunami effect, black swan.

ABSTRACT: Planning is a process of defining goals and identifying means and methods to achieve them, effective and relevant to future operating conditions, and therefore a diagnosis of a current situation, design and choice of goals, and ways to reach them. The main substance of this publication is to present research methods (methods of prediction) relating to the creation of the future of an organisation, especially a political organisation, or a country. They are: strategic planning and strategic review. In addition, the problems relating directly to the above methods such as limits to grand strategy, the Black Swan effect, the Tsunami effect, and the arguments against normative methods will be presented.

Every organisation – be it a company or a state – if it is to have a future, must think about it and create it. It must therefore consciously shape its development, which is determined by its goals, resources, and opportunities (and risks) inherent in the environment. It must develop current and long-term goals and devise ways and means to achieve them in the changing environment, even in the context of the rapid changes taking place in the modern world. To shape its future, it must remove numerous obstacles and limitations to overcome risks and unexpected events, it must have a vision of the future, draw the lines of action, dimensions, and ways to realise this vision¹.

¹ J. Penc, *Encyklopedia zarządzania. Podstawowe kategorie i terminy*, Łódź 2008, p. 651.

This, as mentioned, refers to both the realms of business and politics (if the two can be separated at all). The nature of politics in turn is prediction. Therefore, politicians must think about the future. There is scientific evidence to support politicians, for example, they can base on expert analyses. To create such analyses, scientists collect data from the real world. For obvious reasons, scientists can collect data only from well-described parts of the system. If the indications point to a regularity, on this basis a theory predicting the nature or behaviour of parts of the system larger than observed can be built. In this way, the theory can describe the system without any reference to actual data. The most important point of theory lies in its ability to predict the future².

So, is the future predictable? The answer to this question can be formulated as follows: the future is not predictable in detail, nor in concrete terms, can be unpredictable when a page of history turns, but it is predictable in the major trends and tendencies towards fundamental changes that result in conclusions sufficient to begin work on the study of the future³.

The main substance of this publication is to present research methods (methods of prediction) relating to the creation of the future of an organisation, especially a political organisation, or a country. They are: *strategic planning* and *strategic review*. In addition, the problems relating directly to the above methods such as limits to grand strategy, the *Black Swan* effect, the *Tsunami* effect, and the arguments against normative methods will be presented.

At this point, it should be mentioned what classifications of forecasting methods are currently in use. This is reasonable, inasmuch as two of the above-mentioned methods, i.e., forecasting and foresight are often treated as normative methods, and those – despite many advantages – bring about threats. Presently, reference books list several types of forecasting methods, and usually they are divided into: passive methods (e.g., intuitive and exploratory methods), which are primarily located in the

² W. Unge, *W poszukiwaniu uporządkowanej niepewności*, „Unia@Polska. Niezależny Magazyn Europejski” 2005, No. 5–6.

³ A. Karpiński, *Jak tworzyć długookresową strategię rozwoju dla kraju i regionu. Metodyka strategicznego myślenia o przyszłości*, Warszawa 2002, p. 21.

area of intellectual and cognitive research, and active methods, focused directly on practice⁴.

The latter include normative methods, also known as technological methods, which are directly targeted at the planning or alteration of reality. It precedes such action as drafting a future model and determining the direction of changes and methods of their implementation in a desired and predefined manner. Proponents of this method also assume that close cooperation between theorists (predictors) and the practices of political life (decision makers) may in the future lead to the creation of a normative model of reality. This position rejects not only the case of incidental or fatalistic conception of the future, but also the conviction that having set future goals, we can define (programme) effective measures and ways to realise the most theoretical models of the future. Normative methods lead either to the so-called *realistic utopias* (such as the collapse of the colonial system or the Eastern bloc) or collections of the so-called conditioned wishes that contain false indications of implementation⁵. But apart from the normative forecasting distortions, it should be admitted that modern planning at the state level without the support of (not to say approval and funding from) political and business decision-makers is not possible.

Efforts to achieve an objective are the subject of planning, and they show how the existing potential of current and future reserves and resources can be used to ensure an organisation's existence and long-term effectiveness. Planning in organisations is therefore a process of setting goals and choosing means and methods of achieving them. It leads to the creation of strategic and operational plans. *Strategic plans* set directions for an organisation's activity and define its overall objectives, while *operational plans* provide detailed guidelines for the execution or implementation of strategic plans in daily operations. Both of these types of plans are important to the organisation, but the former are given the highest prior-

⁴ K. J. Stryjski, *Prognozowanie i symulacje międzynarodowe*, Łódź 2004, p. 52.

⁵ *Ibidem*, pp. 52–53. Of course, it must be remembered that this division is conventional, because depending on the use of the intuitive method (e.g., the Delphi method), it can be interpreted as a way to achieve specific objectives by policy makers and “promoted” in some measure to the position of operative method.

ity, as they impact on the activities of the organisation in a wide range and are formulated for many years, their effects substantial and long-lasting. Strategic plans also mean preparing the organisation for the future and cause significant quantitative and structural-qualitative changes in its potential, structure, and culture. Operational plans are in turn a derivative of strategic plans, are formulated in a more detailed manner and for short periods. Therefore, the efforts of planners are focused on preparing strategic plans, on identifying and solving problems affecting the future of the organisation, and thus strategic planning⁶.

What is worth considering here is the very notion of strategy. Origins of the word *strategy* have roots in the language used by the military and initially contained only military references. The classical military thinker, Carl von Clausewitz, defined its essence in the first meaning as follows: *Strategy is the employment of the battle as the means towards the attainment of the object of the War. In other words, tactics is the employment of armed forces in combat, and strategy is the employment of the battle to gain the end of War*⁷. It was not until after World War II that the concept of strategy was tied directly and strongly to the management of companies and the activities of the state in the economy⁸. Moving from a military meaning to a general one was relatively simple. Strategy in a general sense, not just a military one, is when one does not surrender to a rapid or random course of economic or social events, but wants to recognise it and steer it in line with the primary goal they have set for themselves and through the use of carefully selected means. The notion of strategy also is a category completely closed in only one category of time, namely in the future. By its very nature, it always speaks about future actions. This does not exclude, of course, analysis of strategy and the results *ex post* or in the course of its conduct. But its essence always remains the projection of future actions⁹.

⁶ Based on: J. Penc, *Encyklopedia zarządzania...*, op. cit., pp. 651–652.

⁷ D. Schoessler, *Clausewitz*, Lublin 1995, p. 80, at: A. Karpiński, *Jak tworzyć długookresową strategię...*, op. cit., p. 38.

⁸ A. Borczuch, *Strategia wojenna a strategia zarządzania przedsiębiorstwem*, „Ekonomia i Organizacja Przedsiębiorstwa” 2004, No. 4, at: A. Karpiński, *Jak tworzyć długookresową strategię...*, op. cit., p. 38.

⁹ A. Karpiński, *Jak tworzyć długookresową strategię...*, op. cit., p. 39.

States creating their grand strategies must take into account the space in which they can invest their plans. The concept of space in the historical development and various cultures evolved, as did other elements of the attainment of civilisation. In the old days, people lived in spaces confined by natural barriers, as the transport technology was poor, and traveling on foot and on horseback took very long, and only with the help of railway at the beginning of the twentieth century did man begin to conquer space. Another enclosure of space were limits of political and religious power (e.g., the *cuius regio eius religio* principle, translated as “Whose realm, his religion”) or clan-tribal one. The development of transportation and communication technologies plus political progress ensuring growing personal freedom resulted in a transition from a world of small and confined spaces to a world of big and open ones. These open spaces were always confined, but their boundaries extended. This is evident when comparing the seas and oceans or the deserts and steppes with airspace and, since the mid-twentieth century, outer space. The colonial conquests of the Europeans also were the conquest of space, and success in this competition between the colonisers was enjoyed by nations powerful at sea, good sailors, and sea warriors¹⁰.

Nowadays, it is quite obvious that spaces are getting more and more filled or even crowded. In addition, elements that fill spaces are structured – to some extent they are in order and in chaos. There are four aspects that are especially important to fully understand a specific space in which state strategies are developed and implemented: 1 Space as a function of cultural heritage such as tradition and social memory; 2 Space as a function of the dynamics of the social structure and economic development, especially the accelerated vertical and horizontal mobility of people through the development of market economy; 3 Space as a function of the development of technologies, especially technologies of transportation, communications, working tools, and weapons, as the result of which one can see and feel distance shrinking and areas of activity expanding; 4 Space as a choice of the directions and methods of action oriented to goals (strategic concept of space). Such activity is always a system of movements.

¹⁰ W. Lamentowicz, *Granice strategii państwa. Efekt Tsunami*, Częstochowa 2012, p. 31.

Movement (of troops, capital, ideas, technology, etc.) always occurs in spaces specific to what is moving. The strategic management of space is therefore a key to victory¹¹.

The position of actors, including states, in key spaces and the ability to change it rapidly and unexpectedly (flanking manoeuvre, encirclement, going behind enemy lines on the battlefield) are the most important resources and/or strategic skills. The art of the rapid manoeuvring of resources in spaces relevant for strategic success is becoming a more and more valuable asset. What makes a space strategically relevant? The battlefield and its properties, manoeuvre room, and knowledge of the opponents are the factors in the perception and imagining of a space and the opportunities it offers. The ability to achieve the objectives of grand strategy depends to a very high degree on three abilities of the key organs of the state: 1 The ability to move in spaces large and small, confined and open, loosely filled and crowded, segmented and nonsegmented; 2 The ability to achieve an appropriate rate of these movements, especially a speed greater than competitors' or enemies'; 3 The ability to surprise opponents with moves¹².

Among others, the prediction of social phenomena (in a global sense) is hindered (limited) by *evolving nature of social reality* – the reality we live in is changing radically. The demands of history require that new general knowledge be complemented by new information about new epochs. Therefore, general knowledge has little relevance, in itself it must be saturated with new information. Consequently, in order to continue to predict, new concrete historical knowledge must be taken into account¹³. Common manifestations of the confusion of changes and indefiniteness of decision-making situations can be the result of the increasing complexity of the global system. Evidence for this can be phenomena referred to

¹¹ Ibidem, pp. 32–33.

¹² Ibidem, pp. 35–36.

¹³ Materials about forecasting made available by M. Solak, in Author's possession. See also: M. Karwat, *Syndromatyczny charakter przedmiotu nauki o polityce*, in: K. A. Wojtaszczyk, A. Mirska (Eds.), *Demokratyczna Polska w globalizującym się świecie – I Ogólnopolski Kongres Politologii*, Warszawa 22–24.09.2009, Warszawa 2009, pp. 175–188.

as the Black Swan¹⁴. What are they? Well, for centuries in Europe there was a conviction that all swans were white. What is more, there was even a saying that something was so obvious as the fact that all swans were white. This state of affairs continued to more or less the seventeenth century, when Danish researchers discovered a new continent, Australia, and with it, new species of plants and animals. Among the latter, particular attention was drawn to swans, whose plumage was ... black. It is worth taking a moment to reflect on the event. For centuries, every observation confirmed the view on the colour of swans. But it was enough for only one case observed on an area unknown to the then civilisation to destroy whole millennia of continuous confirmations of the belief that all swans were white. The swan discovered in Australia turned out to be something incredible, unexpected, or even impossible. The Black Swan was popularised by N. N. Taleb, a financier and investor on Wall Street, whose mathematical and philosophical passion led to fierce criticism of the functioning of banks, brokerage houses, investment funds, and many other financial institutions. In a book titled *Black Swan. The Impact of the Highly Improbable* (London, 2007), he explained the concept as follows: *It is an event with the following three attributes: First, it is an outlier, as it lies outside the realm of regular expectations, because nothing in the past can convincingly point to its possibility. Second, it carries an extreme impact. Third, in spite of its outlier status, human nature makes us concoct explanations for its occurrence after the fact, making it explainable and predictable*¹⁵.

High situational risk and new challenges to strategists favour decision-making errors, but new risks and challenges need not mean interference of three extreme states that W. Lamentowicz called the Tsunami effect: 1 The total unpredictability of spontaneous processes running erratically and nonlinearly within political institutions; 2 The complete uncontrollability of the global system due to structural, material, ideological, and

¹⁴ W. Lamentowicz, *Granice strategii...*, op. cit., p. 56.

¹⁵ G. Malinowski, *Czarny Łabędź*, http://www.felieton.pl/2986_czarny-labedz.html (accessed: 30.12.2012); N. N. Taleb, *The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable*, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/22/books/chapters/0422-1st-taleb.html?_r=0 (accessed: 30.12.2012); N. N. Taleb, *Ten principles for a Black Swan-proof world*, <http://www.fooledbyrandomness.com/tenprinciples.pdf> (accessed: 30.12.2012).

intellectual constraints; 3 The inability of the strategic (political, economic, and military-police) elites to devise and implement strategies adequate for the situation, strategies with an appropriate level of innovation as well as regulatory and adaptive potential good enough for the threats and challenges¹⁶. As noted by Lamentowicz, the main theses associated with the Tsunami effect as the final frontier of strategic thinking and action can be described in a couple of points: 1 The ontic problems with the nonlinear nature of many realities in which we need/want to act lead to epistemological difficulties and practical problems with effective, intentional action organised by rationally designed strategies. Accordingly, we are in a circle of fundamental categories such as multiple realities, their exploration, organised intentional action, fundamental to ontology, epistemology, and praxeology. Without such a foundation, reflection on strategies is doomed to superficiality and lack of intellectual seriousness. 2 A poor recognition and understanding of these ontic, new conditions of civilisation may be the cause of the Tsunami effect, generated at the meeting point of the objective barriers and subjective limitations of rationality of thinking and efficiency of action, including action organised by strategic thinking. The Tsunami effect occurs when no strategy is effective, when all the actors are helpless, and the situation is hopeless. 3 Strategies are created above all to ensure order and regularity, to reduce uncertainty and risk in the development, for the development to be driven by our will, mind, and interests, and for the battles to be won. However, sometimes we are infected with the uncontrollability of our environment, and instead of establishing our order in it, we succumb to imported disorder, which permeates our regulatory institutions and paralyses them by the Tsunami effect. The strategist is then helpless or – even worse – becomes a victim and a prisoner of chaos, which they were going to control by their change management strategy¹⁷.

For this not to happen, practitioners and theorists are trying to develop more and more perfect ways of planning/strategic management. The trends in strategic management, developed as early as in the nineties, not-

¹⁶ W. Lamentowicz, *Granice strategii...*, op. cit., p. 57.

¹⁷ *Ibidem*, pp. 58–59.

ing the failure of the previous methods and the successes of organisations implementing innovation, quite clearly indicate four basic factors, the conditions for the success of any organisation: 1 The attitude to change and the ability to manage it; 2 Restoration of the significance of the quality elements of management; 3 Keeping an atmosphere and efficiency of continuous exploration and creativity; 4 Openness and ecoempathy¹⁸.

The classical definition of *strategic management* inextricably links it with the phenomena of turbulent, unpredictable changes, their increasing dynamics and scale, and what that means – the inadequacy of adaptive and regulatory activities. What becomes necessary are the ability and readiness to manage *strategic change*, requiring: 1 A change in the basic concept of the functioning of the organisation (strategic course); 2 A change in the strategic potential of the organisation; 3 A change in the strategic culture of the organisation¹⁹.

Meanwhile, it is not human nature at all to rationally search for the best solutions, but to tackle as soon as possible a problematic situation leading to the necessity of making choices. In practice, what dominates is narrow pragmatism, typical of us – minimising any effort – and narcissism, giving a sense of satisfaction with what has been accomplished. We appreciate stability, which gives a sense of certainty and durability within a state that is more or less convenient, not necessarily the best. We do not like change, we are naturally distrustful of “novelties”²⁰.

These “novelties,” however, sometimes even the strength of an aforementioned Black Swan, come and every once in while destabilise our plans. The basis of good planning once again proves to be a preliminary study (inquiry and factual research more and more often ignored in favour of advice given by Dr Google) aimed at providing reliable and, whenever possible, complete information about the object. A strategic review can be most helpful in it. It is treated as a tool for strategic planning (manage-

¹⁸ T. Lambert, *Problemy zarządzania*, Warszawa 2000; J. Penc, *Zarządzanie dla przyszłości*, Kraków 1998, K. Oblój, *Strategia sukcesu firmy*, Warszawa 1998, at: C. Rutkowski, *Przegląd strategiczny jako narzędzie polityki*, Warszawa 2003, p. 16.

¹⁹ H. I. Ansoff, *Zarządzanie strategiczne*, Warszawa 1985, at: C. Rutkowski, *Przegląd strategiczny...*, op. cit., p. 16.

²⁰ C. Rutkowski, *Przegląd strategiczny...*, op. cit., p. 17.

ment), used to obtain a deliberate and structured information base to make choices (make mainly strategic decisions) at every (any) stage of the planning process (management)²¹.

Such a definition, as noted by Rutkowski, has the following consequences: 1 A strategic review is made the definitional equivalent of a strategic planning tool. This remark seems to be necessary in view of a quite popular perception that it as a “stage” or “phase” of the planning process. 2 The results of the strategic review do not constitute some more or less self-contained result of planning, they, however, play an auxiliary role, supporting the process and determining its course, value, and validity (application) of the results; 3 The strategic review implicitly refers to the process of action. Therefore, maybe its description, explanation, or standardisation should be determined primarily on the basis of the sciences of action, with the proper methodology and instrumentation; 4 The essence of the review is to provide (obtain) deliberate and structured information rationalising the groundwork for decision-making in the course of strategic planning (management); 5 Maybe the tool of the strategic review should be and is used during the whole strategic planning process, and not just in the initial stage before it starts²².

In the practical application of the strategic review, in view of its role and mission in the process of planning and implementation of policy, creating the conditions for its usefulness as a tool, there should be a clear distinguish between *review goals* and *products* and *planning goals* and *products*. The review provides information, more precisely, knowledge, it does not provide, however, ready-made solutions or decision drafts. The latter are the result of the whole process of *planning*, which has the results of the *review* placed at its disposal. The distinction is a much-needed treatment in the light of confusion over the ends and means, overinterpretation of strategic review tasks, fairly common both in theory and in practice. For the same reason, one should emphasise once again the nature of the relationship between the information obtained as the result of a *review* and the information contained in a *plan* or *decision*. When designing a plan, preparing a decision, one has

²¹ Ibidem, p. 23.

²² Ibidem, pp. 24–25.

knowledge gained through review, which prevents putting an equal sign between the two *sets of information*, or presuming a relation of the linear result of the decision (plan) from the review results. Both the *planner* and *decision-maker* can (should), but do not have to, include the information provided by the review in further work planning, in making choices. Such information remains within their planning and decision-making base, and only the planner's will determines whether it will be included or not, and the extent and manner of its use in *management*²³.

Such reviews are prepared by, among others, structures involved in security in a broad sense. An example is the Polish *National Security Strategic Review (Strategiczny Przegląd Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego, SPBN)*. Its establishment was justified by the fact that increased complexity and dynamic changes in security environment call for constant reflection on the effectiveness and integration of Poland's national security policy, recognising whether all challenges have been identified in terms of both threats and chances and whether theory and practice in the field of national security policy are coherent, with no competences overlapping and fields that remain uncovered. Therefore, to address all security aspects it is necessary to develop comprehensive approach that would go beyond traditional perception of national security. This need was the core inspiration for the National Security Strategic Review, started by the National Security Bureau in November 2010. The National Security Strategic Review is defined as a studies enterprise, analytical and conceptual, aimed at establishing credible (justified and documented) and comprehensive knowledge about the state and prospects of national security and developing recommendations to the highest authorities of the state in areas of its strategic management. Included in its contents are: a diagnosis of the state as a subject of national security, including identification of its national interests and strategic goals; a forecast of shaping the strategic environment (conditions); a projection of the possible and desired options of the operation and preparatory strategies²⁴.

²³ Ibidem, p. 25.

²⁴ *Strategiczny Przegląd Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego*, http://www.bbn.gov.pl/palm/pl/568/2650/Strategiczny_Przegląd_Bezpieczenstwa_Narodowego.html (accessed: 30.12.2012).

Be not deceived, one will never be prepared for all eventualities, but the risk of the occurrence of events perceived as negative can be greatly reduced. As mentioned, a real help can be, to name but a few, a well-designed strategic review, trying to a large extent to eliminate the so-called management discontinuities²⁵.

The research methods that are used to plan the future resemble a research process of a political scientist. The basis of the research are factual, empirical, and historical research findings. They provide the analytical material for synthesis. What characterises them are the methodology and cognitive status of research on current facts and social processes. The subject is in direct contact with the changing reality. It should also be emphasised that, with no general theory, factual research of a political scientist would be blind, and, without factual research, the general theory void²⁶. One of the difficulties of good (effective – recognising the practical purpose of science) prediction is the collection of reliable data (needed in strategic planning, the construction of a strategic review, etc.). These and other difficulties that make us today unable to take full advantage of forecasting social processes in practice (at the national and international levels) and the fact that the methodology level of forecasting is still assessed as imperfect, all this should not constitute a development barrier in this field for too long. Changes will be enforced by the needs of political, economic, or military practice, but the aspirations that decision-making centres have to more and more accurately recognize the current state and predict the evolution of the current reality in the desired direc-

²⁵ Discontinuity is an organisation management process state in which: 1 In the organisation and/or its environment there have been phenomena/events/processes critical to its survival; 2 These phenomena were not included in the information model providing the basis for management; 3 Lack of prevenient information (at the time) had nothing to do with the organisation or performance of tools of monitoring and forecasting activities – the organisation could not have foreseen the situation; 4 The ability to maintain the existence and solving the problem lie within the organisation, in its construction. The situation of discontinuity in its pure form is thus the result of limitations of organisational cognition, the actual extent of the exploration of the environment. Its source are phenomena, events occurring in an unlimited space beyond the scope of monitoring and prediction. C. Rutkowski, *Przegląd strategiczny...*, op.cit., pp. 27–28.

²⁶ Materials about forecasting made available by M. Solak, in Author's possession.

tion will also play a considerable role. The said changes will be furthered by the rapid development of technology in general, especially computer technology, and the continuous improvement of social communication and monitoring of virtually all of the procedures and processes, including those on an international scale²⁷.

Subjects taught in science and humanist studies can serve the development of the science of forecasting. The author of this publication for several years has successfully been teaching classes in Forecasting and International Simulations (to postgraduate students of international relations). Theory and academic practice can be extremely helpful, but students do not always have – within political and social phenomena – good models to follow. The theory of decision-making process involves an accurate assessment of future states of affairs and effects in order to join through action the cause and effect chain, but too often practice contradicts theory. A community promised the realisation of a target will change on the way to achieving it, as will the attitudes and behaviours of decision makers and implementers. A theory remains a theory where magical thinking dominates, where politicians think that reality can be controlled with decrees²⁸.

Improving decision-making requires knowledge about the future. Not a full knowledge, because it is still impossible to achieve, but a specific evaluation of the effects of decision-making on the basis of the intended results. But the notion should be recalled that the division into past and future is linked to our notions of reason and free will. Within a fixed scheme, we can accurately see both a specific past and future. Future events already exist, and we just move towards them, still unable to read them. Those that will happen are for the time being one of pseudopasts, one of a wide choice, but not having sufficient knowledge of the factors that determine them, we are unable to anticipate them²⁹.

²⁷ K. J. Stryjski, *Prognozy i symulacje międzynarodowe*, „Studia Międzynarodowe. Zeszyty Naukowe WSSM w Łodzi” 2003, No. 1.

²⁸ A. Sepkowski, *Człowiek a przyszłość*, Toruń 2005, p. 65.

²⁹ Ibidem, pp. 84–85. See also: Ł. Donaj, *Chosen Problems of Forecasting Social Phenomena: Forecasting, Backcasting, and Foresight*, “PolitBook” 2012, No. 2.

As noted by Płoszajski, thinking, and even more so writing, about the future is as uneasy as it is ungrateful. The problem is that although we all anticipate the coming revolution in the organisation, no one knows what twenty-first century organisations will really look like. The world of organisations is subject to change so deep and multiform that the reality that emerges as a result cannot be analysed using the existing theoretical concepts and theoretical instruments. Observation of many of these new phenomena and processes not only leads us into questioning a number of old theories, approaches, and analytical categories, but also can give rise to the need to reformulate the most fundamental principles of the philosophy of management³⁰, in particular, the management of structures as large as states. Only time will tell whether our ideas for new strategies, concepts, and goals set for these structures will be right.

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³⁰ P. Płoszajski, *Organizacja przyszłości: przerażony kameleon*, <http://pl.pdfsb.com/readonline/5a6c6c4c65673937566e6438446e396a56413d3d-3271685> (accessed: 30.12.2012).

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