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POLAND IN NATO – SOME GEOPOLITICAL AND PRAXIOLOGICAL REMARKS

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ABSTRACT: This paper presents some remarks on the situation of Poland in NATO. The problem of 'predictability' is analysed on the basis of a simple scheme (system, its environment, their interactions). The geopolitical analysis of this dynamic model leads to the conclusion that the future cannot be described as highly predictable, although some long-term scenarios seem to be relatively plausible and may be used in the construction of more realistic global and national/regional strategies. The results of this analysis suggest global cooperation and regional integration.

The subsequent analysis will be based on a simple scheme from general systems theory (system, its (natural and artificial) environment, interactions (e.g. such as feedbacks)).¹ The system and its artificial environment can be characterized by their: 1) goals; 2) structure(s) (visible and latent / hidden, formal and informal, actual and possible), resources (military, demographic, financial / economic, energy, information, food etc.) and reserves (their scale); 3) interactions; 4) operational parameters (steerability, cohesion, stability, inertia, flexibility, adaptability, resistance (degree of invulnerability), reliability, efficiency/efficacy); 5) predictability. The natural environment can be characterized by its: 1) structures/ mechanisms; 2) resources (e.g. energy); 3) controlability; 4) stability; 5) inertia; 6) flexibility and adaptability; 7) resistance (degree of invulnerability); 8) predictability.

¹ Cf. L. v. Bertalanffy, *General Systems Theory*, New York 1969.

NATO AS A SYSTEM GOALS

First of all, let us deal with the original goal as defined in *The North Atlantic Treaty* (1949). According to the *Treaty* (Art. 5): „The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them [...] will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area...”² From our perspective, some expressions in the above text are anachronistic and vague. For example, the *Treaty* mentions „an armed attack”, whereas at present other than military kinds of attacks are possible (cf. the problems of energy, financial / economic, information (e.g. cyberattacks),³ electronic, food, radioactive, epidemiological security). This issue directs our attention to possible: 1) sequences of various kinds of attacks (e.g.: economic / financial attack (China > the US) > energy attack (Russia > the European Union) > electronic / cyberattack (Electromagnetic Pulse, viruses, hacking) > military attack); 2) combinations of various kinds of attacks (e.g.: information attack (intelligence, counterintelligence) + energy attack + electronic attack + military attack); 3) avalanche effects. The expression: „...each of them [...] will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith [...] such an action as it deems necessary...” is ambiguous.⁴ This problem (the question of national ratifications) can be illustrated with the standpoint of Germany in the case of NATO operations in Afghanistan and Libya (no participation in combat operations). Another example – Island. This country has no army at all.

² *The North Atlantic Treaty*, 04.04.1949, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm, (accessed: 24.04.2014).

³ Cf.: A. Słojewska, *NATO grożą głównie terroryści i cyberataki*, „Rzeczpospolita”, 9–10.10.2010, A11: according to A.F. Rasmussen, the number of cyberattacks on NATO systems amounts to around 100 per day.

⁴ *The North Atlantic Treaty*, *op.cit.*; cf. R. Grodzki, *Problem bezpieczeństwa Czech, Polski i Węgier w kontekście poszerzenia NATO*, Poznań 2011, p. 335.

The Treaty clearly defines the territorial range of operations.⁵ However, the fact is that in connection with an obvious hierarchy of power in NATO, and such events as the attacks in the US in 2001 (WTC, Pentagon) the range practically becomes global („protection of members” > „out of area preventive / repressive operations”).⁶

STRUCTURES AND RESOURCES

NATO is not uniform. Some member countries are rather pro-Russian (Germany, France), some are pro-American (Great Britain, Poland, Romania) or „neutral”. Numerous members of NATO are members of the European Union which is divided because of differentiated economic interests (e.g. the Euro-zone, the PIGS states, the Nord Stream pipeline (Russia > Germany)). There is some political friction between Turkey (a member of NATO but not of the European Union) and Greece (the Greek economic problems result, to some extent, from German and French credits spent on military equipment – against Turkey). Some problems may occur on ethnic / religious basis. For example, Chapter 9.5. of the Koran, the Holy Script of the Islamic world, clearly exhorts to killing the infidels.⁷ Two Muslim states are members of NATO: Turkey (1952) and Albania (2009). It is possible that one more Muslim state will join NATO: Bosnia-Herzegovina. At present there are around 18 million Muslims in the European Union (Germany – 3 million, France – 4,5 million,

⁵ Cf. J. Ćwieluch, M. Ostrowski, T. Zalewski, *Kto nas obroni*, „Polityka”, No. 11, 12.3–18.03.2014, pp.12–15.

⁶ Cf. *The National Security Strategy of the US*, 2002, 2006 etc.; A.Z. Kamiński (ed.), *Polityka bez strategii. Bezpieczeństwo Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej i Polski w perspektywie ładu globalnego*, Warsaw 2008, p.67; R.A. Dicke, N. Anson, P.A. Roughton, R.C. Hendrickson, *NATO Burden. Sharing in Libya: Understanding the Contribution of Norway, Spain and Poland to the War Effort*, „The Polish Quarterly of International Affairs” 2013, No. 4, pp. 29–53.

⁷ Cf. *Translation of the Holy Quran in Polish*, Islamabad 1990, pp. 396–397.

the UK – 1,6 million, Italy- 1 million, The Netherlands – 1 million, Spain – 1 million, Bulgaria – 0,9 million people).⁸

Any enlargement of NATO (now: 28 member states) in the East may generate new problems (for example, General W. Jajko (the US, intelligence, retired) suggested in 2014 that Ukraine should join NATO.⁹ Other specialists also believe that „eastward enlargement” of NATO would be profitable.¹⁰ However, it is possible that new (and weak) members with old conflicts will mean new conflicts for old members of NATO.

RESOURCES AND RESERVES

In the past 20 years the military budget of the US amounted to c. 3–5.3% of GDP (Gross Domestic Product; e.g.: 456 milliard (American bn) USD in 2004, 682 milliard USD in 2012).¹¹ The military expenditures of 28 NATO members amounted (in 2012) to 991 milliard USD (670 milliard USD in 2007).¹² For comparison: the military expenditures of China and Russia respectively amounted (estimates) in 2004 to 84 and 61 milliard USD, and in 2012 to 166 milliard USD

⁸ Cf. M. Ostrowski, *Święta wojna z dżihadem?*, „Polityka”, No. 29, 23.07.2005, pp. 22–25; O. Dołęśniak-Harczuk, C. Karakas, *Bruksela nie potrzebuje Turcji*, (interview), „Gazeta Polska”, 6.03.2013, p. 23.

⁹ W. Jajko, *Dajmy broń Ukrainie*, „Gazeta Polska”, 5.03.2014, pp. 4–5.

¹⁰ Cf. P. Buchanan, *Suicide of a Superpower: Will America Survive to 2025?*, Polish ed., Koberzyce 2013, p. 327; I. Gretskey, *Ukraine’s Foreign Policy under Yushchenko*, „The Polish Quarterly of International Affairs” 2013, No. 4, pp. 7–28; K. Zielke, *Geopolityka ukraińskiej rewolucji*, „Gazeta Polska”, 5.02.2014, pp. 12–13.

¹¹ Cf. T. Świąchowicz, *Putin sam przeciw światu*, „Gazeta Polska”, 26.03.2014, pp.20–21; R. Pęksa, *Tożsamość i perspektywy NATO na początku XXI wieku*, [in:] P. Olszewski, T. Kapuśniak, W. Lizak (eds.), *Bezpieczeństwo międzynarodowe. Wyzwania i zagrożenia XXI wieku*, Radom 2009, pp. 357–372; cf. *NATO’s Military Decline*, „The Wall Street Journal”, <http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303802104...>, (accessed: 24.06.2014).

¹² Cf. T. Świąchowicz, *op. cit.*, p.20; P. Cywiński, *Po co nam NATO*, „Wprost”, 15.03.2009, pp. 40–47.

and 91 milliard USD.¹³ The United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy respectively spend on their armed forces between 60 and 34 milliard USD. In the case of Poland the military expenditures amount to around 1.9% of GDP (c. 7 milliard USD (22.6 milliard PLN) in 2008; c. 9.3 milliard USD in 2014).¹⁴ Such countries as Greece, Belgium, Portugal, Romania, Hungary spend less than Poland (Croatia, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, Albania spend less than 1 milliard USD (Island: 0.01 milliard USD)). Some believe that the military expenditures of the European NATO members are too low.¹⁵ As for the manpower: there are 4 million soldiers at NATO's disposal (the US: 1.4 million soldiers; Turkey: 664,000, the UK: 206,000, France, Germany, Italy: between 222,000 and 180,000 soldiers, Poland: 100,000 soldiers). Several countries (Slovakia, Croatia, Slovenia, Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, Albania) have less than 20,000 soldiers (Island has no soldiers at all). Some authors estimate the number of Chinese soldiers at 2.2–2.8 million people (Russia: formally c. 1 million soldiers (in fact c. 760,000) and c. 2 million reserves).¹⁶ Such estimates must be regarded as an obvious misunderstanding, as the population of China exceeds 1.341 milliard people.¹⁷ As for the equipment: according to some estimates, Russia and the US have several thousands nuclear warheads each (France 300, China 100–400, United Kingdom 225, Pakistan 110, India 100, Israel 80, North Korea less than 10).¹⁸ NATO has 6,281 aircraft and 6,988 helicopters (Russia: 1,900 aircraft and 1,655 helicopters; Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia have no military aircraft at all). NATO has 1,174 warships (Russia 202) and 15 aircraft carriers (the US: 11, the UK: 3; France,

¹³ T. Świąchowicz, *op.cit.*, p. 20 (estimates based on the data from SIPRI).

¹⁴ J. Cwieluch et al., *op.cit.*

¹⁵ Cf. W. Michnik, *From Security Consumer to Security Provider*, "New Eastern Europe" 2014, No. 2, p. 85.

¹⁶ Cf. R. Pęksa, *op.cit.*, pp. 365, 367; P. Cywiński, *op.cit.*, pp. 40–47.

¹⁷ Cf. *Concise Statistical Yearbook of Poland*, Warsaw 2013, p. 546.

¹⁸ Cf. M. Jarkowicz, "Wprost", No. 15, 14.04.2013, p. 64 (after: the Federation of American Scientists).

Italy, Spain: 1 each; Russia: 1 aircraft carrier).¹⁹ The crucial problem is the technological level of this equipment.

At present, the Polish armed forces are based on a professional army (c. 90,000 soldiers (among them 30,000 privates and 40,000 non commissioned officers; in 1989 c. 400,000 soldiers (draft); the National Reserve Forces: c. 10,000 soldiers).²⁰ The Polish army includes 3 divisions (armoured cavalry – Żagań (11), mechanized division – Szczecin (12), mechanized division – Elbląg (16); their dislocation seems erroneous) – in other words: 4 armoured brigades, 7 mechanized brigades, 3 specialized brigades (c. 1,000 battle tanks (Leopard (128 (partly (one third) out of use); German make; archaic), T-72 (Russian construction; archaic; problems with spare parts), a number of mechanized combat vehicles (BWP (archaic), Rosomak (relatively modern) and artillery (1,200 units (120 mm ups)).²¹ According to a NIK (the Highest Chamber of Control) report (2014), 57% of equipment is incompatible with modern warfare.²²

Poland has 112 jet fighters (F-16 (48), Su-22 (48; Russian make), Mig-29 (36; old, Russian make), c. 200 helicopters (mainly Russian make).²³ In order to secure the air space over Poland 160–200 F-16 are necessary. There is no modern system of air defence (anti-ballistic missile system as well as anti-aircraft system; cf. the problem of a GMD (Ground-Based Midcourse Defence) based in Poland (10–40 silos with missiles). Only two Polish airfields are compatible with F-16 (Łask / Łódź, Krzesiny / Poznań).²⁴

¹⁹ Cf. T. Świąchowicz, *op.cit.*, p. 20.

²⁰ Cf. S. Sieradzki, *Zawodowe Wojsko Polskie*, “Wprost”, 27.04.2003, pp.26–28; J. Ćwieluch, *op.cit.*, p.13; A. Wiejak, *Obrona już nie narodowa*, “Nasza Polska”, No. 51–52, 22–29.12.2009, pp. 30–31; W. Waszczykowski, T. Wójcik, *Biedna armia nas nie obroni*, (interview), “Gazeta Polska”, 11.08.2011, p. 25; Polish Military Personnel, http://mon.gov.pl/pl/strona/47/LG_54_55/2014-06-24 (accessed: 15.05.2014).

²¹ K. Niwoda, *Gdyby przyszli podpalić Polskę*, “Gazeta Polska”, 12.03.2014, p. 36–37; cf. Ministry of National Defence, Ministerstwo Obrony Narodowej, *Uzbrojenie*, http://www.mon.gov.pl/pl/strona/206/LG_54_181 (Accessed: 24.04.2014).

²² Cf. M. Cielma, A. Kiński, *Leopardy do modernizacji*, “Technika Wojskowa” 2012, No. 5, pp. 12–16.

²³ Cf. J. Ćwieluch et al., *op.cit.*, p. 14.

²⁴ Cf. *Ibidem*; K. Zielke, *Czy Polska się obroni?*, “Gazeta Polska”, 24.10.2012, p.14; K. Zielke, *Powrót Ameryki*, “Gazeta Polska”, 6.11.2013, pp. 18–19.

As for the Polish Navy (e.g. 2 frigates out of repair, 3 corvettes, 5 submarines, 19 mine counter-measure vessels): the situation is very difficult and can be described as “collapse(cf. the case of Gawron)”²⁵

The above figures result, to some extent, from the financial / economic situation of the US and other NATO countries. In turn, the financial / economic situation of a country can be illustrated, to some extent, by GDP (Gross Domestic Product) and GDP per capita (for example (2011): the US: 14,991 milliard USD and 48,043 USD per capita; Germany: 3,604 milliard USD and 44,071 USD per capita; the United Kingdom 2,429 milliard USD and 38,725 USD per capita; France: 2,776 milliard USD and 42,585 USD per capita; Poland: 516 milliard USD and 13,385 USD per capita; Lithuania: 43 milliard USD and 12,962 USD per capita; Estonia: 22 milliard USD and 16,546 USD per capita).²⁶ The so-called „margin of error” (the acceptable size of risk) is associated with „territory” and „human resources” (for example, the US: 9,527 thousands square km and 313.4 million people; Germany: 357 thousands square km and 81.604 million people; the UK: 243 thousands square km and 62.675 million people; France: 544 thousands square km and 63.278 million people; Poland: 313 thousands square km and 38.526 million people; Estonia: 45 thousands square km and 1.3 million people).²⁷ „Energy resources” determine the level of „energy security”. The US develops the exploitation of shales (gas and petroleum) in order to achieve self-sufficiency concerning energy.²⁸ It is expected that the US will be able to export (around 2019?) significant amounts of shale gas to the European Union. The situation in Europe with regard to the

²⁵ Cf. M. Dura, *Nowa (?) koncepcja rozwoju marynarki wojennej RP*, “Nowa Technika Wojskowa” 2012, No. 5, pp. 90–98; M. Pawlak, *Polskie okręty wojenne w niebezpieczeństwie*, *Gazeta Polska*, 30.11.2011, p. 22; M. Pawlak, *Marynarka Wojenna bez przyszłości*, “*Gazeta Polska*”, 24.10.2012, p. 29; M. Pawlak, *SOS dla Marynarki Wojennej*, “*Gazeta Polska*”, 11.07.2012, p. 3; M. Pawlak, *Tomahawkami w agresora*, *Gazeta Polska*, 25.06.2014, p. 26.

²⁶ *Concise...*, op.cit., pp. 615–616.

²⁷ *Ibidem*, pp. 548–555.

²⁸ Cf. B. Zb. Szałek, *Geopolityczne uwarunkowania bezpieczeństwa energetycznego Polski*, in: J. Piątek, R. Podgórzńska (eds.), *Terminal LNG w Świnoujściu a bezpieczeństwo energetyczne regionu i Polski*, Toruń 2013, pp. 120–142.

energy problem is bizarre. The European NATO members are not, as a rule, self-sufficient with regard to gas and oil (except Norway). Some countries (e.g. Slovakia, Bulgaria) depend in 100% on the Russian supplies of gas and oil. In the case of other countries the level of dependence amounts to 20–95%. Moreover, there is a strong Russian lobbying in Brussels against the exploitation of shales.²⁹

Information resources of NATO seem to be vast (they are produced by such organizations and systems as CIA, NSA, Echelon etc.). However, sometimes some „informations” turn out to be misleading (as in the case of „Mass Destruction Weapons” in Iraq under the rule of Saddam Hussein).

The above-mentioned resources are associated with the problem of reserves (e.g.: energy, equipment, manpower). For space reasons other kinds of resources and reserves will not be analysed in this paper.

OPERATIONAL PARAMETERS

Steerability depends on cohesion, stability, inertia, flexibility, adaptability, resistance (degree of invulnerability) and influences such parameters as reliability and efficacy / efficiency.

Cohesion (harmonisation, compatibility, synchronisation, coordination, consolidation) is crucial for the effectiveness of NATO. Cohesion can be tested by multinational exercises on a large scale and missions.³⁰ The NATO system cannot be described as „cohesive”. For example, let us analyse the following symptoms: 1) attempts of some (pro-Russian) NATO members (Germany, France) at a reduction of influence of the US in

²⁹ Ibidem.

³⁰ Cf. A. Bilski, *Słowa silniejsze od bomb*, „Polityka”, No. 43, 27.10.2007, pp. 58–59; M. Kosman, *Rola mocarstw we współpracy euroatlantyckiej*, in: *Stosunki...*, op.cit., pp. 93–138; B. Kowalski, *Afganistan, czyli NATO w „wilczych dołach”*, „Myśl Polska”, 9–16.11.2008, p. 3; J. Laskowski, *Wojna na wyczerpanie*, „Gazeta Polska”, 14.07.2010, p. 21; T. Otłowski, *Ukraińskie tsunami*, „Polska Zbrojna” 2014, No. 4, pp. 92–93; A. Pietraszek, R.W. Wyrostkiewicz, *Prawda i kłamstwo wojny afgańskiej*, „Nasza Polska”, No. 31, 3.08.2010, p. 12.

Europe / the European Union³¹; 2) bilateral negotiations over the „missile defence shield” between the US and Poland – and not between NATO and Poland (according to D. Cohn-Bendit, such negotiations should be conducted between NATO and the European Union). According to J. Asselhorn, these negotiations were against the interests of the European Union.³² Moreover, it would be difficult to describe the foreign and military policy (e.g. the „shield” issue) of G.W. Bush and B. Obama as cohesive; 3) the US (the main member of NATO) prefers „preventive military operations” (the hard way), whereas the European Union prefers „diplomatic operations” (the soft way); 4) there is no significant progress (1995–2014) with regard to the Transatlantic Free Trade Agreement (TAFTA (an economic analogy to NATO) = NAFTA (North American FTA = the US, Canada, Mexico) + the European Union); 5) two members of NATO, Greece and Turkey can be described as mutual enemies.³³ The present financial problems of Greece result, to some extent, from massive expenditures on military equipment (against Turkey); 6) national governments can introduce operational limitations / restrictions as to when and how to use their forces (e.g. Germany in Afghanistan, Poland in Libya);³⁴ According to R.A. Dicke et al.: „an alliance that is shaped largely by domestic public opinion and narrow domestic political interests and benefits does not portend well for an alliance that seek strategic consensus...”;³⁵ 7) in 2009 B. Obama suggested that Turkey (c. 80 million people ruled by Islamists) should be permitted to join the European Union. At present, there are over 18 million Muslims in the European Union. Germany, one of the main members of the European Union and NATO, does not want Turkey (second largest army in NATO) in the European Union;³⁶ 8) Poland signed a long-term contract with Qatar

³¹ Cf. J. Darski, *Polski cel strategiczny*, „Gazeta Polska”, 24.08.2011, p. 27.

³² Cf. S. Fidler, Ch. Adams, D. Dombey, *Blair Seeks British Role in U.S. Missile Defence*, „Financial Times”. 24.02.2007.

³³ Ibidem.

³⁴ Cf. R. Grodzki, op.cit., p. 322.

³⁵ R.A. Dicke et al., op.cit., p. 53.

³⁶ Cf. O. Doleśniak-Harczuk, C. Karakas, *Bruksela nie potrzebuje Turcji*, (interview), 6.03.2013, p. 23.

(following the footsteps of the United Kingdom; supplies of LNG (Liquefied Natural Gas)), which supports the Talibs (cf. the Polish and English troops in Afghanistan (ISAF / NATO)), the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas in Palestina, as well as the so-called Qatar Fund for Muslim inhabitants in France. According to O. Jones: „Qatar is helping to deliver Libyan armaments to Syria, where Russian-made weapons bought by Gaddafi’s regime are being given to fundamentalist Islamist rebels”.³⁷ According to W. Kieżun, in 2050 the Muslim population will outnumber the original population of France;³⁸ 9) there is no unanimity with regard to the idea of independent (local – not global) armed forces of the European Union („militarization of the EU”; European troops independent from NATO, „constructive duplication” or „separable but not separate” (J. Hutton (British Minister of Defence) accepts a separable European unit (3,000 soldiers) within NATO)). It is probable that the „independent” armed forces would be commanded by Germany and France, two pro-Russian members of the EU. However, the situation is far more complicated. For example, as related (in 2014) J. Ćwieluch and others, the majority of the member states are not interested even in a discussion concerning a regional army (expected manpower: 60,000 soldiers, ready within 60 days for 1 year; population of the EU: c. 500 million people (over 18 million Muslim inhabitants)).³⁹ In 2012 M. Drent and L. Landman suggested „an updated European Security Strategy” based on „shared security interests that the member states can agree upon”. According to them, this security strategy should be compatible with the international context. Drent and Landman emphasized a lack of a coherent strategy for the next 10 years (C. Ashton is (2009-) the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (> CSDP (Common Security and Defence Policy)).⁴⁰ European Defence

³⁷ O. Jones, *The West can’t walk away from Libyan mire*, “The Guardian Weekly”, 28.03.2014, p. 19.

³⁸ Cf. M. Michalska, W. Kieżun, *Postkolonialna Polska nie wykorzystuje swoich zasobów*, (interview), “Nowe Państwo” 2014, No. 4, pp. 16–21; A. Rybińska, *Kontrowersyjny wybawca znad Zatoki Perskiej*, “Gazeta Polska”, 10.10.2012, p. 25.

³⁹ J. Ćwieluch et al., op.cit., p. 13.

⁴⁰ *Annex IV to Presidency Conclusions. European Council Presidency Report on Strengthening the Common European Policy on Security and Defence*, European Council,

Agency (2004) deals with such issues as crisis management, defence industry, European cooperation with regard to the military equipment, cyber defence, security of supplies. However, Denmark opted-out of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (on the other hand, Norway opted-in).⁴¹ The concept of the EU Battlegroups (elaborated in 2004) is peculiar for two reasons. First of all, their name („battlegroups”) is misleading – as they are meant to conduct humanitarian operations (e.g. evacuation, stabilization).⁴² Secondly, the adjective „European” is misleading, as these units (expedition forces) operated “out of area”. Such Battlegroups are expected to become the kernel of the European Forces of Rapid Response; 9) there is an obvious discrepancy between such American „gifts” for Poland as two archaic frigates (ready to be repaired in the US for 140 million USD), and the concept of the European Armed Forces (modern equipment, training, transportation etc.); 10) Germany (a NATO member) in a joint venture with Gazprom / Russia reduced the capacity of the Polish port of Świnoujście (modernized by NATO) by conducting the Nord Stream pipeline so that the approach to the port is restricted to relatively light ships.

The problem of stability can be illustrated with the changes in the US foreign policy within the last 10 years (G.W. Bush > B. Obama; e.g. the case of the anti-missile shield in Poland). It is obvious that during any significant reforms/transformations the system becomes more vulnerable (cf. the opinion of M. Pawlak about the reform of the system of command conducted in Poland by General S. Koziej (chief of the Bureau of National Security)).⁴³

The problem of inertia can be illustrated as follows: 1) significant supplies of LNG from the US to the European Union are expected in 2019 (at

Helsinki, 10–11.12.1999; M. Drent, L. Landman, *Why Europe needs a new European Security Strategy*, “Clingendael Policy Brief” 2012, No. 9.

⁴¹ Ibidem; cf. Ł. Szarpak, *Grupy Bojowe jako element reagowania kryzysowego Unii Europejskiej*, in: *Bezpieczeństwo międzynarodowe...*, op.cit., pp. 373–384; A. Wiejak, *Obrona już nie narodowa*, “Nasza Polska”, No. 51–52, 22–29.12.2009, pp. 30–31.

⁴² Cf. Ł. Szarpak, op.cit., p. 379.

⁴³ M. Pawlak, *Trzecia wojna światowa na ropę i gaz*, “Gazeta Polska”, 7.05.2014, pp. 4–5.

present, according to the EU requirements, the reserves of oil and gas must suffice for 90 days);⁴⁴ 2) in 1999 (Helsinki) the European Rapid Reaction Forces were expected to become a reality in 2003 (60,000 soldiers, 30–60 days for deployment and 1 year for operations);⁴⁵ 3) in 2004 (Munich) the European Battlegroups were expected to be deployed (global scale!) within 15 days;⁴⁶ 4) in 2006 the Rapid Response Forces of NATO were expected to be deployed (global scale!) within 5 days for more than 30 days of operations.⁴⁷ However, in the case of an attack Poland is expected to fight alone for at least one week;⁴⁸ 5) the cycles of purchases of military equipment (e.g. training aircraft for pilots of F-16) are long (6 years in the case of Poland);⁴⁹ 6) the plan of modernization of the Polish Armed Forces is scheduled for 30 years;⁵⁰ 7) the Polish Armed Forces expect to be equipped with modern anti-aircraft and anti-missile systems (6 batteries, 530 rockets (380 on launchers), middle range (< 100 km)) by 2022.⁵¹

The problem of inertia is associated with „flexibility” and „adaptability”. „Flexibility” is important because of VUCA (volatility, uncertainty, complexity and ambiguity of the situation).⁵² „Short-term” flexibility can be limited by the so-called military justice in native countries (cf. the prosecution and trial of Polish soldiers on a mission in Afghanistan).

„Adaptability” could be defined as „long-term flexibility”. This issue could be illustrated with the suggestion of „rewriting” the European Security Strategy (2003; adaptation to the actual international context).⁵³ NATO, understood as a purely military organization, could be described

⁴⁴ Cf. B. Zb. Szalek, *Geopolityczne...*, op.cit.

⁴⁵ Cf. Ł. Szarpak, op.cit., p. 374–375.

⁴⁶ Ibidem, p. 376.

⁴⁷ Cf. P. Cywiński, *Po co nam NATO*, „Wprost”, 15.03.2009, pp. 40–47.

⁴⁸ Cf. M. Pawlak, op.cit., p.27.

⁴⁹ Cf. J. Ćwieluch et al., op.cit., p.14.

⁵⁰ Cf. R. Polko, J. Lichočka, *Trzeba być przygotowanym na wszystko*, „Gazeta Polska”, 13.03.2014, pp. 26–27.

⁵¹ Cf. J. Ćwieluch et al., op.cit.

⁵² Cf. B.S. Williams, *Heuristics and Biases in Military Decision Making*, „Military Review”, Sept.-Oct. 2010, pp. 40–52.

⁵³ Cf. M. Drent, L. Landman, op.cit.

as an anachronic structure (e.g. the problem of cyber warfare, cyber units, financial warfare, energy warfare, information warfare etc.; see above).

In this aspect „adaptability” is associated with „resistance / invulnerability” (for instance, let us imagine computerized armed forces defenceless against hacking) and „interactions” between the system and its natural and artificial environments. One can distinguish two typologies of „vulnerability / threats”: 1) internal, external and quasi-external threats; 2) threats associated with „natural environment” and threats associated with „artificial environment”. In turn, we can distinguish two kinds of „threats” associated with „natural environment”: “real threats” (e.g. natural cataclysms such as collisions with meteorites, large-scale earthquakes, hurricanes, inundations) and „illusory threats” (e.g. some experts and politicians in the EU believe in „combating climate change” (warming up) – this „combat” is expensive (hundreds of milliards USD) and results in budget cuts with regard to the armed forces; lobbyists in the EU claim that the exploitation of shale gas is dangerous from the viewpoint of ecology – therefore it is better to rely on the supplies from Russia).⁵⁴ On the other hand, it is necessary to distinguish „purely natural threats” (e.g. scarcity of certain raw materials) and „threats resulting from human manipulations with regard to the natural environment” (e.g. artificial earthquakes, weather manipulations etc.).

Let us illustrate the problem of „internal threats” with some examples of doubtful decisions and doings: 1) the governments of some NATO countries (e.g. France, Italy, the US) allow(ed) supplying Russia, China, Syria, Libya, Iran etc. with ultramodern military equipment and technologies (e.g. French warships (Mistral) for Russia);⁵⁵ 2) some members of NATO are interested in Russian military equipment (e.g. Turkey is interested in Russian mobile anti-rocket and anti-aircraft defence systems);⁵⁶ 3) some governments must buy spare parts for their military equipment (of Russian make) – in Russia (e.g. Poland buys spare parts for

⁵⁴ Cf. B. Zb. Szalek, *Some praxiological remarks on the problems of the European Union*, “Reality of Politics” 2011, No. 2, pp. 183–201.

⁵⁵ Cf. R. Śmigielski, *Nowe oblicze rosyjskiej armii*, “Armia”, 11.2012, pp. 64–68

⁵⁶ Cf. T. Wójcik, *Rosja się zbroi*, “Gazeta Polska”, 26.08.2009, p. 13.

its gunships);⁵⁷ 4) servicing (approved by the Polish counterintelligence service?; cf. the agreement on the cooperation between the Federal Security Service (Russia; FSB) and the Service of Counterespionage (NATO))⁵⁸ of the Polish airplane no 1 in Russia (TU-154; in 2010 crash at Smoleńsk and the death of top politicians and military commanders; cf. the crash of CASA and the death of top Air Force commanders); 5) shortcomings in the doings of counterintelligence (e.g. the case of Wikileaks and the defensive plan for Poland; Polish government occasionally uses Russian servers) – despite such endeavours as NATO Policy on Cyber Defence (2011), US Cyber Command (2009; cf. European Cyber Security Strategy);⁵⁹ 6) some NATO countries depend on Russian oil and gas (e.g. Germany, Italy (40–60%), Austria, Greece, Estonia, Poland, Slovakia, Lithuania, Latvia, Bulgaria (60–100%)). In other words: NATO members finance Russian armaments. In order to increase the energy security a real (and not pseudo- (e.g. Russian gas bought from go-betweens) or quasi- (e.g. pipelines under Russian control) diversification of supplies is necessary.⁶⁰ A temporary solution would consist in satisfactory reserves of oil and gas (at present, according to the EU requirements the reserves should suffice for 90 days); 7) corruption is a problem in some member countries (provisions up to 10%).⁶¹ In general, there is no cohesive strategy of purchases (the solutions introduced by EDA are doubtful). Another problem is „insufficient knowledge with regard to the real mechanisms of business” (for instance: one and the same company supplies Georgia with drones – and Russia with codes to these drones);⁶² 8) another problem is “lack of

⁵⁷ Cf. J. Ćwieluch et al., op.cit., p. 14.

⁵⁸ Cf. D. Kania, *Służby poszły spać*, “Gazeta Polska”, 12.03.2012, pp. 14–15.

⁵⁹ Cf. R. Czulda, *Cyberbezpieczeństwo istotne dla NATO*, “Armia” 2012, No. 11, pp. 47–49; N. Robinson, *The European Cyber Security Strategy: Too Big to Fail?*, RAND, <http://www.rand.org/blog/2013/02/the-european-cyber-security-strategy-too-bi-to-fa...>, (accessed: 05.05.2014); K. Głowacki, *Sieć ściśle jawna*, “Nasza Polska”, No. 51–52, 22–29.12.2009, p. 31.

⁶⁰ Cf. B. Zb. Szalek, *Geopolityczne...*, op.cit.

⁶¹ Cf. G. Indulski, J. Jakimczyk, *Korupcja w marynarce*, “Wprost”, 30.04.2006, p.30–32.; A. Dmochowski, *Śmiertelnie chore lotnictwo*, “Gazeta Polska”, 4.01.2012, p. 11.

⁶² Cf. R. Polko, J. Lichočka, op.cit.

responsibility” in the cases of faulty command and management in military / security affairs (e.g. the case of Smolensk); 9) in some countries (e.g. in Poland) the lack of money (e.g. due to faulty privatization) leads to deterioration of equipment;⁶³ 10) faulty systems of assignments and promotions.

ARTIFICIAL ENVIRONMENT

Of course, the artificial environment of NATO as a system is not homogenous and does not have one common goal.⁶⁴ Some outside structures / states can be described as friendly, neutral, possibly hostile and officially / frankly hostile. Some neutral states (e.g. India) appear in certain structures (e.g. BRICS) also including possibly hostile (China) and officially hostile (Russia) states. Some structures (e.g. the Shanghai Cooperation Organization; economic and military cooperation) include states that can become mutually hostile (cf. the issue of formerly Chinese territories within the present Russian Federation). Certain outside structures are based on religious ties (Islam; cf. the problems of Iran and Muslim terrorism). Due to pressure on space, I will only deal with Russia, China and the world of Islam (cf. the respective data in the first part of this paper). Russia is said to possess several thousands nuclear warheads (according to K. Głowacki: „the Russian strategic nuclear arsenal is in bad condition”).⁶⁵ However, Russia is an economic dwarf: General Domestic Product (GDP) of this vast country (17 million square km; 142.7 million people) is smaller (1,858 milliard USD) than GDP of Italy in the epoch of crisis (301 thousands square km; 60.7 million people; GDP = 2,196 milliard USD).⁶⁶ The Russian exports (to the EU and China)

⁶³ Cf. W. Waszczykowski, T. Wójcik, *Biedna armia nas nie obroni*, (interview), „Gazeta Polska”, 11.08.2010, p. 25.

⁶⁴ Cf. the case of Israel and AIPAC (American Israeli Political Action Committee) – its lobbying organization in the US (see: H. Szafir, *Wrodzy przyjaciele*, „Wprost”, 16.12.2007, pp. 98–99) in comparison to Russia and the EU.

⁶⁵ K. Głowacki, *Atomowy Pax Americana*, „Nasza Polska”, No. 4, 22.01.2008, p. 13.

⁶⁶ *Concise...*, op.cit., p. 549 and 616.

are mainly based on fuels (59%; gas, oil) and weapons. Decreasing prices of oil and gas (cf. the issue of shales) will create budget problems in Russia and influence the social and military sphere (eg Russia plans (2012–2022) to spend 700 milliard USD on military equipment).⁶⁷ At present, the Russian army undergoes a process of modernization (aims: modern structures of command and organization, a thorough modernization of equipment, increase of mobility, combat readiness, unified information / communication network, and – reduction of manpower), conducted by Serdyukov (Minister of Defence) and Makarov (Chief of General Staff / Headquarters).⁶⁸ The Russian military doctrine published in 2010 presented NATO and the US as the main enemy.⁶⁹ However, according to General N. Makarov: „NATO and China are the most dangerous among our geopolitical rivals”.⁷⁰ On the other hand, D. Trienin (former officer and lecturer (NATO Defence College in Rome)) does not regard NATO as a structure hostile to Russia.⁷¹

Gross Domestic Product of China (7,298 milliard USD) is higher than that of Russia (1,858 milliard USD)) and smaller than GDP of the US (14,991 milliard USD). However, GDP per capita is in the case of China considerably lower (5,417 USD) than in the case of Russia (13,006 USD; in the case of the US: 48,043 USD).⁷² China is said to possess 100–400 nuclear warheads. However, any comparisons of official manpower in Chinese armed forces (see above; 2.2–2.8 million people) are misleading as the population of China exceeds 1.342 milliard people). China lacks energy and fertile land (cf. the migration of millions of Chinese citizens to the eastern part of Russia). Russia (within the framework of SCO) offers

⁶⁷ Cf. T. Święchowicz, *Putin sam przeciw światu*, „Gazeta Polska”, 26.03.2014, pp. 20–21.

⁶⁸ Cf. R. Śmigielski, *Nowe oblicze rosyjskiej armii*, „Armia” 2012, No. 11, pp. 64–68.

⁶⁹ Cf. D. Ćosić, A.F. Rasmussen, *NATO nie jest wrogiem Rosji*, (interview), „Wprost”, 14.03.2010, pp. 76–77.

⁷⁰ Cf. A. Rybczyński, *Chiny–Rosja. Na razie szorstka przyjaźń*, „Gazeta Polska”, 30.06.2010, p. 13.

⁷¹ D. Trienin, *Pokochajcie Rosję*, (interview), „Polityka”, No. 48, 27.11.2010, pp. 54–56.

⁷² *Concise...*, pp. 546, pp. 615–616.

cooperation with regard to the energy (for instance: new pipelines) and weapons supplies. However, China tries to ensure direct energy supplies from such countries in Central Asia as Kazakhstan.⁷³ American presence in Iraq, Afghanistan is against the interests of China. Other sources of energy supplies are either far away (eg Sudan, Venezuela, Saudi Arabia) or not ready to be exploited (for instance, in the vicinity of the Paracel and Senkaku Islands). China possesses thousands of milliards USD in the US Government securities. In other words China possesses a financial weapon against the US.

Let us deal with the countries (from Mauritania to the Philippines and Indonesia) distinguished by their religion – Islam. This criterion is important in view of the fact that the idea of panislamism (eg „panislamist political unity” supported by Osama bin Laden) is quite popular in fundamentalist circles. The Organization of Islam Conference (OIC) is a structure including 52 countries (among them the Turkish Cyprus) with a population of around 800 million people. Some structures are based on the idea of „panarabism” (eg Arab Cooperation Council (ACC), Council of Arab Economic Unity (CAEU; 14 countries), Organization of Arab Petroleum –Exporting Countries; 12 countries)). There are several regional organizations based on ethnic and religious criteria (the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf (CCASG; other name: Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC; Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar (LNG supplies for the United Kingdom and Poland), Saudi Arabia (supplies for the US), United Arab Emirates (supplies for China)),⁷⁴ the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU; Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Tunisia)).⁷⁵ Such Muslim countries as Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan (Central Asia) belong to the Commonwealth of Independent States (lead by Russia) as well as to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (including China; observer status: Afghanistan, India, Iran, Mongolia, Pakistan; Turkey,

⁷³ Cf. B. Zb. Szalek, *Geopolityczne...*, op.cit.

⁷⁴ Cf. M.C. Peck, *The A to Z of the Gulf Arab States*, Scarecrow Press 2010.

⁷⁵ Cf. F. Tamburini, *L'Union du Maghreb Arabe, ovvero l'utopia di una organizzazione regionale africana*, "Africa" 2008, No. 3, pp. 405–428.

a member of NATO, is a „dialogue partner”).⁷⁶ The richest countries are grouped in the Gulf Cooperation Council. Their GDP and GDP per capita are estimated (2011) at 1,400 milliard USD and 33,000 USD.⁷⁷ For comparison, GDP of the Arab Maghreb Union members is between 376 (nominal GDP) and 607 (GDP (PPP)) milliard USD (GDP per capita is between 4,230 and 6,835 USD).

The Turkish armed forces are the second largest (manpower) forces in NATO (see above), whereas Pakistan (with its ambiguous policy towards the US) is said to possess 110 nuclear warheads (Iran, supported by the leaders of Russia, is on its way to become a nuclear power).

Hostile operations can be directed at decision making with regard to the goals of NATO and its member states (cf. the problem of „agents of influence”). In 2010 A.F. Rasmussen (Secretary General of NATO) intended to invite Russia in order to create „a new architecture of security in Europe”.⁷⁸ According to the Deauville Declaration (Myedvyedyev, Merkel, Sarkozy; October 2010), the European Union should cooperate with Russia in order to increase the European security.⁷⁹ „Combating climate change” (a program elaborated in Brussels) and considerable „reduction of CO2 emissions” mean economic problems (budget > military budget) for such countries with economies based on coal as Poland. Of course, there is an alternative – gas supplies from Russia (such „alternatives” mean an unavoidable increase of gas prices). Russia conducts open and covert (indirect) operations within the European sector of energy (e.g. in Poland (shales, problematic diversification of energy supplies – for instance the question of Novorossiysk; attempts at buying two Polish corporations (PKN Orlen, Grupa Lotos) and the best coal mines), Germany (Gazprom

⁷⁶ Cf. S.L. Yom, *Power Politics in Central Asia: The Future of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization*, “Harvard Asia Quarterly” 2002, No. 6, pp. 48–54; F.W. Stakelbeck, *The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation*, Front Page Magazine.com., 8.08.2001.

⁷⁷ M.C. Peck, op.cit.

⁷⁸ A. Słojewska, *NATO grożą głównie terroryści i cyberataki*, “Rzeczpospolita”, 9–10.10.2010, A11; cf. the Russian doings in Crimea and the present (2014) situation in Ukraine.

⁷⁹ Cf. A. Rybczyński, *Francja, Niemcy, Rosja. Budowa Eurorosji*, “Gazeta Polska”, 3.11.2010, p.17; cf. the present (2014) doings of Russia in Ukraine.

Germany; Nord Stream), Hungary and other countries.⁸⁰ A strong pro-Russian lobby in Brussels / the European Union is a fact (moreover, cf. the problem of Russian / Latvian deputies in the European Parliament).⁸¹ It is, to some extent, associated with pro-Russian attitude (will it change in light of the Russian annexation of Crimea?) of successive governments of Germany and France, two important members of the EU and NATO. However, from a global perspective, Russian operations may be idle, for Russia and NATO are not the only players in the game (cf. the Chinese activities in Central Asia). It would be difficult to expect from the hostile structures in the artificial environment to withdraw from operations against the potential (military, economic / financial, energy, information etc.) of NATO. The latter problem can be illustrated with numerous cases. For instance: 1) 3,000 Russian agents in Lithuania (a member of NATO);⁸² 2) operations against NATO and the EU conducted by FSB, SVR, GRU;⁸³ e.g. J.P. De Lisle (intelligence officer, NATO naval base in Halifax / Canada) spying for Russia,⁸⁴ 3) officers formerly educated in the Soviet Union (GRU, KGB) occupying high positions in military intelligence services in such NATO countries as Poland;⁸⁵ 4) entrusting City Security (a Russian guard service, operating in Russia and Ukraine, employing former (?) KGB and GRU agents) with protection / safe guarding of two NATO airports at Malbork and Pruszcz Gdański / Poland (this led to the dismissal of General J. Nosek (commander of the Military Counterintelligence Service in 2013)).⁸⁶

It would be risky to expect from the hostile structures in the artificial environment to enhance the steerability, cohesion, stability, flexibility, adaptability, invulnerability, reliability and efficacy of NATO and its

⁸⁰ Cf. B.Z. Szalek, *Geopolityczne aspekty bezpieczeństwa energetycznego krajów Europy Środkowej i Zachodniej*, in: M. Janowski, J. Jonczek, L. Ślepowroński (eds.), *Quo vadis, Europa*, Vol. 2, Szczecin 2008, pp. 118–152.

⁸¹ R. Czarniecki, *W sojuszu przeciw Rosji*, "Gazeta Polska", 4.06.2014, p. 16.

⁸² Cf. A. Wiejak, *Rosyjskie oblicze Unii*, "Nasza Polska", 10.11.2009, p. 12

⁸³ A. Rybczyński, *Raport zagrożenia*, "Gazeta Polska", 4.05.2011, p. 16.

⁸⁴ A. Rybczyński, *Rosyjski szpieg w sercu floty*, "Gazeta Polska", 25.01.2012, p. 21.

⁸⁵ Cf. D. Kania, *Patriota z GRU*, "Nowe Państwo", 2014, No. 2, pp. 4–6.

⁸⁶ Cf. K. Zielke, *Powrót Ameryki*, "Gazeta Polska", 6.11.2013, p. 18–19.

member states. The same can be said about the predictability of the situation (I will deal with this problem at the end of this paper). The situation is ambiguous and complicated. Let us illustrate the problem of vulnerability with examples associated with the set of „operational parameters”.

Let us present some possible operations against „steerability”:⁸⁷ 1) appropriately positioned agents of influence may „steer” such a country as Poland. According to A. Macierewicz, Poland, a member of NATO, becomes a „Russian zone”;⁸⁸ 2) elimination of commanding officers (for instance by means of air crashes; 3) sudden blockade of energy supplies; 4) operations in cyberspace (such as hacking, annihilation of data bases of Ministries of Defence, Foreign Affairs etc. (cf. Chinese operations against Germany and the US (Pentagon), Russian operations against Estonia)).⁸⁹

It is useful to analyse the problem of cohesion from a global perspective. For instance: 1) Muslim attempts in Madrid in 2003 led to the withdrawal of Spanish (NATO) troops from Iraq; 2) Russian operations based on bilateral „negotiations” in matters of energy supplies led to tensions within the European Union and between NATO countries; 3) Chinese direct contacts with Central Asia (energy supplies) do not enhance the cohesion of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (by some regarded as „Asian NATO Bis) and do endanger the ties based on the Commonwealth of Independent States; 4) the same can be said about the Chinese supplies of weapons for the Talibs in Afghanistan and Russian air bases for NATO transports destined for Afghanistan; 5) the so-called RMA (Revolution in Military Affairs) is based on electronic equipment (cf. the concept of C4ISTAR: command, control, communi-

⁸⁷ A. Ścios, *Nasi i obcy- w stronę Układu Warszawskiego*, „Gazeta Polska”, 26.06.2013, pp. 12–13; K. Rytko, *Estoński sposób na walkę w cyberprzestrzeni*, „Armia” 2012, No. 11, p. 46–48;

⁸⁸ J. Lichočka, A. Macierewicz, *Stajemy się rosyjską strefą*, „Gazeta Polska”, 19.02.2014, pp. 20–21.

⁸⁹ Cf. *Polityka bez strategii*, op.cit., p. 21; T. Mysłek, *Rosyjskie lobby rośnie w siłę*, „Gazeta Polska”, 7.05.2014, p. 19.

cations, computers, information / intelligence, surveillance, targeting acquisition, reconnaissance)⁹⁰ – annihilation of electronic equipment by means of weapons based on the concept of EMP (Electromagnetic Pulse) will reduce the possibility of „Rapid Decisive Operations” and „Netcentric Warfare based on the Internet” to zero.

The latter case is associated with ‘flexibility’. Destabilization of member states can be achieved by political, financial (cf. the problem of the US Government securities (thousands of milliards USD) in China), intelligence, energy and terrorist operations. Operations directed at „inertia” and „adaptability” may have military (e.g. slowing down the process of modernization of armed troops) and economic dimension (e.g. slowing down or stopping / blocking investments in the energy sector). All this may lead to increasing vulnerability, lower reliability and efficacy. However, low reliability and efficacy may result from poor quality of top politicians (cf. the cases of Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan; of course, they could be described as „very expensive (over 1,000 milliard USD) and time consuming military exercises”). One thing is „military potential” and quite another thing is „reasonable use of it”.⁹¹ The problem of reliability can be illustrated with the failure of western intelligence services in the case of Georgia (2008) and Crimea (2014).⁹² It would be difficult to describe the operations in Iraq and Afghanistan as „success”. The problem of efficiency and efficacy could be also illustrated with national expenditures on military missions in that region (in the case of Poland – hundreds of millions USD per year).⁹³ Of

⁹⁰ Cf. J. Ferris, *Sily konwencjonalne we współczesnej wojnie*, in: J. Baylis, J. Wirtz, C.S. Gray, E. Cohen (eds.), *Strategia we współczesnym świecie. Wprowadzenie do studiów strategicznych*, Kraków 2009, pp. 273–298.

⁹¹ According to Sun Tzu (a Chinese strategist; c. 500BC), „...there has never been a protracted war from which a country has benefited”; Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, Oxford 1963, p. 73

⁹² Cf. A. Torres, O. Doleśniak-Harczuk, *Obama nie potrafi wiarygodnie grozić*, (interview), „Gazeta Polska”, 12.03.2014, p. 8.

⁹³ T. Szatkowski, M. Michalska, *W sprawie Syrii nie powinniśmy być narzędziem*, „Gazeta Polska”, 4.09.2013, p.17; according to these authors, the missions mean additional and significant expenditures from the same military budget and can reduce the defensive potential with regard to the territory of Poland.

course, the Polish Armed Forces receive some financial support from the US (in total: below 1 milliard USD). However, there are some controversial problems with other kinds of support (e.g. two archaic frigates – practically out of repair at a reasonable price, the anti-missile shield etc.). The problem of efficiency is associated with the issue of the so-called „constructive duplication”. The expenditures on the Nordic Battlegroup (2400 men; 6 months in 2008; no action) amounted to 150 million Euro. Poland is expected to take part in 3 European Battlegroups.⁹⁴

Top Polish politicians name a number of advantages associated with our membership in NATO: 1) guarantees of security, technological (equipment) and educational progress, economic advantages (R. Sikorski, Foreign Affairs, earlier National Defence); 2) military security (B. Klich, earlier National Defence); 3) secure frontiers, foreign investments in Poland, internal security (verification of secret services), a better position on the international level (J. Buzek, former Prime Minister of Poland); 4) security (L. Wałęsa, former President of Poland); 5) good relations with our neighbours, direct investments, new quality in management, increase of exports (A. Kwaśniewski, former President of Poland).⁹⁵ On the other hand, according to W. Michnik: “a public research project piloted by the German Marshall Fund of the United States, showed that in 2012 only 45 per cent of Poles subscribe to the notion that NATO is essential to Poland’s security, with 40 per cent taking the opposite view”. And he adds: “Nevertheless, the perception of NATO as being less beneficial for Poland than the EU misses a basic point: physical security often comes before economic well-being.”⁹⁶

Let us deal with predictability.

⁹⁴ Cf. A. Wiejak, *op.cit.*

⁹⁵ P. Cywiński, *op.cit.*; cf. R. Grodzki, *op.cit.*, p. 327.

⁹⁶ W. Michnik, *op.cit.*, p. 82.

PREDICTABILITY

Predictability depends on our knowledge with regard to the system, its environment and their (system – environment (natural, artificial)) interactions. This knowledge must be based on reliable intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance and appropriate analytical work. The degree of unpredictability can be reduced by means of certain heuristic techniques (e.g.: spidergraphs, the Delphi technique, dynamic scenarios). Of purely heuristic use are the topological theory of 7 catastrophes by R. Thom,⁹⁷ the rule of K. Boulding (distance against power; cf. the question of enlargement of NATO and the European Union),⁹⁸ and the „margin of error” (as in the case of the US and Estonia).⁹⁹ Some scientists specialize in political and foreign-policy forecasts.¹⁰⁰ On the other hand, illusory knowledge means for example: 1) faulty ranking of priorities (cf. the rule of „20:80”); 2) wrong identification of geopolitical codes (e.g. our present and potential allies and enemies);¹⁰¹ 3) wrong identification of key-points and centres of power; 4) erroneous assumptions (e.g. western-like democracy in such countries as Afghanistan; communication systems based on electronics will not be destroyed by EMP; military alliances will work); 5) depersonalization (e.g. Turkey ruled by fundamentalist is not the same as Turkey ruled by secular governments).¹⁰² There is a difference between the US ruled by R. Reagan and the US ruled by B. Obama. It is symptomatic that some experts dealing with ‘principles of warfare’ disregard the problem of correct assignments and promotions (e.g. promotions for

⁹⁷ R. Thom, *Structural Stability and Morphogenesis*, W.A. Benjamin 1972.

⁹⁸ Cf. C. Jean, *Geopolitica*, Roma–Bari 1995; K. Boulding, *Conflict and Defence*, New York 1963.

⁹⁹ Cf. G. Friedman, *The Next 100 Years. A Forecast For the 21st Century*, New York 2009.

¹⁰⁰ Ibidem; also: B. Bueno de Mesquita, *The Predictioneer’s Game: Using the Logic of Brazen Self-Interest to See and Shape the Future*, Random House, 2009.

¹⁰¹ See C. Flint, *Introduction to Geopolitics*, Routledge 2006.

¹⁰² Cf. A. Koniuszewski, *Geopolityczne gry i zabawy*; „Myśl Polska”, 28.02.–7.03.2010, p. 8; according to this author: “...any deep reorientation of this... country... would be a real disaster”.

nothing).¹⁰³ Depersonalization (oversimplification?) leads to omission of such problems as corruption, infiltration, indolence, stupidity, incompetence, treason, responsibility. Depersonalization diverts our attention from the problem of scale (e.g. demography: China versus Russia); 6) „knowledge” based on pure lies (e.g. Mass Destruction Weapons in Iraq (2003)) as a pretext for military operations; 7) knowledge based on fragments of reality (fragmentation in space and time (cf. the problem of consequences); e.g. focusing on marginal local problems without taking into account major global issues; dealing with „military security” without taking into account „energy security” etc.).¹⁰⁴ In certain cases this „knowledge” can be based on deception / diversion; 8) knowledge based on pseudoheuristics such as availability, anchoring, representativeness (B.S. Williams associates with them: „retrievability bias”, „illusory correlation”, „biased evaluation of conjunctive and disjunctive events”, etc.).¹⁰⁵

It is useful to analyse the problem of predictability and illusory knowledge in association with such concepts as „black swans”, „hinge factor”, „emergentness”, „fuzziness (e.g. fuzzy geopolitics, Janus-like issues (for instance: the UPA / Bandera issue and the relations between Poland and Ukraine)).¹⁰⁶

The problem of predictability can be illustrated with two opinions / forecasts with regard to the fate of the US (there can be no doubt that the power of NATO (and the security of its members – such as Poland) is based on the power of the US. According to G. Friedman (Stratfor), the 21st century will be the century of the US (Poland, supported by the US, will become a regional power).¹⁰⁷ However, according to P. Buchanan, another political analyst, the US will disintegrate in the coming decades (therefore any significant support for Poland will be impossible).¹⁰⁸ The

¹⁰³ Cf. D. Strasburger, *Zasady sztuki wojennej*, Warszawa 1996.

¹⁰⁴ Cf. J. Ćwieluch et al., op.cit., p. 13.

¹⁰⁵ B.S. Williams, op.cit., pp. 40–52.

¹⁰⁶ N.N. Taleb, *The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable*, New York 2007; E. Durschmied, *How Chance and Stupidity Have Changed History: The Hinge Factor*, New York 1999.

¹⁰⁷ G. Friedman, op.cit.

¹⁰⁸ P. Buchanan, op.cit., Polish ed., Warsaw 2013.

assumption that NATO as a military alliance will prove reliable also in times of a global war seems to be optimistic (cf. the national „opt-outs” in Afghanistan). P. Buchanan does not believe in Germany’s, France’s or Italy’s declaration of war in the case of Russia’s attack on Estonia.¹⁰⁹ Poland remembers the doings of the United Kingdom and France („allies”) in 1939–1940 and in 1943–1945. Are Buchanan’s doubts valid in the case of Poland? Such countries as Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Poland have small „margins of error”. Would be a local, Eastern European alliance including Sweden, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Croatia, Slovenia etc. – a solution to this problem? For, according to G. Friedman, the EU will disintegrate in the coming decades.¹¹⁰

At present, Russia (ie V. Putin) regards NATO as its enemy. It is interesting that some NATO members (Germany, France, Italy) supply Russia with modern weapons.¹¹¹

According to T. Pompowski and P. Goble, Russia is weak, and Putin’s „tit for tat” (e.g. Kosovo – Osetia) is just a game in order to improve the image of Russia.¹¹² According to G. Friedman and W. Bukowski, Russia will disintegrate in the first half of the 21st century (first of all because of demographic problems; cf. the problem of energy supplies to Poland).¹¹³

Some analysts regard the Russian – Chinese alliance within the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization as illusory. According to M. Chodorkovsky, China is not an ally of Russia, but the main enemy.¹¹⁴ According to A. Rybczyński, a conflict between Russia and China is

¹⁰⁹ Ibidem, p.328; cf. C. Davis, *NATO Is In No Position to Protect Eastern Europe From Russia*, „New Republic”, <http://www.newrepublic.com/article/116967/nato-no-position-protect...>, (accessed: 24.06.2014).

¹¹⁰ Cf. A. Szostkiewicz, *Czy Unia przetrwa do 2057 roku?*, „Polityka”, No. 42, 20.10.2007, pp. 62–64.

¹¹¹ Cf. A. Rybczyński, *Jak Niemcy, Francja i Włochy zbroją największego wroga NATO*, „Nowe Państwo” 2014, No. 5, pp. 70–74.

¹¹² T. Pompowski, P. Goble, *Rosja jest dziś słabym państwem*, (interview), „Gazeta Polska”, 14.11.2012, p. 27.

¹¹³ G. Ślubowski, *Rozbiór Rosji*, „Wprost”, 8.03.2009, pp. 78–79.

¹¹⁴ G. Ślubowski, *Chinagorod*, „Wprost”, 8.04.2007, p. 114.

inevitable – the only question is: when will it happen?¹¹⁵ Th. Delpech goes a step forward and suggests: „Let us talk with Russia, and be afraid of China”.¹¹⁶ At present, the only significant alternative with regard to the Russian energy supplies offer the Muslim states in Central Asia and in the Near East. On the other hand, G. Friedman expects (in a long perspective) disintegration of China.

The main problem seems to be connected with „correct interpretation of the real political code” of such countries as China, Russia, the US and the world of Islam. The real value of military alliances can be tested in times of need (cf. the case of the „too reluctant / slow allies” of Poland in 1939, and the case of Japan in 1941: this „ally” of Germany attacked the US instead of the Soviet Union). It is incomprehensible that in times of relative peace Poland, an ally of the US, has a problem with visas to this country. It is also incomprehensible that two allies do not cooperate (e.g. satellite pictures) in such grave matters as the Smolensk crash in 2010 (victims: President of Poland and top military commanders). According to J. Stefanowicz, the real value of our membership in NATO and other western structures of security depends on the degree of “European Unity” – and not on formal treaties.¹¹⁷ Such defensive plans for Poland as „Eagle Guardian” are anachronic from the global point of view (deployment of 9 divisions: 4(?) Polish divisions, and 5 English, German and North American divisions transported (how fast?) by air, land and sea).¹¹⁸ R. Sikorski’s (Foreign Affairs) proposal (2014, after the Russian annexation of Crimea) of transferring two armoured NATO (in fact – German) brigades to Poland appears as risky in light of pro-Russian sympathies in German political circles.¹¹⁹

¹¹⁵ A. Rybczyński, *Chiny–Rosja. Na razie szorstka przyjaźń*, „Gazeta Polska”, 30.06.2010, p. 13.

¹¹⁶ W. Smoczyński, Th. Delpech, *Rozmawiajmy z Rosją, bójmy się Chin*, „Polityka”, No. 48, 29.11.2008, pp. 91–92.

¹¹⁷ J. Stefanowicz, *Zachodnie gwarancje bezpieczeństwa dla Polski. Rys historyczny*, [in:] *Bezpieczeństwo...*, *op.cit.*, p. 7–13.

¹¹⁸ Cf. K. Zielke, *Czy Polska się obroni?*, „Gazeta Polska”, 24.10.2012, p.14.

¹¹⁹ Cf. K. Zielke, *NATO wraca do gry*, „Gazeta Polska”, 16.04.2014, pp. 26–28.

In conclusion: the above geopolitical analysis suggests that the predictability of Poland's future could not be described as high, although some long-term scenarios seem to be relatively plausible and can be used in the construction of a more realistic national / regional security strategy.

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