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**INVOLVEMENT OF THE COMMON SECURITY  
AND DEFENCE POLICY ON THE ASIAN CONTINENT  
ON THE EXAMPLES OF MISSIONS  
IN AFGHANISTAN AND INDONESIA**

**Keywords:** security, defence, civilian missions, military missions.

**ABSTRACT:** European Union's Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) is a fundamental example of comprehensive approach used by the EU to achieve its goals. Though CSDP the EU is able to carry out civil missions and military operations not only in Europe, but also away from it, in the farthest regions. Since 2003 CSDP's missions and operations have been taking place on three continents: Africa, Asia and Europe. EU's presence on continents other than Europe allows it to be perceived as a global player responsible for security on the international arena. Each of the continents is important for EU's policies. It contributes to each of them as well as has benefits from each of them. The Union plays a certain role on each of the continents, which contributes to its position on the international arena. Focusing the actions of European Security and Defence Policy's (ESDP) (at that time) on Asia was a crucial step towards the status of a global player and also meant a beginning of a new dimension for the relations between the EU and Asia in the area of security. Missions in Indonesia and Afghanistan proves too, that the Asian continent is particularly important for the EU when it comes to security.

European Union's Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) is a fundamental tool of comprehensive approach used by the EU to achieve its goals. Though CSDP the EU is able to carry out civil missions and military operations not only in Europe, but also away from it, in the farthest regions. Since 2003 CSDP's missions and operations have been taking place on three continents: Africa, Asia and Europe. EU's presence on continents other than Europe allows it to be perceived as a global player

responsible for security on the international arena. Each of the continents is important for EU's policies. It contributes to each of them as well as has benefits from each of them. The Union plays a certain role on each of the continents, which contributes to its position on the international arena.

This paper aims at analysing CSDP's actions on the Asian continent with particular attention to the EUPOL police mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL Afghanistan) and mission in Indonesian Aceh (Aceh Monitoring Mission, AMM). The missions have not been selected randomly and as contrasting operations will allow for a detailed analysis of EU's presence in Asia and accompanying threats. The author has found it important to point out the differences between the two missions, problems that EU's representatives encountered, results and potential gains for the EU. Thanks to such an analysis it will be possible to show weak points of EU's structures used for the carrying out of defined tasks. It is also worth looking into how EU's presence in the aforementioned regions is perceived – as positive and necessary or conversely: as disapproved by the local communities?

Focusing the actions of European Security and Defence Policy's (ESDP)<sup>1</sup> (at that time) on Asia was a step towards the status of a global player and also meant a beginning of a new dimension for the relations between the EU and Asia in the area of security.

The first signs of EU's interest in Asia concerning security were visible in its documents. And so the Council of the European Union (later called Council) in its first report concerning Common Foreign Security Policy (CFSP) in 1997 clearly states that Asia is CFSP's priority. EU's relationship with Asia has not been of no interest to the European Commission either, because in 1994 a document explaining the general approach towards Asia was released- called *Towards New Asia Strategy*, and later in 2001 a revised Strategic Document- *Common Foreign Security Policy (CFSP)* came into force. A revised document meant a firmer approach due to a stronger message on the importance of security in contacts with Asia and dividing

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<sup>1</sup> Authors note. Changing of the name to European Security and Defence Policy's was made under the Lisbon Treaty in 2009.

it into further sub-regions: southern, south-eastern and north-eastern. Three out of six extensive aims expressed in the document concern the issue of security: a) contributing to peace-making and security in the region and all over the world through EU's involvement in the region of Asia, b) contributing to human rights' protection, promoting democracy, good governing and rule of law, c) creating global partnership and alliance with Asian countries to strengthen common efforts on global matters, also security. The European Parliament expressed interest in Asia as well and in 1999 called for a more active involvement of CFSP in security matters in Asia, especially in the area of trust-building, proactive diplomacy and conflict prevention.<sup>2</sup> Constructive involvement of the EU in the aforementioned actions in Asia was possible due to European Security and Defence Policy and its use of civil and not military measures for conflict solving and emergency management, through the so-called soft power. This was supposed to give the EU advantage over other alliances.<sup>3</sup> At the moment the Common Security and Defence Policy mission has been dominated by the soft power approach which has been beneficial for the EU which is not seen as an aggressor but as a trustworthy actor carrying aid.

Arranged in chronological order, the Aceh Monitoring Mission took place first. It started on the 15<sup>th</sup> of September 2005.<sup>4</sup> It was designed to monitor the implementation of different aspects of military pact contained in the memorandum (*Memorandum of Understanding* (MoU) signed by the government of Indonesia and *Free Aceh Movement, Gerakan Aceh Merdeka* (GAM)).<sup>5</sup> It should be underlined here that MoU called the EU

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<sup>2</sup> S. Baroowa, *Engaging Regional Partners for Effective Conflict Resolution: Problems and Prospects of the EU's Strategic Partnership In Asia*, 2008, Vol. 5, No. 15, Miami-Florida European Union Center of Excellence, s. 4–5. Cf. *Annual Report CFSP 1997*, Council of Ministers, European Commission, *Europe and Asia: A Strategic Framework for Enhanced Partnership*, 4.09.2001, Brussels, COM (2001), 469 final.

<sup>3</sup> S. Baroowa, *op.cit.*, p. 6.

<sup>4</sup> *Wspólne działanie Rady 2005/643/WPZiB z dnia 9 września 2005 r. w sprawie Misji Obserwacyjnej Unii Europejskiej w Aceh (Indonezja)* (Misja Obserwacyjna w Aceh (Aceh Monitoring Mission – AMM)), OJ L 334M, 12.12.2008.

<sup>5</sup> *Eu Monitoring Mission in Aceh (Indonesia)*, [http://www.eas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/aceh-amm/pdf/15122006\\_factsheet\\_aceh-amm\\_en.pdf](http://www.eas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/aceh-amm/pdf/15122006_factsheet_aceh-amm_en.pdf), (accessed: 07.07.2014).

to start the mission on the 15<sup>th</sup> of August, however it was impossible due to EU's complex bureaucratic process. That is why the Council set the date of 15<sup>th</sup> of September to be the commencement of the mission. *EU Initial Monitoring Mission Presence*, (IMP) was however launched in order to dispel fears that a delay could jeopardise the fragile peace. IMP involved over two hundred observers and aimed at monitoring of the military pact between the 15<sup>th</sup> of August and 15<sup>th</sup> of September 2005. Such a swift action entailed problems, especially financial ones, but not only. Mission's unconventional way of financing blocked the cash flow which meant problems for the staff taking part in it. These included having to pay travelling costs on their own, lack of company phones, no access to cash, offices or computers.<sup>6</sup> It is worth mentioning that EU member states were not unanimous about the mission's launch. Most of them, including Germany, thought that EU's presence in Asia should not be a priority and that instead of becoming involved into an area thousands of kilometres away the EU should concentrate its efforts closer, e.g. in the Balkans or within the framework of wider neighbourhood. France, Finland, Sweden and Netherlands were in the opposition. In the end the vote of British Presidency (sceptical at the beginning) tipped the scales in favour of the AMM. The Aceh Mission began to be treated as potentially beneficial due to two reasons. Firstly, it was possible to show that despite the rejection of the constitutional Treaty and financial impasse the European Security and Defence Policy of that time had its feet on the ground and was able to carry aid. Secondly, the mission was key for EU's vision of itself as a global player who did not only limit to bringing stabilisation to the neighbourhood but carried out also more ambitious plans. Thirdly, the mission constituted a sort of a test for civil mechanisms of ESDP at the time to be used in the situations of crisis management. It was also clear that lack of trustworthy and

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<sup>6</sup> F. Heiduk, *ESDP in Asia: The Aceh Monitoring Mission In Indonesia*, in: M. Asseburg, R. Kempin (eds.), *The EU as a Strategic Actor in the Realm of Security and Defence? A systematic Assessment of ESDP Missions and Operations*, "SWP Research Paper", RP 14, December 2009, Berlin, p. 103.

objective observers would lead to a breach of the peace agreement and resumption of hostilities.<sup>7</sup>

As it has already been mentioned in the paper AMM was the first civil mission in Asia. Its term of office was agreed on six months (later it was prolonged by six more) and aimed at: monitoring of GAM demobilisation and demilitarisation (handing out arms seemed key), monitoring of army and police forces and monitoring of reintegration of former GAM warriors. Monitoring of human rights, implementation of necessary changes in governing and respecting Aceh's autonomy and amnesty regulations were also found crucial. Investigating violations of MoU was mission's another task and it held executive power for the implementation of the tasks. The main points of its appointment and of the peace process as a whole were to demilitarise GAM, reintegrate and withdraw forces against the rebellion deployed in Aceh and implement legal regulations. For the first time within the framework of crisis management MoU empowered the mission to carry out important tasks related to human rights' protection. According to some analytics it was signal for the EU to increase efforts towards incorporating actions related to human rights' protection into civil and military missions' mandate.<sup>8</sup> And in fact such aspect has been clearly underlined in following missions. Promoting democratic values has become an inseparable element of civil and military missions. Supervising work on Law on Governing Aceh, (LOGA) and later monitoring of the first direct elections were key matters. When it comes to human rights, AMM was responsible for exercising control over the creation of Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). According to the concluded agreement, new legislation for Aceh would be made on the basis of the principle of gov-

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<sup>7</sup> Ibidem, p. 101, cf. G. Grevi, *The Aceh Monitoring Mission: towards integrated crisis management*, in: P.A. Braud, G. Grevi (eds.), *The EU mission In Aceh: implementing peace*, "Occasional Paper" 2006, No. 61, Institute for Security Studies, p. 24.

<sup>8</sup> F. Heiduk, op.cit., pp. 103–104. Cf. S. Anderson, *Why EU promotion is at odds with successful crisis management: Public relations, news coverage and the Aceh Monitoring Mission*, "Working Paper" 2012, No. 10, EU Centre in Singapore.

erning in all public sectors except for foreign affairs, external security, state security, fiscal and monetary affairs and justice and freedom of belief which would fall with the remit of Indonesian Republic's government.<sup>9</sup>

Aceh mission was relatively small and time-limited, however was supposed to be significantly beneficial for Indonesia and the whole region. On the one hand, its tasks came down to supervising the compliance of military treaty, but on the other, its context was wider. First of all, raising the level of security and stability in the region was supposed to strengthen the international position of Indonesia, the country that had the highest Muslim population in the world, which could consequently set a good example to others and help to solve other conflicts in the region. Aceh's case can be seen as one of the peace missions carried out successfully between the years 2005–2006. Every conflict is different and has its own dynamics, but Aceh mission has its achievements done in a very short period of time. Surely, a few particular factors influenced it, such as the presence of EU representatives in the last phase of negotiations. That created a kind of synergy between the negotiators and observers. Moreover, the agreement contained clear provisions and a timetable for implementation. It specified a wide autonomy for Aceh, demilitarisation, demobilisation, reintegration, political involvement, including the right to appoint political parties, which was completely new and controversial for Indonesia. Additionally, it specified respect of human rights, amnesty for political prisoners and introduction of dispute settlement mechanism. At the end of 2005 GAM handed over arms and terminated its militant wing. The government declared readiness to reform and modernise the army, as well as allowed for a part of governing to be moved to other regions. During the mission, talks on ways of dispute settlement between parties were held. *Commission on Security Arrangements* (COSA) was established and it included representatives of both parties as well as AMM chairman. COSA meetings were held at the provincial and local (*District level DiCOSA*) level. AMM lead and assessed progress on each of the stages of completion

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<sup>9</sup> K.E. Schulze, *A sensitive mission, monitoring Aceh's agreement*, [http://www.c-r.org/sites/default/files/accord%2020\\_10A%20sensitive%20mission\\_2008\\_ENG.pdf](http://www.c-r.org/sites/default/files/accord%2020_10A%20sensitive%20mission_2008_ENG.pdf), (accessed: 14.07.2014), p. 38.

and helped to solve upcoming problems.<sup>10</sup> Organisation of meetings at the local level helped to spread the peace process and ceded responsibility for problem solving to local leaders. Decisions at COSA and DiCOSA meetings were taken by consensus, which according to EU's assumptions is an excellent way of trust building between the parties and AMM mission. As a fully integrated mission of the EU and observers of the *Association of South-East Asian Nations* (ASEAN), it introduced a new dimension of cooperation and partnership. Cooperation coordination is an excellent example of effective multilateralism in the world of global media, markets and threats. EU's strategic approach includes preventing states from collapsing, keeping them strong and united so that they are able to meet the challenges of current times, such as international terrorism, organised crime, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and extremism. Cooperating with regional partners improved EU's approach towards crisis management through raising awareness and respect for local conditions of living, circumstances and cultures. Through it, it wants to become a global actor and not a superpower. Thanks to its political and economical resources it is most often described as soft power that should contribute to security improvement around the world.<sup>11</sup> Such a comprehensive attitude is based on bilateral benefits. First of all, ESDP at the time appeared in Asia for the first time. Its efforts contributed to the solving of Aceh conflict but also expressed EU's wider policies aimed at raising security and stability in the region.<sup>12</sup> Multifaceted involvement expressed through the support for development, raising security, investments is to make EU member states and their citizens feel safe and secure. The experience gained from the truly innovative AMM mission influenced further crisis management missions within the frameworks of CSDP. Basing on both civil and military experience AMM was an exceptional mixture of competence. AMM mission showed that EU is capable of running complicated and successful missions far away from its typical geographical

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<sup>10</sup> P. Feith, *The Aceh Peace Process. Nothing Less than Success*, "Special Report", No. 184, March 2007, United States Institute of Peace, Washington, DC 20036, p. 2.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 3.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibidem*.



area of interest.<sup>13</sup> Moreover, it proved itself to be trustworthy. Thanks to its involvement it gained credibility and became competitive against other allies offering a different range of measures.

EUPOL civil mission in Afghanistan that started in the middle of June 2007 clearly contrasts with the AMM mission.<sup>14</sup> Before the year 2007 the EU did not have a major input into the Afghanistan military conflict except for humanitarian aid and other economic programmes in which the European Commission was involved. In 2007 EUPOL police mission was launched. It aimed at giving support to the international community which helped the Afghans to take over the responsibility for law and order. This mission, similarly to AMM, is a part of EU's general involvement in Afghanistan, as well as its coordinated approach, which covers political guidance and efforts to rebuild the country. Mission's fundamental aim is to establish permanent and effective civil police.<sup>15</sup>

Afghanistan is one of the poorest and most dangerous countries for foreigners with a high rate of illiteracy and corruption at state and district level. Its biggest challenge is to have well-functioning justice and police sectors.<sup>16</sup> Afghanistan's government has not had smoothly running police forces for years. Since 1747 the state has not had civil police forces. Historically, the police had limited role and existing police forces consisted of illiterates and were under the control of armed forces. That is why EUPOL mission has encountered numerous difficulties, especially when it comes to reforming institutional structures and training procedures.<sup>17</sup> The mission also promotes reforms aimed at building trust towards the

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<sup>13</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>14</sup> *Wspólne działanie Rady 2007/369/WPZiB z dnia 30 maja 2007 r. w sprawie utworzenia misji policyjnej Unii Europejskiej w Afganistanie (EUPOL AFGANISTAN)*, O. J L 139, 31.05.2007.

<sup>15</sup> *EU Police Mission in Afghanistan- EUPOL Afghanistan*, [http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/eupol-afghanistan/pdf/factsheet\\_eupol\\_afghanistan\\_en.pdf](http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/eupol-afghanistan/pdf/factsheet_eupol_afghanistan_en.pdf), (accessed: 08.07.2014).

<sup>16</sup> S. Bloching, *Policing in conflict-an overview of EUPOL Afghanistan*, "European Security Review" 2011, No. 7, ESR Briefing, p. 4.

<sup>17</sup> I. Gurbanow, *The Civilian Crisis Management Policy of the European Union in Afghanistan: Challenges for Police Mission*, "Strategic Outlook", Adequatio Intellectus et rei, February 2014, p. 4.



police forces. Moreover, it is important to spread the knowledge about the rule of law and human rights' protection. The mission provides leadership and specialised training, mentors and advisors in the afghan Ministry of the Interior and Justice, Office of the Attorney General in Kabul and a few provinces. EUPOL helps the Afghans to develop their civil and police skills. EUPOL Afghanistan concentrates upon three areas: 1) institutional reform of the Ministry of the Interior 2) professionalization of the *Afghan National Police* (ANP) 3) conjunction of police reform and judiciary.<sup>18</sup>

EUPOL is one of the most demanding missions due to the militarisation of actions, theatre of violence, cultural and religious differences. Police reform in Afghanistan is a true challenge because of the following reasons: high level of corruption, weak central government and limited social trust. The police reform implemented by EUPOL is carried out on the basis of *Security Sector Reform* (SSR), which concentrates upon the development of regulations of rule of law and strengthening the judicial and police sector. *Security Sector Reform* (SSR) is an important part of international effort to stabilise and rebuild Afghanistan after the military intervention of allied countries in 2001. That is why the EU, for whom SSR is important in the process of carrying out its strategic objectives set out in *European Security Strategy* (ESS), decided to undertake the mission in accordance with SRR agenda including: army, police and judicial sector reform, demobilisation, demilitarisation, reintegration and action on drugs.<sup>19</sup> Unfortunately, EU's liabilities to Afghanistan concerning the restoration of the rule of law and good governance have been difficult to carry out due to numerous restrictions such as aggression increase, poor coordination between the EU and other parties of the international community and limited resources and capacities of EUPOL.<sup>20</sup> In the case of Afghanistan SRR aims at increasing its capacity to meet several needs, both in the area of internal

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<sup>18</sup> *EU Police Mission in Afghanistan- EUPOL Afghanistan*, [http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/eupol-afghanistan/pdf/factsheet\\_eupol\\_afghanistan\\_en.pdf](http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/eupol-afghanistan/pdf/factsheet_eupol_afghanistan_en.pdf), (accessed: 08.07.2014).

<sup>19</sup> S. Bloching, op.cit., p. 01.

<sup>20</sup> M. Larivé, op.cit., p. 03.

and external security in accordance with democratic norms and principles of good governance, respecting human rights and rules of law.<sup>21</sup>

The mission in Afghanistan is for the EU a test on its credibility as a world actor taking part in civil missions, which it gained throughout the AMM mission in Indonesia. However due to a completely different situation it is not easy. The biggest obstacle, probably, is insecurity. Another one is multiplicity of actors since it creates distortions, inconsistent activity and common approach. In case of this mission there is no cooperation between actors, conversely to AMM mission. Such a specific situation in which on the one hand a military operation is carried out and on the other a democratic institution is being built (all taking place during a war against terrorism) can unfortunately lead to an impairment of EU's efforts in carrying out of SRR.<sup>22</sup>

It has to be underlined that the USA and Germany were the first actors to be involved into police reform in Afghanistan, however their approaches were divergent. The US concentrated on militarisation of the police whilst Germany and the EU at the moment, basing on *German Police Project Office* (GPPO), have been implementing civilian approach. German view adopted by the EU aims at centralising initiative coordination and training and bases on a long-term strategy. It has to be mentioned here that the EU member states, apart from Great Britain, viewed the Afghanistan war as a part of state building strategy. The German long-term strategy did not succeed due to insufficient personnel and limited funds which proves that a concentrated effort of more countries can bring more benefits and help the project to be completed.<sup>23</sup> Germany gave support to Afghan police forces in the sixties and seventies and when Afghanistan's restoration began in 2002 it played its part to assist it by joining at the international Tokyo conference. During recent years, however, the situation regarding security has significantly deteriorated- the number of suicidal bombings and rebel attacks has increased and corruption in the security sector has increased. All those factors made Germany ask for support of their efforts

<sup>21</sup> Ibidem, p. 11.

<sup>22</sup> Vide E. Gross, *Security Sector Reform in Afghanistan: the EU's contribution*, „Occasional Paper”, 2009, No. 78, European Union Institute for Security Studies, p. 11.

<sup>23</sup> M. Larivé, op.cit., pp. 13–14.

in restoring Afghan National Police (during their Presidency of the Council). On the 30<sup>th</sup> of May 2007 The General Affairs and External Relations Council adopted common actions on establishing police mission. It was the biggest and most ambitious civil mission within the framework of CSDP in those times.<sup>24</sup> On the 15<sup>th</sup> of June 2009 Germany officially passed the responsibility for transforming Afghan National Police into effectively working police forces over to the EU. Establishing such forces in unstable countries is considered to be one of the key objectives for the international community. Civil forces are able to ensure law and order, and most importantly foster trust amongst citizens, which is fundamental for every well-functioning state.<sup>25</sup> However, in a country where the majority has faith in the elders instead of justice administration is it even possible?

EUROPOL's assumption of German project's tasks meant a continuation of the civil strategy for Afghanistan, but not in the original version. Of course the mission is based on the project but its tasks have been extended to consulting for the personnel of the Ministry of the Interior, high-ranking officers and regional chiefs of police. This allows a better coordination between the EU member states and third parties.<sup>26</sup> Contrary to the AMM mission EUPOL is not an executive mission and its task are monitoring, counselling and training. It coordinates projects carried out by the member states and others that are connected to the mission and supports its goals.<sup>27</sup>

The mandate of the EUPOL Mission runs until the 31<sup>st</sup> of December 2014. So far within its framework a number of training programmes have been carried out and thousands of Afghan police officers and national inspectors have been trained under the Ministry of Interior. The police standards have been improved and the cooperation between the police,

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<sup>24</sup> R. Kempin, S. Steinicke, *EUPOL Afghanistan: The Credibility- TEST for Europe' Civilian Engagement*, in: M. Asseburg, R. Kempin (eds.), *The EU as a Strategic Actor in the Realm of Security and Defence? A Systematic Assessment of ESDP Missions and Operations*, "SWP Research Paper" 2009, RP 14, Berlin, pp. 136–137.

<sup>25</sup> S. Bloching, op.cit., p. 5.

<sup>26</sup> M. Larivé, op.cit., pp. 13–14.

<sup>27</sup> E. Gross, op.cit., p. 29.

investigators and prosecutor's office has been tightened. Under the founded Police Academy, Police Office of the Ombudsman and Department of Human and Gender Rights was established. The final objective is to increase social trust to Afghan justice system. It has already been mentioned in the paper that the EU was faced with numerous problems regarding the implementation of crisis management policies. Above all, it is not able to carry out large-scale autonomous operations. In this context it still has to rely on NATO's support and capacities which may have adverse effect and delay mission's deployment (as it happened in the case of EUPOL mission when Turkey used its right of veto). What is more, the EU did not send enough police forces due to not having known the conditions in which the mission would be carried out. This led to local community's insufficient trust for the EUPOL mission.<sup>28</sup>

Both of the discussed missions have been important for the EU and both have been driven by the necessity to support and carry aid. They have aimed at bringing stabilisation, peace, reforms and spreading values known to the European community but new to the Asian one. In the case of AMM mission the EU played a key role in the peace process in Indonesia. It was different in many aspects from the others, most importantly it has been the first civil mission in Asia and the first one to be carried out in cooperation with another regional organisation. Additionally, other states outside of the EU such as Norway and Switzerland have taken part in it. AMM took place only a couple of months after a tragic tsunami, which makes it even more special- one can see its simultaneous goals- to help in country rebuilding and peace restoring. Mission's implementation took three weeks which for bureaucratic EU is quite impressive.<sup>29</sup> Unfortunately, the mission had its weak points as well. First of all, its staff- the appointed experts (former military personnel and military experts) were undertrained when it comes to human rights' protection. The mission did not have its own safeguard and its staff was guarded by Indonesian government- this did not foster trust amongst the society. Other parties

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<sup>28</sup> I. Gurbanow, *op.cit.*, p. 5–6.

<sup>29</sup> F. Heiduk, *op.cit.*, p. 100. Cf. N. Pirozzi, S. Sandawi, *Military and Civilian ESDP missions: Ever Growing and Effective?*, Documenti IAI, 2009, No. 9.

established in that area, including Non Governmental Organizations (NGO's), did not have such safeguard.<sup>30</sup> Nevertheless, the EU managed to achieve its goals. The reforms were carried out to the possible extent. As an integrated, hybrid mission AMM carried out coherent actions with other actors of the region at the provincial and local level. The EU was welcomed as a reliable and neutral partner, which was important because despite the initial scepticism ESDP was successful in that region of Asia.

In the case of EUPOL mission the situation is different. EUPOL was EU's first mission to function in an openly hostile environment. In such difficult conditions, without security, and with mistrustful society used to completely different standards, it is difficult to introduce reforms in the two key sectors. Still, the EU undertook the mission carrying out actions at three levels: central, local and provincial.

In the case of this mission the personnel was entirely dependent on external security, private companies, safeguarding and NATO forces. However, when it comes to NATO, it could only intervene in emergencies due to a lack of formal agreement regarding EUPOL personnel (which had been blocked by Turkey). Without support the training staff would not be able to carry out their work properly and because of it they were mostly placed in Kabul, where the European infrastructure was present. Violence and ongoing war were and are the main reasons for limited progress of task implementation.<sup>31</sup> Another difficulty regards entities engaged in Afghanistan. Their traditional backgrounds vary and the use of police resources in their native countries differs, which translates into diverse reforms and inconsistent training courses for the police. In some EU member states police plays a role of a purely civil actor, in others, such as France, paramilitary police forces exist (such as gendarmerie used in conflict situations). Similarly to AMM mission, the seconded police officers did not have enough experience in the area of police training and did not have enough knowledge about Afghan police sector and country's cultural context.<sup>32</sup> This at the beginning hindered mutual understanding

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<sup>30</sup> Ibidem, p. 108.

<sup>31</sup> See: M. Larivé, *op.cit.*, p. 20.

<sup>32</sup> S. Bloching, *op.cit.*, p. 5.

and motivation to carry out necessary reforms. The aforementioned illiteracy constitutes another difficulty. Afghan police officers are illiterate and therefore not able to process evidence, copy instructions or make reports, not to mention that many of them are addicted to drugs.<sup>33</sup> Another crucial problem regarding strengthening civil dimension of police forces is the absence of women advisors which is especially visible in Afghanistan because one of the Mission's assumptions is to train on human rights' and gender equality.<sup>34</sup> It can be said that EUPOL mission has been facing and having to deal with barriers since the beginning. The EU is still running training courses in Afghanistan, for the first time together with Combined Security and Transition Command Afghanistan (CSTC-A) in April 2014. Training in close cooperation aims at developing police forces and further training courses in other provinces and districts. CSTC-A has undertaken to provide classrooms and organise turnout and EUPOL is to provide information on effective communication, gender and human rights, combat corruption and solve problems, undertake decisions, coordinate projects and plan budget.<sup>35</sup> In June of the same year numerous training courses were provided, inter alia on children's safety, gender, human rights' protection, differences between the running of state and regional police. Under Crime Management Collegium several dozens of police officers completed training on investigative interview, evidence collection, intelligence-gathering techniques and so on.<sup>36</sup> Last year the Phoenix programme was introduced. It aims at supplying civil police with uniform rules at different levels of cooperation.<sup>37</sup> Possibly, the EU will consider

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<sup>33</sup> Cf. A. Qayoom, *The EUPOL Challenges to Success in Afghanistan*, [http://www.academia.edu/4098780/The\\_EUPOL\\_Challenges\\_to\\_Success\\_in\\_Afghanistan](http://www.academia.edu/4098780/The_EUPOL_Challenges_to_Success_in_Afghanistan), (accessed: 14.07.2014), p. 5.

<sup>34</sup> S. Bloching, *op.cit.*, p. 05.

<sup>35</sup> *News In brief*, [http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/eupol-afghanistan/news/index\\_en.htm](http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/eupol-afghanistan/news/index_en.htm), (accessed: 14.07.2014).

<sup>36</sup> *First core investigators course graduation at Crime Management College*, [http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/eupol-afghanistan/news/20140714\\_2\\_en.htm](http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/eupol-afghanistan/news/20140714_2_en.htm), (accessed: 14.07.2014).

<sup>37</sup> *Zob. EUPOL Kabul Field Office: Project Phoenix Partnership Meeting*, [http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/eupol-afghanistan/news/20140706\\_en.htm](http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/eupol-afghanistan/news/20140706_en.htm), (accessed: 14.07.2014).

extending the mission in order to support introduced reforms through a monitoring of the shared knowledge and supervising implemented changes. It is all dependant on Afghani officials and their ability to maintain order and respect the principles submitted by more experienced European experts.

A prolonged mission would be more beneficial both for the EU and Afghanistan. Obviously, in case of acts of war the EU does not have the power to stop them, it is neither a superpower nor a military alliance. That is why it has to learn to work together with actors who are capable of restoring order. Afghanistan's case has revealed chaos in that area. On the one hand, it should not place, but on the other, it is difficult to reconcile two differing concepts and action strategies. Such a situation can be treated as homework to be done by the EU.

Afghanistan's case proves that the Asian continent is particularly important for the EU when it comes to security. Moreover, other missions have been in progress- EUJUST and LEX-Iraq in Iraq and EUPOL COPPS and EUBAM RAFAH in Palestinian Authority. Each of the aforementioned missions has been a novelty for the EU, two entirely different theatres of operation even though on the same continent. Both missions concentrated on soft issues of security which despite numerous problems casts the Union in favourable light in comparison to other players involved, for instance in Afghanistan. In the case of both missions a diffusion of borders between civil and military forces can be observed even though they were both intended as civil missions. They are both a confirmation of EU's crucial role as a global player on the international arena who can actively operate in any situation, irrespectively of the conditions. This only shows that EU's often criticized soft power is capable of pursuing the objectives and be more or less effective (depending on the obstacles it has to deal with). Moreover, the reception of EU's methodological approach by third parties that seek for its presence is invaluable and underestimated by the member states and EU's bureaucratic machine. However, the goal set by the Union makes its presence in Asia and outside of it more visible which brings positive reactions and connotations. The EU will never be a military alliance, but thanks to its methodological attitude it has a huge



clout. Contamination of civil and military forces is capable of ensuring security of the EU and the rest of the world.

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