

---

*Monika Lipiec-Karwowska*<sup>1</sup>

DOI: <https://doi.org/10.15804/rop2023205>

## **DEALING WITH UKRAINIAN REFUGEE CRISIS IN POLAND – AN EXAMPLE OF A WELL- FUNCTIONING CIVIL SOCIETY IN ACTION**

**Keywords:** Ukrainian refugees, humanitarian crisis, volunteering, civil society, aid

**ABSTRACT:** The Russian attack on Ukraine on 24 February 2022 triggered the beginning of the biggest humanitarian crisis in modern Europe since the end of World War 2. Within the first six days of the war, more than four million refugees crossed the Ukrainian border, and most of them arrived in Poland. In response to this crisis, non-governmental organizations and volunteers in Poland played a crucial role in providing support to Ukrainian refugees. Their efforts included providing basic necessities such as food and shelter, as well as assisting with legal and administrative matters. This may be dubbed an example of civil society in action, where citizens take initiative to help those in need here and now, without waiting for the state to introduce specific legal acts. This article aims to describe the historical background of civil activities in Poland as well as the response of both volunteers and the government to the refugee crisis in the first period of the war.

### **INTRODUCTION**

Russia's invasion on Ukraine in February 2022 brought about the largest refugee migration in Europe since World War 2, according to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). During the first two months of the war, over 6 million people crossed the Ukrainian border, the majority went to Poland, UNHCR states. This unprecedented scale of

---

<sup>1</sup> State University of Applied Sciences in Koszalin; [monika.lipiec.karwowska@gmail.com](mailto:monika.lipiec.karwowska@gmail.com).

migration caused a refugee crisis that would have been a challenge for any country, especially as reaction was needed immediately. Mitigating the crisis would not have been possible were it not for immediate help of thousands of volunteers, first at the border, then throughout the whole country. Some of those volunteers had already been active in nongovernmental organizations, especially dealing with humanitarian aid, some were politically active only in anti-government protests, others were common people, not experienced in any serious activity other than occasional financial support of a chosen charity. In those difficult times Poland proved its value as a well-functioning civil society that acts when and where action is needed, without waiting for the government to issue special laws or regulations.

The first section of this article presents the historical background of civil activism in Poland, with special emphasis put on the Solidarity movement and anti-government protests. Then, the focus is moved to the concept of volunteering and its definitions, first generally, then in the context on the Ukrainian refugee crisis in Poland. Further, government help for refugees is described and finally, conclusions are offered.

## CIVIL ACTIVITIES IN POLAND

The history of civil society in Poland is longer than its modern democracy. While most researchers concentrate on the Solidarity movement of the 1980s, one needs to remember numerous activities of the Polish society after the tripartitions of the 18<sup>th</sup> century and subsequent loss of independence. Leś (2000) describes those activities as mainly striving to help the poor, provide education, health care or generally aiming at preserving Polish culture. Grzegorz Piotrowski, on the other hand, stresses that “whether it was self-help, educational or cultural activity, or religious activity – national identification and the contestation of an oppressive, hostile system became an important factor focusing people’s actions” (Piotrowski, 2020, p. 201).

Then, under the communist regime, human rights were constantly violated, which led to massive anti-government protests – in Poznań in

1956, in Gdańsk in 1970, in Radom and Ursus in 1976, and finally in the whole country in 1980. The result of the last ones was the creation of an independent trade union NSZZ Solidarność (Solidarity), which reached ten million members (Castle and Taras, 2002). According to Matczak et al. (2019), the Solidarity movement “still plays a fundamental reference point for the civil society in Poland.” However, as many authors stress out, after the fall of the communist regime, Polish society became disillusioned and disappointed with the new system. Kubik (2000) points out that during periods of political transformation people often retreat into their private worlds. Domaradzka (2016) sees this retreat as a direct result of the enforced participation in civic engagement during communist era. She concludes that after many years “when public participation in state run or state-controlled organisations was often obligatory, many people today are still reluctant to participate in any social activity” (Domaradzka, 2016, p. 126). According to Kinowska-Mazaraki (2021), “it was perhaps over-optimistic to expect that the mentality shaped by years under communism would disappear automatically with a change of the political system” (Kinowska-Mazaraki, 2021, p. 4).

However, the situation changed in 2015, when parliamentary elections won by the right-wing Law and Justice party (PiS) moved Poland towards a more authoritarian rule. Theoretically, the political system of the country did not change, as the ruling party did not have sufficient majority to change the constitution. That did not stop the authorities from dismantling the system piece by piece, by so called ‘reform’ of the justice system, taking over public media, state-owned companies and public institutions on an unprecedented scale. As a result of these changes, Poland started to be called an ‘illiberal democracy’, a term coined by Fareed Zakaria in 1997 (Piotrowski, 2020). This term, originally describing countries that failed to achieve democracy after the fall of communism, now is also used, according to Piotrowski, as relating to “countries with established democratic systems that – due to the electoral choices of their citizens – are withdrawing from the rule of law and other pillars of contemporary liberal democratic systems” (Piotrowski, 2020, p. 197).

Numerous laws that the ruling party introduced or attempted to introduce were met with mass social protests. Among those especially contro-

versial were abortion laws. Abortion in Poland was possible under the so-called “abortion compromise” of 1993, which restricted it to specific cases: when pregnancy endangered the life or health of the mother, when pregnancy was the effect of rape, and when fetus was seriously damaged. The compromise was not really satisfactory for anyone: those pro-choice emphasized the thin window of possibility to abort, those anti-abortion complained that the window was too wide (or that it even existed). However, among social tensions caused by the dismantling of the rule of law, PiS decided to “open the Pandora’s box” (Kinowska-Mazaraki, 2021, p. 12) and proposed a bill to change the abortion law in 2016. This triggered mass protests throughout the country on so-called “Black Monday” (later called “black protests” to include further rounds in 2017, 2018 and 2020), labelled as the All-Poland’s Women’s Strike (Ogólnopolski Strajk Kobiet). The participants of the protests wore black, they also posted photos of themselves or others with hashtag #blackprotest on social media. This increased the visibility, recognition and range of the protests on an unprecedented scale, reaching beyond the typical well-educated, liberal, big city activists (Majewska, 2017). The numbers are impressive – some of the protests reached over 100,000 participants, but what is more interesting is the fact that 90% of the protests took place in cities, towns and villages with less than 50,000 inhabitants (Muszel, Piotrowski, 2017). The ruling party backed off, but returned to the idea in October 2020, in the middle of the pandemic, with a new approach – bypassing the parliament, referring the matter to the Constitutional Tribunal which by then had been practically taken over by the ruling party. Despite the pandemic restrictions, hundreds of thousands of people again took part in mass protests.

The antagonistic and anti-democratic policy of the ruling party has led to growing political polarization, but also to an increased political participation, which is visible in higher voter turnout (Kinowska-Mazaraki, 2021). This growing politicization of the society and the civil society is seen by scholars as not necessarily bad in its essence (see e.g. Korolczuk, 2017). Jacobsson and Korolczuk (2017) state that it may be difficult to measure informal initiatives which make up an important part of Polish civil society and are often overlooked by researchers who concentrate on

more formal types of activities and thus see the Polish society as weak and passive, which is not necessarily in case.

## VOLUNTEERING IN POLAND

Activism and volunteerism may be called two sides of the same coin, as they both involve commitment, involvement or engagement in civic activities. They differ as to the desired output – volunteerism does not usually have a direct political purpose. According to Erdoğan Coşkun (2022), “while volunteers turn toward activities aimed at improving individual problems, activism strives for social change in a radical way”, and therefore it may be said that volunteers ‘target’ people and seek for individual solutions, rather than social, political and institutional changes (Erdoğan, Coşkun, 2022). However, they are both types of civic activities based on altruism and free will, both may involve unpaid work, and both strive to make the world a better place, either for individuals or for societies in general.

The definition of volunteering in Poland may be found in numerous sources, for example the Klon/Jawor association, which regularly publishes reports on the state of Polish volunteering, offers that it is the unpaid, voluntary commitment of time to “voluntary work in non-governmental organizations, institutions, social and political parties and movements, trade unions, churches, religious associations and other religious movements” (Dąbrowska et al., 2002, translation mine). A wide definition is also offered by Dorota Moroń (2009), who lists the subjects for whom voluntary work may be given, including not only non-governmental organizations, but also local government units and organs of public administration. Ochman (1997) additionally stresses the fact that voluntary activities must extend beyond relationships between family or friends. Thus, most definitions have three elements in common: voluntary activity must be performed out of free will, be unpaid and realized for subjects outside of family and friends.

In Poland, volunteering is quite strictly regulated by law. The most important document is Public Benefit and Volunteer Work Act of 2003 (ustawa

o działalności pożytku publicznego i wolontariacie, Journal of Laws 96, item 873, as amended). Article 2 p. 3 of the act precisely defines a volunteer as every individual, who performs voluntary and unpaid work as specified by the act. There are specific duties that concern not only volunteers themselves, but also organizations that use their services, among others relating to social insurance and signing a contract. Agnieszka Bejma (2012) sums up the types of activities performed by volunteers, categorizing them according to the place of activity or the organization that utilizes them. They range from helping children in doing their homework to helping patients in hospices or working for political parties. However, one of the activities deserves special attention, as it lies within the scope of interest of this paper, namely fundraising to help victims of natural disasters or to purchase medical equipment, and collecting clothes, food and household items for those in need. She also divides voluntary activity into one-time only and periodic, ranging from short- to long-term. A similar distinction is made by Dorota Moroń (2009), who divides volunteering into permanent and occasional (action-based). The second type may be related to a one-time help for the victims of natural disasters (e.g. floods) or may be connected with a recurring event. The most famous type of such an event in Poland is The Great Orchestra of Christmas Charity (Wielka Orkiestra Świątecznej Pomocy), which organizes its grand finale with outdoor concerts and events in January each year to collect money to buy medical equipment for public hospitals. The charity was established in 1993 and each finale raises millions for a specific goal with help of thousands of volunteers collecting donations in Polish cities, towns and villages, just for one day, amounting to over 1 billion PLN raised since its beginnings (<https://www.wosp.org.pl>). According to the charity, in 2019 over 120,000 volunteers took part in the great finale. In time, online donations became more and more popular, but still the majority of Poles recognize volunteers with characteristic collection “cans” and red heart-shaped stickers with the Orchestra logo given to donors. The brand itself, according to Millward Brown and Young and Rubicam agency, is the first or second (depending on the year) strongest in Poland, and the one with the greatest respect among Polish people (<https://www.wirtualnemedia.pl/artykul/ptasie-mleczko-wosp-i-zloty-najsilniejszymi-markami-w-polsce-tvn-najwyzej-z-mediow>).

However, even such an esteemed charity is not safe from political turmoil. For many years, The Orchestra was given media time, with public TV relating each grand finale in detail. However, with the change of government in 2015 came the change in attitude towards the charity. In 2017, public TV (controlled by the ruling party) stopped broadcasting the finale, and instead started a smear campaign directed at the Orchestra founder, charismatic Jurek Owsiak, and even at the young volunteers. In 2019, as related by Stanley Bill (2022), “the campaign against the Orchestra escalated violently on public television.” During the fundraising finale that year, on 13 January, the mayor of Gdańsk and opposition politician Paweł Adamowicz was stabbed to death on stage. Afterwards, public TV voiced accusations through its journalist and ruling party’s politicians towards Owsiak and the opposition, claiming they were “indirectly responsible for the murder through their supposed creation of a growing climate of hate speech” (Bill, 2022, p. 125).

It seems, however, that the negative campaign only helped the Orchestra, which set a new fundraising record each year after PiS came to power, in 2019 raising over three times more than in 2015 despite the lack of coverage from the public media and the negativity from the ruling party. Some journalists, like Sebastian Ogórek (2017) claim that the smear campaign may be precisely one of the reasons why Poles decided to support the charity more generously, to “spite the government.” Bill (2022) calls Polish civil society distinctively resilient, and Jacobsson and Korolczuk (2017), on the other hand, remind that although studies may show low levels of engaging in activities of a formal type, as many as 78% of Poles confirmed that they engaged in “any type voluntary and non-profit pro-social activity.” CBOS survey (2010) shows that in 2009 only 6% of Poles declared one or more voluntary activity. The report on the condition of non-governmental organization showing trends in the years 2002–2021, prepared by the Klon/Jawor association (Charycka et al., 2022), notes the decrease in the number of volunteers strictly cooperating with non-governmental organizations within a year— from 15 people in 2002 to only 5 in 2021). However, in a leaflet describing the report, Agnieszka Lisowska-Lewkowicz from Centrum Wolontariatu (Volunteering Center) is quoted saying that the number of people engaging in formal activities

is falling (also due to the COVID-19 restrictions), but on the other hand, there is a significant increase in the number of people committing to helping others in a less formal way, outside of the frames of any organization. This includes also activities that do not fall under the official definitions of volunteering, as for example helping friends, relatives and neighbors in doing shopping, walking the dogs, and so forth. Thus, there is a clear tendency of social need for engagement, but without being part of any formal structure, which may pose a challenge for non-governmental organizations.

### **HELPING UKRAINIAN REFUGEES**

The war on the Ukrainian territory brought about the largest refugee migration in Europe after World War II, according to many sources that quote the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, estimated to be 8.4 million refugees (see e.g. Duszczyk, Kaczmarzyk, 2022; Domaradzki et al., 2022; Baszczak et al., 2022). The largest number of Ukrainian refugees came to Poland, either directly or through neighboring countries, according to UNHCR. However, part of those refugees stayed in Poland only for a limited time, going further West or to Scandinavia, and part of them (over three million) have already returned to Ukraine (Baszczak et al., 2022). Nevertheless, such a rapid influx of refugees would have been a challenge for any government, not only the Polish one. However, Polish citizens did not wait for the government's actions and engaged immediately in "ad hoc 'crisis management' efforts", thus "helping to alleviate some of the stress placed on the national government" (Domaradzki et al., 2022), contributing their own time and money. The amount of people engaged in the help and its extent was absolutely unprecedented.

The help took many forms. Since the outbreak of the war, spontaneous donations in kind and financial aid have become the most popular forms. In the study conducted by Baszczak et al. for *Polski Instytut Ekonomiczny* (2022), 59% of respondents engaged in buying necessary products, and 53% donated money for refugees. A smaller number of the respondents (20%) declared helping refugees in different spheres, i.e. official matters in

institutions, and 7% took refugees under their own roof. It is difficult to evaluate those actions purely in terms of financial help, as not all data have been published. However, the biggest charity organizations in the country declared over 326 million PLN (Baszczak et al., 2022). Apart from them, there were numerous fundraising activities by a number of smaller organizations, as well as spontaneous, individual donations directed at a specific refugee family, very common in Polish kindergartens or schools for example. Agnieszka Wincewicz-Price, one of the authors of the report, states in an interview with Estera Flieger (Flieger, 2022) that the value of donations during the first three months of war amounted to 9–10 billion PLN, which was significantly more than on all charity in 2021 (3.9 billion). The mere numbers prove that among the volunteers must have been people who never engaged in such activities before, who were not members of any non-governmental organization, and finally, who would not call themselves ‘activists.’

Nevertheless, help of such magnitude required specific knowledge as to where it should be directed. According to Agnieszka Jędrzejczak (2022), who collected data on how Poland helped the refugees for the independent press portal OKO.press, activists in the whole country immediately, on the first day of the Russian invasion, started collecting information on how refugees could be helped in their town or village. When the photos of Ukrainians crossing the border hit the media, it became clear that they were running away with personal belongings only and would need everything – food, warm clothes, medicine, transport, accommodation. Jędrzejczak states that as the result of previous anti-government protests, all active local organizations had fanpages on Facebook and could immediately reach their followers faster and more precisely (=locally) than the media, whose involvement was also invaluable, as they could carry the information outside the ‘bubble’ of local supporters. Therefore, Jędrzejczak claims, it was possible to reach and engage people, who had never been actively involved in volunteering or protesting or any other kind of civil activism.

Local governments were also able to react faster than the state government. An example may be a border town of Medyka, with a population of around 6,500 people, which in the first two weeks of war welcomed almost

2 million refugees. The mayor of Medyka stated that the town, as being directly on the border with Ukraine, was the first to create a reception center for refugees (quoted by Saltmarsh, 2022). Even though for most it was only a transition point to go further west, the refugees needed a warm place to rest, food to eat and help with transport. The whole town pitched in, according to Saltmarsh, bringing food and hosting Ukrainian families. It looked similar in other Polish towns – while local governments were needed to organize reception points or mass transport, they would not have been able to help without thousands of volunteers who were everywhere – from train stations to reception points and town halls, helping refugees with transfers, translating, bringing food and water, giving them warm clothes.

### **GOVERNMENT ASSISTANCE**

The government's reaction was slow, considering the severity of the crisis, and according to some opinions inadequate, especially in the first days when millions of refugees crossed Polish borders and help was needed here and now, really urgently. On 1 March, a week after the beginning of the Russian invasion, Polish minister of family and social policy Marlena Maląg announced during a press conference that the government is working on a special law concerning Ukrainian citizens who arrived in Poland after 24 February. The law would, among others, give them the right to receive state benefits, including so-called 500+ for each child under 18 years of age. However, numerous experts, including Agnieszka Kosowicz, the president of Polish Migration Forum, criticized the government for chaotic communication, and excluding the citizens of other countries who fled from Ukraine into Poland, e.g. international students (Sitnicka, Szymczak, 2022). The act was published on 22 March 2022, amended and signed by the president four days later, and entered into force on the same day. The new law mostly dealt with rules for legalizing the stay of Ukrainian refugees who came to Poland after the beginning of the war (i.e. 24 February 2022), stating that those refugees would be able to legally stay in Poland for 18 months (from 24 February), obtain a PESEL number, have

guaranteed access to healthcare and labour market, and finally, they would have the right to social assistance and maintenance support. Apart from the 500+ child benefit mentioned above, Ukrainian children were also eligible for other benefits, including a “start of school” benefit (300 PLN at the beginning of school year), so called family care capital (12,000 per child aged from 12 to 36 months, providing it is not the oldest child in the family) and all the social welfare that Polish families are entitled to. Additionally, Ukrainian refugees were also to be paid a living allowance of 300 PLN per person (one-off). Aid was also to be provided in the form of meals or food packets (co-funded by the EU). Temporary protection was also guaranteed for third-country nationals who fled from Ukraine. Additionally, the new law contained provisions on granting financial support for institutions and individuals who provided accommodation and board for Ukrainian refugees. According to those provisions, the money was to be paid for no longer than 120 days (in the first version: no longer than 60 days) and its amount was set on the basis of government’s regulation to 40 PLN per day per person. Tax relief was also introduced for providing help.

The new law was very much needed and in theory, well-planned. However, all types of assistance, both for the refugees and for those helping them, required obtaining a Polish PESEL number by the citizens of Ukraine wishing to legalize their stay in Poland. The PESEL (Polish: Powszechny Elektroniczny System Ewidencji Ludności, Universal Electronic System for Registration of the Population) is a national identification number in Poland, required to be employed, get access to healthcare and so on. The right to receive social assistance and maintenance support was determined by the law to be not earlier than the month in which the Ukrainian citizen in question had been entered into the PESEL register. It was impossible to apply for any official aid without this identification number, also in the case of Polish citizens who hosted refugees and wanted to apply for financial support. However, obtaining PESEL proved to be problematic. As Marcin Wiącek, Polish Ombudsman, pointed out in his letter to the Minister of Family and Social Policy, long queues to the offices made it difficult for some citizens to receive the help when they really needed it – the press reported that in some cities the waiting time might

reach several months (*Kolejki po PESEL przyczyną nierównego dostępu uchodźców do świadczeń*, 2022). And yet again, this situation proved that volunteers and local authorities provided help, without waiting for the government to reimburse them.

## CONCLUSIONS

Especially, but not only, in the first days and weeks after the beginning of the war it was the NGOs and volunteering citizens who played a major part in helping Ukrainian refugees. In the first phase of the refugee crisis, the most important was to satisfy the basic needs – for food, rest, a place to sleep. Numerous people were waiting at the borders and train stations, offering meals for travelling Ukrainians or toys for children, accepting refugees under their own roofs or helping at refugee reception and accommodation points, driven by sympathy and empathy.

However, Jędrzejczak (2022) stresses the fact that it is harmful for Poles to call this “the reflex of the heart”, in terms of purely humanitarian instincts. It is difficult not to agree with her that help of this magnitude requires both knowledge and skills, and those, on the other hand, have been honed in the long years of Polish activism. People did not wait for special regulations and laws to take effect, perhaps disillusioned by the government, but took the matters into their own hands. According to Ociepa-Kicińska et al. (2022), the time after the outbreak of the war was “a test for the Polish society when it was immediately necessary for individuals and NGOs to take ad hoc actions to help those in dire need.” In the eyes of many, the Polish society passed this test.

It must be stated, however, that no country and no government could be prepared for a humanitarian crisis of this magnitude. Thus, had this situation happened in any other area of the world, probably the biggest burden would fall on the volunteers’ shoulders, exactly like in Poland.

**BIBLIOGRAPHY:**

- Baszczak, Ł., Kiełczewska, A., Kukołowicz, P., Wincewicz A., & Zyzik, R. (2022). *Pomoc polskiego społeczeństwa dla uchodźców z Ukrainy*. Warsaw: Polski Instytut Ekonomiczny.
- Bejma, A. (2012). *Wolontariat w Polsce i w Europie Środkowo-Wschodniej. Prawo i praktyka*. Warsaw: Oficyna Wydawnicza ASPRA-JR.
- Bill, S. (2022). Counter-Elite Populism and Civil Society in Poland: PiS's Strategies of Elite Replacement. *East European Politics and Societies and Cultures*, 36(1), pp. 118–140.
- Castle, M., & Taras, R. (2002). *Democracy in Poland*. Boulder-Oxford: Westview Press.
- CBOS (2010). *Dobroczynność w Polsce*. Raport BS/15/2010. Warsaw.
- Charycka, B., Gumkowska, M., & Bednarek, J. (2022). *Kondycja organizacji pozarządowych*. Warsaw: Stowarzyszenie Klon/Jawor.
- Dąbrowska, J., Gumkowska, M. (2002). *Wolontariat i filantropia w Polsce – raport z badań 2002*. Warszawa: Stowarzyszenie Klon/Jawor.
- Domaradzka, A. (2016). Civil Society in Poland. In: Ch. Schreier (ed.). *25 Years After: Mapping Civil Society in the Visegrád Countries*. Vol. 11. Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co KG.
- Domaradzki, J., Walkowiak, D., Bazan, D., & Baum, E. (2022). *Volunteering in the front line of the Ukrainian refugee crisis: A brief report from Poland*. *Frontiers in Public Health*, September 2022. DOI: 10.3389/fpubh.2022.979751.
- Duszczyk, M., & Kaczmarczyk, P. (2022). The War in Ukraine and Migration to Poland: Outlook and challenges. *Intereconomics*, 57(3), pp. 164–170.
- Erdoğan Coşkun, A. (2022). *Volunteerism and Activism*. In book: *Volunteerism and Working with Volunteers* (pp. 21–40). Istanbul: University Press DOI: 10.26650/B/SS49.2022.007.01.
- Flieger, E. (2022). *Ukraina. Skala pomocy finansowej przerosła zaangażowanie w cele dobroczynne przez cały zeszły rok*. Retrieved from: <https://publicystyka.ngo.pl/ukraina-pomoc-polakow-raport-pie>.
- <https://www.wirtualnemedi.pl/artukul/ptasie-mleczko-wosp-i-zloty-najsilniejszymi-markami-w-polsce-tvn-najwyzej-z-mediow>.
- Jacobsson, K., & Korolczuk, E. (2017). Introduction: Rethinking Polish Civil Society. In: K. Jacobsson, E. Korolczuk (eds.). *Berghahn Civil Society Revisited. Lessons from Poland* (pp. 1–35). New York: Oxford: Berghahn Books.
- Jędrzejczyk, A. (2022). *Polska obywatelska pomaga Ukrainie i nie jest to żaden cud nad Wisłą*. Retrieved from: <https://oko.press/polska-obywatelska-pomaga-ukrainie-i-nie-jest-to-zaden-cud-nad-wisla/>.

- Kinowska-Mazaraki, Z. (2021). The Polish Paradox: From a Fight for Democracy to the Political Radicalization and Social Exclusion. *Social Sciences*, 10(112). DOI: 10.3390/socsci10030112.
- Kolejki po PESEL przyczyną nierównego dostępu uchodźców do świadczeń. RPO pisze do minister Maląg. Resort odpowiada.* Retrieved from: <https://bip.brpo.gov.pl/pl/content/rpo-ukraina-pesel-przepisy-dot-swadczen-socjalnych-do-poprawy>.
- Korolczuk, E. (2017). *Spółeczeństwo obywatelskie w Polsce–kryzys czy nowe otwarcie?* Warszawa: Instytut Studiów Zaawansowanych.
- Korolczuk, E. (2018). Odzyskiwanie języka, czyli jak zmieniła się debata o aborcji w kontekście Czarnych Protestów i Strajków Kobiet. In: E. Korolczuk, B. Kowalska, J. Ramme, C. Snochowska-Gonzalez (eds.). *Bunt kobiet. Czarne Protesty i Strajki Kobiet 2016–2018*. Gdańsk: Europejskie Centrum Solidarności.
- Kubik, J. (2000). Between the State and Networks of ‘Cousins’: The Role of Civil Society and Noncivil Associations in the Democratization of Poland. In: N. Bermeo, P. Nord (eds.). *Civil Society before Democracy: Lessons from Nineteenth-Century Europe* (pp. 181–207). Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Leś, E., Nałęcz, S., & Wygnański, J. (2000). *Defining the Nonprofit Sector: Poland. Working Papers for the John Hopkins Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project*, no. 36. Baltimore: The John Hopkins Center for Civil Society Studies.
- Majewska, E. (2017). *Tramwaj zwany uznaniem. Feminizm i solidarność po neoliberalizmie*. Warsaw: Książka i Prasa.
- Marszałek-Kawa, J., Plecka, D. (ed). (2019). *The Dictionary of Political Knowledge*. Toruń: Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek.
- Matczak, P., Buttler D., & Posłuszny, Ł. (2019). Solidarity and beyond. Patterns of Public Activity in Contemporary Poland. In: A. Kotlarska-Michalska, K. Farkas, R. Romaniuk (eds.). *The Invisible Groups Chapter II* (pp. 97–115). Poznań: Wydawnictwo Nauk Społecznych I Humanistycznych UAM.
- Moroń, D. (2009). *Wolontariat w trzecim sektorze*. Wrocław: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego.
- Muszel, M., & Piotrowski, G. (2018). Rocking the small-town boat: Black Protest activists in small and provincial Polish cities. *Praktyka Teoretyczna*, 4(30), pp. 89–116.
- Ociepa-Kicińska, E., & Gorzałczyńska-Koczkodaj, M. (2022). Forms of Aid Provided to Refugees of the 2022 Russia-Ukraine War: The Case of Poland. *International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health*, 19(7085). DOI: 10.3390/ijerph19127085.
- Ochman, M., & Jordan, P. (1997). *Wolontariusze – źródło siły organizacji*. Warsaw.
- Ogórek, S. (2017). *Rekord WOŚP dzięki PiS. Polacy wrzucili do puszek pieniądze z 500+?* Retrieved from: <https://www.money.pl/gospodarka/wiadomosci/artykul/wosp-rekord-500-plus-rzad-pis,102,0,2276198.html>.

- Piotrowski, G. (n.d.). Civil Society in Illiberal Democracy: The Case of Poland. *Politology Casopis*, 2 (pp. 196–214).
- Saltmarsh, M. (2022). *Polish border town welcomes refugees from Ukraine, but will itself need help*. Retrieved from: <https://www.unhcr.org/news/stories/2022/3/6230b3094/polish-border-town-welcomes-refugees-ukraine-itself-need-help.html>.
- Sitnicka, D., & Szymczak, J. (2022). *Rząd zapowiada 500 plus i zasiłki rodzinne dla uchodźców z Ukrainy. Jakie są jeszcze potrzeby?* Retrieved from: <https://oko.press/500-plus-uchodzcy>.
- United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. Operational Data Portal. Ukrainian Refugee Situation (2022). Retrieved from: <https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/ukraine>.
- Ustawa z dnia 12 marca 2022 o pomocy obywatelom Ukrainy w związku z konfliktem zbrojnym na terytorium tego państwa (Act of 12 March 2022 on assistance to Ukrainian refugees in connection with the armed conflict on the territory of their country, Journal of Laws 2022 item 583, as amended).